A body of critical legal scholarship argues that, by the time they have completed their studies, students who enter legal education holding social ideals and intending to use their legal education to achieve social change, have become cynical about the ability of the law to do so and no longer possess such ideals. This is explained by critical scholars to be the result of a process of ideological indoctrination, aimed at ensuring that graduates uphold the narrow and conservative interests of the legal profession and capitalist society, being exercised by law schools acting as adjuncts of the legal profession, and exercised upon the passive body of the law student. By using Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject to interrogate the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, this thesis intends to suggest a way of thinking differently to the approach taken by many critical legal scholars. It then uses an analytics of government (based on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’) to consider the construction of the legal identity differently. It examines the ways in which the governance of the legal identity is rationalised, programmed, and implemented, in three Queensland law schools. It also looks at the way that five prescriptive texts to ‘surviving’ law school suggest students establish and practise a relation to themselves in order to construct their own legal identities. Overall, this analysis shows that governance is not simply conducted in the profession’s interests, but occurs due to a complex arrangement of different practices, which can lead to the construction of skilled legal professional identities as well as ethical lawyer-citizens that hold an interest in justice. The implications of such an analytics provide the basis for original ways of understanding legal education, and legal education scholarship.

Systématiquement présente dans les discours depuis l’affirmation du positivisme juridique, la sanction est souvent confondue avec la contrainte et la violence étatique, ce qui a comme conséquence sa naturelle exclusion du domaine du droit public, et notamment constitutionnel. En tant qu’élément du discours doctrinal, et suivant une définition stipulative préalable, ce concept apparaît en revanche très utile pour comprendre l’affrontement des courants constitutionnalistes, à propos de la façon d’envisager la science du droit constitutionnel et son principal objet, la constitution. L’étude des usages du concept de sanction constitutionnelle par les discours doctrinaux permet de construire deux modèles de discours : un modèle exclusif et un modèle inclusif. Dans les deux discours, la sanction est un instrumentum, dont les enjeux sont très divers : le type exclusif de discours souhaite la décrire à travers la sanction, et le discours inclusif vise à la rendre efficace par-delà la sanction purement juridique. On peut ainsi considérer le modèle exclusif porté par la logique normativiste comme une conception limitée de la création des normes juridiques, tendant à faire sortir du domaine de l’analyse juridique tout élément considéré comme impure. À l’inverse, le discours inclusif reconnaît un pluralisme consensuel, où tous les destinataires participent à la création normative et sont pour cela davantage enclins à respecter les normes qu’en raison de la présence d’une sanction. Le discours inclusif sur la sanction constitutionnelle cherche à garantir les droits fondamentaux par des sanctions juridictionnelles, tout en maintenant l’importance du rôle de l’adhésion des individus, et en limitant le caractère consensuel du droit, du moins pour une partie des sujets : les gouvernants. / Consistently present in the legal discourse since the assertion of legal positivism, sanction is often confused with coercion and state violence, which resulted in his exclusion from the natural domain of public law, including Constitutional Law. As part of doctrinal discourse, according to a preliminary stipulative definition, this concept appears, however, very useful in order to understand the current constitutional debate, about how to approach constitutional science and its principal object, the constitution. The study of the uses of the concept of constitutional sanction by the doctrinal discourse can build two models of discourse: an exclusive model and an inclusive model. In both discourses, sanction is a instrumentum, but the stakes are very different, and yet still related to the prominence of a certain conception of the constitution and constitutional law; exclusive type of discourse tend to define the constitution as a norm through sanction, and inclusive discourse aims to make it effective beyond the purely legal sanction. The model worn by the exclusive normativist logic can be considered as a limited conception of the creation of legal norms, tending to exclude from the field of legal analysis any item considered impur. In contrast, the inclusive discourse recognizes a consensus pluralism, where all subjects are involved in creating norms and are more likely to obey to the constitution that due to the presence of a sanction. Inclusive discourse on constitutional sanction seeks to ensure fundamental rights by judicial sanctions, while maintaining the importance of the acceptance by individuals, and at the same time limiting the consensus of the law, at least for part of the subjects: the legislator in the broad sense.

Cette thèse a pour but de comprendre si les droits humains contemporains sont les équivalents des droits naturels affirmés à l’époque moderne. En un premier temps, les conceptions contemporaines sur la nature des droits humains sont étudiées, en particulier les conceptions qui reconstruisent le sens des droits de l’homme à partir des positions ontologiques. En un second temps, une reconstruction de cette comparaison est mise en évidence sous trois perspectives : l’idée des droits naturels, le concept des droits naturels et les théories des droits naturels. Enfin, une fois mis en évidence les aspects significatifs de ces catégories, on procède à leur comparaison, en soulignant les points de continuité entre droits humains et droits naturels et les différences qui séparent leur chemin. / The aim of this work concerns the relation between human rights and natural rights, in order to understand if human rights are those natural rights affirmed in the modern age. First of all, we analyse the contemporary conceptions about human rights nature, especially those which find their meaning from ontological positions. Secondly, we reconstruct the term of this comparison from three perspectives : the idea of natural rights, the concept of natural rights, the theories of natural rights. At last, after the individuation of relevants aspects between both categories, we compare them, highlighting the common points and the differences that separate their path.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

O trabalho estuda a evolução da teoria geral dos contratos e os seus reflexos na teoria do risco contratual, tendo como ponto de partida o direito contratual clássico do século XIX e o paradigma da autonomia da vontade. No novo direito contratual do século XX em diante, a análise toma como fio condutor as obras de Emilio Betti e de Karl Larenz, dentro do que se pode considerar o novo paradigma do direito contratual: a regulação e a satisfação de interesses privados mediante critérios de autonomia e heteronomia. O objetivo específico desse estudo é verificar a hipótese de que a teoria atual tenha (ou não) enfrentado o problema econômico dos riscos imprevistos dentro da idéia de "economia interna do contrato", tratando o risco econômico imprevisto como um integrante do conteúdo do contrato com autonomia diante da prestação. O caminho percorrido pelo trabalho identifica que o direito contratual tem sua estrutura teórica construída sobre uma concepção formalista de contrato, segundo a qual essa figura jurídica é uma entidade com existência própria, a qual está centrada na noção jurídica-formal de "obrigação de prestar". Mesmo que, com a evolução do direito contratual, tal estrutura tenha passado a contar com uma função a ser desempenhada na vida real, o trabalho conclui que a teoria continua sem tratar adequadamente o risco econômico imprevisto, porque tal função permanece limitada pela noção jurídico-formal de "obrigação de prestar". / This dissertation studies the evolution of contract law theory and its influences on the legal theory of contractual risk. It begins with the classic theory of the 19th century and the will theory paradigm within it; from the 20th century onwards, the main analysis is based on the works of Emilio Betti and Karl Larenz, alongside with the new paradigm that pursues concrete interests through the combination of private autonomy and private heteronomy. The specific purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the current theory may have (or may have not) dealt with the economic problem of unforeseen risks by utilizing the idea of economic balance of contract, insofar as to consider the unforeseen economic risk as an autonomous factor in the content of contracts. The research identifies that the theoretical structure of contract law is built over a formalist conception of contract, according to which the contract is an entity with selfexistence, one that is exclusively centered on the notion of "duty to pay". Although the evolution of contract law has given a function to this structure to perform in society and between parties to a given contract, the dissertation concludes that the current theory is still limited by the notion of "duty to pay", and that the unforeseen economic risk has not yet been provided with an adequate legal treatment.

This article analyzes the process of paradigm change in Law, a non-peaceful transition from a model developed in the XX century to a new law which will sit throughout the XXI century. The changes that have occurred from this new legal paradigm are not superficial, but rather crossing the structures and foundations of modern legal ideology and technique that underlies, as the constitutionalization of national law, the internationalization of economic relations, the development of treaties or development of Community law. Furthermore, the author refers to the impact that this change took place in the theoretical construction of taxes and the delimitation of the scope of the tax phenomenon. / El presente artículo analiza el proceso de cambio de paradigma en el Derecho, un tránsito no pacífico entre un modelo ideado en el siglo XX a un nuevo Derecho que se asentará a lo largo del siglo XXI. Los cambios que se han producido a partir de este nuevo paradigma jurídico no son superficiales, sino que atraviesan las estructuras y bases de la ideología jurídica moderna y la técnica que la subyace, como la constitucionalización del derecho nacional, la internacionalización de las relaciones económicas, el desarrollo de los tratados o el desarrollo del Derecho comunitario. Asimismo, el autor hace referencia a la incidencia que produjo este cambio en la construcción teórica del tributo y la delimitación de los alcances del fenómeno tributario.

State immunity has undergone major changes over time and is still a highly controversial and hotly debated topic. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between human rights and the norms governing state immunity. Located in different geological strata of international law, the clashes between the law of state immunity and human rights drew attention to the struggle among competing conceptions of international law. On one hand, being commonly linked to the principle of sovereign equality and to the need for stability in international relations, state immunity operates when a domestic court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of a dispute because one of the parties is a foreign state. On the other, human rights have a different logic and require change and the realization of justice. The development of the body of human rights law allowed to call into question the grant of state immunity in cases in which human rights norms were violated. Legal questions arising from the relationship between state immunity and human rights have been put before domestic and international courts. Having examined the various judgments dealing with these issues, this study contends that the answers to the technical and dogmatic questions originating from the encounter between state immunity and human rights reproduce theoretical conflicts which happen - to use Koskenniemi\'s expression - at a \'higher level of abstraction\'. The ICJ\'s judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State may have crystallized a consensus according to which state immunity trumps the individual\'s right to reparation for serious violations of human rights. This consensus, however, is contingent and can be questioned through the language of international law. / A imunidade estatal passou por grandes mudanças através dos tempos e ainda é um tema controverso e bastante debatido. A proposta deste estudo foi investigar a relação entre os direitos humanos e as normas que governam a imunidade estatal. Estando em camadas geológicas diferentes do direito internacional, os choques entre o direito da imunidade estatal e os direitos humanos chamaram atenção para a disputa entre concepções conflitantes de direito internacional. De um lado, sendo comumente relacionada ao princípio da igualdade soberana e à necessidade de estabilidade nas relações internacionais, a imunidade estatal opera quando uma corte não pode exercer jurisdição sobre o objeto de uma disputa em razão de uma das partes ser um estado estrangeiro. De outro, os direitos humanos têm uma lógica diferente e requerem mudança e a realização da justiça. O desenvolvimento do corpo dos direitos humanos permitiu questionar a concessão de imunidade estatal em casos em que normas de direitos humanos foram violadas. Questões jurídicas originadas do relacionamento entre imunidade estatal e direitos humanos foram levadas a várias cortes domésticas e internacionais. Tendo sido realizado o exame dos vários casos lidando com esse assunto, este estudo argumenta que as respostas para as questões técnicas e dogmáticas originadas do encontro entre imunidade de jurisdição e direitos humanos reproduzem conflitos teóricos que ocorrem - na expressão de Koskenniemi - em um \'nível mais elevado de abstração\'. O julgamento da Corte Internacional de Justiça em Imunidades de Jurisdição do Estado pode ter cristalizado um consenso segundo o qual as normas que se relacionam com a imunidade estatal prevalecem sobre o direito individual de reparação por sérias violações de direitos humanos. Tal consenso, no entanto, é contingente e pode ser questionado por meio da linguagem do direito internacional.

Comment le Droit peut-il définir le concept de Liberté ? De quelles manières la théorie du droit et le droit public appréhendent-ils la définition de la Liberté ? Défiant en effet toute entreprise de définition, la Liberté se dérobe immédiatement à toute contrainte. Pourtant, on le pressent, et on le vérifie au quotidien, la liberté des uns entrera fatalement en conflit avec la liberté des autres. Nous suggérons que l'intérêt général est l'élément de médiation indispensable à la coexistence de nos droits fondamentaux. La problématique de cette étude s'articule alors autour de la relation entre l'intérêt général et les droits fondamentaux. Cette relation prend successivement deux formes. D'une part, il ressort que les droits fondamentaux reçoivent l'intérêt général en tant qu'il est une notion politique et juridique destinée à définir les droits et libertés. Il s'agira d'apprécier la relation essentielle qui se noue entre intérêt général et droits fondamentaux. D'autre part, il importe de concilier l'intérêt général et les droits fondamentaux en conceptualisant l'intérêt général. Nous aborderons, cette fois, la relation existentielle entre les droits fondamentaux et l'intérêt général. Toutefois, l'analyse révèle que l'intérêt général demeure un concept politique auquel une fonction juridique est donnée. Il contribue cependant à la définition du concept de Liberté. Il démontre fondamentalement qu'un droit qui anéantirait, par principe, la Liberté, s'anéantirait en tant que Droit. / How can Law define the concept of Liberty? In which ways does the theory of Law and Public Law define Liberty? Being virtually impossible to define, Liberty eludes any constraints. Nevertheless, one can sense it and on a daily basis can verify that the Liberty of some will inevitably clash with the Liberty of others. We suggest that public interest is an essential means of mediation enabling our fundamental rights to coexist. What is at stake in this study is the relationship between public interest and fundamental rights. This relationship can be of two kinds. On the one hand, insomuch as public interest is a political and legal notion intended to define rights and liberties, it is deeply rooted in fundamental rights. We will analyze the essential relationship which links public interest and fundamental rights. On the other hand, it is important to reconcile public interest and fundamental rights by conceptualizing public interest. We will therefore examine the existential relationship between fundamental rights and public interest.However, this analysis reveals that public interest remains a political concept, which has been given a legal function. It nonetheless contributes to defining the concept of Liberty. It demonstrates that a Law which would annihilate Liberty on principle would annihilate itself.

No description available.

While rankings of presidents are quite common, rankings of Supreme Court justices are much rarer. Herein I produce one and make use of both to see if perceived greatness of one actor can effect perceptions of greatness for the other. This work examines those influences that indicate success for Supreme Court Justices by seeking to determine what the historically great justices have in common. I first develop a composite score of all the Supreme Court Justices based on the limited previous ranking research and relevant indictors to rank the Justices 1-112. Next, I examine potential indicators of such success; previous experience, personal characteristics, conformation vote, and most interestingly the perceived greatness of their appointing president. This research finds a direct relationship between perceptions of presidential greatness and perceptions of judicial quality. Overall the great Justices are statistically more likely to be appointed by a great president, consistent with the appointment literature that often describes an appointer-appointee relationship as a legacy impacting one.