The purpose of the present study is to measure the amount of liberality of college students, freshman through graduate, in the schools of psychology and business administration at North Texas State University, toward the Negro. This purpose was accomplished through the use of a variation of the semantic differential which was developed by C. E. Osgood to measure the meaning of various concepts.

La libéralité à caractère collectif est destinée à la collectivité ou à un groupe de personnes. Elle est au service d’une oeuvre, d’une cause. Profitant à des personnes physiques indéterminées et non individualisées, elle ne peut être réalisée directement. Pour atteindre son but, elle fait intervenir une personne juridique, le plus souvent une personne morale de droit public ou de droit privé à but non lucratif. Par le truchement de la personne morale, la libéralité profite aux bénéficiaires de l’oeuvre du groupement : du cercle de ses membres à un groupe de personnes, voire à la collectivité tout entière.Les mécanismes permettant de réaliser une libéralité à caractère collectif sont divers et pour certains la qualification libérale leur est refusée. Ils peuvent être regroupés en deux catégories selon le rôle joué par le bienfaiteur : une fondation, si l’oeuvre est initiée par lui ; une libéralité-participation, si le bienfaiteur vient soutenir une oeuvre déjà existante. À l’image des mécanismes, les techniques employées sont variées que l’acte repose sur une simple libéralité avec charge ou de façon plus originale sur une fiducie aux fins de libéralité ou un engagement unilatéral de volonté. Malgré cette diversité, des caractères communs transcendent la catégorie des libéralités à caractère collectif : elles sont affectées et intéressées. La notion de libéralité à caractère collectif délimitée, il est alors possible de mettre un peu d’ordre dans les règles qui s’y appliquent. À l’heure actuelle, celles-ci sont tout à la fois éparpillées, lacunaires et inopportunes. Le régime des libéralités à caractère collectif doit donc être repensé en tenant compte de leurs spécificités. / A liberality of a collective nature is aimed at the community, or at a group of people. It is to benefit a cause. Because it benefits undetermined and not individualized natural persons, this kind of liberality cannot be carried out directly. In order to reach its goal, it includes a juridical person, most often a notforprofit legal person of public law or private law.Through the legal person, the liberality benefits the beneficiaries of the grouping’s cause: these beneficiaries may be the members of grouping, to another group of people, or even to the wholecommunity. The ways to carry out a liberality of a collective nature are numerous and some of themare denied the designation of “liberality”. Two sorts of ways may be distinguished, according to the role played by the benefactor: either a Foundation, if the cause it initiated by the benefactor; or a liberality-participation, if the benefactor contributes to an existing cause. The techniques are varied:the operation may be based on a liberality with a charge, or more originally on a fiducia aimed at a liberality, or on a commitment by unilateral will. In spite of this diversity, liberalities of a collective nature have common features: they are earmarked and for-profit. Once the notion of liberality is mapped out, it becomes possible to sort out the rules that apply to it. Currently, these rules are scattered, insufficient and improper. The rules governing the liberalities of a collective nature must be redesigned by taking into consideration their specific nature.

O objeto deste trabalho será analisar criticamente a maneira como o direito conceitua a doação. Será dividido em três partes. O Capítulo I tratará dos diversos modos como a doação foi estruturada no direito romano, no direito francês, no direito italiano e no direito brasileiro, das razões para essa diversidade e possíveis críticas à estruturação atual. O Capítulo II cuidará dos critérios para delimitar a fattispecie da doação e distingui-la dos demais contratos gratuitos. Normalmente, a doutrina identifica um elemento objetivo e um elemento subjetivo como caracterizadores da doação. O Capítulo III problematizará esses elementos, a fim de indagar sobre a abrangência do conceito jurídico de doação, tendo como base dois aspectos: a possibilidade de a doação ter por objeto prestações de fazer e o papel atribuído ao chamado animus donandi. / The purpose of this thesis is to analize critically the legal concept of gift. It will be divided into three parts. Chapter I covers the different legal structuring of gifts in Roman Law, French Law, Italian Law and Brazilian Law. The chapter also covers the reasons for the existence of different concepts and possibile criticism of the actual structure of gifts. Chapter II deals with the criteria for defining a legal concept of gift and the distinction between gifts and other gratuitous contracts. Generally, legal science identifies an objective element and a subjective element as characteristic features of gifts. Chapter III discusses these elements focused on the magnitude of the legal concept of gift in accordance with two aspects: the possibility of gratuitous services to be considered gifts and the role assigned to the so-called animus donandi.

O objeto deste trabalho será analisar criticamente a maneira como o direito conceitua a doação. Será dividido em três partes. O Capítulo I tratará dos diversos modos como a doação foi estruturada no direito romano, no direito francês, no direito italiano e no direito brasileiro, das razões para essa diversidade e possíveis críticas à estruturação atual. O Capítulo II cuidará dos critérios para delimitar a fattispecie da doação e distingui-la dos demais contratos gratuitos. Normalmente, a doutrina identifica um elemento objetivo e um elemento subjetivo como caracterizadores da doação. O Capítulo III problematizará esses elementos, a fim de indagar sobre a abrangência do conceito jurídico de doação, tendo como base dois aspectos: a possibilidade de a doação ter por objeto prestações de fazer e o papel atribuído ao chamado animus donandi. / The purpose of this thesis is to analize critically the legal concept of gift. It will be divided into three parts. Chapter I covers the different legal structuring of gifts in Roman Law, French Law, Italian Law and Brazilian Law. The chapter also covers the reasons for the existence of different concepts and possibile criticism of the actual structure of gifts. Chapter II deals with the criteria for defining a legal concept of gift and the distinction between gifts and other gratuitous contracts. Generally, legal science identifies an objective element and a subjective element as characteristic features of gifts. Chapter III discusses these elements focused on the magnitude of the legal concept of gift in accordance with two aspects: the possibility of gratuitous services to be considered gifts and the role assigned to the so-called animus donandi.

Western society has undergone a major developments in human values, social norms and the degree of tolerance to various manifestations of human behavior after the World War II. and this development naturally continues until today. With this is connected a permissive society, society with so free normative structure, that it tolerates almost all kinds of social behavior. For some people is exaggerated liberality harmful and threatens normative system and values asociated with moral decline. The thesis will be about permissiveness and tolerance to some kinds of people's action in Czech republic. At the very beginning of the theoretical part I will explain the basic concepts. Then I'll make a probe into the past and explain social revolution which led to formation of permissive society with all important causes. After that I'll focuse on main symptoms of permissive society. Theoretical part will be ended by historical look at the conditions for permissiveness in post-war Czech. In analytical part I will use data from European values study, my based on that quantitative research from year 2014 and other available data. There will be general anaylisis about development of permissivenes since 1991 till today. My 2014 data will be also used in more detailed analysis using sociodemographic characteristics. Powered...

La libéralité est un acte translatif de propriété au profit d'une autre personne. Et c'est parce qu'il y a volonté de gratifier, de protéger par cet acte que nous nous sommes demandés si le gratifié pouvait inclure le vivant. Le sujet de la libéralité est une personne, l'objet de la libéralité est un bien, on ne contracte pas sur l'être. Or la technologie biomédicale a besoin aujourd'hui du matériau humain. La science rencontre alors la volonté d'individus qui souhaitent obtenir un produit, un matériau humain. C'est alors que les plus faibles peuvent se voir réifier. L'homme deviendrait-il alors objet de la libéralité ? La bioéthique pose des principes, mais les avancées scientifiques et surtout biotechnologies, les font reculer. Le droit délaisse alors son travail de qualification, de systématisation, il ne règle plus les impulsions personnelles. Pour ces raisons, nous avons pensé qu'une relecture de la summa divisio pouvait nous permettre de poser à nouveau des limites, de qualifier, de classer. Cela nous semble plus opportun d'arriver ainsi à la protection de l'ensemble du vivant plutôt que d'attribuer des droits à certains vivants non humains pour qu'ils puissent devenir bénéficiaires d'une libéralité notamment . Cette entrée dans la summa divisio ne doit pas conduire au confusionnisme avec l'homme et notamment la personne humaine, mais rappeler les liens, pour que ce qui est digne de respect ne soit pas dans la catégorie de l'avoir. / Liberality is a transitive act of property for the benefit of another person. And because there is a will of favoring and protecting someone by this act we asked if the presented can include the living. Liberality's subject is a person, liberality's object, is a good of patrimonial's nature, one can't contract about the being. But, biomedical technology needs today human material. Science meets then individual's wills who'd like to obtain human material. Consequently the weakest can be reified. In that case can the mankind become the object of the liberality ? Bioethics sets principles, but scientific progress and mainly biotechnical ones erase them. Then right abandons its work of qualification and systematization and only rules personal impulsions. That's why we have been thinking that a re-reading of the summa divisio could allow us to set the borders, to qualify and to classify again. It seems appropriate to arrive to the protection of all the living rather than attributing rights to some non-human livings in order to make them beneficiaries of a liberality. This entrance in the summa divisio must not lead to confusionism with man and in particular with the human person, but it should recall the connections, so that what's worthy of respect would not be in the having category.

Há grande probabilidade de termos comunidades de fé em nossos dias como aquela descrita em Atos dos Apóstolos, na qual não havia nenhum necessitado. O que nos falta? Examinando bem as lideranças daquela igreja, bem como a própria vida e exemplo de Jesus, a generosidade era algo marcante e decisivo para determinar as ações. Mas de onde vinha isso? O Antigo Testamento deixa muitíssimo claro que desde o princípio o Criador e Deus de Israel tinha em mente uma sociedade de justiça. Essas providências e provisões são apresentadas em inúmeras passagens do Pentateuco, elas são louvadas nos livros de sabedoria, e os profetas as proclamam destemidamente, tirando quaisquer dúvidas quanto à origem do movimento social que tomou conta da primeira comunidade de fé. Ao examinar os currículos de uma seleção de nossas escolas de teologia, porém, descobrimos que não existe esta compreensão da importância da generosidade na liderança de nossas comunidades de fé. O ensino teológico está alcançando um nível cada vez mais elaborado, científico o que é muito bom, mas a sensibilidade solidária precisa ser cultivada. Para isso, precisa ser exemplificada, vivida, passada adiante. E se não começou no próprio lar, precisa ter seu início na igreja. Zaqueu, após o momento de graça com o Mestre, sabia muito bem o que fazer com os seus bens materiais pois conhecia as Escrituras. Propomos um currículo que coloque a generosidade como a marca do egresso um desafio que exigirá unidade na instituição, um corpo docente coeso, capaz e flexível, e a dedicação dos alunos, em sala de aula, nos projetos, em seus relacionamentos, na família, na comunidade. Ficará óbvio também que o neoliberalismo, o individualismo e o consumismo acabarão sendo desmascarados neste processo de formação pastoral. / There is a high probability of having faith communities in our day as the one described in Acts of the Apostles, in which there was no need. What do we lack? Examining the leaders of the early church as well as the life and example of Jesus, generosity was something striking and decisive to determine their actions. But where did this come from? The Old Testament makes it abundantly clear that from the beginning the Creator and God of Israel had in mind a society of justice. These measures and provisions are found in innumerous passages of the Pentateuch, they are praised in the books of wisdom, and the prophets proclaim them fearlessly taking away any doubts as to the origin of the social movement that swept the first community of faith. By examining the curricula of a selection of our schools of theology, however, we dont find this understanding of the importance of generosity in the leadership of our communities of faith. Theological training in Brazil is reaching an increasingly more elaborate, scientific plateau - which is very good, but the need to cultivate solidary sensitivity is obvious. For that purpose it must be exemplified, lived out, passed on. And if the process did not start at home, it must have its beginning in the church. Zacchaeus, after the moment of grace with the Master, knew very well what to do with his possessions - because he knew the Scriptures. We propose a curriculum that places generosity as the brand of the graduates - a challenge that will require unity in the institution, a faculty that is cohesive, capable and flexible, and the dedication of the students in the classroom, in the projects, in their relationships, family, in the community. It will also become obvious that neoliberalism, individualism and consumerism will eventually be unmasked in the process of forming a new generation of pastors.

The economy of favor was an essential mechanism in the construction of monarchical and colonial power, encouraging the loyalty of subjects and a more effective control of the territory. Through an analysis of the residencia of don Pedro Osores de Ulloa, this article aims to examine the role of Charcas’s second visita and land composition judge in the exercise of colonial favor. The research suggests that land and the assignment of its property, mediated by Osores de Ulloa, formed the basis of loyalty and patronage relationships that strengthened viceregal power in Charcas and articulated different layers of power. / La economía de la gracia era un mecanismo esencial en la construcción del poder monárquico y virreinal, al fomentar la lealtad de los súbditos y el control efectivo del territorio. A partir de la residencia de don Pedro Osores de Ulloa, este artículo examina el rol del segundo juez de visita y composición de tierras charqueñas en el ejercicio de la dádiva virreinal. En ese sentido, se postula que la tierra y la cesión de los derechos a su propiedad, mediatizadas por Osores de Ulloa, constituyeron la base de relaciones de lealtad y patronazgo que afianzaron el dominio virreinal sobre los vecinos charqueños al tiempo que articularon las distintas esferas jurisdiccionales del poder.

A l'heure où la famille moderne se conçoit au pluriel, à l'heure où les ascendants organisent en amont la transmission et la dévolution de leur patrimoine, à l'heure où la mondialisation prône l'uniformisation du droit et la fin des spécificités étatiques, il est nécessaire de s'interroger sur l'avenir de la réserve héréditaire. Les parents ne souhaitent plus être privés de leur pouvoir de disposer librement de leur patrimoine, même pour cause de mort. Que répondre à un père qui angoisse à l'idée de voir son patrimoine dilapidé par un enfant ingrat avec lequel il ne vit que de conflits ? Que dire à cet enfant qui a vu son frère avantagé par décision maternelle, de manière abusive et arbitraire ? Quels conseils donner à ces individus qui ouvrent chaque jour la porte de nos offices pour demander l'aide de leur notaire ? Que dire à cet époux qui veut protéger son conjoint de la véhémence d’enfants d’un premier lit ? Afin de leur répondre dans la pratique, appliquons-nous à étudier les moyens de contourner cette réserve héréditaire. Attachons-nous à vérifier leur efficacité. Au-delà des mécanismes classiques du Code civil tels que le testament et la donation, l'intérêt de cette thèse est de se tourner vers des mécanismes plus complexes, afin de répondre aux parents déçus par leur progéniture, mais aussi à eux, enfants lésés, pour leur donner des moyens juridiques de contrer une injuste privation. Il est utile de comprendre et de connaître ce qu’il est possible de faire pour transmettre son patrimoine avec une liberté recouvrée sans risquer les foudres de la loi. A travers l’étude de ces instruments, de leur efficacité et de leur traitement tant légal que familial, la question de la modernisation de la réserve ressurgit. La famille change, et avec elle, la conception traditionnelle de la réserve héréditaire. / At a time when the modern family is conceived in the plural, at a time when ascendants organize upstream transmission and devolution of their heritage, at a time when globalization advocates the standardization of law and the end of specificities States, it is necessary to question the future of the hereditary reserve. Parents no longer wish to be deprived of their power to freely dispose of their patrimony, even for reasons of death. What to answer to a father who is anxious about seeing his heritage squandered by an ungrateful child with whom he lives only conflicts ? What to say to this child who saw his brother favored by maternal decision, in an abusive and arbitrary way ? What advice can be given to those individuals who open the door of our offices every day to ask the help of their notary ? What to say to this husband who wants to protect his spouse from the angry of children from a first bed ? In order to answer them in practice, let us study ways of circumventing this hereditary reserve. Let's focus on checking their effectiveness. Beyond the classical mechanisms of the Civil Code such as the will and the gift, the interest of this thesis is to turn to more complex mechanisms, in order to answer the parents disappointed by their offspring, but also to them, children wronged to give them legal means to counter unfair deprivation. It is useful to understand and know what can be done to transmit one's heritage with a recovered freedom without risking the wrath of the law. Through the study of these instruments, their efficiency and their legal and family treatment, the question of the modernization of the reserve resurfaces. The family changes, and with it, the traditional conception of the hereditary reserve.

Cette étude vise à démontrer les limites de la responsabilité alimentaire des grands-parents, car la charge qui leur est imposée par l’ordonnancement juridique brésilien les oblige au-delà des limites constitutionnelles. Le système judiciaire brésilien impose aux grands-parents des sacrifices et des privations indus, auxquels ils ne sont pas tenus, surtout quand, de l’autre côté, il y a un enfant ou un adolescent dont ce sont les parents qui ont le devoir de les nourrir. Le meilleur intérêt de l’enfant doit être considéré et interprété avec pondération, notamment quand il se heurte à un meilleur intérêt des grands-parents. Il faut établir une distinction entre l’obligation des parents et celle des ascendants ; la première concerne la responsabilité découlant du pouvoir familial tandis que la deuxième se situe dans le contexte de la parenté. Aux parents revient une responsabilité illimitée, et non aux grands-parents ; il revient aux parents d’assurer l’entretien de leurs enfants, alors qu’aux grands-parents ne peut être assignée que la responsabilité de nourriture, et encore, à titre subsidiaire. L’obligation alimentaire entre parents et enfants n’implique pas la réciprocité: il s’agit d’une obligation unilatérale ; entre grands-parents et petits-enfants, au contraire, la réciprocité est prévue par la loi, les grands-parents devront subvenir aux besoins de leurs petits-enfants, une fois leurs propres besoins satisfaits. Entre parents et enfants, se posent d’abord les intérêts des enfants ; entre grands-parents et petit-enfants, d’abord les besoins des grands-parents. Une détermination différente n’est pas conforme aux préceptes constitutionnels, et porte atteinte aux droits les plus élémentaires des ascendants, en blessant leur dignité. Etablir la distinction entre obligation légale et libéralité affective, à la lumière de la constitution, c’est le but de cette thèse. / O presente estudo visa a demonstrar os limites da responsabilidade alimentar dos avós, pois o ônus que lhes é imposto no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro os obriga além dos limites constitucionais. O sistema judiciário brasileiro atribui aos avós sacrifícios e privações indevidos, a que não estão obrigados, principalmente quando, do lado oposto, se encontra uma criança ou adolescente, cujos pais é que detêm o dever de os alimentar. O melhor interesse da criança deve ser lido e interpretado com ponderação, notadamente quando colide com o melhor interesse dos avós. É preciso estabelecer a distinção entre a obrigação parental e a obrigação avoenga: esta se situa no âmbito do parentesco, enquanto aquela diz com a responsabilidade decorrente do poder familiar. Aos pais cabe responsabilidade ilimitada, e não aos avós; os pais devem prover os alimentos naturais e civis de seus filhos, ao passo que aos avós somente pode ser atribuída a responsabilidade dos alimentos naturais, e ainda assim, em caráter subsidiário. A obrigação alimentar entre pais e filhos não implica reciprocidade: trata-se de uma obrigação unilateral; entre avós e netos, ao contrário, existe a reciprocidade prevista em lei, e deverão os avós complementar as necessidades dos netos somente depois de supridas as suas próprias. Entre pais e filhos, em primeiro lugar, põem-se os interesses do filho; entre avós e netos, em primeiro lugar, estão as necessidades dos avós. Determinar de forma diversa desrespeita os preceitos constitucionais, atentando contra os mais elementares direitos dos progenitores, ferindo sua dignidade. Demonstrar a distinção entre a obrigação legal e a liberalidade afetiva, à luz da constituição, e situar o papel dos avós nesse contexto é o que se propõe este estudo. / The present thesis aims at analyzing the limits of child support by grandparents as the Brazilian Judicial System imposes them an obligation beyond constitutional boundaries. Furthermore, the Brazilian Judiciary inflicts on them sacrifices, ordeals and privations which ought to be imputed to parents. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between parenting and grandparenting obligation – the latter is related to family ties, and the first to family power; therefore, parents have an unlimited responsibility, contrary to grandparents, whose responsibility should be regarded as subsidiary. In view of that, the best interest of the child has to be interpreted with ponderation, mainly when it collides with the best interest of the grandparents; nonetheless, parental child support is a unilateral obligation which does not require reciprocity. Regardless of the fact grandparent child support reciprocity is lawful, grandparents should ensure the needs of the child only after providing for their own. Notwithstanding, parents are the ones to secure for the best interest of their children; consequently, in a relationship involving grandparents and grandchildren, the best interest of the grandparents are to come first - the contrary would not only be unconstitutional, but would also hurt their dignity. Finally, it is also the aim of this paper to establish the difference between legal obligation and liberality at the light of the Constitution. / El presente estudio pretende demostrar los límites de la responsabilidad alimentaria de los abuelos y abuelas, pues el encargo que les da el ordenamiento brasilero los obliga allá de los límites constitucionales. El sistema jurídico brasileño hace que los abuelos y abuelas tengan sacrificios y privaciones indebidas, a los cuales no están obligados, principalmente cuando en el otro lado se encuentra un niño, una niña o un adolescente cuyos padres y madres tienen el deber de los alimentar. El mejor interés del niño y de la niña, debe ser leído e interpretado con ponderación, principalmente cuando se encuentra con el mejor interés de los abuelos y abuelas. Es necesario que se establezca la distinción entre la obligación de los padres y madres y la obligación de los abuelos y abuelas; esa está ubicada en el ámbito del parentesco, mientras la otra deviene del ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental. A los padres y madres les compete la responsabilidad sin límites, y no a los abuelos o abuelas; los primeros deben dar sustento a los hijos e hijas y darles los alimentos naturales y civiles, al paso que a los abuelos y abuelas solamente se les puede atribuir la responsabilidad de los alimentos naturales, en carácter subsidiario. La obligación alimentar entre los padres y madres y los hijos e hijas no implica reciprocidad, pues es una obligación unilateral, al paso que entre abuelos y abuelas y nietos y nietas, al contrario, existe reciprocidad establecida en ley y los abuelos deben, sí, complementar las necesidades de sus nietos y nietas, pero solamente después que sus propias necesidades están ya satisfechas. Entre padres y madres e hijos e hijas, en primero lugar se ponen los intereses de éstos últimos, pero entre abuelos y abuelas y nietos y nietas, primeramente están ubicadas las necesidades de las personas adultas mayores. Hacerlo de forma diversa es irrespeto a los preceptos constitucionales, y atenta con los más elementares derechos de los progenitores, hiriendo de muerte su dignidad. Demostrar la distinción entre la obligación legal y la liberalidad afectiva, bajo de la luz de la Constitución Política, y ubicar el rol de los abuelos y abuelas en ese contexto, es lo que se propone en este estudio.