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1	Language, necessity and convention : reconsidering the linguistic approach to modality Nyseth, Fredrik January 2018 (has links) This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in "making a consistent empiricism possible". Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be "created" by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.
2	Three Wittgensteins: Interpreting the <em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</em> Brommage, Thomas J, Jr. 06 August 2008 (has links) There are historically three main trends in understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The first is the interpretation offered by the Vienna Circle. They read Wittgenstein as arguing that neither metaphysical nor normative propositions have any cognitive meaning, and thus are to be considered nonsense. This interpretation understands Wittgenstein as setting the limits of sense, and prescribing that nothing of substantive philosophical importance lies beyond that line. The second way of reading the Tractatus, which has became popular since the 1950s, is the interpretation which most currently accept as the early Wittgenstein's view; for this reason I refer to it as the 'standard reading.' According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein did not consider metaphysical and ethical discourse as nonsense. Rather, relying upon the distinction between saying [sagen] and showing [zeigen], he meant that these truths cannot be uttered, but instead are only shown. The standard reading can perhaps be best understood in contrast with the third interpretation, dubbed the "resolute reading." The resolute reading takes seriously Wittgenstein's remark at 6.54 that "[m]y propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense [unsinnig]." According to the resolute interpretation, Wittgenstein is not advancing a series of philosophical theses in the Tractatus. Rejecting the distinction characteristic of standard readings, between propositions without sense [sinnlos] and just plain nonsense [unsinnig], these interpreters read Wittgenstein as treating ethical and metaphysical inquiry, as well as a bulk of the doctrines in the text, as nonsense. To them, Wittgenstein did not intend to put forth any theses in the the text. Instead his methodology is therapeutic, similar to the later philosophy. It In this essay I explain each interpretation, and evaluate them in terms of textual and philosophical viability. I conclude by arguing that the biases which exist in the tradition of analytic philosophy substantively temper the interpretation of historical texts, which ultimately leads to the fundamental distinction between these three interpretations. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Resolute reading Logical empiricism Metaphysics American Studies Arts and Humanities
3	New Foundations for Ecological Economics Spash, Clive L. 05 1900 (has links) (PDF) Ecological economics has been repeatedly described as transdisciplinary and open to including everything from positivism to relativism. I argue for a revision and rejection of this position in favour of realism and reasoned critique. Looking into the ontological presuppositions and considering an epistemology appropriate for ecological economics to meaningfully exist requires rejecting the form of methodological pluralism which has been advocated since the start of this journal. This means being clear about the differences in our worldview (or paradigm) from others and being aware of the substantive failures of orthodox economics in addressing reality. This paper argues for a fundamental review of the basis upon which ecological economics has been founded and in so doing seeks improved clarity as to the competing and complementary epistemologies and methodologies. In part this requires establishing serious interdisciplinary research to replace superficial transdisciplinary rhetoric. The argument places the future of ecological economics firmly amongst heterodox economic schools of thought and in ideological opposition to those supporting the existing institutional structures perpetuating a false reality of the world's social, environmental and economic systems and their operation.
4	La théorie coordinative de la connaissance et son lien avec les problèmes épistémologiques de la mesure dans les écrits empiristes-logiques de la première moitié du XXe siècle / The coordinative theory of knowledge and its relation to the epistemological problems of measurement in the logical-empiricist writings of the first half of the twentieth century Giovannetti, Gabriel 10 December 2018 (has links) Ce travail fait l’analyse du concept de « principe de coordination » tel qu’il se développe au sein de la théorie coordinative de la connaissance, et plus particulièrement au sein du mouvement empiriste-logique, à partir de la deuxième décennie du XXème siècle. Ce concept est primordial lorsqu’il s’agit de comprendre la manière dont la définition des concepts de grandeur en physique se construit comme la mise en rapport, la coordination, des variables mathématiques de la théorie avec les opérations de mesure dans le laboratoire. L’enjeu est de montrer qu’un des concepts centraux de l’empirisme au XXème siècle est utilisé initialement, par Schlick et Reichenbach, pour analyser la théorie de la relativité, mais qu’il devient rapidement l’outil d’un programme plus spécifique, entrepris par Carnap et Hempel, de reconstruction logique des théories physiques. Pourtant ce concept, pris au sein de l’épistémologie coordinative, permet un empirisme qui laisse une place au développement historique des concepts de grandeur. Analysé et compris correctement il peut permettre de poser les fondements d’un empirisme historique, au sein duquel les concepts théoriques ne seraient plus reconstruits seulement à partir des mesures empiriques, mais aussi à partir des concepts hérités de théories historiquement antérieures. / This work analyzes the concept of "principle of coordination" as it develops within the coordinative theory of knowledge, and more particularly within the empiricist-logical movement, from the second decade of the twentieth century. This concept is essential to understand the way in which the definition of the concepts of magnitude in physics is constructed as the linking, the coordination, of the mathematical variables of the theory with the measurement operations in the laboratory. The challenge is to show that one of the central concepts of empiricism in the twentieth century is used initially, by Schlick and Reichenbach, to analyze the theory of relativity, but that it quickly becomes the tool of a more specific program, undertaken by Carnap and Hempel, of logical reconstruction of physical theories. Yet this concept, along with other concepts from coordinative epistemology, allows an empiricism that leaves room for the historical development of the concepts of magnitude. Analyzed and understood correctly, it can lay the foundations of a historical empiricism, in which theoretical concepts would no longer be reconstructed only from empirical measurements, but also from concepts inherited from historically antecedent theories. Philosophie Philosophie des sciences Philosophie de la physique Épistémologie Empirisme-Logique Coordination Hans Reichenbach Philosophy Philosophy of science Philosophy of physics Epistemology Logical-Empiricism Coordination Hans Reichenbach
5	La philosophie politique de l'empirisme logique : Otto Neurath et le "Cercle de Vienne de gauche" / Politics of logical empiricism : Otto Neurath and the "Left Vienna Circle" Aray, Basak 18 September 2015 (has links) Malgré sa condamnation post-positiviste et sa réception négative par la gauche, l’empirisme logique regagne en intérêt. Cette thèse est une contribution à la littérature émergente du «Cercle de Vienne de gauche» (CVG). Autour de Neurath et quelques autres personnalités de l’aile gauche du Cercle (Carnap, Frank, Hahn, Zilsel), nous proposons de repenser la relation de l’empirisme logique avec le marxisme. Ces deux courants se rejoignent dans leur défense d’une «conception scientifique du monde» et leur sécularisme radical. Les critiques communistes et néo-marxistes (l’École de Francfort, l’épistémologie féministe) adressées à l’empirisme logique sont recensées et leur pertinence questionnée à travers les données de l’historiographie du CVG. La politique de l’empirisme logique est examinée à travers les textes économiques de Neurath et son œuvre d’infographiste. Son engagement pour l’économie socialiste planifiée et ses efforts en graphisme pour la popularisation des méthodes quantitatives (la méthode Isotype pour la visualisation des statistiques sociales) sont présentés en vue d’une évaluation politique du CVG, ainsi que les connexions de l’empirisme logique avec le mouvement pour une langue auxiliaire internationale. / Despite logical empiricism’s dismissal by ambient postpositivism in academia as well as by the Far Left, a growing interest in its previously unknown socialist origins has resulted in a new topic in the history of philosophy of science : «Left Vienna Circle» (LVC). This thesis dedicated to LVC studies aims to clarify the politics of European logical empiricism. A presentation of its major critics from the Left (from communist parties to neo-Marxist trends like Frankfurt School and feminist epistemology) is followed by more recent arguments about its socialist politics. The «scientific world conceptions» of logical empiricism and Marxism will be compared through the work of Neurath and some other representatives of LVC (Carnap, Frank, Zilsel, Hahn). Alongside the connections of logical empiricism to the movement for an international auxiliary language, Neurath’s economical writings and his efforts to popularize quantitative methods in social sciences (the Isotype method of visual statistics) will be presented in an attempt to evaluate the politics of logical empiricism. Otto Neurath Empirisme logique Positivisme logique Cercle de Vienne Isotype Marxisme Langue auxiliaire internationale Otto Neurath Logical empiricism Logical positivism Vienna circle Isotype Marxism International auxiliary language 146.42
6	Ecological Economics and Philosophy of Science: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology and Ideology Spash, Clive L. January 2012 (has links) (PDF) Ecological economics has been repeatedly described as transdisciplinary and open to including everything from positivism to relativism. I argue for a revision and rejection of this position in favour of realism and reasoned critique. Looking into the ontological presuppositions and considering an epistemology appropriate for ecological economics to meaningfully exist requires rejecting the form of methodological pluralism which has been advocated since the start of this journal. This means being clear about the differences in our worldview (or paradigm) from others and being aware of the substantive failures of orthodox economics in addressing reality. This paper argues for a fundamental review of the basis upon which ecological economics has been founded and in so doing seeks improved clarity as to the competing and complementary epistemologies and methodologies. In part this requires establishing serious interdisciplinary research to replace superficial transdisciplinary rhetoric. The argument places the future of ecological economics firmly amongst heterodox economic schools of thought and in ideological opposition to those supporting the existing institutional structures perpetuating a false reality of the world's social, environmental and economic systems and their operation. (author's abstract) / Series: SRE - Discussion Papers RVK AR 14350
7	Carnap Visits Canberra: Updating the Logical Positivist Criteria of Cognitive Significance Magrath, Andrew Whiteley 11 April 2012 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Canberra Plan Logical Positivism Logical Empiricism Cognitive Significance Theory of Meaning Rudolf Carnap David Lewis Frank Jackson David Braddon-Mitchell Frank Ramsey Ramsification
8	American Public Administration: A Foundation for Praxis and Praxiology McCann, Lluana 30 January 2008 (has links) American Public Administration (PA) theory and practices have lacked adequately articulated or formalized normative foundations since the formal founding of the American State. Discussions regarding how PA theory derives from individual and collective critical reflection on practices (praxiology) and how that knowledge can inform future actions (praxis) virtually have been absent in all organizations. The recognition of the political legitimacy of PA has been lacking. The placing of a viable and critical social theory that posits conscious, responsible, and committed human practices within the context of the administration of the American Constitutional State, a politically narrow context, has been lacking as well. This dissertation establishes the works of social theorists Orion White, Jr., Michael Harmon, Robert Denhardt and Bayard Catron as the foundation for understanding how individuals do and can contribute to the collective administration of the complex state, including how they operate daily in organizations they join, critique and are capable of changing. These scholars understand the dynamics of human being and present discussions of human actions and practices that are capable of tackling the challenges associated with administering the American State. The work of John Rohr has established the other missing links—the constitutional legitimacy of PA and the clarification of constitutional values to which American administrative actions and knowledge must adhere. This dissertation asserts that it is the placing of human theory and action within the distinctly American theory and practices of the State that constitutes the solid normative foundations for American PA Praxis and Praxiology that constitutes a viable and formal founding of American Public Administration in word and deed. / Ph. D. ancient philosophers logical positivism western philosophy federal government logical empiricism Constitution political theory praxis praxiology public administration public administration theory public administration practice social theory
9	Concepts of the 'Scientific Revolution': An analysis of the historiographical appraisal of the traditional claims of the science Onyekachi Nnaji, John 12 June 2013 (has links) ´Scientific revolution´, as a concept, is both ´philosophically general´ and ´historically unique´. Both dual-sense of the term alludes to the occurrence of great changes in science. The former defines the changes in science as a continual process while the latter designate them, particularly, as the ´upheaval´ which took place during the early modern period. This research aims to demonstrate how the historicists´ critique of the justification of the traditional claims of science on the basis of the scientific processes and norms of the 16th and 17th centuries, illustrates the historical/local determinacy of the science claims. It argues that their identification of the contextual and historical character of scientific processes warrants a reconsideration of our notion of the universality of science. It affirms that the universality of science has to be sought in the role of such sources like scientific instruments, practical training and the acquisition of methodological routines / "Revolución científica", como concepto, se refiere a la vez a algo «filosóficamente general» e « históricamente único". Ambos sentidos del término aluden a la ocurrencia de grandes cambios en la ciencia. El primero define los cambios en la ciencia como un proceso continuo, mientras que el último los designa, en particular, como la "transformación", que tuvo lugar durante la Edad Moderna. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo demostrar cómo la crítica de los historicistas a la justificación de las características tradicionales de la ciencia sobre la base de los procesos y normas científicos de los siglos XVI y XVII, ilustra la determinación histórica y local de los atributos de la ciencia. Se argumenta que la identificación del carácter contextual e histórico de los procesos científicos justifica una reconsideración de nuestra noción de la universalidad de la ciencia. Se afirma que la universalidad de la ciencia se ha de buscar en el papel de tales fuentes como instrumentos científicos, la formación práctica y la adquisición de rutinas metodológicas Filosofia de la Ciència 1
10	The Darwinian revolution as a knowledge reorganization Zacharias, Sebastian 24 February 2015 (has links) Die Dissertation leistet drei Beiträge zur Forschung: (1) Sie entwickelt ein neuartiges vierstufiges Modell wissenschaftlicher Theorien. Dieses Modell kombiniert logisch-empiristische Ansätze (Carnap, Popper, Frege) mit Konzepten von Metaphern & Narrativen (Wittgenstein, Burke, Morgan), erlaubt so deutlich präzisiere Beschreibungen wissenschaftlicher Theorien bereit und löst/mildert Widersprüche in logisch-empiristischen Modellen. (Realismus vs. Empirismus, analytische vs. synthetische Aussagen, Unterdeterminiertheit/ Holismus, wissenschaftliche Erklärungen, Demarkation) (2) Mit diesem Modell gelingt ein Reihenvergleich sechs biologischer Theorien von Lamarck (1809), über Cuvier (1811), Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1835), Chambers (1844-60), Owen (1848-68), Wallace (1855/8) zu Darwin (1859-1872). Dieser Vergleich offenbart eine interessante Asymmetrie: Vergleicht man Darwin mit je einem Vorgänger, so bestehen zahlreiche wichtige Unterschiede. Vergleicht man ihn mit fünf Vorgängern, verschwinden diese fast völlig: Darwins originärer Beitrag zur Revolution in der Biologie des 19.Jh ist klein und seine Antwort nur eine aus einer kontinuierlichen Serie auf die empirischen Herausforderungen durch Paläontologie & Biogeographie seit Ende des 18. Jh. (3) Eine gestufte Rezeptionsanalyse zeigt, warum wir dennoch von einer Darwinschen Revolution sprechen. Zuerst zeigt eine quantitative Analyse der fast 2.000 biologischen Artikel in Britannien zwischen 1858 und 1876, dass Darwinsche Konzepte zwar wichtige Neuerungen brachten, jedoch nicht singulär herausragen. Verlässt man die Biologie und schaut sich die Rezeption bei anderen Wissenschaftlern und gebildeten Laien an, wechselt das Bild: Je weiter man aus der Biologie heraustritt, desto weniger Ebenen biologischen Wissens kennen die Rezipienten und desto sichtbarer wird Darwins Beitrag. Schließlich findet sich sein Beitrag in den abstraktesten Ebenen des biologischen Wissens: in Narrativ und Weltbild – den Ebenen die Laien rezipieren. / The dissertation makes three contributions to research: (1) It develops a novel 4-level-model of scientific theories which combines logical-empirical ideas (Carnap, Popper, Frege) with concepts of metaphors & narratives (Wittgenstein, Burke, Morgan), providing a new powerful toolbox for the analysis & comparison of scientific theories and overcoming/softening contradictions in logical-empirical models. (realism vs. empiricism, analytic vs. synthetic statements, holism, theory-laden observations, scientific explanations, demarcation) (2) Based on this model, the dissertation compares six biological theories from Lamarck (1809), via Cuvier (1811), Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1835), Chambers (1844-60), Owen (1848-68), Wallace (1855/8) to Darwin (1859-1872) and reveals an interesting asymmetry: Compared to any one of his predecessors, Darwins theory appears very original, however, compared to all five predecessor theories, many of these differences disappear and it remains but a small original contribution by Darwin. Thus, Darwin’s is but one in a continuous series of responses to the challenges posed to biology by paleontology and biogeography since the end of the 18th century. (3) A 3-level reception analysis, finally, demonstrates why we speak of a Darwinian revolution nevertheless. (i) A quantitative analysis of nearly 2.000 biological articles reveals that Darwinian concepts where indeed an important theoretical innovation – but definitely not the most important of the time. (ii) When leaving the circle of biology and moving to scientists from other disciplines or educated laymen, the landscape changes. The further outside the biological community, the shallower the audience’s knowledge – and the more visible Darwin’s original contribution. After all, most of Darwin’s contribution can be found in the narrative and worldview of 19th century biology: the only level of knowledge which laymen receive. Evolution Interpretation Rudolf Carnap Ludwig Wittgenstein Beschreibung Historische Epistemologie wissenschaftliche Revolution wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt wissenschaftliche Theorie Kontinuität Diskontinuität wissenschaftliche Erklärungen Abgrenzungskriterium Unterdeterminiertheit analytische Sätze synthetische Sätze Logischer Empirismus wissenschaftlicher Realismus Metaphern Narrative wissenschaftliche Modelle Natürliche Auslese Natürliche Selektion Kampf ums Dasein Homologie Archetype Charles Darwin Robert Chambers Richard Owen Alfred Russel Wallace Georges Cuvier Jean-Baptiste Lamarck Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire Gottlob Frege Karl Popper evolution interpretation Rudolf Carnap Ludwig Wittgenstein Historical epistemology scientific revolution scientific progress scientific theory continuity discontinuity scientific explanations demarcation criterion underdetermination analytic statements synthetic statements logical empiricism scientific realism metaphors narratives description scientific models natural selection struggle for existence homology archetype Charles Darwin Robert Chambers Richard Owen Alfred Russel Wallace Georges Cuvier Jean-Baptiste Lamarck Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire Gottlob Frege Karl Popper WH 2000

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