La France de nos jours ne connait un moyen plus légitime de sélectionner le personnel que le concours public, et depuis 1958, le concours public est devenu aussi le moyen par excellence de sélection du corps de la magistrature. Cependant, l'état actuel d'une sociologie de ce groupe professionnel ne répond pas à la question « comment devient-on magistrat en France ? » en tenant compte du concours. Beaucoup de travaux ont été consacrés à la scolarisation au sein de l'ENM, ainsi qu'à la socialisation professionnelle des magistrats. Les réponses académiques expliquent plus largement les processus de sélection sociale. La réponse déterministe expliquera les processus de sélection sociale par des déterminations structurelles liées à l'héritage de compétences venues surtout de l'origine de classe et du parcours scolaire. La réponse compréhensive expliquera les compétitions et sélections par une sorte d'« effet miroir » existant entre sélectionneurs et sélectionnés. La première réponse institutionnelle consiste à dire que le concours est fait pour sélectionner les meilleurs étudiants sortants de l'enseignement universitaire. La seconde réponse, concurrente et simultanée à la première, dit que le concours doit chercher dans les candidats un profil taillé pour le métier de magistrat, du point de vue technique mais aussi psychologique. Croyant voir des insuffisances et même peut être des erreurs dans toutes ces réponses, ce travail sera consacré à l'élaboration d'une autre réponse. À travers l'usage d'une sociologie interactionniste, et d'une approche empirique multi-méthode, la recherche proposée ici essayera de valoriser l'interaction entre les préparateurs, les jurés et les candidats, ainsi que les contextes particuliers des différentes épreuves comme sources majeures d'une autre réponse possible à la question « comment devient-on magistrat en France ? ». Tout d'abord, au lieu de l'écarter, il faut s'attacher à la tautologie selon laquelle « les concours sélectionnent ceux qui se sont mieux préparés aux concours », car il n'est pas si futile qu'il y parait. / Contemporary France does not know a more legitimate mean of personnel selection than the public examination, and since 1958 it has become the means of magistrates recruitment by excellence. It is noteworthy, however, that the state of the art in the sociology of professional groups in France today does not take the examination into consideration when seeking an answer to the question “how does one become a magistrate in France today?” Instead, most work consecrates on the teachings at the National School of Magistracy (ENM) and on the magistrate's professional socialization. A variety of answers to the question of selection are proposed by contemporary scholarship. The determinist answer explains the social selection processes by the structural determination linked to the “competence heritage” coming above all from the social origin and the scholar's background. The comprehensive answer explains the competitions and selections by means of a “mirror effect” between jurors and candidates. A first institutional answer suggests that the examination is designed in order to select the best students finishing the university system. A second institutional answer, which is simultaneous and concurrent with the first, says that the examination must search in the candidates a suitable profile for the profession of magistrate from a technical but also a psychological point of view. Finding these explanations to be insufficient or even false, this work is dedicated to the formulation of a new one. Through the use of interactionnist sociology and an empirical multi-method approach, the research presented here seeks to revalue the interactions among jurors and candidates, and the peculiar context of the different exams as a major source of a new possible answer to the question “how does one become a magistrate in France?” For now, instead of ignoring it, it is necessary to reassess to the apparent tautology that says “the examinations selects those who are best prepared for the examinations,” because it is not as futile as it seems.

This thesis aims to reveal the very considerable extent of the power and influence of the clerk to the justices and court clerks in magistrates' courts, and to assess the nature of the balance achieved by clerks between the demands of the organisation of the courts which they run and their role as the court's lawyer with responsibility for upholding, inter alia, due process norms. The first section of the thesis examines the role of the clerk in the courtroom. After assessing the extent to which the clerk's behaviour is constrained by legal rules, the relationship between clerk and magistrates is examined and the impact of the clerk on the proceedings of the court and the decisions of the magistrates are considered. It is argued that the clerk has a significant effect on the experience of all of those who come into contact with the criminal justice system and to this end the relationship between the clerk and unrepresented defendants, the clerk and the legal profession, the clerk and the police, and the clerk and probation officers and social workers is assessed. The second part of the thesis deals with the role of the clerk outside the courtroom. The influence of the clerk to the justices on the attitudes of magistrates through training is considered, and the impact of the clerk on policy decisions for the court is assessed. The quasi-judicial powers of the clerk are examined and the question of whether there is scope for future extension of the clerk's role is addressed. It is concluded that the role of the clerk is one of the most significant factors in determining the nature of summary justice, that the nature of the clerk's role is ready for re-assessment and that this may be most appropriately achieved by extension of the legal role of the clerk. The clerk does play a real part in protecting due process rights, but in relation to the protection of unrepresented defendants the clerk cannot be as effective as an advocate, and as a result represents a liberal compromise of 'good enough' justice.

Notoriously, the French monarchy began to exchange judicial posts in its courts of law for cash to raise emergency funds in the early sixteenth century. The fact that all sorts of royal posts subsequently became venal or hereditary is a familiar aspect of ancien régime France, yet very little work exists on the genesis of this institution. This thesis traces the meanings, practices, and effects of 'venality' between 1490 and 1547. It does so by studying the relationship between the crown and the second most important law court of the kingdom, the Parlement of Toulouse. Traditional interpretations of office sale have tended to explain the phenomenon as a tale of royal hypocrisy, and have prioritised research on the Parlement of Paris. In contrast, this study argues that the study of a provincial court forces us to reconsider the chronology, techniques, and outcomes of early venality. A considerable amount of unexploited archival and printed material exists on office sale. By approaching it through the lens of legal culture, this thesis proposes an investigative model not only capable of explaining why venality emerged, but also why it was so vilified. Existing studies of office sale have tended to ignore legal talk and legislation as misleading or dissimulative. By paying particular attention to law and language, however, this study argues that the sale of judicial offices was a deeply ambiguous theme in the first half of the sixteenth-century that was open to constant interpretation. It was this very slipperiness that allowed a variety of actors to engage with it. Early office sale prolonged late medieval practices, but also heralded unprecedented changes, influencing the formation of the early-modern state. By studying the phenomenon, this thesis offers a rich and multifaceted picture of the relations and functioning of the crown and its tribunals.

O argumento central deste trabalho é de que há uma interface entre a mudança na forma de resolução dos conflitos familiares (com o declínio do patriarcado e o reconhecimento legal de relações familiares menos hierárquicas) e a maior presença do Poder Judiciário na sociedade. A partir deste pressuposto, tendo como material empírico as percepções de magistrados que atuam área de família, e Max Weber como principal referencial teórico, demonstra como o declínio da autoridade tradicional faz com que os conflitos familiares demandem mais intensamente às decisões judiciais, produzindo uma “racionalização da intimidade”. Os magistrados intervêm nesses conflitos exercendo uma autoridade legitimada tanto racional como carismaticamente. A conclusão do trabalho é de que a forma como se constitui a demanda – racionalizando a intimidade – e o exercício da autoridade do magistrado – racional e carismática – indicam que os conflitos familiares são exemplos da jurisdicionalização das relações sociais. / The interface between the change in the form of the family conflict resolution (after the decline of the patriarchate and the legal recognition of less hierarchical familiar relations) and a bigger presence of the Judiciary Power in the society is the central question of this work. From this pretext, using as empirical material the perceptions of the magistrates who act in the family area and as main theoretical referential Max Weber, it demonstrates how the decline of the traditional authority makes the familiar conflicts to demand more intensely for sentences producing a “rationalization of the privacy”. The magistrates intervene in these conflicts exerting a legitimated authority as rational as charismatic. The conclusion of the work is that the form as if it constitutes the demand, rationalizing the privacy, and the exercise of the authority of the magistrate, charismatic and rational, indicate that the familiar conflicts are examples of the juridictionalization of the social relations.

O argumento central deste trabalho é de que há uma interface entre a mudança na forma de resolução dos conflitos familiares (com o declínio do patriarcado e o reconhecimento legal de relações familiares menos hierárquicas) e a maior presença do Poder Judiciário na sociedade. A partir deste pressuposto, tendo como material empírico as percepções de magistrados que atuam área de família, e Max Weber como principal referencial teórico, demonstra como o declínio da autoridade tradicional faz com que os conflitos familiares demandem mais intensamente às decisões judiciais, produzindo uma “racionalização da intimidade”. Os magistrados intervêm nesses conflitos exercendo uma autoridade legitimada tanto racional como carismaticamente. A conclusão do trabalho é de que a forma como se constitui a demanda – racionalizando a intimidade – e o exercício da autoridade do magistrado – racional e carismática – indicam que os conflitos familiares são exemplos da jurisdicionalização das relações sociais. / The interface between the change in the form of the family conflict resolution (after the decline of the patriarchate and the legal recognition of less hierarchical familiar relations) and a bigger presence of the Judiciary Power in the society is the central question of this work. From this pretext, using as empirical material the perceptions of the magistrates who act in the family area and as main theoretical referential Max Weber, it demonstrates how the decline of the traditional authority makes the familiar conflicts to demand more intensely for sentences producing a “rationalization of the privacy”. The magistrates intervene in these conflicts exerting a legitimated authority as rational as charismatic. The conclusion of the work is that the form as if it constitutes the demand, rationalizing the privacy, and the exercise of the authority of the magistrate, charismatic and rational, indicate that the familiar conflicts are examples of the juridictionalization of the social relations.

nÃo hà / A formaÃÃo e o processo avaliativo de magistrados nem sempre foram objeto de preocupaÃÃo especÃfica no Brasil. Embora desde o Brasil-ColÃnia houvesse interesse na formaÃÃo superior das elites nacionais, ela ainda ocorria inteiramente na MetrÃpole. Somente com a vinda da FamÃlia Real, surgiram os primeiros cursos jurÃdicos, ainda completamente voltados a fornecer quadros autÃctones destinados a servir aos interesses da Coroa. O ensino jurÃdico, por sua vez, marcado pelo tradicionalismo, passou por diversas reformas e sempre foi objeto de muitas crÃticas, sobretudo em razÃo do formalismo, tecnicismo e dogmatismo que o caracterizavam. Com a ProclamaÃÃo da RepÃblica, uma nova classe de intelectuais, Ãvida por ocupar cargos e funÃÃes pÃblicas e exercer atividades polÃticas, constituÃa-se. Os bacharÃis, graduados nessas instituiÃÃes tradicionais, apresentavam-se como os principais quadros, entre os quais era possÃvel recrutar os juÃzes brasileiros. As sucessivas reformas do ensino jurÃdico, entretanto, nÃo foram capazes de dar conta das exigÃncias de uma formaÃÃo que propiciasse aos bacharÃis em Direito conhecimentos, habilidades e atitudes que os preparassem para o exercÃcio de funÃÃes judicantes, muito menos as funÃÃes atÃpicas de administraÃÃo das unidades jurisdicionais. Somente nos anos 1970, visando a suprir esta lacuna, surgiram das escolas judiciais e, apÃs a redemocratizaÃÃo do PaÃs, depois de quase 20 anos de ditadura civil-militar, surgiram as escolas judiciÃrias, com a finalidade de melhor preparar os quadros da magistratura. Com as recentes reformas do JudiciÃrio, a exigÃncia de frequÃncia e aperfeiÃoamento em cursos oficiais de formaÃÃo inicial para que os magistrados obtenham o vitaliciamento passou a constituir-se como uma realidade e reforÃou a importÃncia destas escolas. O objetivo deste trabalho à avaliar o que pensam e como o fazem os juÃzes acerca de sua formaÃÃo e avaliaÃÃo, aquilatando em que medida estes cursos de formaÃÃo tÃm, de fato, cumprido o seu papel, colaborando para desenvolver o saber, o saber-fazer e o saber-ser, dimensÃes que nÃo podem ser negligenciadas em qualquer processo formativo, mormente na educaÃÃo judicial. A pesquisa tem como referencial teÃrico a Fenomenologia Existencial de Heidegger e a metodologia aplicada consistiu na realizaÃÃo de entrevistas semiestruturadas, alÃm de grupos focais com os magistrados, observaÃÃo e aplicaÃÃo de questionÃrios para aferir o perfil geral dos participantes. Os resultados, decorrentes da identificaÃÃo das unidades de significado contidas nos depoimentos e sua categorizaÃÃo, apontam para a consolidaÃÃo de tendÃncias jà observadas em pesquisas anteriores acerca do perfil dos novos juÃzes e podem trazer à tona outros aspectos problemÃticos, como a falta de preparaÃÃo adequada para o exercÃcio da magistratura, decorrente das deficiÃncias da formaÃÃo recebida na graduaÃÃo e do modelo de recrutamento, alÃm das dificuldades em conciliar trabalho e formaÃÃo. Surgiram, porÃm, valiosas e inÃditas sugestÃes para a melhoria da qualidade dos cursos de formaÃÃo de juÃzes e dos mÃtodos de avaliaÃÃo de magistrados, evidenciando-se a valorizaÃÃo da zona de desenvolvimento proximal (Vygotsky) e da experiÃncia anterior dos magistrados.

O argumento central deste trabalho é de que há uma interface entre a mudança na forma de resolução dos conflitos familiares (com o declínio do patriarcado e o reconhecimento legal de relações familiares menos hierárquicas) e a maior presença do Poder Judiciário na sociedade. A partir deste pressuposto, tendo como material empírico as percepções de magistrados que atuam área de família, e Max Weber como principal referencial teórico, demonstra como o declínio da autoridade tradicional faz com que os conflitos familiares demandem mais intensamente às decisões judiciais, produzindo uma “racionalização da intimidade”. Os magistrados intervêm nesses conflitos exercendo uma autoridade legitimada tanto racional como carismaticamente. A conclusão do trabalho é de que a forma como se constitui a demanda – racionalizando a intimidade – e o exercício da autoridade do magistrado – racional e carismática – indicam que os conflitos familiares são exemplos da jurisdicionalização das relações sociais. / The interface between the change in the form of the family conflict resolution (after the decline of the patriarchate and the legal recognition of less hierarchical familiar relations) and a bigger presence of the Judiciary Power in the society is the central question of this work. From this pretext, using as empirical material the perceptions of the magistrates who act in the family area and as main theoretical referential Max Weber, it demonstrates how the decline of the traditional authority makes the familiar conflicts to demand more intensely for sentences producing a “rationalization of the privacy”. The magistrates intervene in these conflicts exerting a legitimated authority as rational as charismatic. The conclusion of the work is that the form as if it constitutes the demand, rationalizing the privacy, and the exercise of the authority of the magistrate, charismatic and rational, indicate that the familiar conflicts are examples of the juridictionalization of the social relations.

Se pencher sur « les élections que fait le peuple » dans la République de Genève revient à se fixer un double objectif. Il s’agit d’une part d’éclairer un des points obscurs de l’historiographie genevoise pendant les quelques trente dernières années du « long sommeil » du Conseil général, avant la crise de 1707 ; d’autre part d’approfondir des questionnements plus généraux concernant l’histoire du vote et de la procédure électorale sous l’Ancien Régime à partir du terrain genevois, qui est de ce point de vue d’une richesse exceptionnelle. Ces deux approches permettront de réinterroger le concept de formalité, qui a été souvent utilisé à propos de ces élections, en faisant varier les échelles et les points de vue.Sans occuper une place centrale dans le système constitutionnel genevois ni dans l’accession aux charges, les élections populaires gardent une importance autant théorique que pratique à Genève (1ère partie, à quoi sert-il d’élire ?). Si la légitimité vient d’ailleurs, que ce soit dans la théorie gouvernementale qui conçoit le pouvoir comme le patrimoine de certaines familles, ou dans l’opposition bourgeoise en 1707, qui veut avant tout restaurer l’exercice direct de la souveraineté par le Conseil général (vote des lois, de l’impôt etc.), et n’envisage à aucun moment un système représentatif, l’élection populaire crée néanmoins un lien particulier entre certains magistrats et le peuple (Ch.1). Si les résultats sont souvent prévisibles, ils ne le sont pas totalement et des enjeux demeurent si l’on y regarde d’assez près : le jeu est plus ouvert quand un poste de syndic est vacant et, si les syndics sortants sont toujours reconduits sur notre période, il est arrivé plusieurs fois que les citoyens menacent de « faire sauter les vieux » (Ch.2). Les multiples précautions qui sont adoptées dans la manière d’élire montrent aussi que ces élections populaires demeurent importantes, d’une façon d’ailleurs différente pour le gouvernement et pour les citoyens (2ième partie, comment élire ?). Malgré l’ordre aristocratique qu’affirment les préséances, la fiction de la souveraineté théorique du peuple doit être préservée par le rituel électoral (Ch.3). Si l’organisation spatiale du vote et la technique du vote auriculaire mettent les électeurs sous pression, les citoyens s’insurgent finalement contre ce système et obtiennent le vote par billet et l’isoloir, grande nouveauté dans l’Europe d’alors (Ch.4). Certains citoyens s’impliquent enfin d’une manière quelque peu particulière dans l’élection à travers les brigues, qui sont pour les brigueurs comme pour les brigués un grand moment de sociabilité, dont nous pouvons découvrir les différents acteurs grâce aux sources exceptionnelles que constituent les dossiers d’enquête des procès pour brigue (Ch.5). / By leaning on « The elections the people does » in the Republic of Geneva, we have set to reach two objectives. On the one hand, we wanted to shed light on a subject which has been largely overlooked by the scholarly literature concerning the 30 last years of the “long sleep” of the General Council. On the other hand, we wanted to raise larger questions about the history of voting and electoral proceedings in the Ancien Regime through the exceptionally well-documented case of Geneva. In crossing these two approaches, we will reinterrogate the concept of formality, which has often been used about these elections, and use various scales of analysis and points of view. Even if popular elections do not play a central role in the constitutional system or in the accession to offices, they still have a theoretical and practical importance in Geneva (1st part. What is the use of elections?).Though legitimacy lies elsewhere, both in governmental theory which considers power as the patrimony of certain families, and for the citizens in the opposition party in 1707 who want to restore the sovereignty of the General Council through the direct exercise of its powers (the vote of laws, of new taxes etc.) and never envision a representative system, popular elections still create a particular link between some magistrates and the people (Ch.1). Though the outcome of these elections is often highly predictable, it is not always so and we see that there are stakes if we look close enough: the game is more open when one of the seats for the syndicate is vacant and, though the incumbent syndics are always reelected during our period, citizens have threatened several times that they would “skip the old ones” (Ch.2). The multiple precautions adopted in the manner of electing also show that these popular elections matter, and in a different way for the government and for citizens(2d part. How to elect?). Despite the aristocratic hierarchy maintained by the order of precedence, the electoral ritual must preserve the theoretical sovereignty of the people (Ch.3). Though the spatial organization of the vote and the practice of the auricular vote put citizens under pressure, they finally rise against this system and obtain the vote by ballot and the voting booth, a great novelty in Europe at the time (Ch.4). Finally, some citizens are involved in the election in a quite peculiar way, by taking part in electoral cabals, which are a great social occasion both for cabal leaders and for bribed voters, and which we can discover in great details thanks to exceptional primary sources such as the investigation files in the trials for caballing (Ch.5).

Le directeur des services de greffe judiciaires, ancien greffier en chef, est un fonctionnaire de catégorie A de la fonction publique qui exerce des fonctions de gestion et d’encadrement au sein des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire. Au fil du temps, ses missions se sont diversifiées par le transfert d’un certain nombre de compétences jusqu'alors dévolues aux magistrats. Par la suite, le directeur des services de greffe a été déchargé de certaines des compétences transférées pour se recentrer sur son cœur de métier qui est l’administration et la gestion. Le rôle de ce cadre est peu connu non seulement à l'extérieur des juridictions mais aussi en leur sein. Pourtant son rôle est essentiel dans le fonctionnement des juridictions où il exerce de multiples attributions. La multiplicité de ses attributions l’expose à voir sa responsabilité souvent mise en cause, chacune de ses fonctions pouvant être à l’origine d’une faute engageant sa responsabilité. Cette responsabilité est multiforme, elle peut être indemnitaire, pénale, disciplinaire et financière. / The Director of administrative service of the court, formerly the Chief Clerk, is a public service category A public servant who performs managerial and supervisory functions in the courts of the judiciary. Over time, his missions have diversified by transferring a number of skills previously assigned to magistrates. Subsequently, the Director of administrative service of the court was relieved of some of the transferred skills to refocus on his core business of administration and management. The role of this cadre is little known not only outside but also within the jurisdictions. Yet his role is essential in the functioning of the jurisdictions in which he has multiple powers. The multiplicity of his attributions exposes him to see his responsibility often questioned, each of his functions being able to be at the origin of a fault engaging his responsibility. This responsibility is multifaceted; it can be compensatory, penal, disciplinary and financial.

John Milton has been frequently associated with rebellion, both by modern scholars and by his contemporaries. Objectively speaking, he may very well be a rebel; however, looking to his own works complicates the issue. In fact, Milton makes very clear in his writing, especially in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, that he abhors rebellion mainly because it is unlawful. Furthermore, he describes the uprising against King Charles I by disassociating it from any kind of rebellion, instead determining that the uprising was done lawfully. Milton writes about rebellion in the same way in many of his works leading up to and including Paradise Lost, where Satan resembles the rebel that Milton so vehemently despises. Given Milton's dislike of rebellion, his association of it with Satan complicates another commonplace scholarly argument; that Satan is sympathetic in Paradise Lost. This work will explicate Milton's definition of rebellion, especially through Tenure, and will then use that definition to demonstrate that Satan cannot be read as sympathetic. / Master of Arts