This essay tries to lay the transcendental foundations to a notion of “pure evil”, pure in the Kantian sense of the term, which means to find the necessary conditions for the concept and establish which criteria must be in place for such a concept to be justified. This essay tries to show the importance of thinking evil on its own terms instead as a secondary concept derived from ”the Good”. The prevailing philosophical stance from Platon until Kant has been to treat evil as either privation or unreason; this paper instead seeks to formulate a substantive notion of evil as pure evil, showing how it can be thought in its own right as an independent and self-sufficient concept. From a Kantian perspective it is only practical reason that can ground a moral action or maxim as free and self-determined, therefore a true concept of evil is only possible at level of the moral law i.e. the source of reason itself. Hence this paper argues that pure evil is intimately linked to the functioning of pure reason itself. In contrast to the traditional thinking regarding the issue of evil, I argue that reason is the sole source of pure evil and that no other factors such as pathology, affect or bad faith can account for events or actions that demonstrates the characteristics of pure evil. With help from the groundbreaking work of Kant, Arendt, Lacan and Sade I hope to point towards a new understanding of the concept of evil as a product of reason itself. Hopefully this work manages to show how and why such a perspective is needed and makes clear what we might gain from such an analysis.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This dissertation aims to explain and discuss the Kantian proposal regarding the grounds of moral action from the pure practical reason, and the relationship between these grounds and the "moral sense", i.e., the feeling of "respect". Thus, it is presented the reconstruction of the Kantian argumentation concerning the problem of objective validity of the moral law as a determinant of human will, as well as an analysis of the respective sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, which present the Kant's arguments concerning the relation between the moral law and the feeling of respect, as a central figure to the practice of this law. In order to do so, the first chapter deals with a terminological analysis of the concept of feeling of Respect, distinguishing it from the conception of moral sense and the feeling of happiness. In the second chapter it is intended to show how the moral law can be realized in the hearts of a finite rational human being like a man, in view of the issue of moral motivation and the systematic link between the feeling of respect and the moral law. Finally, in the third chapter, the dissertation addresses the relationship between the feeling of respect and the fact of reason. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo principal explicitar e discutir a proposta kantiana quanto à fundamentação do agir moral a partir da razão prática pura, e a relação desta fundamentação com o chamado sentimento moral , i.e., o sentimento do respeito . Nessa medida, apresenta-se a reconstrução da argumentação kantiana acerca do problema da validade objetiva da lei moral como determinante da vontade humana, bem como uma análise dos respectivos trechos da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e da Crítica da Razão Prática, que apresentam os argumentos de Kant referentes à relação da lei moral com o sentimento do respeito, como figura central para a prática desta lei. Para isso, no primeiro capítulo, faz-se uma análise terminológica do conceito do sentimento do respeito, distinguindo-o da concepção de senso moral e do sentimento de felicidade. No segundo capítulo busca-se mostrar como a lei moral pode ser efetivada no ânimo de um ser racional finito como o homem, tendo em vista a questão da motivação moral e a ligação sistemática entre o sentimento do respeito e a lei moral. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, a dissertação aborda a questão da relação entre o sentimento do respeito e o facto da razão. A presente dissertação tem como objetivo principal explicitar e discutir a proposta kantiana quanto à fundamentação do agir moral a partir da razão prática pura, e a relação desta fundamentação com o chamado sentimento moral , i.e., o sentimento do respeito . Nessa medida, apresenta-se a reconstrução da argumentação kantiana acerca do problema da validade objetiva da lei moral como determinante da vontade humana, bem como uma análise dos respectivos trechos da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e da Crítica da Razão Prática, que apresentam os argumentos de Kant referentes à relação da lei moral com o sentimento do respeito, como figura central para a prática desta lei. Para isso, no primeiro capítulo, faz-se uma análise terminológica do conceito do sentimento do respeito, distinguindo-o da concepção de senso moral e do sentimento de felicidade. No segundo capítulo busca-se mostrar como a lei moral pode ser efetivada no ânimo de um ser racional finito como o homem, tendo em vista a questão da motivação moral e a ligação sistemática entre o sentimento do respeito e a lei moral. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, a dissertação aborda a questão da relação entre o sentimento do respeito e o facto da razão.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The present study discusses the union among relations based on the philosophical proposals of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) focusing on some of his practical philosophy such as Morality, Religion and Education. The aim into attempting to rebuild the course of Kant practical philosophy is to present the development process and the contribution of pedagogy in the process of moral formation. The objective is to present in an articulated manner, the idea of progress and improvements on human conduct along with the project on the metaphysics of moral and its ending of uniting all men of good will, in other words, in an ethical community way. First, the moral law is presented as a necessary condition for a good conduct in oneself, straying from any sensible representation in which it pretends to serve as a reference to every virtuous conduct. The explanation being held in this study is only about the possibility of a purely moral conduct, and only if the reference for the formulation of a good character is based on the rational law. However, the requisite for a good moral character is only valid if in accordance with practical reason law. Concerning the union of men, the consequence of this match is the origin of evil just as the union of some equal virtuous interest is capable of overcoming bad actions due to ideas of an ethic community. Finally, in the third chapter, the research strategy does not apply only to Pedagogy but also to other several masterworks, aiming to systematize the proposal of a moral education, seen by Kant, as essential and indispensable on the formation of a virtuous individual member of a certain ethic community. / O presente trabalho aborda o enlace e as relações da proposta de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) no que tange a alguns temas de sua filosofia prática, a saber, Moralidade, Religião e Educação. Esta tentativa de reconstruir o percurso destes conceitos da filosofia prática kantiana tem por intenção apresentar o processo de desenvolvimento e a contribuição da pedagogia no processo da formação moral. O objetivo é apresentar, de forma articulada, a ideia de progresso e aperfeiçoamento da conduta humana, condizente com o projeto da metafísica da moral e seu desfecho na união de todos os homens de boa ação, ou seja, na forma de uma comunidade ética. Inicialmente apresenta-se a lei moral como condição necessária para uma boa conduta em si, afastando-se de qualquer representação sensível que pretenda ser referência para toda conduta virtuosa. O que se busca explanar aqui é apenas a possibilidade de uma conduta puramente moral, desde que a referência para a formulação da boa conduta esteja ancorada na lei racional. Contudo, o requisito para uma conduta moralmente boa é sua validação a partir da lei pura da razão. Kant atribui a origem do mal ao encontro dos homens. De forma que nosso autor acredita que a solução para o mal está justamente na unificação de um mesmo interesse virtuoso, único capaz de superar ações más por conta da ideia de uma comunidade ética. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, a estratégia de pesquisa não se restringe apenas a obra Pedagogia, mas a várias obras, procurando sistematizar a proposta de uma educação moral, vista, por Kant, como essencial e indispensável na formação de um sujeito virtuoso, membro de uma esperada comunidade ética.

This thesis is an attempt to understand Joseph Conrad's own concept of the "moral law"; what is meant by the terms "positive" and "negative," often used to describe the forces so obviously influencing his characters; and the characters, the action, and the endings as proofs of Conrad's belief in such a law and such forces.

<p>Kant's ethical theory is often characterized as one in which freedom is identified with obedience to the moral law. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, however, free will appears to be characterized as the ability to choose either to obey or disobey the moral law. Hence, an evil act could be freely chosen, whereas according to the usual ethical conception, evil appears to have to be interpreted as a manifestation of lack of freedom. The problem treated in this thesis is whether or not Kant's account of radical evil in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is compatible with the conception of free will given in the ethics. If the two conceptions are aspects of one developed theory of free will, does the theory hold together; if they are actually two theories of will, what are the implications for Kant's ethics?</p> <p>Chapter I presents the problem and summarizes the two Prefaces to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as its first essay, "On the Radical Evil in Human Nature." Two conunentators, L.W. Beck and J.R. Silber, view Kant as developing one theory of free will. To show that this is so, they focus on Kant's distinction of will into two parts, Wille and Willkür, as a key to resolving possible contradictions. Their arguments are discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III analyzes the primary sources which Beck and Silber bring to corroborate their versions of the theory, and briefly sets forth the arguments of Emil Fackenheirn, who regards the essay in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone as repudiating the ethics. It concludes on the inconclusive note that the problem may be unresolvable.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:21:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 23 / Nenhuma / O presente estudo trata do problema da interpretação na teoria do direito. Tem o intuito de fazer uma reflexão sobre alguns aspectos da teoria positivista e o grau de discricionariedade nas decisões dos casos excepcionais. Parte da exposição do debate travado entre Carl Schmitt e Hans Kelsen sobre quem deve guardar a Constituição e de suas concepções céticas em relação a uma teoria do direito que alie o elemento moral. Passa pela hipótese sustentada por David Dyzenhaus sobre a existência de um mini-estado de exceção nas decisões em casos difíceis e a consequente aproximação entre o debate sobre a guarda da Constituição e a crítica de Ronald Dworkin quanto à tese da discricionariedade. Termina, analisando elementos da teoria do direito e da justiça de Dworkin no sentido de desenvolver algumas críticas às teorias positivistas e apontar para uma teoria da interpretação que alie o elemento moral à teoria do direito, no caso, a leitura moral do direito.

Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes : La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal : libre arbitre ou détermination ? Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil.

Le présent texte porte sur la question du ressort ou mobile (« Triebfeder ») de l’action morale chez Kant. L’interprétation qui y est soutenue consiste à dire qu’il n’y a pas qu’un seul ressort de ce type chez Kant, comme le soutiennent maints commentateurs, mais plutôt deux : la loi morale et le sentiment de respect. Le nerf argumentatif de cette thèse réside dans la prise en compte systématique des aspects des facultés de l’esprit humain impliquées dans la question du ressort moral chez Kant. Deux éléments jouent ici un rôle particulièrement important : (i) les deux sens explicites attribués par Kant au mot « volonté », mot qui peut signifier (a) la raison pratique et (b) la faculté de désirer, et (ii) la division de la faculté de désirer en (a) (libre) arbitre et (b) raison pratique. Plus d’une douzaine d’interprétations, réparties sur plus d’un siècle, sont analysées de manière critique, et deux modifications du manuscrit allemand de la « Critique de la raison pratique » sont proposées pour le chapitre « Des ressorts de la raison pure pratique ». / This text focuses on the question of the incentive (“Triebfeder“) of moral action in Kant’s philosophy. The interpretation that is supported here is that there isn’t only one incentive of this sort in Kantian morality, as argued by many commentators, but rather two: the moral law and the feeling of respect. The argumentative nerve of this thesis lies in the systematic consideration of aspects of the faculties of the human mind involved in the question of the moral incentive in Kant. Two elements are here particularly important: (i) the two meanings explicitly assigned by Kant to the word “will”, a word which can mean (a) practical reason and (b) the faculty of desire, and (ii) the division of the faculty of desire in (a) (free) power of choice (“Willkür”) and (b) practical reason. More than a dozen interpretations spread over a century are critically analyzed, and two changes of the German manuscript of the “Critique of practical reason” are also proposed, in the chapter “Incentives of the pure practical reason”.

In this Study, the empiricist ethical system of Epicurus and idealist ethical system of Kant will be compared. Kant maintains that as Epicurus&rsquo / ethics regards morality as a means for the attainment of happiness, it is nothing but a self-love ethics. He, for this reason, calls Epicurean morality &ldquo / selfishness.&rdquo / According to Kant, the maxims of happiness can be known only through experience but he says, experience can never produce a law which is universal and necessary. He contends that as Epicurean ethics has happiness as its ultimate goal (i.e., the highest good), it cannot be able to produce an objective morality, valid for all rational beings. Kant, on the other hand, tries to found his ethical system on an a priori moral law of pure reason which borrows nothing from experience. This Study would, in a sense, be a defense of Epicurean ethical system against Kant&rsquo / s claims. The main argument of the thesis is that Epicurean ethics is not a self-love ethics, but rather a system which propounds happiness for all. I will be arguing that for Epicurus, one&rsquo / s own happiness is necessarily bound up with the happiness of others, and that his system is sound and consistent. I will also try to show that Kant is not successful in deducing a transcendentally ideal (a priori) law of reason and that his system has some inconsistencies.

本研究旨在探究康德與孟子對於「道德判斷之根據」的論述。首先討論康德在前批判時期的道德思考歷程，發現其思考兼具理性主義和經驗主義之色彩。但到了〈論感性世界與智思世界的形式及其原則〉一文發表，康德已經確立兩重世界觀，將倫理學領域歸屬在智思世界。在批判時期，康德明確地以「道德法則」為核心，而將其視為倫理學上最後的評斷規準，其中，康德談論了諸多人類不同的心智狀態，俱是其論道德判斷之根據的不同說法。復次，在孟子哲學方面，本研究將其定位在「一接續人心與他者、萬物、天地間之歷程」。第三，關於康德與孟子之對比下，本研究以兩種模式作為對比之進路：一是「文化類型」；另一是「生活世界」，結果指出，可以「基督宗教倫理觀影響」和「存有的相契與連續性」作為兩者道德思考的關鍵性因素。基於以上所述，本研究嘗試說明康德與孟子哲學之道德教育意義及其限制性。 / This thesis studies the ground of moral judgment of Immanuel Kant and Mencius. I'll divide it into three parts. In the first part, I attempt to explicate the process of moral thinking of Immanuel Kant in his pre-critical period. In this period, it is proved that both idealism and empiricism are included in his thinking. After the paper On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Kant, 1770) was presented, Immanuel Kant firmly established the theory, dualism of world, in which the sphere of ethics is classified under an intelligible world. After that, in his critical period, the moral law is much emphasized and considered the last standard for ethic judgment. Besides, it is also indicated that there are many different states of human mind underpinning the distinct statements of what the ground of moral judgment is. In the second part, the moral thinking of Mencius is under discussion. Mencius argues that there is a process of human mind connecting others, all things on earth and heaven and earth. In the third part, I try to compare Immanuel Kant with Mencius by two approaches: “cultural type” and “life-world.” The conclusion is drawn that the impact of ethical viewpoints of the Christian religion and the connection and continuity of being are the crucial factors in their moral thinking. Therefore, on the basis of the mentioned above, the implication and limitation of moral education of Immanuel Kant and Mencius are explained.