[pt] O tema da normatividade desde sempre foi tido como misterioso. Muitas explicações foram dadas sobre o fenômeno em diversos âmbitos do saber, embora nenhuma em definitivo. Quando se trata da normatividade jurídica não é diferente. Com o objetivo de trazer novas luzes sobre o nebuloso assunto, o ponto de partida da presente investigação é o conceito de afirmações internas do direito, tal como formulado por Herbert L. A. Hart. Por meio de uma análise sociolinguística, o autor propõe que tais enunciados comprometidos com o direito sejam vistos como expressões da aceitação de certas regras. No entanto, o autor não vai muito além em pontos importantes e alguns questionamentos surgem tanto sobre a melhor leitura de certos conceitos na obra de Hart, quanto em relação a real capacidade de sua teoria dar conta do tema. Há evidências nos escritos do autor que permitem dizer que a sua proposta é bastante semelhante à ideia de expressivismo de normas, tal como formulado por Allan Gibbard no campo da metaética. Essa linha teórica aparece como uma versão sofisticada de não-cognitivismo e, portanto, entende que os termos normativos são geralmente utilizados na linguagem ordinária para expressar um estado conativo, um estado mental diferente de uma crença, e que, portanto, não possui aptidão de verdade. Pretende-se demonstrar que tal postura, expressivista, é bastante atraente para o filósofo do direito, pois consegue explicar tanto as afirmações internas do direito como o elo implícito com a ideia de normatividade. Além disso, essa perspectiva é capaz de responder às críticas que teóricos rivais (cognitivistas) formularam sobre a construção conceitual hartiana. Por meio da análise da superação por parte dos autores expressivistas de argumentos tradicionais do campo da metaética é possível deixar mais sólida a posição dentro da teoria do direito, bem como transferir o ônus argumentativo para os oponentes da posição. Por fim, será sugerida interpretação sobre o mecanismo psicológico e social por detrás do expressivismo de normas. O recente corpo de evidência científica parece fornecer uma licença para o otimismo em favor do expressivismo em relação à capacidade de se desvendar o mistério da normatividade. / [en] Normativity has Always been taken as something mysterious. Many explanations from a range of different areas were given about this phenomenon, though, no definitive one. Legal normativity is no different. Aiming to bring new lights to this cloudy subject, the starting point of the present investigation is Hebert L. A. Hart s concept of internal legal statements. Through a sociolinguistic analysis, the author claims that such statements committed with the law are to be seen as expressions of rule s acceptance. Nevertheless, Hart does not go further and a lot of relevant points and questions arise both about the best way to read his work and on the real explanatory power of his theory. There are evidences in his writings that allow us to read his theory in a very similar way to Allan Gibbard s metaethics one. This line of though seems to be a sophisticated version of a non-cognitivism and, therefore, sees normative terms as used to express conative states of mind. These mental states are different from a belief and hence cannot have truth aptness. We intend to show that such theoretical posture, expressivist, is very alluring for the legal philosopher, since it can explain the internal legal claims and its implicit relationship with normativity. Further, this perspective is capable of answering critics posed by cognitivists about Hart s conceptual work. By means of an analysis of how expressivism can answer traditional metaethical questions, it is possible to make the legal expressivist position even more solid, and to switch the argumentative burden to opponent side of the dispute. Lastly, we will indicate an interpretation of a social and psychological background mechanism to norm expressivism. The recent body of scientific evidence provides a license for optimism in favor of expressism s ability to unveil the mystery of normativity.

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L’éducation morale est un aspect central de l’éthique de la vertu de tradition aristotélicienne. De nombreux auteurs sont attachés à l’idée qu’une bonne théorie éthique doit nous informer sur la manière de former de meilleurs agents moraux. Les éthiciens de la vertu considèrent que c’est par une éducation du caractère que l’on peut façonner des agents vertueux. Or, une telle éducation est-elle vraiment possible? Et si elle l’est, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Ce mémoire entend répondre à ces questions en explorant les horizons de la théorie des vertus, horizons qui dépassent maintenant les limites de la philosophie. En s’interrogeant d’abord sur le naturalisme moral en théorie des vertus, le naturalisme libéral est retenu comme la position métaéthique la plus réaliste pour l’avenir de la théorie. Celle-ci doit tenir compte des avancées scientifiques, notamment en psychologie sociale, si elle souhaite accomplir ses objectifs éducatifs. Pour suivre cette démarche, les caractéristiques centrale du concept de vertu sont identifiés, puis mis à l’épreuve par la critique situationniste des vertus. Selon le situationnisme, de nombreuses études empiriques montreraient que les comportements moraux des agents sont déterminés par des facteurs circonstanciels et arbitraires. Par conséquent, une caractéristique centrale de la théorie, la robustesse des vertus, est abandonnée. Cet abandon ne marque toutefois pas la fin de la théorie des vertus : elle est alors orientée vers l’éducation morale où elle demeure pertinente grâce à la littérature sur l’expertise et sur l’intelligence émotionnelle. Ce cadre théorique et empirique permet de donner une solide fondation pour l’éducation de vertus. Certaines difficultés demeurent présentes quant à l’implantation de programmes concrets d’éducation des vertus dans les écoles. Pour le futur, les chercheurs devront relevés les défis que représentent l’environnement scolaire et la mesure de vertus. / Moral education is a central aspect of the virtue ethics of Aristotelian tradition. Many authors are attached to the idea that a good ethical theory should inform us about how to form better moral agents. The ethicists of virtue consider that it is through an education of character that virtuous agents can be fashioned. But is such an education really possible? And if it is, what does it consist of? This thesis aims to answer these questions by exploring the horizons of the theory of virtues, horizons that now exceed the limits of philosophy. By first questioning moral naturalism in the theory of virtues, liberal naturalism is retained as the most realistic metaethical position for the future of the theory. It must take into account scientific advances, particularly in social psychology, if it wishes to achieve its educational objectives. To follow this approach, the central characteristics of the concept of virtue are identified and then tested by the situationist critique of virtues. According to the situationism, many empirical studies would show that the moral behaviors of the agents are determined by circumstantial and arbitrary factors. Therefore, a central feature of the theory, the robustness of virtues, is abandoned. This abandonment, however, does not mark the end of the theory of virtues: it is then oriented towards moral education where it remains relevant thanks to the literature on expertise and emotional intelligence. This theoretical and empirical framework makes it possible to give a solid foundation for the education of virtues. Some difficulties remain in implementing concrete curricula for the education of virtues in schools. For the future, researchers will have to take up the challenges of the school environment and the measurement of virtues.

<div>This dissertation redefines the placebo effect in light of new empirical observations and certain strands of philosophical ethics. </div>Chapter 1 critically reviews available definitions of placebo responsiveness against their abilities to hang together the diversity of empirical observations and emerging research interests. Projecting Wittgenstein's example of a child learning pain language, Chapter 2 redefines the phenomenon as a particular kind of experience of meaning and reconsiders clinical empathy in terms of the loss and recovery of language that belongs to illness experience and diagnosis. Chapter 3 broadens the account of psychosomatic responsiveness from the experience of meaning to the experience of values, utilising Canguilhem's definition of health and Nietzsche's genealogical account of the health of values. Chapter 4 explores the foregoing by recounting how Wittgenstein's moral philosophy might hold together the traditional ethical and bioethical question of what makes life worth living with psychosomatic responsiveness.

<p>This dissertation argues for a number of theses related to responsibility, norm psychology, and personhood. Although most of the papers argue for “standalone” theses, in the sense that their truth does not depend the truth of the others, the five papers collectively illustrate a broader view of humans as (a) responsible agents who are (b) self-governing and (c) equipped with a capacity for norms, and whose agency (d) centers on dynamic responsiveness to corrective feedback. Drawing on this broader picture, the dissertation sheds light on ethical questions about our social practices and technologies, as well as descriptive questions about the nature of substance use disorder. </p> <p>Most centrally, the dissertation argues that forward-looking considerations are relevant for responsibility, not merely because the consequences of our responsibility practices are desirable, but primarily because of a connection which I argue exists between relationships, norms, and learning. On the view I defend, an agent is a responsible agent only if she can learn from being held responsible, so as to regulate herself according to norms of which she presently falls short. I argue that, if it were not for the capacity of humans to learn from <i>social corrective feedback</i>, such as normative responses like praise and blame, humans would be unable to participate in norm-governed relationships and communities. It is in virtue of their participation in these relationships and communities that humans are subject to interpersonal norms, such that they can fulfill or violate these norms and be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing so. So, without the kind of learning that makes participation in these relationships a possibility, humans could never be praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything that they do. </p> <p>The dissertation also argues that human norm psychology has implications for how we should relate to “social robots”—artificial agents designed to participate in relationships with humans. I argue that, like humans, social robots should be equipped with a capacity to recognize and respond to normative feedback. Lastly, the dissertation resists a common narrative about addiction as being a form of akrasia in which agents act against their own better judgment. While this is certainly a central aspect of many cases of addiction, I argue that it fails to appreciate the ways in which addiction sometimes interacts with a person’s identity and goals, especially in cases where the agent believes that the things she values would not be feasible if she did not continue to engage in addictive behavior.</p>

Samhällsutvecklingen går i en riktning där människor arbetar i allt närmare samarbete med artificiella agenter. För att detta samarbete ska vara på användarens villkor är det viktigt att förstå hur människor uppfattar och förhåller sig till dessa system. Hur dessa agenter bedöms moraliskt är en komponent i denna förståelse. Malle m.fl. (2015) utförde en av de första studierna kring hur normer och skuld appliceras på människa respektive robot. I samma artikel efterfrågades mer forskning kring vilka faktorer hos agenter som påverkar de moraliska bedömningarna. Föreliggande studie tog avstamp i denna frågeställning och avsåg att undersöka hur moralisk godtagbarhet och skuldbeläggning skiljde sig beroende på om agenten var en person, en humanoid robot eller ett autonomt intelligent system utan kropp (AIS). Ett mellangrupps-experiment (N = 119) användes för att undersöka hur agenterna bedömdes för sina beslut i tre olika moraliska dilemman. Deltagares rättfärdigaden bakom bedömningar samt medveten hållning utforskades som förklaringsmodell av skillnader. Medveten hållning avser Dennetts (1971) teori kring huruvida en agent förstås utifrån mentala egenskaper. Resultaten visade att person och robot erhöll liknande godtagbarhet för sina beslut medan AIS fick signifikant lägre snitt. Graden skuld som tillskrevs skiljde sig inte signifikant mellan agenterna. Analysen av deltagares rättfärdiganden gav indikationer på att skuldbedömningarna av de artificiella agenterna inte grundade sig i sådan information som antagits ligga till grund för denna typ av bedömningar. Flera rättfärdiganden påpekade också att det var någon annan än de artificiella agenterna som bar skulden för besluten. Vidare analyser indikerade på att deltagare höll medveten hållning mot person i störst utsträckning följt av robot och sedan AIS. Studien väcker frågor kring huruvida skuld som fenomen går att applicera på artificiella agenter och i vilken utsträckning distribuerad skuld är en faktor när artificiella agenter bedöms.

<p>  </p> <p>We cannot fully assess the normative and epistemic implications of online discourse, especially political discourse, without recognizing how it is being systematically leveraged to undermine the credibility and autonomy of those with marginalized identities. In the following chapters, I supplement social/feminist epistemological methodologies with norm theory to argue that online discourse entrenches the mechanisms of political dominance and cultural hegemony by ignoring and devaluing the experiences and struggles of marginalized individuals. Each chapter investigates a different, concrete manifestation of this dynamic. In Chapter 1, I argue that digital capitalist enterprises like Facebook facilitate the targeting of minoritized users with disproportionate instances of abuse, misinformation, and silencing. This is exemplified by the practice of using racial microtargeting to engage in Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) voter suppression. I contend in Chapter 2 that, given the exploitative nature of racially-microtargeted political advertising campaigns, these social media companies are ultimately morally responsible for initiating and sustaining a burgeoning digital voter suppression industry. In Chapter 3, I argue that the presence of online disinformation, in tandem with key party figures’ explicit endorsement of vicious group epistemic norms like close-mindedness and dogmatism, have directly contributed to the formation and epistemic isolation of conservative political factions in the US. Finally, I argue in Chapter 4 that social media and hostile media bias rhetoric directly reinforce sexist and racist credibility norms, effectively creating a toxic environment of misogynistic online discourse that hurts the perceived credibility of women journalists.</p>

This essay examines Jesus' conflict counseling in the Gospel of Luke, by conducting a literary analysis of Luke 9:46-48, 12:13-21 and 22:24-30, which are stories of conflicts where Jesus himself is not involved. The texts have been analyzed in their historical context and are illuminated by heuristic use of contemporary conflict theory and moral psychology. Through this reading, a pattern emerges: Jesus' main method of dealing with conflicts is to correct the attitudes of those involved in conflict.