Thesis advisor: Liane Young / Thesis advisor: Hiram Brownell / When (moral) psychologists make a claim (e.g., “Participants judged X as morally worse than Y”), how many participants are represented? Such claims are often based exclusively on group-level analyses; here, psychologists often fail to report, or perhaps even investigate, how many participants judged X as morally worse than Y. More troubling, group-level analyses do not necessarily generalize to the person-level. This dissertation first investigates a moral cognition hypothesis about the relation between perceptions of relationship obligations and moral evaluations of helping behavior. It is found that people, on average, judge agents who help strangers as more morally good than agents who help family members, but people also judge agents who help strangers instead of family members as less morally good than agents who help family members instead of strangers. Second, methodological issues with these studies are assessed, fixed, and thus the original psychological effect is retested with better experimental designs, measures, and analyses. Third, it is discovered that the moral cognition hypothesis consistently describes the psychology of only a minority of participants. Moreover, it is discovered that most psychologists misinterpret typical group-level analyses as revealing how prevalent a psychological phenomenon is. Finally, a set of simple and flexible methodological and statistical options are offered to better align typical psychological hypotheses with appropriate analyses, enabling researchers to confront this “group-to-person generalizability” problem in their own work. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Would it be irrational of you to love an inanimate object? Or would it be misguided to dedicate yourself to a random stranger on the street as opposed to, say, your partner or your child? I take it that such attitudes and actions are irrational. In this dissertation, I explore what considerations provide love with a rational basis. I call these considerations reasons for love. These are the reasons that make love make sense. I argue that the valuable qualities of the beloved are reasons for love. Moreover, I argue that to give a complete account of such reasons, one must reflect on the nature and value of love. In Chapter One, I argue that love’s nature includes valuing a relationship with the beloved and valuing them as a bearer of valuable qualities. In these ways, love is a unique way of engaging with a person’s value, and love’s relational component distinguishes it from other pro-attitudes, like respect or admiration. In Chapter Two, I argue that love, like knowledge, virtue, pleasure, and achievement, is non-instrumentally good for the person in love. Moreover, love is a virtue because it is the right kind of response to the valuable qualities of another person. In Chapter Three, I refine the qualities view by arguing that such qualities do not need to be maximally valuable. Instead, love is grounded in qualities that are good enough. Finally, in Chapter Four, I explore reasons of love, which are reasons for actions that justify the special treatment we reserve for those whom we love. Reasons of love are often treated as a problem for moral theory because morality demands impartiality, and love demands partiality. I address this problem by defending an altruistic, as opposed to impartialist, view of morality. On the altruistic view, facts about an individual’s personal identity can be the ground for morally right actions. I make this case by considering self-sacrifice’s central role in both morality and love.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-04-11T13:12:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wildemar Félix Assunção e Silva_.pdf: 749028 bytes, checksum: 8d4ea8ec361cc0b562ea9ef3a874d07c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-11T13:12:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wildemar Félix Assunção e Silva_.pdf: 749028 bytes, checksum: 8d4ea8ec361cc0b562ea9ef3a874d07c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-15 / Nenhuma / Relatos sobre divergências acerca das conexões entre o Direito e a moralidade remontam aos tempos do Direito Romano. Alguns estudiosos acreditam que as regras morais e as regras jurídicas pertencem a um mesmo ordenamento, ou seja, que existe, na verdade, uma fusão entre Direito e Moral. Alguns filósofos defendem que essa conexão se dá ao nível dos princípios, como, por exemplo, Ronald Dworkin, que defende que, em decisões complexas ou difíceis, os juízes apelam a princípios morais (“extrajurídicos”) para justificar suas decisões. Esse papel da moralidade nas decisões jurídicas é, por vezes, explicitado no próprio direito positivo. Segundo a nossa Constituição Federal de 1988, um dos princípios fundamentais observados é justamente o chamado “princípio da moralidade”. Esse princípio prescreve uma ordem administrativa baseada, principalmente, na confiança, na boa-fé, na honradez e na probidade. Dessa forma, a ética, ou o “princípio ético”, é relembrada, estando esse princípio atrelado ao princípio da moralidade. O princípio da moralidade política é apreciado a partir da determinação jurídica da observância de princípios éticos produzidos pela sociedade. Isso determina, então, uma base fundamental para a moralidade administrativa; já essa está baseada na correta utilização dos instrumentos de uma ordem jurídica definida. No tocante à questão da moralidade na administração pública, um cargo de grande atenção é justamente o da Presidência de uma República, cargo que deve ser exemplo fiel desses princípios que permeiam a ordem jurídica e pública de uma nação. O conceito moderno de democracia pressupõe esses princípios, uma vez que a democracia representa um equilíbrio de poderes baseados na probidade e moralidade na administração pública. Quando o governante maior de um país, no cargo de Presidente da República, age de modo tal que procede contrariando os princípios de moralidade e ética da ordem jurídica, política e pública, as regras da Constituição Federal de 1988 estabelecem termos de punição administrativa. O processo de impeachment, ou seja, a destituição do cargo de Presidente da República, somente é factível quando observadas infrações políticas e crimes de responsabilidade, deliberados em pelo menos duas etapas principais: primeiramente, a admissão da denúncia do crime de responsabilidade pela Câmara dos Deputados e, posteriormente, o julgamento da denúncia como procedente pelo Senado Federal. Dessa forma, se crimes de responsabilidade forem verificados, pode, então, ocorrer a destituição do cargo de Presidente da República com seguimento à ordem pública de uma nação e em observância dos preceitos da moralidade e do Direito de um povo. Nesta dissertação, pretende-se mostrar que os debates sobre a ocorrência de crime de responsabilidade que ocorreram no poder legislativo durante um processo de impeachment representam exemplos de apelos legítimos a considerações não apenas legais, mas morais, contra (ou a favor) do acusado, no caso, o mandatário do cargo maior do país, o Presidente da República. O exemplo do impeachment guarda, assim, semelhanças com os exemplos que Dworkin, comprovando a tese de que a moralidade política é parte indissociável do próprio direito. / Reports of divergences about the connections between law and morality go back to Roman times. Some scholars believe that moral rules and legal rules belong to the same order, that is, that there is, in fact, a merger between Law and Morals. Some philosophers argue that this connection is at the level of principles, such as Ronald Dworkin, who argues that in complex or difficult decisions, judges appeal to moral ("extra-juridical") principles to justify their decisions. This role of morality in legal decisions is sometimes made explicit in positive law itself. According to our Federal Constitution of 1988, one of the fundamental principles observed is precisely the so-called "principle of morality." This principle prescribes an administrative order based primarily on trust, good faith, honesty, and probity. In this way, ethics, or the "ethical principle", is remembered, being this principle linked to the principle of morality. The principle of political morality is appreciated from the legal determination of the observance of ethical principles produced by society. This then determines a fundamental basis for administrative morality; this is based on the correct use of the instruments of a defined legal order. With regard to the question of morality in the public administration, a position of great attention is precisely that of the Presidency of a Republic, a position which must be a faithful example of these principles that permeate the juridical and public order of a nation. The modern concept of democracy presupposes these principles, since democracy represents a balance of powers based on probity and morality in public administration. When the major ruler of a country, in the position of President of the Republic, acts in such a way as to proceed contrary to the principles of morality and ethics of the legal, political and public order, the rules of the Federal Constitution of 1988 establish terms of administrative punishment. The impeachment process, that is to say, the dismissal of the office of President of the Republic, is only feasible when political offenses and crimes of responsibility are observed, deliberated in at least two main stages: first, admission of the complaint of the crime of responsibility by the House of Representatives. Deputies and, subsequently, the judgment of the complaint as proceeds by the Federal Senate. In this way, if crimes of responsibility are verified, then the dismissal of the President of the Republic can follow the public order of a nation and in compliance with the precepts of morality and the law of a people. In this dissertation, it is intended to show that the debates about the occurrence of a crime of responsibility that occurred in the legislature during a process of impeachment represent examples of legitimate appeals to considerations not only legal but moral, against (or in favor) of the accused, in this case, the representative of the largest office of the country, the President of the Republic. The example of impeachment thus retains similarities with the examples that Dworkin, proving the thesis that political morality is inseparable part of the law itself.

Submitted by Sara Ribeiro (sara.ribeiro@ucb.br) on 2018-04-13T17:29:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoBatistadaSilvaDissertacao2017.pdf: 1985015 bytes, checksum: 05122c8ab94bfe518cb37e6b3ea40bf0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Sara Ribeiro (sara.ribeiro@ucb.br) on 2018-04-13T17:29:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoBatistadaSilvaDissertacao2017.pdf: 1985015 bytes, checksum: 05122c8ab94bfe518cb37e6b3ea40bf0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-13T17:29:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoBatistadaSilvaDissertacao2017.pdf: 1985015 bytes, checksum: 05122c8ab94bfe518cb37e6b3ea40bf0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-15 / This dissertation focuses on scientific morality as a means of overcoming traditional morality featured on the work ???A brief introduction to philosophy of education: the progressive school or the transformation of school??? by An??sio Teixeira. The philosophical view presented in Teixeira???s work was heavily influenced by two works of John Dewey: Experience and education and Democracy and education: introduction to the philosophy of education. Based on these two references, more directly on the first one, in which Dewey developed the theory of experience, Teixeira approached the issue of traditional versus scientific morality. Teixeira???s claims that the traditional morality, which prevailed in his context and that had in the catholic church its most vocal supporters, did not assure that the school, as a medium of education, could cater to a society that had been undergoing fast transformations. This morality, Teixeira argued, harbored in its entirety rigid and authoritarian principles that did not contribute for an optimal individual development once blind obedience, inaction, the respect to books, and professors were unquestionable rules. Therefore, in a society in which, due to scientific progress, had been going through continuous changes in its social tapestry and, above all, with a visible democratic tendency, called for schools to adopt in its pedagogical practice the scientific morality that embraced the advances stemming from the experimental morality. Teixeira argument on the relevance of scientific lied on the fact that it would contribute for a democratic education due to the sheer fact that it would grant the individual freedom of expression of his personality. It would also allow the individual to make his own choices and bear its inherent responsibilities in a way permitted him to be capable of self-government becoming his own master and a promoter of social welfare. / Esta pesquisa tem como objeto a moral cient??fica como supera????o da moral tradicional na obra Pequena introdu????o ?? filosofia da educa????o: a escola progressiva ou transforma????o da escola de An??sio Teixeira. A proposta filos??fica apresentada nesta obra de An??sio sofreu fortes influ??ncias de duas obras de John Dewey, quais sejam: Experi??ncia e educa????o e Democracia e educa????o: introdu????o ?? filosofia da educa????o. A partir destas duas refer??ncias, mais diretamente da primeira, na qual Dewey desenvolve a teoria da experi??ncia, foi que An??sio abordou o problema da moral tradicional versus a moral cient??fica. Compreende An??sio Teixeira que a moral tradicional que prevalecia no seu contexto e que tinha como defensores mais not??rios a Igreja cat??lica, n??o contribu??a para que a escola, enquanto meio de educa????o, pudesse atender a uma sociedade que vinha passando por c??leres transforma????es, j?? que esta moral tinha em seu conjunto preceitos r??gidos e autorit??rios que n??o contribu??am para a boa forma????o do indiv??duo, uma vez que a obedi??ncia e a passividade, o respeito aos livros e aos mestres eram ditames incontest??veis. Portanto, em uma sociedade que, em virtude dos avan??os cient??ficos, vinha sofrendo uma cont??nua mudan??a nos seus arranjos sociais e, sobretudo, com uma expressiva tend??ncia democr??tica, fazia-se necess??rio que a escola adotasse em seu fazer pedag??gico a moral cient??fica que incorporava tais avan??os advindos do m??todo experimental. O argumento de An??sio Teixeira sobre a relev??ncia da moral cient??fica esteia-se no fato de que esta contribuiria para uma educa????o democr??tica pelo simples fato de permitir ao indiv??duo a liberdade de express??o de sua personalidade, bem como de fazer as suas pr??prias escolhas e de assumir as suas reponsabilidades de maneira que ele fosse capaz de se autogovernar, tornar-se senhor de si mesmo e visar o bem social.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:35:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-08-13Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:44:52Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 bronzatto_m_dr_arafcl.pdf: 2011971 bytes, checksum: 28e42d9df6fbbfc6e3fa768665482f91 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Vive-se uma época crepuscular do dever, a meio caminho entre a agonia moral e a renovação ética. Estudos recentes na área da Psicologia Moral têm demonstrado que se os valores morais se tornarem centrais nas representações de si das pessoas, esse querer particular, o dever, será sentido com força e prevalecerá sobre outros quereres estranhos ou contrários à moral. Tudo o que se tem a fazer é investir a personalidade com tais valores. Mas como, se o Bem é átono e as ações morais, pouco prestigiadas socialmente como traduções de excelência do ser no tempo presente? De tal problematização nasce este estudo, cuja proposição foi a de investigar a influência do recebimento de um atendimento magnânimo de compaixão como um fator impulsionador do querer fazer moral. Sem pretender com esse sentimento fundar uma moral, estudamo-lo sob dois aspectos: 1º) realizando uma análise psicológica e filosófica de algumas obras clássicas do mundo ficcional que o tematizam; e 2º) por meio de uma pesquisa empírica, indo a campo ouvir 50 adolescentes entre 15 e 18 anos sobre como concebem a compaixão e se estar sob seus efeitos, depois de tê-la experimentado (em situações hipotéticas, veiculadas por meio de narrativas a eles apresentadas), contribui para desviar um pouco seus olhares de si mesmos e colocá-los no outro, enxergando suas necessidades e direitos e realizando escolhas morais correspondentes. O resultado a que se chegou com a pesquisa empírica pode assim ser traduzido: pela admiração e gratidão que suscita, pela gratuidade que veicula, pelo valor que confere e pelo desequilíbrio que provoca, um atendimento magnânimo de compaixão motiva grandemente para o querer fazer moral. O estudo com a literatura ficcional, que, entre outras análises, incluiu a dos romances “O Idiota”, de Dostoiévski, e “Os Miseráveis”, de Victor Hugo, possibilitou uma... / We live in a twilight age of duty, midway between moral agony and ethical renewal. Recent studies in the area of Moral Psychology have shown that if moral values become central to the self-representations of people, this peculiar desire or duty will be felt with such strength that it will prevail over other desires that are strange or opposed to morality. All you have to do is to invest your character with such values. But how can you do this, if the Good is unassertive and moral actions have little social prestige, at present, as manifestations of excellence? This perplex issue is what gave birth to the present study, the proposition of which was to investigate the influence of receiving the magnanimous touch of compassion as a driving factor in wanting to do moral actions. With no pretense of using this feeling to create a moral system, we examined it under two aspects: 1) conducting a psychological and philosophical analysis of some classic fictional writings that used this subject as a theme, and 2) by means of an empirical research in which 50 teenagers between 15 and 18 years old were interviewed on their concept of compassion and if they felt that being under its effect, after having experienced it (in hypothetical situations, given through narratives presented to them), would help to take their attention off themselves and place it on others, seeing the others’ needs and rights and making the correspondent moral choices. The conclusion that was reached through the empirical research may be expressed as follows: by reason of the admiration and gratitude that is engendered, the graciousness that is imparted, the appreciation that is attributed and the impact that takes one off balance, the magnanimous touch of compassion is a very strong factor that motivates a person to want to act morally. The study of fictional literature, which, among other analyses, included the novels ... (Complete abstract click electronic access balow)

Orientador: Maria Lúcia de Oliveira / Banca: Yves Joel Jean-Marie Rodolphe de La Taille / Banca: Luciene Regina Paulino Tognetta / Banca: Telma Pileggi Vinha / Banca: Ricardo Leite Camargo / Resumo: Vive-se uma época crepuscular do dever, a meio caminho entre a agonia moral e a renovação ética. Estudos recentes na área da Psicologia Moral têm demonstrado que se os valores morais se tornarem centrais nas representações de si das pessoas, esse querer particular, o dever, será sentido com força e prevalecerá sobre outros quereres estranhos ou contrários à moral. Tudo o que se tem a fazer é investir a personalidade com tais valores. Mas como, se o Bem é átono e as ações morais, pouco prestigiadas socialmente como traduções de excelência do ser no tempo presente? De tal problematização nasce este estudo, cuja proposição foi a de investigar a influência do recebimento de um atendimento magnânimo de compaixão como um fator impulsionador do querer fazer moral. Sem pretender com esse sentimento fundar uma moral, estudamo-lo sob dois aspectos: 1º) realizando uma análise psicológica e filosófica de algumas obras clássicas do mundo ficcional que o tematizam; e 2º) por meio de uma pesquisa empírica, indo a campo ouvir 50 adolescentes entre 15 e 18 anos sobre como concebem a compaixão e se estar sob seus efeitos, depois de tê-la experimentado (em situações hipotéticas, veiculadas por meio de narrativas a eles apresentadas), contribui para desviar um pouco seus olhares de si mesmos e colocá-los no outro, enxergando suas necessidades e direitos e realizando escolhas morais correspondentes. O resultado a que se chegou com a pesquisa empírica pode assim ser traduzido: pela admiração e gratidão que suscita, pela gratuidade que veicula, pelo valor que confere e pelo desequilíbrio que provoca, um atendimento magnânimo de compaixão motiva grandemente para o querer fazer moral. O estudo com a literatura ficcional, que, entre outras análises, incluiu a dos romances "O Idiota", de Dostoiévski, e "Os Miseráveis", de Victor Hugo, possibilitou uma ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: We live in a twilight age of duty, midway between moral agony and ethical renewal. Recent studies in the area of Moral Psychology have shown that if moral values become central to the self-representations of people, this peculiar desire or duty will be felt with such strength that it will prevail over other desires that are strange or opposed to morality. All you have to do is to invest your character with such values. But how can you do this, if the Good is unassertive and moral actions have little social prestige, at present, as manifestations of excellence? This perplex issue is what gave birth to the present study, the proposition of which was to investigate the influence of receiving the magnanimous touch of compassion as a driving factor in wanting to do moral actions. With no pretense of using this feeling to create a moral system, we examined it under two aspects: 1) conducting a psychological and philosophical analysis of some classic fictional writings that used this subject as a theme, and 2) by means of an empirical research in which 50 teenagers between 15 and 18 years old were interviewed on their concept of compassion and if they felt that being under its effect, after having experienced it (in hypothetical situations, given through narratives presented to them), would help to take their attention off themselves and place it on others, seeing the others' needs and rights and making the correspondent moral choices. The conclusion that was reached through the empirical research may be expressed as follows: by reason of the admiration and gratitude that is engendered, the graciousness that is imparted, the appreciation that is attributed and the impact that takes one off balance, the magnanimous touch of compassion is a very strong factor that motivates a person to want to act morally. The study of fictional literature, which, among other analyses, included the novels ... (Complete abstract click electronic access balow) / Doutor