Nous cherchons dans ce travail à détricoter la relation à la fois compétitive et coopérative, indifféremment technique, économique, juridique, sociale, politique et résolument communicationnelle de Google et des éditeurs de presse. Pour cela, après avoir historicisé la rencontre de deux univers singuliers, nous décrivons ce que les éditeurs peuvent faire pour franchir le prisme du moteur de recherche et y optimiser la visibilité de leur production. Nous tâchons ensuite de décrypter ce que la firme Google peut faire faire aux éditeurs en analysant leurs relations de pouvoir, leurs incitations, leurs projets et leurs environnements informationnels respectifs. Enfin, nous rendons compte de ce que les éditeurs français issus de la presse imprimée font effectivement : ce qu’ils communiquent à Google, par quels moyens et à quel prix, pour quels résultats espérés, à l’issue de quelles concessions, quels détours, quelles contestations. Nous expliquons comment les conditions et les modalités de captation du trafic sont susceptibles d’influencer la valorisation du contenu, l’organisation e sa production, la structure du site, les pratiques journalistiques et les lignes éditoriales. Nous montrons qu’un aller-retour performatif se crée entre énoncés et conditions d’énonciation, agissant par et sur les textes, les architextes et les hypertextes. En somme, c’est à la compréhension de ce que deviennent l’actualité et eux qui la mettent en récit, dès lors qu’ils cherchent à ce que l’information qu’ils produisent soit trouvée par les utilisateurs de Google, que notre thèse est consacrée. / In this thesis, we aim to disentangle the cooperative but also competitive relationship between Google and news publishers, which is at the same time technical, economic, legal, social, political and certainly communicational. In order to do so, we trace the historical development of two singular universes, describing what publishers can do to overcome the search engine and optimize their ranking. We then analyse how Google can influence publishers’ conduct, by studying power relations, respective incentives, aims, and informational and socio-economic backgrounds. Finally, we report on actual practices of French traditional news publishers: what they communicate to Google, by which means and at what price, for which expected results, after which concessions, detours and controversies. Thus, we explain how search engine optimization is likely to affect the way content is valued, its production organisation, the website’s structure, journalists’ prac tice an editorial policy. We show a back and forth movement between performative utterances and performed circumstances, having an effect on and by texts, architexts and hypertexts. To sum up, this thesis is dedicated to understanding what happens to news and publishers once they strive for their information to be found by Google's users.

The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.