This thesis addresses the moral permissibility of illegal acts of animal liberation in the form of civil disobedience, acts of rescue, and acts of sabotage. Animal liberation movements have been the subject of much media and political attention, with particular focus on use liberationist strategies of intimidation, vandalism, and harassment. Governments have mobilised state apparatus in surveillance, infiltration, and investigation, and have characterising radical activism as 'terrorism'. The variety of illegal activities aimed at preventing harm to non-human animals, particularly those involving violence towards property or persons, have often been classified together under the term 'animal liberation' and assumed to be wrong. I argue that the assumption of wrongness is questionable because it fails to give significant weight to the justification for acts of animal liberation. I pose the question as to whether and what illegal practices of animal liberation are ethically justifiable. I begin by arguing that non-human animals are worthy of moral consideration for their own sake, because their sentience above a basic level, particularly their capacity to suffer, gives moral agents reasons to acknowledge and respect their goods. Following this, I defend the claim that liberal democratic states that fail to treat animals living within them with respect are unjust. This injustice provides a justification for civil disobedience on behalf of non-human animals. Following this, I argue that beings worthy of moral consideration are owed positive duties of aid and easy rescue and I extend third-party intervention theory to non-human animals under threat from humans. I explore the limits to the duties of aid and intervention, using principles drawn from those of humanitarian intervention to identify duty bearers, and I weigh those duties against duties to fellow citizens and the state.

Summary. In this thesis there is treated legal institute solidary obligation relationship. It is one of that legal institutes which are not in the limelight of as many specialized works as they should be for their frequency of their use in practice. Although it could seem at first sight that the solidary obligation relationship is formed enough that there cannot arise any faintnesses there, but the opposite is true. There is not a one united theoretical view of solidary obligation relationship; the solidary obligation relationship can be understand as a one obligation relationship by the first view called theory of unity, but it can be understand as more obligation relationships which exist between creditor and every solidary debtors (in case of passive pluralism) or between debtor and every solidary creditor (in case of active pluralism) by the other view called theory of plurality. The most of specialized literature which take heed of solidary obligation relationship and which were written in recent time understand the solidary obligation relationship in accordance with the theory of plurality. This thesis in opposite to that specialized works understands solidary obligation relationship as a one obligation relationship in accordance with the theory of unity which is preffered in practice although it is...

1 Abstract Transfer of ownership of flats from the cooperatives to its members The aim of this thesis is to analyze the legislative regulation of transfers of ownership of flats from housing cooperatives to their members. This is a hot topic, since there are still many members who have not yet settled legal claims against the housing cooperatives. Attention is paid to the legislation contained in the Act on ownership of flats. In addition, legal regulation in the Transformation Act is mentioned, which introduced legislation on transfer of ownership from housing cooperative to its members. Individual provisions of the Commercial Code, which relates to housing cooperatives legislation, are also being analyzed. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter discusses the formation and development of housing cooperatives, explains its basic principles and mainly characterizes concepts of former housing cooperatives. This introductory chapter also defines the basic terms of the housing cooperatives, such as a cooperative housing and cooperative apartment. The second chapter is interpretation of the contemporary legislation on transfer of ownership of cooperative units. Firstly, the legal protection of a member of a housing cooperative is analyzed in detail. Considerable attention is paid to contractual...

Do global financial institutions and the governments of developed nations owe anything to the global poor? I argue that they do. In my view, the global poor are owed a form of assistance because of the unjust harms imposed upon them. The negative rights of the global poor, which are the rights involving freedom from unjust interference, are consistently violated by the global economic order (GEO). I demonstrate that the causal chain that connects global poverty directly with the policies of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization reveals that the negative rights of the global poor are being violated. These violations occur through the effects of trade policies, unjustified sovereignty, and loan conditions, which serve to trap the poor in inescapable cycles of poverty. I argue that rather than relying on controversial accounts of the positive rights of the poor, and the appeals to charity that follow from them, we can ground the obligation to alleviate global poverty in negative rights, which are more minimal and widely accepted. My argument establishes that poverty poses a problem even if one does not see inequality as a problem in itself. I argue in support of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to poverty, which discusses the effects of poverty as a deprivation of a person’s abilities to do and be what she has reason to value. This approach identifies what is really at the heart of the problem with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to act in ways that allow the expression of basic freedoms, rather than merely a lack of resources or income. The negative rights approach to grounding an obligation to alleviate global poverty has traditionally been based on a conception of wrongdoing as a deprivation of basic needs. However, I contend that wrongdoing should be seen as a deprivation of fundamental capabilities instead. Using capability deprivations as a baseline for wrongdoing presents us with the theoretical resources required to create a foundation for an ecumenical theory of global justice, and the framework within which to demonstrate that the GEO has an obligation to help alleviate global poverty. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

Le débat sur la justiciabilité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (c’est-à-dire le contrôle de leur mise en œuvre, plus précisément le contrôle des obligations étatiques qui découlent de ces droits) est en cours au sein de l’O.N.U. depuis 1945. Pourtant, les travaux préparatoires (notamment ceux de la Charte internationale des droits de l’homme et de la Charte européenne des droits de l’homme), les diverses évolutions internationales et régionales du régime juridique de ces droits, conséquences des nouvelles normes procédurales et des jurisprudences qui en découlent, offrent des ressources permettant que lesdits droits soient « justiciabilisés » ou « opposables » aux Etats. L’exploitation de toutes ces ressources aide à vider ce débat. C’est dans ce contexte qu’a émergé ; depuis 1997, un projet de Protocole facultatif au Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels rédigé par le Comité qui a en charge le monitoring de ces droits. Nous avons revisité ce Protocole dans la perspective de passer d’un statut des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels virtuels à celui des droits concrets. / The United Nations are debating about the justiciability of the economic, social and cultural rights since 1945. The debate concerns the monitoring of the state’s obligations under the International convention on the economic, social and cultural rights. Since the creation of the United Nations, there is a need to strengthen legal protection of those rights. However, the « travaux préparatoires » concerning the Human rights International Charter and the Human rights European Charter, the internationals and regionals evolutions of their legal system lead to the justiciability of those rights. The exploitation of these resources and possibilities can help us to finish that debate. In this context, the Committee of economic, social and cultural rights has drafted, since 1997, an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Economic, social and cultural rights authorizing the monitoring of these rights. We have studied and revisited this Protocol so that the economic, social and cultural rights become not the virtuals rights but the concretes ones.

Le débat sur la justiciabilité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (c’est-à-dire le contrôle de leur mise en œuvre, plus précisément le contrôle des obligations étatiques qui découlent de ces droits) est en cours au sein de l’O.N.U. depuis 1945. Pourtant, les travaux préparatoires (notamment ceux de la Charte internationale des droits de l’homme et de la Charte européenne des droits de l’homme), les diverses évolutions internationales et régionales du régime juridique de ces droits, conséquences des nouvelles normes procédurales et des jurisprudences qui en découlent, offrent des ressources permettant que lesdits droits soient « justiciabilisés » ou « opposables » aux Etats. L’exploitation de toutes ces ressources aide à vider ce débat. C’est dans ce contexte qu’a émergé ; depuis 1997, un projet de Protocole facultatif au Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels rédigé par le Comité qui a en charge le monitoring de ces droits. Nous avons revisité ce Protocole dans la perspective de passer d’un statut des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels virtuels à celui des droits concrets. / The United Nations are debating about the justiciability of the economic, social and cultural rights since 1945. The debate concerns the monitoring of the state’s obligations under the International convention on the economic, social and cultural rights. Since the creation of the United Nations, there is a need to strengthen legal protection of those rights. However, the « travaux préparatoires » concerning the Human rights International Charter and the Human rights European Charter, the internationals and regionals evolutions of their legal system lead to the justiciability of those rights. The exploitation of these resources and possibilities can help us to finish that debate. In this context, the Committee of economic, social and cultural rights has drafted, since 1997, an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Economic, social and cultural rights authorizing the monitoring of these rights. We have studied and revisited this Protocol so that the economic, social and cultural rights become not the virtuals rights but the concretes ones.

This thesis takes as its focus R. v. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 and seeks to assess its possibilities as the source of a legal principle to guide the constitutional review of the aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.<p>In Chapter 1, the decision and the commentary to which it gave rise is discussed. Chapter 2 reviews the history of the law of aboriginal rights with a particular focus on the Indian law of the United States. Chapter 3 reviews Canadian Native law with a particular stress on the trust obligation. In Chapter 4 the language of trusts is reviewed and the influence of International law is canvassed. After a brief discussion of fiduciary law, the chapter closes with a suggested basis for a constitutional fiduciary principle. Chapter 5 opens with a discussion of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The theory is then proposed.<p>The theory would find its origin in the common law recognition of the precontact sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples and its denial by the colonizing nation at the time of colonization. The assumption of legislative power by the Crown came with an obligation, acknowledged by the Crown, that it must use its legislative power so as to protect and promote the interests of the aboriginal peoples in order to assist them through the process of colonization. It is suggested that s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 may have made that obligation justiciable and may require the courts to check the exercise of its legislative power to make certain that any negative effect on the aboriginal peoples is justified. The standard, being a fiduciary one, would be high.<p>The thesis closes with an application of the theory to some past and present issues in Native law.

Sen and Nussbaum generate very different degrees of obligation for the affluent under their theories of justice, despite each of them deriving their theory of justice from capability as a metric for quality of life. On one hand, Sen’s account of obligation seems very weak, while Nussbaum’s seems overwhelmingly robust. I argue that the sufficient/decisivereasons framework as put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit captures the nuances of their extremely different accounts of obligation. Further, I argue that this framework convincingly demonstrates that the accounts of obligation that Sen and Nussbaum offer in each of their versions of the capability approach are unsatisfying, as each approach occupies such extremes that they are unreasonable. In spite of this, supplementing the capability approach with a different and perhaps more centrist account of obligation can make the capability approach a more consistent and appealing theory of justice. To this end, I appropriate Thomas Pogge’s account of obligation.

Dans ce mémoire, on étudie la distribution empirique des estimateurs de vraisemblance maximale pour des processus affines, basés sur des observations à temps discret. On examine d'abord le cas où le processus est directement observable. Ensuite, on regarde ce qu'il advient lorsque seule une transformation affine du processus est observable, une situation typique dans les applications financières. Deux approches sont alors considérées: maximisation de la vraisemblance exacte ou maximisation d'une quasi-vraisemblance obtenue du filtre de Kalman. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Estimation de vraisemblance maximale, Processus affines, Obligation à l'escompte, Quasi-vraisemblance, Filtre de Kalman.