Thèse : Théologie : Helsinki : 1978. / Bibliogr. pp. 195-204.

This dissertation makes progress on the mind-body problem by examining certain key features of epistemic defeasibility, introspection, peer disagreement, and philosophical methodology. In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many of us as true. And absent defeaters, we should believe what strikes us as true. In the first three chapters, I discuss a variety of proposed defeaters—undercutters, rebutters, and peer disagreement—for the seeming truth of dualism, arguing that not one is successful. In the fourth chapter, I develop and defend a novel argument from the indefeasibility of certain introspective beliefs for the conclusion that persons are not complex objects like brains or bodies. This argument reveals the non-mechanistic nature of introspection. / text

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-23T20:56:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Mestrado_Tadeu_Cincurá_de_A._S._Sampaio.pdf: 1005274 bytes, checksum: 781347a7cf25d5bfd8bfc7eb6c8d3394 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-23T20:56:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Mestrado_Tadeu_Cincurá_de_A._S._Sampaio.pdf: 1005274 bytes, checksum: 781347a7cf25d5bfd8bfc7eb6c8d3394 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-23T20:56:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Mestrado_Tadeu_Cincurá_de_A._S._Sampaio.pdf: 1005274 bytes, checksum: 781347a7cf25d5bfd8bfc7eb6c8d3394 (MD5) / A presente dissertação apresente o resultado da investigação do fortalecimento dos precedentes judiciais como fonte de direito e sua irradiação na mudança do paradigma sistemático processual com a contaminação cultural da tradição common law em busca de segurança jurídica, confiança no judiciário, previsibilidade, igualdade e acesso à justiça em tempo razoável, identificando a reclamação constitucional como instrumento de fortalecimento da jurisprudência do tribunal baiano diante da evidente necessidade de mudança da cultura de resistência aos precedentes judiciais vinculantes e o caráter criador do juiz. Demonstra a constitucionalidade da reclamação no Tribunal de Justiça da Bahia, destacando sua utilidade para efetividade da celeridade, duração razoável do processo, segurança jurídica e, sobretudo, a igualdade. Enfim, identifica as transformações paradigmáticas da introdução dos precedentes judiciais vinculantes e obrigatórios no direito brasileiro, bem como a aplicação e a necessidade de mudanças pragmáticas no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado da Bahia e na prática organizacional judiciária e jurisdicional para inaugurar um novo atuar dos magistrados.

One of the most important figures of Registry Law is the inscription: The reason for theregistration procedure. It seeks, through it,to grant legal protection to the owner of the registration, by the registration publicity itbrings.In this article, the author analyzes thisimportant legal figure, by focusing on the article 2013 of the Peruvian Civil Code, whichhe considers must be renovated and updated, according to the circumstances and recent regulatory changes. / Una de las figuras más importantes del Derecho Registral es la inscripción: La razón del procedimiento registral. Se busca, a través de ella, conceder protección jurídica al titular dela inscripción, valiéndose de la publicidad registral que ésta otorga.En el presente artículo, el autor realiza un análisis de esta importante figura legal, centrándose para ello en el artículo 2013 del Código Civil del Perú, el cual considera debe ser reformado y actualizado acorde a las circunstancias y modificaciones normativas  de los últimos años.

Le régime des autorisations d’urbanisme était l’objet de nombreuses critiques en raison de sa complexité, de l’incertitude du délai d’instruction et de l’imprévisibilité de la décision administrative. Cette situation résultait de l’accumulation des modifications sans vision d’ensemble. Les acteurs du droit de l’urbanisme n’étaient pas en mesure de prévoir aisément un résultat et de compter sur celui-ci.L’ordonnance du 8 décembre 2005 et la loi du 13 juillet 2006 réforment ce régime afin d’améliorer la sécurité juridique des acteurs du droit de l’urbanisme. Pendant de la loi du 13 décembre 2000 pour les documents d’urbanisme, cette réforme réécrit le Livre IV du Code de l’urbanisme.La réforme a intégré la sécurité juridique dans le droit de l’utilisation et de l’occupation des sols. La réforme a pour objectifs de clarifier le champ d’application des autorisations d’urbanisme en regroupant les travaux, de simplifier la procédure d’instruction, de garantir la prévisibilité de la décision administrative. Ces objectifs correspondent aux prescriptions techniques de la sécurité juridique, à savoir : la stabilité et la prévisibilité du droit.Entrée en vigueur depuis le 1er octobre 2007, le bilan de la réforme peut désormais être établi. Présentée comme un renforcement de la sécurité juridique du constructeur ou de l’aménageur, la réforme améliore l’efficacité de l’action administrative. La sécurité juridique de l’opérateur s’en trouve renforcée par ricochet.Le processus décisionnel a été aménagé pour sécuriser la délivrance des autorisations d’urbanisme. La réforme du contentieux de l’urbanisme vise aujourd’hui à renforcer la sécurisation des autorisations et la réalisation des constructions et des opérations d’aménagement. / The system of planning permissions was the subject of a number of criticisms because of its complexity, uncertainty regarding the length of the process and the unpredictability of administrative decisions. This situation was the result of piecemeal amendments being made without being considered as a whole. Those using the planning law were not able to easily foresee the outcome or be able to rely on it.The Ordonnance of 8 December 2005 and the Law of 13 July 2006 reformed this system in order to improve the legal certainty of those using the planning law. Part of the Law of 13 December 2000 relating to planning documents, this reform rewrote Book IV of the Planning Code.The reform integrated legal certainty in the law relating to the use and occupation of land. The aim of the reform is to clarify the circumstances in which planning permission is required by regrouping works, simplifying the application procedure and improving the foreseeability of administrative decisions. These objectives correspond with the technical guidance of legal certainty, namely: stability and predictability of the law.Being in force since 1 October 2007, the impact of the reform can now be assessed. Presented as strengthening the legal certainty of builders and developers, the reform improved efficiency of the administrative process. As a result the legal certainty of users has been strengthened.The decision making process has been set up to bring certainty to the granting of planning provisions. The reform of planning disputes is currently aiming to ease the granting of permissions and carrying out building and development projects.

G.E. Moore’s argument in Proof of an External World” seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism. / El argumento de G.E. Moore en Prueba del mundo exterior” parece consistir en una flagrante petición de principio y adolecer de una incomprensión del  desafío  representado  por  las  hipótesis  escépticas.  Aquí  intentaremos  una interpretación que evite ambos cargos. A tal fin, distinguiré entre los modos en que Moore concibe su posición dialéctica frente a sus rivales idealistas y escépticos,  y  abordaré  la  concepción  del  problema  escéptico  que  subyace  al  planteo mooreano. Finalmente, defenderé que el núcleo del argumento consiste en una afirmación anticartesiana aun cuando su relevancia epistemológica se encuentra en  su  potencial  como  respuesta  a  una  problemática  sobre  la  justificación  más cercana a un escepticismo de tipo pirrónico.

Dans l’exercice de son office, le juge est en permanence aux prises avec la loi et sa conscience. Cette réalité n’est pas propre à notre temps. Elle est une donnée constante de l’histoire judiciaire. Et selon les époques, la conscience du juge n’a pas toujours occupé la même place. Cette oscillation de la place de la conscience dans l’acte de juger témoigne à la fois d’un souci de justice et d’un souci éthique. Malgré les tentatives des doctrines positivistes et légicentristes d’atténuer, voire d’évacuer la question de la conscience du juge de la sphère judiciaire, elle demeure entière, et bien plus encore aujourd’hui avec la complexité de plus en plus grande de certaines affaires judiciaires. Le droit et la conscience sont un couple viscéralement lié mais malheureusement un couple en « difficulté », où le droit ne triomphe pas toujours et où la conscience n’a pas toujours bonne presse au regard de la dimension subjective qui la caractérise et à laquelle elle est très souvent réduite. Si cette question a fait l’objet jusqu’ici d’une abondante littérature tant en droit français qu’en droit canonique, il nous semble qu’elle a été essentiellement abordée soit sous l’angle du droit séculier soit sous l’angle exclusivement du droit canonique. A notre connaissance aucune étude comparative n’a été faite sur ce sujet. D’où l’intérêt de notre étude. Nous proposons donc dans cette investigation une étude comparée de la conscience du juge en droit pénal français et en droit canonique à travers respectivement les concepts d’intime conviction et de certitude morale. En droit pénal français, les juges et les jurés conformément à l’art. 353 CPP, doivent juger en se référant à leur intime conviction tandis que dans la législation canonique le juge ne peut, quel que soit le litige, prononcer sa sentence qu’après avoir acquis conformément au c. 1608, CIC/83 la certitude morale sur la vérité des faits. L’« intime conviction » en droit français et la certitude morale en droit canonique sont deux formes de la manifestation de la conscience du juge. Nous nous interrogeons donc de savoir si la certitude morale est en droit canonique ce que l’intime conviction en droit pénal français. À travers cette étude comparée nous voulons soustraire le jugement selon la conscience des caricatures dont il fait l’objet et mettre en évidence la complexité de l’office du juge. Au cœur du débat sur la conscience du juge c’est l’office tout entier du juge qui est en jeu. Juger est un art qui mobilise toute la personne du juge et met en évidence son autorité à travers une perspicacité et une prudence ritualisées. La conscience du juge – dont la manifestation se décline sous les vocables d’intime conviction et de certitude morale respectivement dans les systèmes juridiques français et canonique et dont le risque d’arbitraire est si communément appréhendé par l’opinion – est un gage de justice et de vérité pour autant qu’elle soit soumise à l’épreuve du rituel judiciaire. Si notre société contemporaine se rebiffe à l’idée de conscience – renvoyée d’emblée à la sphère exclusivement morale et subjective – notre investigation a pour finalité de démontrer que la conscience du juge telle que comprise dans les législations canonique et française revêt un sens technique précis qui ne saurait être enfermé dans une quelconque normativité. / In the exercise of his office, the judge is constantly struggling with the law and his conscience. This reality is not peculiar to our time. It is a constant in judicial history. According to the times in history, the judge's conscience has not always occupied the same place. This oscillation of the place of consciousness in the act of judging shows both a concern for justice and an ethical concern. Despite the attempts of positivist and law-centrist doctrines to mitigate or even dispel the question of the judge's consciousness of the judicial sphere; it remains intact, even more so today with the increasing complexity of certain cases. The ‘righteous’ and the ‘conscientious’ are a viscerally linked couple but unfortunately it is a couple in "difficulty", where the law does not always triumph and where the conscience does not always have good press with regard to the subjective dimension which characterizes it and to which it is very often reduced. If this question has so far been the subject of an abundant literature in both French and Canon law, I believe that it has been essentially approached either from the angle of secular law or exclusively Canon law. To our knowledge, no comparative study has been made on this subject. Hence the interest of our study. We therefore propose in this investigation a comparative study of the judge's conscience in both French criminal law and Canon law through respectively the concepts of ‘intimate conviction’ and ‘moral certainty’. In French criminal law, judges and jurors, in accordance with art. 353 CPP must judge by referring to their intimate conviction whereas in the Canon law the judge cannot; whatever the litigation pronounce in his sentence that after having acquired according to c. 1608, CIC/83 "moral certainty" about the truth of the facts. "Intimate conviction" in French law and "moral certainty" in Canon law are two forms of manifestation of the judge's conscience. We therefore wonder whether "moral certainty" is in canon law what the "conviction" is in French criminal law. Through this comparative study we wish to subtract the judgment according to the consciousness of the caricatures of which it is the object, and to highlight the complexity of the office of the judge. At the heart of the debate about the conscience of the judge is the entire office of the judge that is at stake. Judging is an art that mobilizes the whole person of the judge and highlights his authority through a ritualized perspicacity and prudence. The conscience of the judge - whose manifestation is expressed under the terms of intimate conviction and moral certainty respectively in the French and canonical legal systems and whose risk of arbitrariness is so commonly apprehended by the public - is a pledge of justice and truth as much as it is subject to the test of judicial ritual. If our contemporary society rebels to the idea of consciousness – seen as an outset to the exclusively moral and subjective sphere -, our investigation aims to demonstrate that the conscience of the judge as understood in the canonical and French legislation has a precise technical meaning, which cannot be locked in any normativity.

There are many psychological aspects that enter the process of recognition. The theoretical part summarizes the current knowledge of the process of recognitions and explains some phenomena that may be involved in this process, among others the age of a witness and his subsequent ability to pass the process of reconciliation fruitfully. As far as foreign sources demonstrate a lot of research has been focused on this topic, however, when it comes to the domestic literature, this topic has not yet been given sufficient attention despite the fact that the percentage of the age representation in the population is changing significantly and the number of seniors, and thus potential senior witnesses, is constantly growing. Based on previous foreign research, this work presupposes that seniors have more difficulty with recognizing and identifying the offenders than younger adults do because their decision making is influenced by various factors, such as memory deterioration, higher suggestibility, or attempt to comply with authority. Subsequently, the thesis follows the connection between successful recognition and the certainty with which it was assumed. The research was conceived as an experiment and was attended by 120 participants. At first the video was presented and then participants were asked to...

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Magister Artium - MA / Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqīn) in Ghazālī’s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghazālī? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghazālī’s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghazālī’s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazālī, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazālī has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazālī as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghazālī’s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghazālī’s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (taʿlim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.