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This thesis investigates systematic liquidity risk and short-term stock price reaction to large one-day price changes. We study 642 constituents of the FTSALL share index over the period from 1st July 1992 to 29th June 2007. We show that the US evidence of a priced systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Liu (2006) is not country-specific. Particularly, systematic liquidity risk is priced in the London Stock Exchange when Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio is used as a liquidity proxy. Given the importance of systematic liquidity risk in the asset pricing literature, we are interested in testing whether the different levels of systematic liquidity risk across stocks can explain the anomaly following large one-day price changes. Specifically, we expect that the stocks with high sensitivity to the fluctuations in aggregate market liquidity to be more affected by price shocks. We find that most liquid stocks react efficiently to price shocks, while the reactions of the least liquid stocks support the uncertain information hypothesis. However, we show that time-varying risk is more important than systematic liquidity risk in explaining the price reaction of stocks in different liquidity portfolios. Indeed, the time varying risk explains nearly all of the documented overreaction and underreaction following large one-day price changes. Our evidence suggests that the observed anomalies following large one-day price shocks are caused by the pricing errors arising from the use of static asset pricing models. In particular, the conditional asset pricing model of Harris et al. (2007), which allow both risk and return to vary systematically over time, explain most of the observed anomalies. This evidence supports the Brown et al. (1988) findings that both risk and return increase in a systematic fashion following price shocks.

Prior studies have shown that returns exhibit certain predictable patterns that are inconsistent with the mainstream finance theory. In this thesis, I explore the behaviour of returns following three different types of market events with a particular focus on behavioural and non-behavioural factors that are attributable to the predictability of post-event returns. This thesis consists of three self-contained empirical essays. The first essay examines the information role of large S&P500 futures trades (commercial, noncommercial, dealers, asset managers, and hedge funds) in shaping future index returns. I find that commercial firms’ net trading level appears positively correlated with future index returns but the relationship is not stable across time. Based on more recent data, hedge funds appear superior in terms of access to information and/or trading ability but this advantage is only preserved at high frequency. Therefore, the current weekly Commitment of Traders (COT) report - published with a three-day delay - prevents timely public access to this type of information. Also, trading signals based on two of the more popular position-based sentiment indicators do not produce significant average returns. Overall, this calls into question the reliability of COT-based trading signals used by market professionals. The second essay studies the impacts of short sellers’ trading in shaping the behaviour of stock returns following extreme price moves using data from stock market in mainland China where short sales were initially prohibited. Extreme price moves occurring under non-prohibitive/prohibitive short-sale constraints are defined as shortable/non-shortable events. I find shortable events exhibit less post-event price drift/reversals than non-shortable ones, indicating an increase in the efficiency of stock prices reacting to unexpected events. Further analysis of short sellers’ trading activities on the price event days suggests that they are successful in trading informed price shocks but not in trading uninformed ones. Finally, I find evidence of massive short-covering that amplifies price shocks. The third essay investigates investors’ reaction to stock market rumours using data from China where listed companies are required to clarify rumours appearing in the media. I find that post-clarification abnormal returns exhibit continuation of pre-clarification momentum for rumours that are not denied by the listed companies and reversals for those which are denied. These results suggest that investors are unable to distinguish the reliable rumours from the false ones, as they under-react to rumours containing material information and over-react to those without. Further regression analyses on post-clarification abnormal returns using various subsamples of rumour events show that investors respond more efficiently to rumours when they are more informed about news topics or the rumoured companies.

Studying whether new trading rules provide higher returns than the buy-and-hold strategy is relevant for both finance theory and the asset management field. In this thesis, we examine the profitability of the newly proposed trading strategy based on the concept of price overreaction on eight developed stock indices. In comparison to other studies, we extend a definition of price overreaction with an inclusion of a minimum volatility threshold. Based on the Ordinary Least Squares model, we find that a volatility condition significantly improves the predictability of return reversals after positive price overreaction. For comparison with the buy-and-hold, we use Hansen's Superior Predictive Ability test that corrects the data snooping bias. Despite better annualised returns during in-sample and out-of-sample periods, the results show that the proposed strategy is not superior to the buy-and-hold at any stock index due to heavy reliance on the predictions of the largest declines. Nevertheless, we confirm the effect of decoupling (flight to quality) that can positively affect our strategy, but only when we do not take into account transaction costs. In the end, we summarize behavioural concepts that lie behind our strategy as the overreaction and decoupling are mostly justified with cognitive biases.

This thesis investigates systematic liquidity risk and short-term stock price reaction to large one-day price changes. We study 642 constituents of the FTSALL share index over the period from 1st July 1992 to 29th June 2007. We show that the US evidence of a priced systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Liu (2006) is not country-specific. Particularly, systematic liquidity risk is priced in the London Stock Exchange when Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio is used as a liquidity proxy. Given the importance of systematic liquidity risk in the asset pricing literature, we are interested in testing whether the different levels of systematic liquidity risk across stocks can explain the anomaly following large one-day price changes. Specifically, we expect that the stocks with high sensitivity to the fluctuations in aggregate market liquidity to be more affected by price shocks. We find that most liquid stocks react efficiently to price shocks, while the reactions of the least liquid stocks support the uncertain information hypothesis. However, we show that time-varying risk is more important than systematic liquidity risk in explaining the price reaction of stocks in different liquidity portfolios. Indeed, the time varying risk explains nearly all of the documented overreaction and underreaction following large one-day price changes. Our evidence suggests that the observed anomalies following large one-day price shocks are caused by the pricing errors arising from the use of static asset pricing models. In particular, the conditional asset pricing model of Harris et al. (2007), which allow both risk and return to vary systematically over time, explain most of the observed anomalies. This evidence supports the Brown et al. (1988) findings that both risk and return increase in a systematic fashion following price shocks. / Yarmouk University, Jordan.

One could argue that the most discussed topic in finance is whether or not it is possible to “beat the market”. Even though many people claim to do this, there is little evidence to support the idea that one can consistently beat the market over a long period of time. There are indeed several examples of investors who have managed to outperform the market consistently for a long time, but the efforts of these individuals or institutions could by many be considered to be pure luck. One of the many strategies that have been evaluated by several researchers and is said to generate a risk adjusted return greater than that of the market, is one based on the P/E-effect. This strategy is based on the financial ratio P/E – price divided by earnings – and used by constructing portfolios consisting of stocks with low P/E ratios. Several studies have confirmed the existence of the P/E-effect on various stock markets around the world and over different time periods. On the Swedish market, however, few studies have generated the same results. Most of these studies can be considered to be insufficient with regards to sample sizes and methods, spawning a need for more extensive studies. We have examined the P/E strategy on the Swedish Stock Exchange (SSE) between 2004 and 2012. The sample included 358 companies (excluding financial companies) with available necessary data. The stocks were divided into five portfolios based on their yearly P/E ratios (low to high), upon which the monthly returns of the individual stocks were calculated using a logarithmic formula. The returns were also risk adjusted using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), followed by a regression analysis to see if possible abnormal returns could be considered to be statistically significant for the examined time period. The results of our study indicate that the P/E effect is not present on the Swedish Stock Exchange during the examined time period, and we therefore conclude that it was not possible to utilize a strategy based on the P/E effect between 2004 and 2012 in order to achieve an abnormal return. The results can be used to argue that the Swedish stock market is more efficient than for example the U.S. stock market where the P/E effect has been found to exist.

Submitted by Berger Antoine (antoine.elie.berger@icloud.com) on 2016-10-23T18:33:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Antoine_Berger_THESIS-GV.pdf: 3338904 bytes, checksum: 289cc845dc6c3ae75dfa87d26b3fba4d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Luiza Holme (ana.holme@fgv.br) on 2016-10-24T10:57:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Antoine_Berger_THESIS-GV.pdf: 3338904 bytes, checksum: 289cc845dc6c3ae75dfa87d26b3fba4d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-24T11:06:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antoine_Berger_THESIS-GV.pdf: 3338904 bytes, checksum: 289cc845dc6c3ae75dfa87d26b3fba4d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-26 / The Greek crisis happened in a total of three peaks, the last one happening during the Summer 2015. Western European financial sectors as well as financial markets in general in Europe were hardly hit despite the fact that private sectors in Europe widely reduced their exposure to Greece. In this research paper, we aim to test for Overreaction on the FTSE 100, DAX 30, and CAC40. The Overreaction Hypothesis states that overreacting indices display an asymmetric mean and variance. In this optic, we test for ARCH type models on the previously cited markets. / A crise grega aconteceu em um total de três picos, o último a acontecer durante o Verão de 2015. setores financeiros da Europa Ocidental, bem como os mercados financeiros em geral na Europa quase não foram atingidos apesar do fato de que os setores privados na Europa amplamente reduziram a sua exposição à Grécia . Neste trabalho de pesquisa, pretendemos testar a reação exagerada sobre o FTSE 100, DAX 30, e CAC40. A reação exagerada hipótese afirma que os índices de reagirem excessivamente exibir uma média assimétrica e variância. Nesta óptica, testamos para os modelos tipo de arco nos mercados citados anteriormente.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carlos Marcelo Lauretti.pdf: 379237 bytes, checksum: c8dbc22b9067945f6592ba2b8da5ea4d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-13 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / Many academic studies of the last two decades are focused to explain Book-to-Market (B/M), market overreaction, and return reversal effects observed on empirical researches data. This research replicates to Brazilian stock market recent researches that bring new explanations to these data. We show that these effects are results of market overreaction to what may be named intangible information. We decompose returns into one component that can be named tangible, which can be explained by accounting measures, and another one, orthogonal to it, that can be named intangible. This research demonstrates that market overreacts to intangible and not to tangible information, and this explains Book-to-Market effect and return reversals. Many financial researchers look for explanations to exceeding gains on stock market beyond what would be expected by risk prize. Exceeding gains are grounded, against to Efficient Market Hypothesis, that returns would follow predictable patterns. These patterns are: first, returns tend to reverse and, second, future returns are related to variables associated with past accounting performance scaled to market stock price. The most important of these ratios is B/M ratio. One research branch, leaded by Fama and French, argues that high B/M firms are likely to be riskier, and hence investors require higher expected returns. None of these explanations gives us complete answers to data gathered by empirical researches. We show that in Brazilian stock market there isn t a significant relation between future returns and past fundamental firm growth. Instead, we found a strong negative relation between returns and realization of intangible returns. We find intangible return reversal and not tangible. We find evidences that market overreacts to intangible information. / Explicar os conhecidos efeitos Book-to-Market (B/M), sobre-reação dos investidores e reversão de retornos tem sido uma grande preocupação dos estudos acadêmicos nas últimas décadas. Esta dissertação reproduz, para o mercado de ações brasileiro, recentes estudos feitos para o mercado norte-americano que demonstram que estes fenômenos, há muito tempo observados empiricamente, têm uma mesma origem: a sobre-reação do mercado às informações que podemos chamar de intangíveis. Decompomos o retorno em uma parcela, denominada tangível, que é explicada pelo crescimento das métricas contábeis, ou pelo que se chama de informação tangível, e outra, o retorno denominado intangível, ou a parcela do retorno não esperada pelo desempenho contábil. Esta pesquisa demonstra que o mercado sobre-reage à informação intangível e não à informação tangível. Isto explica o efeito B/M e reversão de retornos. Inúmeros estudos acadêmicos procuram explicações para os ganhos excessivos nos mercados de ações, entendendo-se como tais os retornos adicionais obtidos pelos investidores além daqueles que seriam esperados apenas pelos prêmios de risco. Estratégias para obtenção de ganhos econômicos normalmente estão fundamentadas, em oposição à Hipótese de Mercado Eficiente, em que os retornos das ações seguiriam padrões previsíveis. Estes padrões têm suas origens em duas observações feitas pelos economistas financeiros. A primeira é que em horizontes mais longos os retornos futuros apresentam a tendência a sofrer efeitos de reversão. A segunda observação é que os retornos futuros estão negativamente relacionados a variáveis associados ao desempenho passado das empresas escaladas ao preço de mercado. A mais significativa destas métricas é razão Book-to-Market (B/M) ou razão entre o valor patrimonial contábil e o valor de mercado. Uma linha de estudos, liderada por Fama e French, argumenta que o altos índices B/M sinalizam um fator de risco que não está presente no modelo CAPM, e por isto, os investidores requerem um prêmio de risco maior. Nenhuma destas interpretações oferece explicações completas para a constatação desta anomalia que é encontrada empiricamente. Esta pesquisa mostra que não há relações discerníveis entre o retorno das ações e o desempenho passado dos fundamentos econômicos das firmas. Os resultados encontrados no mercado de ações brasileiro permitemnos concluir que não há evidências de relação entre o desempenho contábil passado e os retornos futuros. Ao invés disto, encontramos evidências que emergem os efeitos B/M e de reversão dos retornos porque os retornos futuros estão negativamente relacionados com a realização de informações intangíveis, que é o componente do retorno ortogonal ao desempenho contábil passado. De fato, encontramos reversão dos retornos intangíveis e não dos retornos tangíveis, o que é consistente com os resultados empíricos da literatura acadêmica prévia. Encontramos evidências que o mercado sobre-reage às informações intangíveis.

在選定樣本期間1975-2009年下，動能操作策略在日本股市無法獲得顯著正報酬。在三個子樣本期間：1975年-1989年、1990年-1999年以及2000年-2009年下也獲得相同結論，顯示日本股市不存在動能效應。 動能操作策略中的贏家、輸家排序，與公司的財務特性有關。整體而言，輸家股票在平均成交量、平均市值上皆小於贏家股票。另外，動能操作策略在日本股市的月報酬並沒有明顯季節性變化。 本論文比較文獻上提出的三種不同動能操作策略：歷史報酬率法、52週高點法與移動平均比率法在日本股市的績效表現。三者在日本股市皆無法獲得顯著報酬。最後，進行動能操作策略的形成期間分析。在持有期間第11個月至第18個月內，日本股市出現價格反轉情形。根據形成期間歷史報酬率高低，採用前17個月至前12個月的六個月累積歷史報酬率作為選股依據，採取反向操作策略，發現日本股市存在價格反轉現象。 / Momentum strategies do not yield significant positive returns in the Japanese stock market in the sample period (1975 to 2009). In the three sub-periods, 1975 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009, it demonstrates the same conclusion. Momentum effect does not exist in the Japanese stock market. This study shows that the ranking order of winners and losers is associated with financial characteristics of firm. Overall, average trading volume and average market value of losers stocks are both smaller than those of winners stocks. In addition, the monthly return of momentum strategies has no significant seasonal pattern in the Japanese stock market. In this study, we compare the performance of three different momentum strategies: JT’s individual stock momentum, the 52-week high and the moving average ratio in the Japanese stock market. All of three strategies in the Japanese stock market cannot receive significant profits. Final section tests the periodical analysis of momentum strategies. When extending the holding period, we can find that Japanese stock market experiences price reversal from the 11th to 18th months. According to the historical return in formation period, we choose six-month accumulated historical return (17 to 12 months prior to portfolio formation) as the stock selection principle. Under this contrarian strategy, we find that the Japanese stock market has phenomenon of price reversal.

Generation Z har under sin korta tid som investerare på den finansiella marknaden varit med om en säregen börskrasch till följd av coronapandemin 2020. Börskraschen 2020 var unik i förhållande till tidigare börskrascher såsom IT-kraschen 2000 och finanskrisen 2008 eftersom marknaden återhämtade sig och nådde nya rekordnivåer inom ett halvår. Samtidigt stod svenska investerare under de första månaderna av 2022 inför ett nytt ras där den genomsnittliga aktien på Stockholmsbörsen sjunkit med ungefär 36% från dess högsta nivå under perioden 2020–2022 till följd av en hög inflationstakt samt Rysslands invasion av Ukraina. Forskningen kring den yngsta gruppen investerare, generation Z, som saknar erfarenhet av långvariga osäkra marknadsförhållanden är bristfällig och ger därmed upphov till en ny grupp investerare att studera. Studiens syfte är att studera hur riskbenägenhet samvarierar med börspsykologiska bias, kognitiv reflektionsförmåga och erfarenhet från tidigare finansiella kriser samt hur dessa faktorer skiljer sig mellan generation Z och tidigare generationer. Studien finner att generation Z till större del faller för samtliga börspsykologiska bias förutom överreaktion och visar på ett flertal signifikanta skillnader mellan generation Z och äldre generationer. Resultatet visar även att anchoring och konfirmeringsbiassamvarierar signifikant med riskbenägenhet och att den största skillnaden mellan generation Z och äldre generationer kan hänföras till börspsykologiska bias. / Generation Z has during their short time as investors experienced a market crash due to the covid-pandemic in 2020 but also a quick recovery in the same year where the market reached a new all-time high. The market crash in 2020 was unique compared to the crash following the burst of the Dot-com bubble in 2000 and the financial crisis in 2008 because of the quick recovery of the stock market that led to new all-time highs. However, during the first months of 2022, Swedish investors were once again experiencing a market crash where the average stock on the Stockholm stock exchange had lost more than 36% of its value since their peak between 2020-2022 due to high inflation and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The youngest group of investors, generation Z, lacks experience from long-lasting uncertainties in the stock market. Research regarding generation Z is insufficient which gives rise to a new group of investors to study. The purpose of the thesis is to study the relationship between risk tolerance and psychological biases, cognitive reflection and experience from previous stock market crashes and how these factors differ between generation Z and older generations. The thesis finds that generation Z is indicated to be more affected by every psychological bias except overreaction and finds several significant differences between generation Z and the older generations. The result also shows that confirmation bias and anchoring have a significant relationship to risk tolerance and that the largest differences between generation Z and older generations are derived from psychological biases.