盈餘對公司來說是最簡單、最直接之績效衡量指標，故盈餘之報導對公司相當重要，也因此過去有關盈餘管理及損益平穩化行為之相關研究將重點放在報導水準受到各種因素、各類利害關係人之影響。公司之控制權掌握在股東手中，因此股東對盈餘報導之影響不容忽視；但股東（同時也是投資人）之投資目的及投資策略不盡相同，對盈餘之影響亦可能不同。此外，同產業之公司間會因投資人對其所做之相對績效評估而有相互競爭之行為，致使同產業之行為可能有趨向一致之情況，不同產業則可能不同。 　　本研究以民國八十三年至民國八十八年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其損益平穩化行為，從股權結構觀點（以長、短期投資之股東持股比率）探討其與公司損益平穩化行為之關係，藉以瞭解投資人之投資目的不同對公司長期盈餘之趨勢有何關聯性。其次，針對我國電子產業與非電子產業進行產業效果之研究，探討損益平穩化行為之不同是否與產業有關，以及電子產業損益平穩化之傾向。 　　實證結果發現：(1)公司之平穩化行為與股權結構有顯著關聯性；(2)當公司長期投資之股東持股比率愈高時，公司傾向不採行損益平穩化；(3)當公司短期投資之股東持股比率愈高時，公司愈傾向平穩化其損益；(4)產業因素與我國上市公司損益平穩化行為有顯著關聯性，不同產業之平穩化行為不同，且電子資訊產業傾向不從事損益平穩化。 / Earnings is the simplest and most straightforward indicator of a company's performance. Therefore, earnings reporting could be a crucial concern for an investor's decision-making. There are a lot of researches regarding earnings management and income smoothing focused on how the role of stakeholders and other possible factors would affect the accuracy of a company's earnings reporting. For most companies, their shareholders control the core business activities, and thus it is hard to ignore their impact on the earnings performance. However, due to the discrepancy of investing policies and activities of different types of investor, the extent to which the types of shareholders could influence a company's earnings can be varied. Besides, since companies in the same industry always compete for better performance resulted from investors' relative performance evaluation, there is also a trend that the companies in the same industry would behavior in a similar way when reporting their earnings. 　　In order to prove that there's a significant relationship between a company's trend of reported earnings and its shareholders' investing goals, this thesis collects the overall market data from 1994 to 1999 and then examines each company's income smoothing behavior. In addition to testing whether a company's decision to exerting income smoothing is contributed to the portions of long-term and shot-term shareholders, this thesis also tries to identify whether the industry effect exists among the electronic industry and other industries that can make different industries have discrepant income smoothing behaviors, and find the electronic industry's income smoothing intent. 　　The empirical results document that: (1) A company's income smoothing behavior is significantly related to its ownership structure; (2) A company with larger portion of long-term shareholders tends to not adopt income smoothing strategy; (3) A company with larger portion of short-term shareholders tends to adopt income smoothing strategy; (4) The industry effect is significantly related to companies’ income smoothing behaviors. Different industry has different pattern of income smoothing behavior. The companies in the electronic industry tend to not adopt income smoothing strategy.

本研究以力霸集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析力霸集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理機制說明對內部控制議題及財務舞弊之影響。 研究結果顯示，力霸集團企業之最終控制者王又曾家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內七家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為7.72%、28.92%、6.81%，但平均席次控制權則高達95.33%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達22.11%（88.52%）。力霸集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，該集團企業亦嚴重違反內部控制制度中控制環境、風險評估、控制作業、資訊與溝通，以及監督機制等主要原則，造成投資人權益的重大損失。最後，本研究針對內部控制制度之有效性、公司治理機制、會計師責任，以及金融監理功能四層面，提出討論及建議。 / Using the Rebar Business Group as the case of this study, the present research first analyzes the ownership structures of the member firms from an ultimate controller perspective. Internal control related issues are then identified, followed by a discussion on the effect of corporate governance on internal control weakness and fraudulent reporting. The analysis indicates that cross-holding, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are venues utilized by the Wang Family to actively control Rebar Business Group. An analysis on the measurement of voting right, cash flow right and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights, cash flow rights are on average 7.72%, 28.92%, 6.81%, while the board seat-control ratio is 95.33%. The deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 22.11% (88.52%). To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, this research also finds that all principles buttressed in building a sound internal control system are violated. Finally, suggestions for improvements on internal control system and policies are provided.

隨著經濟自由主義時代來臨，面對全球性的競爭及各國市場逐漸開放，公營事業民營化已是各國政府的重要財經政策之一。過去有關民營化對企業經營績效影響之研究頗為豐富，其中國外文獻大多贊成民營化對企業經營績效有顯著提昇之影響，然而國內相關文獻之研究結果，則較為紛歧。本文以西元1989年我國正式推動民營化政策以來，採用釋股方式完成移轉民營之21家上市公司為研究對象，來探討民營化企業獲利能力及經營績效的影響因素。由實證結果得知，政府持股比率、專業機構投資人持股比率、經理人持股比率、獨立董事人數、員工股票分紅等因素，對公司經營績效呈顯著正相關；然而董監事持股比率、董事會規模等因素，則對公司經營績效呈顯著負相關。 / In the era of economic liberalization and globalization, privatization has become one of the most important economic policies around the world. During the past two decades, most studies have indicated that the performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has improved after they were privatized. However, studies on SOEs of Taiwan have received controversial results. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board composition on the performance of privatized firms in Taiwan that experienced full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1989 to 2008. The results show that the ratio of government holdings, the ratio of institutional investors holdings, the ratio of managers holdings, the number of independent directors and share option schemes have significantly positive effects on firm performances. The results also suggest that the scale of board of directors and the ratio of directors holdings have significantly negative effects.

The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

過去相關文獻從公司治理的角度、股權結構的角度、所有權與經營權分離及代理問題的角度等等來探討董監事持股對公司經營績效的關係，而與其他研究不同者，本研究係從董監持股成數差異數的角度，分析董監持股與公司經營績效的關係。 本研究以2005年到2011年在台灣證券交易所上市之一般產業公司為研究樣本，在控制公司治理與公司特性相關變數，以資產報酬率、股東權益報酬率、每股盈餘EPS衡量公司績效，探討董監持股與規定持股成數之差異數對公司績效之影響。實證結果發現，董監事持股成數超過規定持股成數之公司，其公司經營績效較佳。分析結果可能表示，董監持股比例高，因為其自身的財富與公司財務運作之結果關係密切，監督管理者的動機會較強，而使得公司表現較佳，支持董監事持股比例高於公開發行成數規定之公司，其經營績效較佳之研究假說。換言之，本研究發現符合立法者期望透過較多之董監持股，增強其對公司努力經營及監督管理之動機，以達到提升公司經營績效之目的。 / Most previous studies focus on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. Different from studies from other countries, the institutional setting in Taiwan concerning minimal board members shareholdings required by the “Rules and Review Procedures for Director and Supervisor Share Ownership Ratios at Public Companies (the Rules henceforth)” provides a unique research opportunity to examine the effect of the Rules on firm performance. Based on a sample of general industry firms listed in Taiwan Stocks Exchange over the period of 2005 to 2011, this study investigates whether companies with board members holdings more shares than required shareholdings by the Rules have better firm performance. This study employs return on assets, return on common stockholders’ equity and earnings per share as measures for firm performance, and difference in shareholdings over the required shareholdings as the primary explanatory variable. After controlling for governance related and firm characteristic related variables, the empirical results indicate that firms with positive differences in board ownership from the required shareholdings by the Rules have better performance. This empirical evidence implies that the legislative purpose of the Rules—enhance firm performance through the alignment of ownership interest— is supported.

Abstract This dissertation explores two interrelated aspects of banking crises and bank regulations in perspective of regulator¡¦s soft budget constraints (SBCs in brief) and bank top management compensation. First, this paper models, in a game of incomplete information, bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists between regulators and banks. Here, I show that the situation creates the incentives for banks to roll over their defaulting loans to disguise their financial statements. Although a prudential regulator may mitigate this incentive by offering a ¡§slack¡¨ rescue packages, the bank¡¦s reputational concern may cause them to reject rescue offers. In this instance, regulators may be forced to offer amounts of recapitalization that will meet the amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. Otherwise, banks may have to gamble for resurrection, or wait until the banking crises become severe, and then more banks become insolvent, regulators have to offer optimal rescue packages subject to SBCs. New findings include (1) During banking crises, the optimal regulatory policies, on the one hand, may cause regulators have to offer rescue or bailout packages subject to different SBCs, on the other hand, mitigate banker¡¦s moral hazard. The more severe the crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators. (2) The potential severity of banking crises can be measured by the ratios, getting from net worth over the total amount of recapitalization offered by regulators and recovered from nonperforming loans. (3) As banking crises become severe, the cost of rescue becomes larger than that of bailout, the best regulatory policy is to intervene; On the contrary, if a situation labeled ¡§ too-many-to-fail¡¨ arises, the regulators may offer to rescue distressed banks subject to SBC. (4)As Bayesian equilibrium cost of regulator in crises is increasing, a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may be the optimal policy to mitigate the expectation of SBC for banks . Second, this paper also shows that in the circumstances of universal banking or bank holding company, concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios and risk-based deposit insurance may be ineffective in controlling banker¡¦s risk-taking and moral hazard. Here, this paper follows, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the insurance premium scheme incorporate features of top management compensation. In a model of universal banking with two-periods and three-subsidiaries or departments, bank owner pre-commits to regulators to pick an optimal management compensation structure that induces the first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank¡¦s management. Findings include (1) If insurance premium is not fairly priced, the incentives are created for banks to have a ¡§regulatory arbitrage¡¨ by segregating its nonperforming assets from the investment bank, and shift it to the commercial bank, that increases the deposit-insurer an additional risk liability, and aggravates the risk-shifting within the universal bank; and vice versa. (2) Given management contracts{ fixed salary, a bonus paid, a fraction of equity of the bank} and { fixed salary, a penalty , a fraction of equity}for bank and security investment department respectively ; and a capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome , here bonus paid larger than 0, a penalty larger than 0, a fraction of equity between 0 and 1, then the investment policies implemented by managers, is less risky than when manger¡¦s interests are fully aligned with the equity interests. (3) Given a fairly priced insurance premium, and capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal management compensation structure can internalize the cost of moral hazard and induce the Pareto-optimal and department-equilibrium investment policies, thus mitigate moral hazard under universal banking. Finally, the state-owned and half-state-owned banks have experienced the institution-induced ineffectiveness; and the latter suffer from poor business performance level, partially because of the issues of ownership structure. This paper shows the investment policy with moral hazard under these banks incorporated with optimal compensation structures, and given capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal policies induced, that will improve their business performance level. This paper also shows that as the controlling shareholders have power over banks in excess of their cash flow rights, the incentives will be created for them to expropriate the minority shareholders. And, when the incentives for expropriation exists, the investment policy will be distorted with the managerial bias induced by their private benefits, and deteriorate morale of the banks. The regulatory mandatory requirements of one-share-one-vote principle may be proposed, instead.

År 2000 blev det möjligt för svenska börsnoterade bolag att göra återköp av egna aktier. Detta har medfört ytterligare en möjlighet för hur bolagen kan distribuera den vinst de gör vid brist på andra gynnsamma investeringar. Under perioden 2000 till 2013 har 139 olika bolag genomfört återköp av egna aktier och bland dessa bolag varierar mängden återköpta aktier och antalet genomförda återköpsprogram kraftigt. Aktiebolagslagen sätter ramarna för återköpet och per återköpsprogram får maximalt tio procent av det totala aktiekapitalet köpas tillbaka. Bolagstämman beslutar om återköp skall bli aktuellt och beslutet sträcker sig som längst till nästa bolagsstämma. Sedan 2010 finns en utredning hos regeringen där det föreslås att ta bort tioprocentsspärren och låta det stå bolagen fritt att återköpa hur mycket aktier de vill. Detta examensarbete syftar till att undersöka den svenska markanden och att bidra i debatten och belysa ett område som ej tidigare har undersökts, nämligen sambandet mellan de bolag som genomför återköp av egna aktier samt hur ägarandelen i grupperna styrelsen, ledningen och verkställande direktör påverkas före och efter återköpen. Vidare analyser i den här studien inkluderar 126 av de 139 bolagen. Tretton bolag har exkluderats på grund av bristande uppgifter eller att årsredovisningar helt saknas. Materialet kategoriseras efter dels hur återköpen genomförs; ett enda program, flera program i följd alternativt spridda program, dels efter storlek på bolag enligt SmallCap, MidCap och LargeCap. Vidare analyseras sambandet mellan den genomsnittliga ökningen av det egna innehavet hos bolagets styrelse, ledning och verkställande direktör samt ägarandelen, bolagets storlek och återköpsstrategi. Den slutliga analysen bygger på de bolag som gjort flera återköpsprogram samt där styrelse och VD tillsammans ökat sitt genomsnittliga egna aktieinnehav per återköpsprogram. Vår studie visar ett signifikant samband utifrån den avsedda beroendevariabeln, den genomsnittliga ägarandelen för styrelse och VD samt ett signifikant negativt samband med storlekskategorin largecap. Vilket innebär att den genomsnittliga ökningen i innhav per återköpsprogram delvis kan förklaras genom hur stor ägarandelen var innan återköpet samt bolagets storlek. Även grupptillhörighet, det vill säga typ av återköpsstrategi, har ett samband men detta placerar sig strax under en signifikansnivå på 90 procent. / In the year of 2000 the Swedish government changed a part of the Swedish Companies Act and made it possible for swedish listed companies to repurchase a maximum of ten percent of their own shares. Up until today 139 companies have chosen to use this possibility to distribute some of their profit. Out of the 139 companies thirteen companies are excluded due to missing data, 126 companies remains in further studies of this paper. The pattern of the repurchase varies in three different systems; one share repurchase program alone, several consecutive share repurchase programs and several scattered share repurchase programs. We aim to study if there is a connection between the way the companies repurchase their own shares and the change in ownership within the board, CEO and company management. Our study show that a higher concentration of ownership within the board and CEO has a significant positive effect on the average increase of own shares per program. Also largecap firms has a significant negative effect on the average increase per program.

本文針對金融海嘯時期,信用風險大幅擴張的階段,藉由大股東持股比例、 銀行持股比例、政府持股比例分析其對於各家大型金融機構的信用風險之影響, 本文主要採用 Bloomberg 資料庫以及 Bankscope 資料庫,期間涵蓋 2003 年至 2013 年全球資本排名前 60 的大型金融機構的季資料,並透過縱橫資料的技術來分析 股權結構與信用風險之間的相關性。 結論顯示在危機發生的期間時,政府對於大型金融機構的信用風險存在顯著 的抑制效果,本文接著依照過去文獻對投資人的股權保護程度加以分類後,發現 與過去分析總風險和股權結構之間的關係之結果並不相同,以往的結果顯示,保 護程度比較差的國家中,政府對於公司的風險以及公司決策會存在比較大的影響 力,並會進而降低公司的風險,然而本文得到的結果是投資人股權保護程度比較 強的區域裡面,政府對於降低大型金融機構的信用風險會有著比較顯著的影響 性。 / In this thesis, we investigate the level of credit risk taking concerning the ownership structure in large complex financial institutions during the sub-prime crisis period. We use quarterly data of the top 60 large financial institutions based on Bloomberg and Bankscope, covering the interval from 2003 to 2013. From our results, we show that there is negative relationship between the level of risk and government ownership on banks. Furthermore, if we categorize the banks regarding its investor protection, our findings support that government ownership on banks has a significant effect in countries where it provides stronger protection to investors during financial crisis. Different from previous works, which states that in country with less investor protection, government ownership on banks has more influence power, here we arrive at an opposite result. We conclude that increasing government ownership can significantly reduce the level of credit risk on banks.

本研究以大同集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析大同集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理議題作探討，亦對相關之法令缺失，提出改善及政策建議。 研究結果顯示，大同集團企業之最終控制者林蔚山家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內十一家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為1.17%、21.83%、1.07%，但平均席次控制權則高達61.85%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達20.76%（60.79%），席次控制權與盈餘分配權之偏離倍數為178.01倍，亦即最終控制者可以一單位的出資獲取178單位以席次控制力衡量的實質控制力。大同集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，本研究探討該集團企業掏空資產案件、大幅減資、投資通達國際之相關財務資訊透明度，針對大同集團之股權結構與董監組成分析，提出公司治理相關議題討論。最後，本研究針對公司治理相關法令，提出改善及政策建議。 關鍵詞：集團企業、股權結構、公司治理、席次控制權 / This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies. The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided. Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control.

For decades, business press and researchers have observed and investigated the premiums/discounts on closed end investment companies. Proposed explanations for the phenomenon have been poor performance, high expenses (due to agency relationships), inefficient internal capital markets and excess volatility in the returns of the shares of the closed-end investment companies. Some, but not conclusive, empirical evidence support these theories. Most empirical evidence is based on American data. This study uses British and Swedish data on closed end investment companies. Some, but not conclusive, empirical evidence support these theories. Most empirical evidence is based on American data. This study uses British and Swedish data on closed end investment companies from 1972 – 2004 to investigate the premiums/discounts. Three areas of explanations are examined: performance, agency costs and diversification. In contrast to previous studies this study uses detailed data on quoted and unquoted securities respectively to investigate the relationship between performance and premiums/discounts. Evidence is found for a relationship between the performance on unquoted securities and premiums/discounts, but not for quoted securities. Indications that measurement biases in unquoted securities are properly priced are also found. The agency problem is analyzed in two ways, formal and controlling power, to investigate if actions taken by the company substantiating agency behavior have additional effects on prices. Such actions are measured as large investments in other portfolio companies (controlling power).  The empirical evidence suggests that the existence of formal power creates additional discounts. The marginal effect on discounts is even deeper when proposed agency actions are identified. Diversification is argued to decrease the value of a portfolio of securities when heterogeneous beliefs are present. This study provides evidence that portfolio diversification deepens discounts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2007