This dissertation contains four essays on various topics in the fields of corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay, entitled Corporate Governance and Ownership, presents an overview of the causes and consequences of, and possible remedies for, the separation of ownership and control in corporations. In particular, the essay addresses the costs and benefits of ownership concentration. A specific purpose is to put the role of ownership into perspective, while bringing the reader up to date with some recent developments. Essay number two, Shareholder Gains from Equity Private Placements: Evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange, contains an empirical investigation of the stockmarket’s reaction to announcements of equity private placements and rights issues. The essay sets out to test a range of hypotheses put forward in the literature. Extensive cross-sectional analyses of private placement discounts and abnormal returns are performed. The third essay is named Optimal Deterrence and Inducement of Take-overs: An analysis of Poison Pills and Dilution. This essay models how the ex ante wealth of shareholders could be increased with customized contractual provisions that affect takeover probabilities and premia. The proposed provisions resemble anti-takeover defense measures in the form of poison pill plans, and conversely, voluntary dilution schemes in the fashion prescribed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980). Finally, the fourth essay models the wealth effects of a particular takeover regulation, The Mandatory Bid Rule. This rule requires a potential bidder for a control position in a target firm to extend the offer to include any or all of the outstanding shares. Although the mandatory bid rule is aimed at the protection of minority shareholders, the essay argues that this regultion is not generally in the best interest of the shareholders. Each essay is self-contained and could, in principle, be read in any order chosen by the reader. However, for readers less familiar with the corporate finance literature, the first essay may also serve as a helpful introduction to the following three essays. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

La tesis estudia la evolución de la estructura de propiedad de compañías y de sus efectos sobre resultados económicos reales. El capítulo 1 proporciona un análisis empírico de la privatización en Rusia en los años 90. Se utilizan datos de 530 empresas industriales rusas para estimar los factores implicados en la decisión de privatizar una empresa, en la selección entre diversas opciones de privatización, en la distribución inicial de la propiedad que resulta, y en su evolución posterior. El capítulo 2 estudia los efectos de diferencias de intereses entre accionistas sobre decisiones de inversión y el mercado de acciones en un modelo simple. Suponiendo que los mercados financieros son incompletos, la distribución inicial de la propiedad, la riqueza y las preferencias de los propietarios afectan a su nivel preferido de inversión. Las decisiones sobre la inversión son tomadas por mayoría. Dos extensiones, la protección de accionistas de minoría y ventajas privadas del control, permiten un análisis del papel de las instituciones del gobierno corporativo en las decisiones de inversión y estructura de propiedad. Las predicciones del modelo para la evolución de la estructura de propiedad son coherentes con las observaciones empíricas en el capítulo 1. / The thesis studies the evolution of the ownership structure of companies and its effects on real economic outcomes. Chapter 1 provides an empirical analysis of the large-scale privatization in Russia in the 1990s. A comprehensive data set of 530 Russian manufacturing firms is used to estimate determinants of the decision to privatize a firm, of the choice among different options of privatization, the resulting initial ownership distribution, and its further evolution. Chapter 2 studies the effects of conflicting interests of shareholders on investment decisions and share trade in a simple model. In a setting with incomplete financial markets, the wealth, initial stake and preferences of owners affect their preferred level of investment. Decisions on investment are taken by majority. Two extensions, a protection for minority shareholders and private benefits of control, allow us to analyze the impact of corporate governance arrangements on investment decisions and ownership structure. The model predictions for the evolution of ownership are in line with the empirical observations in chapter 1.

This thesis comprehensively examines financial structure choices of firms in three emerging economies of the East African region. It highlights the lack of research in this area and empirically examines three panel data models of financial structure (ownership, firm-specific factorsâ and firm performance models, whilst incorporating the influence of macroeconomic factors) using panel data estimation techniques, including the method of moments framework. It estimates these models using panel data from 47 listed firms; and then data from 20 private firms. The original and significant contributions to knowledge of my thesis are as follows: it provides novel insights into the relation between ownership structure and firm financial structure; it provides new understanding of the relation between firm-specific factors and financial structure of quoted and private firms in emerging economies (an area where research has been lacking); it provides new understanding and additional evidence with respect to the effect of ownership structure on the performance of firms in the East African region; it incorporates the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors on financial structure choices; and it proposes frameworks for reviewing knowledge of financial structure choices, which can be used for further scholarly work on financial structure of firms in emerging economies. The findings of this research have implications for a possibility of a new theoretical framework for researching financial structure choice of firms in emerging economies; for policy makers to design deliberate policies that enhance access to finance for firms operating in an emerging economy; and for policy makers to regulate institutions (banking sector and capital market) as they develop to ensure equitable access (particularly for the private firms) to finance by all firms operating within the economy. Taken together, the results have implication for future scholarship in that they provide clearer and useful insights on ownership structure, financial structure choices and performance of both quoted and private firms in emerging economies; and the methods used are highly replicable and can be replicated in future studies of financial structure choices of firms in emerging economies. It has also invoked further questions that require answers.

Durant la décennie écoulée, une série de scandales financiers impliquant des firmes d’envergure internationale (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) a secoué les places boursières en déclenchant une crise de la confiance chez les investisseurs. L’analyse des cas précités a révélé un recours massif à la fraude et aux manipulations comptables ce qui a relancé le débat autour de la question de la Qualité du Reporting Financier et de l’efficience des mécanismes de gouvernance.En effet, de récents constats révèlent que des problèmes d’agence générés par une structure de propriété complexe caractérisée par la concentration de la propriété familiale et le recours accru aux mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle vont favoriser l’extraction des bénéfices privés par les actionnaires de contrôle au détriment des minoritaires et par conséquent accroître leur l’incitation à la manipulation de l’information comptable et financière offerte et ce pour dissimuler leurs agissements opportunistes.Dans ce cadre, la présente thèse se propose d’étudier dans quelle mesure la structure de propriété complexe peut entrainer des conflits d’agence aggravant les problèmes d’incitation chez l’actionnaire contrôlant en favorisant l’extraction des bénéfices privés via les transactions avec les parties liées et d’analyser l’effet de cette expropriation sur la Qualité du Reporting Financier de l’entreprise.Nous poursuivons trois principaux objectifs. Le premier est de savoir comment les attributs de la structure de propriété complexe vont impacter la consommation des bénéfices privés faite via les transactions avec les parties liées. Le second est d’analyser comment la dissimulation de la consommation des bénéfices privés va impacter la qualité du reporting financier mesurée par la gestion des résultats comptable et réelle et le conservatisme conditionnel et inconditionnel tout en prenant en considération l’interaction entre la gestion des résultats et le conservatisme. Le troisième objectif est de tester, dans le cadre du conflit principal-principal, l’efficience du rôle du conseil d’administration dans la discipline des actionnaires contrôlants à travers la réduction des bénéfices privés ainsi que dans la garantie d’un reporting financier de qualité en s’opposant à la manipulation de l’information.C’est ainsi que sur un échantillon d’entreprises françaises cotées sur l’indice SBF 250 observées sur la période 2001 à 2009 notre étude a révélé que l’excès du contrôle de l’actionnaire ultime est associée à une plus grande consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous relevons également une relation en U inversé entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et les bénéfices privés. La présence de plusieurs détenteurs de blocs de contrôle entrainant une contestabilité du contrôle s’oppose à la consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous avons pu valider l’hypothèse de la dissimulation en confirmant l’effet médiateur des bénéfices privés du contrôle dans la relation entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et la concentration de la propriété institutionnelle d’une part et la gestion réelle des résultats de l’autre. Nos résultats empiriques confirment l’efficience de l’indépendance du conseil d’administration dans la réduction des bénéfices privés et la gestion des résultats.Mots clé : Bénéfices privés du contrôle, transactions avec les parties liées, structure de propriété complexe, conseil d’administration, gestion des résultats et conservatisme. / During the past decade, a series of financial scandals involving firms of international scope (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) has shaken the stock exchanges in triggering a crisis of confidence among investors. The analysis of the aforementioned cases revealed a massive use of fraud and accounting manipulations which has relaunched the debate on the financial reporting quality and the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.Recent findings reveal that of agency problems generated by a structure of complex ownership structure characterized by the concentration of the family ownership and the increased use of control-enhancing mechanisms will promote the extraction of private profits by the controlling shareholders to the detriment of the minority and therefore increase their incentives to the manipulation of earnings in order to conceal their opportunistic behavior.In this framework, this thesis proposes to study to what extent the structure of complex ownership may cause conflicts of agency aggravating the problems of incitement in the controlling shareholder in favoring the extraction of private profits via the conclusion of related party transactions and to analyze the effect of this expropriation on the financial reporting quality of the firm.We are pursuing three main objectives. The first is to understand how the attributes of the complex ownership structure can affect the private benefits consumption via the conclusion of related party transactions. The second objective is to analyze how the concealment of the consumption of private benefits will impact the financial reporting quality as proxied by the accounting and real earnings management and the conditional and unconditional conservatism. while taking into account the interaction between earnings management and the conservatism. The third objective is to test, in the context of the principal-principal agency conflict, the efficiency of the role of the board of directors in the discipline of the controlling shareholders through the reduction of private profit as well as in the guarantee of the financial reporting of quality.Our study focuses on a sample of 81 French companies listed on the SBF 250 index observed on the period 2001 to 2009. Our results reveal that the excess of the control of the ultimate shareholder is associated with greater private benefits consumption. We also note an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ultimate ownership concentration and private benefits. The presence of multiple large shareholders causing a contestability of control reduces the private benefits extraction. We validate the private benefits dissimulation hypothesis by confirming the mediating effect of the private benefits of control in the relationship between the ultimate shareholder ownership and the institutional ownership the real earnings management. Our empirical results confirm the efficiency of the independence of the board of directors in the reduction of private benefits and the earnings management. Against all expectation, we note a week effect of the Audit Committee on of financial reporting qualityKey words: Private benefits of control, related party transactions, ownership structure, board of directors, earnings management, conservatism.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 silviamontes.pdf.jpg: 15510 bytes, checksum: 69c0cc717aee542e0b58b0a369e96487 (MD5) silviamontes.pdf: 205734 bytes, checksum: e0e79a13f2432a1b556c5ccf9e77a6a4 (MD5) silviamontes.pdf.txt: 63049 bytes, checksum: fe745b0eb4d5ad32f45e7416f9b4a182 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-12T00:00:00Z / This paper investigates, what determines the use of derivatives by the non-financial companies listed in São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). To our knowledge, no prior study in Brazil analyzed risk management under the perspective of managerial risk aversion and agency theory. This is our main contribution to academic study. In this research, 125 listed companies were selected, from which 82 present good levels of corporate governance (named as “Nível 1”, “Nível 2” or “Novo Mercado”). The selected period corresponds to calendar year 2006. Through the binary response model, logit, we found following statistically significant results: positive relation between derivative use and the variables firm’s leverage, market value and outside control blocks and negative relation with firm’s quick-ratio. Existence of stock option programs or characteristic as CFO´s age, CFO´s years vested in the firm or tenure of firm´s CFO´s were not relevant for determining risk management strategies in the companies. / O objetivo da pesquisa consiste em identificar os fatores determinantes à utilização de derivativos por empresas não financeiras listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (Bovespa). A principal contribuição aos estudos já publicados sobre esse tema consiste na avaliação, se estrutura de propriedade e/ou motivos gerenciais influenciam as estratégias de redução do risco da firma. Foram coletados dados de 125 empresas de capital aberto referente ao período 2006, sendo que destas empresas, 82 apresentam níveis diferenciados de boas práticas de governança corporativa (Nível 1, Nível 2 ou Novo Mercado). Através do modelo de variáveis binárias Logit, identificaram-se as seguintes evidências: grau de endividamento, valor de mercado da companhia e concentração de propriedade estão positivamente relacionadas com a utilização de derivativos. Já a adoção de políticas financeiras alternativas, mensurada pelo índice de liquidez seca, apresenta relação negativa. Características como 'existência de programas de opções de ações' e 'idade', 'tempo de empresa' e 'prazo de mandato do diretor financeiro' não se mostraram estatisticamente significantes.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T21:00:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Michel Rapaport.pdf.jpg: 2177 bytes, checksum: cf2c0063d8a98ee6b0aae68e0dbbf0f4 (MD5) Michel Rapaport.pdf.txt: 131241 bytes, checksum: a4081728a9fba35e5c71ff48b4c9ce6b (MD5) license.txt: 4712 bytes, checksum: 4dea6f7333914d9740702a2deb2db217 (MD5) Michel Rapaport.pdf: 458868 bytes, checksum: d055978b1d866a6c6b2079dd412f3fe9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-02T00:00:00Z / This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and firm value, modeling the ownership structure as an endogenous and multi-dimensional variable. For this purpose, the model developed by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) is applied to a sample of 192 firms listed in Bovespa between 2006 and 2008. The results show that firm value can affect the concentration of ownership structure, but not vice-versa. The evidence also indicate that, in Brazil, the ownership structure variable that has a (significant and negative) relationship with firm value is the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, represented by the deviation between the concentration of control rights and concentration of cash flow rights. / Este estudo examina a relação entre estrutura de propriedade e valor das empresas, tratando a estrutura de propriedade de forma endógena e multi-dimensional. Para isso, o modelo desenvolvido por Demsetz e Villalonga (2001) é aplicado em uma amostra de 192 empresas listadas na Bovespa entre 2006 e 2008. Os resultados indicam que o valor da firma pode afetar a concentração da estrutura de propriedade, mas não vice-versa. As evidências obtidas também indicam que, no Brasil, a variável da estrutura de propriedade que influencia, de forma negativa, o valor das empresas é o potencial de expropriação dos acionistas minoritários pelos acionistas controladores, representada pelo desvio entre a concentração do direito de controle e a concentração do direito de fluxo de caixa.

Le rachat d'actions est devenu au fil des années une opération financière répondue au même titre que la distribution de dividende. Toutefois, le rachat reste une opération complexe dont la recherche peine à apprécier les motivations et les conséquences. En effet, la décision de rachat est à la fois une décision d'investissement, de distribution, de structure de capital et un moyen de modifier la structure de l'actionnariat. Cette recherche se penche sur les motivations des opérations de rachat d'actions annoncées sur le marché français et analyses leurs conséquences et impacts sur le cours de l'action, les conflits d'agence et la structure de l'actionnariat. / The share repurchase has become in recent years an increasingly important instrument for distributing cash to shareholders. However, the repurchase is a complex operation whose research has difficulties to appreciate its motivations and consequences. Indeed, the decision to repurchase is an investment, payout, and capital structure decision and also the way to change the ownership structure. This research examines the motivations of buyback program of French market and analyzes their implications and impacts in stock price, agency conflicts and ownership structure.

La rémunération des grands dirigeants a augmenté de façon substantielle ces dernières décennies et a participé à l’accroissement des inégalités par les hauts revenus. Deux typologies pour les actionnaires de contrôle sont proposées pour analyser l’évolution et les pratiques de rémunérations des (P-)DG au sein des grands groupes cotés français. La première typologie se fonde sur l’identité de l’actionnaire et différencie des actionnaires actifs et engagés dans la stratégie de la firme, et des actionnaires passifs ou diversifiés. Parmi ces derniers se trouvent des actionnaires dont la stratégie est essentiellement financière. Les rémunérations sont plus élevées et plus sensibles aux performances de court-terme pour ces derniers. La seconde typologie se fonde sur deux critères : le degré (participation au capital) et l’ancienneté (années d’exercice du contrôle) du contrôle. En s’appuyant sur un modèle de données de panel à effet de seuil (modèle PTR), les politiques de rémunération des dirigeants permettent de différencier quatre régimes dans le degré, et deux dans l’ancienneté du contrôle. Cette typologie différencie les contrôles de type dispersé, influent, dominant et majoritaire, d’une part, et les effets des actionnaires de contrôle récents et de long-terme, d’autre part. L’évolution des rémunérations est enfin étudiée en se fondant sur ces deux typologies et sur une période de 12 années. Au-delà de facteurs liés au fonctionnement du « marché des dirigeants », les typologies mettent en évidence un phénomène de rattrapage et de contagion consécutif à la transparence des rémunérations depuis 2001, et une forte augmentation des bonus sous l’effet de l’augmentation des capitalisations boursières et des transformations de l’actionnariat qui l’ont accompagnée. / CEO compensation rose substantially in the last decades and contributed to the rise in high revenues. Two typologies for the controlling shareholders are suggested to study the evolution and the pay-setting process of CEO compensation in large French listed firms. The first typology is based on the identity of shareholders and differentiates active and involved ones to passive or diversified ones. While the former are involved in the industrial strategy of the firm, the latter comprise shareholders whose strategy is mainly financial. CEO pays are higher and more sensitive to short-term performance in this latter case. The second typology is defined according to two criteria, namely the degree and seniority of control. They respectively refer to the share of equity and the number of years of control. Based on a Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model, CEO pay policies allows to differentiate four regimes in the degree of control, and two in the seniority of control, namely dispersed, influent, dominant, and majority control on the one hand, and new and long-term controlling shareholders, on the other hand. These two typologies are eventually used to study the evolution of CEO pay over a 12-year period in France. Beyond factors related to the so-called “market for CEOs”, the typologies reveal a catching up and contagion effect since the implementation of transparency since 2001, and a tremendous rise in bonuses that went hand in hand with the rise in market capitalizations and subsequent changes in ownership patterns.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is widely discussed in the business community in terms of its effectiveness. However, studies of factors that can affect CSR are not so many. The purpose of this study is to evaluate of the impact of ownership structure on Environmental and Social performance. This study was conducted on the example of 174 cases among Swedish companies, listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Environmental and Social performance, which was represented by the largest information provider Thomson Reuters. Using the experience of previous studies, a model of relationship between ownership structure and Environmental and Social performance was founded and a multiple regression analysis was performed. The most significant result of the study, confirmed by previous empirical studies and theoretical literature, is the existence of a relationship between capital structure and CSR performance. Foreign investors, who came to the Swedish market, have a stable positive connection with performance. This form of ownership, like majority control, did not find sufficient evidence to the impact on Environmental and Social performance in this study. The Minority control and Joint Minority and Management control showed no influence on performance in Swedish companies.

Governança corporativa pode ser entendida como o conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo e controle, internos e externos, que visam a minimizar os custos decorrentes do problema de agência. O tema é importante por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que as práticas de governança afetam o desempenho das empresas. Esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar se os mecanismos de governança são exógenos e se exercem influência sobre o valor de mercado e a rentabilidade das companhias abertas no Brasil. A pesquisa foi dividida em três partes inter-relacionadas. A primeira parte investigou os determinantes da qualidade da governança corporativa, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que algumas empresas apresentem um nível de governança maior do que outras submetidas a um mesmo ambiente contratual. Como aproximação para a qualidade da governança corporativa, construiu-se um índice de governança para as 161 companhias componentes da amostra. O resultado principal desta primeira parte sugere que a estrutura de propriedade influencia a qualidade da governança corporativa. Especificamente, encontrou-se uma relação negativa significante entre o excesso de direito de voto em posse do acionista controlador e a qualidade da governança. Os resultados também indicaram que as empresas maiores, emissoras de ADRs e com melhor desempenho apresentam, em média, melhor governança corporativa. A segunda parte do estudo investigou os determinantes da concentração da propriedade, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que o acionista controlador detenha um percentual maior de ações nas companhias abertas. Aplicando técnicas de dados em painel para o período de 1998 a 2002, os resultados indicaram que a concentração da propriedade não parece ser determinada de forma endógena por outras variáveis corporativas. Os resultados, todavia, dependem do método de estimação dos coeficientes empregado, já que se obteve significância estatística pelo método dos Mínimos Quadrados Ordinário mas não pelos procedimentos de Efeitos Aleatórios e de Efeitos Fixos, que se mostraram mais adequados. A terceira parte da pesquisa investigou a relação entre governança e desempenho por meio de diferentes abordagens econométricas em escala crescente de complexidade. Os resultados não indicaram uma influência significante e consistente da qualidade da governança sobre o desempenho das empresas, já que houve mudança no sentido da relação entre o nível de governança e algumas variáveis de desempenho quando foi aplicada a abordagem de equações simultâneas, em relação aos resultados obtidos nas regressões múltiplas com equações isoladas. Das variáveis de desempenho testadas, Q de Tobin foi a que mostrou a relação positiva mais consistente com a qualidade da governança. Como outros resultados importantes, observou-se que as empresas com menor concentração do direito de voto em posse do controlador, menor nível de endividamento, maior proporção de intangíveis, maior tamanho, emissoras de ADRs e com ações mais líquidas apresentaram, em média, melhor desempenho. A discrepância dos resultados obtidos na relação entre governança corporativa e desempenho, em função da abordagem econométrica empregada, destaca a necessidade de um maior desenvolvimento da teoria sobre governança corporativa, de forma a melhor especificar, por meio de equações estruturais, os relacionamentos entre os diferentes mecanismos de governança. / Corporate governance can be defined as the set of incentive and control mechanisms designed to minimize the costs deriving from the managerial agency problem. The subject is important since it is well spread the hypothesis that governance practices impact firm’s performance. This thesis aims at evaluating if governance mechanisms are exogenous and if they influence market value and profitability of listed companies in Brazil. The research is divided into three interrelated sections. The first section investigated the determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality, trying to uncover which firm’s observable characteristics lead some companies to achieve higher governance ratings than others in the same contractual environment. In order to obtain a proxy for corporate governance quality, a governance index was built for the sample of 161 firms. The main result of the first section suggests that ownership structure influences corporate governance quality. Specifically, it was found a significant negative relationship between the excess of voting shares held by controlling shareholder and corporate governance rating. Furthermore, the results indicated that larger companies, ADR issuers, and firms with better performance have, on average, better corporate governance. The second section investigated the determinants of ownership concentration in Brazil. The analysis aims at uncovering which firm’s characteristics lead some controlling shareholders to have higher concentration of shares. By applying panel data techniques for 1998 to 2002 period, the results indicated that ownership concentration doesn’t seem to be endogenously determined by other corporate variables. The results, however, are sensitive to coefficients’ estimation method. Statistically significant coefficients were found when Ordinary Least Squares were applied. However, this method appeared to be less adequate than Random Effects and Fixed Effect procedures, whose resulting estimates revealed that none of the explanatory variables’ coefficients were statistically significant. The third section investigated the relationship between corporate governance and performance through different econometric approaches in increasing level of complexity. The results didn’t indicate a significant and consistent influence of governance quality on corporate performance, since there was a sign change of the relation between governance level and some performance variables when the simultaneous equation approach was applied, compared with the results obtained by the single equation regressions approach. From the performance variables used, Tobin’s Q showed the more consistent positive relation with governance level. The results also suggest that firms with lower voting rights’ concentration held by controlling shareholder, lower debt level, higher proportion of intangibles assets, larger size, more liquid shares and ADRs issuers show, on average, better performance. The discrepancy of the results on the relation between corporate governance and performance, due to the econometric approach employed, highlights the need for a better development of corporate governance theory, in order to improve the specification, through structural equations, of the relationships between different governance mechanisms.