Most recent literature that analyzes parties from an organizational perspective focuses often on the concepts of intra-party democracy and party organizational democratization (Scarrow, 1999a; Scarrow and Kittilson, 2003; LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2002; Bosco and Morlino, 2007). Le Duc (2001) and Rahat and Hazan (2007) underline that the most used instrument for implementing this ‘democratization’ process is the enhancement of the inclusiveness of the methods for candidate and party leadership selection. The actors endowed with candidate and leader selection powers are the central actors in the functioning of the party according to many authors (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Marsh 1993; Massari, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). At the moment, the most inclusive method identified by the literature for selecting candidates for elections or the party leader is represented by party open or closed primaries, i.e. internal direct elections by party members and, in the case of open primaries, supporters and voters (Cross and Blais, 2011; Kenig, 2009b).<p>In this study, we explore two specific dimensions of party politics: membership and internal activisms, on the one hand, and on the other hand the internal democratization processes and in particular those dealing with broadening the inclusiveness of leadership selection procedures. Therefore, this study integrates in particular the debate on the nature and consequences of party organizational democratization. The debate finds its origins both in the influential work of Michels on the “iron law of oligarchy” thesis but has been more recently boosted by the theories of May (1973), Mair (1994) and also the studies on intra-party democracy in the British Labour (Shaw, 1994; Russell, 2005).<p>However, we are interested in the point of view of members themselves on the consequences of internal democratization. We are interested on how members perceive these organizational changes, in whether they are frustrated form the actual consequences on their role and powers and whether they perceive them as a potential threat that could undermine their organizational position within the party. In order to respond to the debate on the consequences of intra-party democracy at individual level, we rely mainly on three questions. The main research questions of this study are thus the following: to what extent party organizational changes in the sense of greater democratization affect the membership role at individual level? How are these organizational changes perceived by members? To what extent members’ perceptions of their own role affect their behaviors and in particular their internal activism?<p>The aim of this study, thus, is to empirically assess the impact on members’ activism of party internal democratization and in particular of the perception of membership role. We are interested in whether party members’ attitudes are changing as a result of parties’ organizational changes, particularly if these changes are giving members more say over outcomes. This is a study of how (and whether) perceived roles affect behaviour. The independent variable is constituted by the members’ perception of their own role within party organizational structures and in particular with regard to the leadership selection methods, whilst the dependent variable is represented by the level of activism of party members, in terms of participation to party activities in general. In fact, the impact of party rules at individual level will be addressed, as well as how the perception of organizational rules affects individual attitudes and behaviors. In particular, the focus is on leadership selection methods that integrate party members at some point in the overall process (Lisi, 2009), such as direct elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2006). The case selection is thus implemented on the basis of the research question: the comparison is developed across parties (and not across time) using different instruments for enhancing intra-party democracy.<p>Therefore, we analyze the role perception, attitudes and behaviors of grass-roots members of three contemporary Western European parties: the Belgian French-speaking socialist party (Parti Socialiste, PS), the British Labour and the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). Among the selected parties, one (PD) holds primaries open to all voters for selecting their leader and one (Belgian PS), on the contrary, has chosen the closed primary (OMOV) system. The British Labour Party uses an electoral college for electing its leader since 1981. The Electoral College method refers to a system in which specific groups are allocated a specific share of the leadership vote. In the case of the UK Labour, the votes are equally divided among its constituency members, the parliamentary caucus and the trade union members.<p>Concerning the first research question of our study, our empirical results underline that in the three selected cases organizational changes affect indeed the membership role at individual level and that grass-root members perceive very clearly this impact on their status and organizational rights, obligations and privileges. When grass-roots members evaluate their role within the party, in particular with regard to the procedure for selecting the leader and the involvement of non-members and passive members within party organization, their perceptions take into account their organizational power as defined, among other factors, also by their share of votes in leadership selection. Thus, we expect that PD members perceive their role as more blurred than Labour members and particularly than PS members. In the case of parties, such as the PS, adopting direct elections of the party leader only by the affiliates, the majority of the members are expected to perceive clearly the distinction of the position, privileges and functions between members and non-members and the extensive role reserved for the affiliates.<p>Our data show that the perception of own role vary among members, but also that many members perceive their own role as being rather blurred. They display in fact nuanced but generally negative attitudes towards the integration of voters and supporters within the selection of party leader. On the basis of our survey data, the observed variation in the perception of membership role within and between the three parties seems to correspond to what we expected. A higher proportion of PD surveyed members declare to perceive their role as blurred, while smaller proportions of PS and particularly labour respondents share this evaluation. In general, our data confirm that party members do not evaluate positively the fact that these formal privileges are extended not only to all individual members, not only to activists but even to passive ones, but also to party voters and supporters. Mair’s “activists’ disempowerment” thesis (Mair, 1994) seems to be supported by our data, at least in terms of individual perceptions.<p>Moreover, our data show that the degree of satisfaction with intra-party democracy significantly vary among parties and is generally not nearly as high as could be expected on the basis of party politics literature. If in the British Labour survey the responses of grass-roots members seem to form a more positive picture, with a great majority of member declaring that the party leader is not too powerful, the level of dissatisfaction with party functioning is rather higher in the other two parties. Nevertheless, PS members are fairly more convinced than PS members that the party internal decision-making is democratic. This is what we expected to find on the basis of our first hypothesis. In fact, our first hypothesis postulated that the perception of the role of party membership by affiliates in terms of (lack of) distinction between members and non-members affects inversely their level of satisfaction with the internal functioning of the party and their degree of perceived political efficacy. The stronger the perception of the blurred role of membership, the lower will be the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party. According to our data, among PD members the perception of the blurred, undefined role of members is rather high and so is the degree of dissatisfaction with intra-party functioning. On the contrary, within the other two parties and especially within the Labour, the role perception by grass-roots members is rather positive and well-defined and the level of specific support for the party is also higher.<p>The expectations formulated on the basis of our first hypothesis appear to be supported by the empirical data also with regard to the variations in the sense of external political efficacy of members. Our data seem consistent with the hypothesis, developed by several scholars (Katz and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2009), that expanding the leadership selectorate and granting formal powers to party members and supporters may hide, on the other hand, the perception by enrolled members to be actually loosing power. On the basis of our data, it is possible to assert that grass-roots members seem to be aware of the possibility of a trade-off between extreme inclusiveness of decision-making procedures and actual centralization of organizational power in the hands of party elites.<p>With regard to the third research question of this study, our results confirm that indeed members’ perceptions of their own role, in relation to internal democratization, affect their behaviors and in particular their internal participation. The three parties appear to have different features in terms of internal activism, at aggregate but in particular at individual level. Secondly, not only the overall level of intra-party activism of grass-roots members vary between and within the three selected parties, but appears to be influenced by members’ attitudes towards the party. In fact, our second hypothesis postulated that the levels of specific support for the party and political efficacy of party members impact directly on their level of activism. The lower the level of political efficacy and specific support for the party, the lower will be the degree of activism of all members (as well as the quality of the activities they perform) and vice-versa. In a party holding open and direct elections to choose its leader, party membership is thought to be divided between a highly active avant-garde and a larger mass of inactive affiliates, feeling inefficacy, frustrated with intra-party democracy and perceiving their own role as blurred and undefined. Consequently, dissatisfied or low efficacy members are argued to participate less.<p>Our data only partially support the expectations. In fact, the impact of the sense of external efficacy is clear and strong in all the three cases, while on the contrary the relationship between specific support and intra-party activism is less clear-cut than expected. The results are therefore nuanced with regard to the expectations formulated in the second hypothesis of this study. The explanatory power of external efficacy and specific support in terms of internal mobilization is only partially supported by our data. Therefore, the evaluation of the consequences of the implementation of party organizational changes such as the adoption of open primaries depends on what party elites are interested in: if the goal is to assure membership loyalty, adopting open primaries is not a good way to strengthen membership involvment in the party.<p>We believe that real intra-party democracy is normatively impossible with regard to the position of members. Organizational power cannot be too dispersed among different units without jeopardizing not only effective functioning of the party, as the old debated on the trade-off between democracy and efficacy asserted (Duverger, 1951; Panebianco, 1988), but also the incentives for internal participation of the party base. Party members are well aware that internal power cannot be too dispersed. From the point of view of members, a party should have a clear chain of command and should be composed by elites, activists and members. Each one of them should also be endowed with clearly defined tasks and responsibilities. In conclusion, we believe that intra-party democracy is a symbolic element of party organization but not as actually implementable.<p>In sum, intra-party democracy does not mean the same for different party units. For party elites, it represents a process for either legitimizing the party, changing party image, mobilizing electoral support, managing internal faction or even indirectly increasing their own organizational room for manoeuvre. For party members, intra-party democracy represents an incentive for mobilizing and a political identification tool until a certain point. After that, it becomes a threat to their rights and their status. For grass-roots affiliates, intra-party democracy is not a value per se, but it depends on its real intensity and actual implementation. In conclusion, at theoretical level, we can conclude that party organization theories should increasingly take into account membership’s point of view. On the contrary, at practical level, we can conclude that parties should adapt their strategies with regard to intra-party democracy according to their goal. If party elites are interested in tightening their grip on internal decision-making while increasing their room for manoeuvre and legitimizing party image at the same time, increasing intra-party democracy could be the best organizational strategy. On the contrary, if the leadership’s aim is to mobilize members and guarantee a stable and loyal membership, then it should be noted that increasing intra-party democracy is not always the best choice. To this regard, it might be useful for party elites to find other and more effective ways to loyalize member.<p><p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Les années 1860-1880 forment une charnière dans l’histoire de la démocratie britannique, car cette période fut celle de la seconde loi de Réforme, qui étendit le droit de vote à de plus larges sections des classes ouvrières. Ce changement politique fut le fruit de nombreuses manifestations nationales dont les syndicats furent les figures de proue. L’engagement en faveur de l’Union au cours de la guerre de Sécession, et en faveur de l’unité nationale italienne et polonaise, fut le vecteur de l’entrée en politique des classes ouvrières. La construction de la citoyenneté ouvrière est étudiée ici au travers des articles du Bee-Hive, journal ouvrier radical et libéral qui fut créé en 1861 pour réclamer en priorité le droit de vote. / The 1860s-1870s form a turning point in the history of British democracy, because these were the years when the second Reform Act was passed, which extended the right to vote to larger sections of the working classes. Such political change was the result of numerous national demonstrations organised by the Trades’ Unions. By showing their strong commitment to the Union during the American Civil War, and to Italian and Polish national unity, the working classes signalled their determination to enter the field of politics. This doctoral thesis studies the construction of working class citizenship through the pages of the Bee-Hive, a radical and liberal working class paper primarily created in 1861 to claim for suffrage.

Depuis l'indépendance du Mexique (1821), deux groupes politiques se disputent le contrôle du pays. Pendant tout le XXe siècle, le système de parti hégémonique a rendu impossible l'observation de clivages dans le pays et, bien au contraire, a stimulé l'idée d'un État-Parti « au-dessus de la mêlée ». Nous exploitons le concept de clivage en tant qu'outil qui permet de voir où se trouvent aujourd'hui les lignes qui divisent les sociétés. Nous étudions le cas des principaux partis politiques au Mexique : le Parti Action Nationale (PAN), le Parti de la Révolution Démocratique (PRD) et le Parti Révolutionnaire Institutionnel (PRI). Les amendements constitutionnels survenus pendant le gouvernement Salinas ont placé à nouveau le conflit entre l'État et l'Église Catholique au centre du débat national. Nous remarquons que le conflit s'est institutionnalisé et s'est poursuivi jusqu'à aujourd'hui, laissant apparaître un important clivage historique déjà perçu à l'époque de l'indépendance. Pour parvenir à notre but, nous présentons une série d'entretiens réalisés avec les jeunes leaders des partis politiques. Nous analysons leurs réponses à partir du clivage État/Église catholique. Des questions croisées à propos des sujets dits « sensibles » (l'avortement et le mariage gay) nous permettent d'observer la reproduction du clivage. Nous élaborons et proposons une typologie (Weber) pour guider et conduire la recherche / Since the independence of Mexico (1821), two political groups have been competing for the control of the country. Throughout the twentieth century, the hegemonic party used the entire state apparatus system to make it impossible to observe the cleavages in the country and on the contrary it stimulated the idea of a party-state above all social conflict. We have studied and exploited the concept of cleavage as a tool. This concept allows us to examine where the lines that divide the society lie. The case of mayor political parties has been studied: the National Action Party (PAN) the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The constitutional amendments that occurred during Salinas's administration have put the State and the Catholic Church in confrontation again. Indeed, this conflict has become the center of a national debate. We can see that the conflict has been institutionalized and has continued until today. To reach our goal we present a series of interviews with the young leaders from political parties. We analyze their answers from the State - Catholic Church cleavage. Crossed questions about the “sensitive” subjects (abortion and gay marriage) let us detect the reproduction of cleavage. We develop and propose a typology (Weber) to guide and lead this research

Initialement adoptée en tant que moyen permettant à la nation turque d' accéder au club des nations européennes civilisées, la laïcité, telle qu'elle est interprétée et appliquée en Turquie, est aujourd'hui devenue l'un des obstacles majeurs à l'adhésion de ce pays à l'Union européenne. Alors que le respect des droits de l'homme est une condition préalable à l'adhésion, la laïcité est perçue et souvent invoquée comme l'un des fondements de la restriction d'une partie importante des libertés fondamentales en Turquie. Certes, en enfermant la religion dans un cadre bien établi et en diminuant ainsi l'influence de celle-ci sur les affaires étatiques et la vie sociale, une conception autoritaire de la laïcité a permis à l'État et à la nation turcs d'accéder à la modernité et de s'approcher de la civilisation européenne. En même temps, une telle application de la laïcité a ralenti le développement de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme en Turquie. Devenue un véritable dogme, la sauvegarde de la laïcité a été invoquée par les forces années turques comme l'un des motifs principaux justifiant leurs interventions dans la vie politique. Elle a constitué également le fondement de la dissolution de plusieurs partis politiques et la répression de l'expression pacifique des opinions par les juges turcs. Cet activisme militaro-judiciaire nuit gravement à l'évolution de la démocratie et de la situation des droits de l'homme en Turquie. Pourtant, il existe d'autres moyens qui permettent à la fois de protéger le caractère laïc de l'État contre le danger d'islamisation et de garantir les droits et libertés fondamentaux, facilitant ainsi l'adhésion de ce pays à l'UE : la protection et la promotion du pluralisme religieux existant au sein de la société turque. C'est dans le développement de la tolérance par rapport aux différentes identités religieuses dans la société turque que l'État trouvera le meilleur rempart face au danger defondamentalisme. / Secularism was originally adopted by the Turkish nation in order to join the club of civilized European nations. In our present times, however, secularism, as interpreted and applied in Turkey, has become one of the major obstacles to its accession to the European Union. While respect for human rights is a precondition for accession, secularism is often perceived and used as a basis to restrict many fundamental freedoms in Turkey. Indeed, by confining religion within well established bounds and thus reducing its influence on state affairs and social life, an authoritarian conception of secularism enabled the state and the Turkish nation to modernize and consequently become closer to European civilization. At the same time, such an application of secularism has slowed the development of democracy and human rights in Turkey. Having become a dogma, safeguarding secularism has been invoked by the Turkish armed forces as one of the main reasons justifying their intervention in poli tics. It has also served as the basis for the dissolution of several political parties and the repression of peaceful expression of opinions by the Turkish courts. This judicial and military activism impairs the development of democracy and the situation of human rights in Turkey. Yet there are other ways to protect the secular nature of the state against the danger of islamization and to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms, thus facilitating the country's accession to the EU: the protection and promotion of the religious pluralism existing within Turkish society. It is through the development of tolerance with regard to different religious identities in Turkish society that the state will find the best defence against the danger of fundamentalism.

Cette thèse analyse les causes de l’apparition, la nature des discours, les modes d’institutionnalisation et les effets sociaux produits par les populismes bulgares pendant une période de plus de vingt ans : de 1992 à 2013. On soutient notamment l’hypothèse que les populismes bulgares catalysent une « révolution rampante » qui remet en cause les hiérarchies sociales et les canaux de représentation politique émanant de la « révolution du palais » de 1989. Elle résulte de la dialectique entre l’institutionnalisation de l’idéologie populiste en tant que grille d’analyse de la réalité et de l’impossibilité de sa réalisation par les partis formés autour des leaders qui la mobilisent. / This thesis analyses the reasons of the appearance, the type of discourse, the modes of institutionalization and the social effects generated by the Bulgarian populisms over a period of more than twenty years: from 1992 to 2013. We argue that Bulgarian populism catalyses a "creeping revolution": it questions the social hierarchies and the channels of political representation that results from the "palace revolution" of 1989; it is a consequence of the dialectic between the institutionalization of the populist ideology as an analytical framework and the impossibility of its implementation by the parties formed around the leaders who mobilize it. / Дисертацията анализира причините за появата, природата на дискурса, типовете институционализация и социалните ефекти, породени от популизмите в България през период от повече от двадесет години: от 1992 г. до 2013 г. Защитава се хипотезата, че популизмите в България катализират “пълзяща революция”. Тя поставя под съмнение социалните йерархии и каналите за политическо представителство, произтичащи от “дворцовия преврат” от 1989 г. Причина за това е диалектиката между институционализацията на популистката идеология като аналитична рамка за разбиране на политическите и икономически процеси и невъзможността за нейната реализация от партиите, формирани около лидерите, които я изповядват.

La thèse consiste en un réexamen des traits saillants des systèmes politique et partisan du Japon d’avant-guerre (1890-1937). L’analyse de données quantitatives et qualitatives sur l’achat de voix et les pratiques d’ingérence des gouvernements dans le déroulement des campagnes électorales démontre que la première pratique était massive et généralisée et les secondes systématiques. L’achat de voix massif et généralisé et les pratiques d’ingérence étaient liés par une relation de complémentarité fonctionnelle, l’ingérence consistant le plus communément en la répression partiale des fraudes électorales. Le système partisan s’ordonnait autour de ce binôme d’expédients. Les acteurs collectifs de ce système furent des spécimens du type « parti-cartel, stratarchique, clientélistes et attrape-tout », des partis qui n’activaient pas de clivage sociologique ou idéologique. Le binôme d’expédients structurants eut de nombreuses conséquences systémiques et constitua la plus puissante des modalités de la politisation des rapports sociaux. En conclusion, les résultats de l’examen de la pratique de l’achat de voix dans le Japon d’avant-guerre sont confrontés à ceux que proposent des études de cette pratique en d’autres sociétés, les États-Unis d’Amérique et le Royaume-Uni au XIXe siècle ou, au XXe siècle, des pays d’Amérique Latine et Taiwan. / This thesis is a reappraisal of salient features of the political and party systems in prewar Japan (1890-1937). Analysis of qualitative and quantitative data on vote buying and governmental interference in electoral campaigns demonstrate that the first practice was massive and generalized; and that the second was systematic. These two practices were tied by a functional relationship since the most common form of governmental interference consisted in a partisan bias in the repression of electoral frauds. The core of electoral politics was a functional set of expedients. The collective actors of this system are characterized as specimens of the “cartel party stratarchic, clientelistic, catch-all” type, many political parties that did not activate any sociological or ideological cleavage. The two electoral expedients bore many systemic consequences and were the most powerful ways of the politicization of social relationships in this society. The concluding chapter is a comparative examination of the characteristics and properties of vote buying in prewar Japan to those of the same practice in other societies, the 19th century United States of America and Britain, or 20th century Latin America and Taiwan.

Malgré le poids considérable des structures internes des organisations partisanes dans la structuration du champ politique turc, l’analyse sociologique de celles-ci reste un terrain assez délaissé dans l’étude des partis turcs. La scène politique turque des années deux mille a été marquée par la prédominance de deux partis : d’une part, le Parti de la justice et du développement (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti) qui a remporté les élections de 3 novembre 2002 en obtenant 34,28% des voix juste un an après sa fondation ; et d’autre part, le Parti républicain du peuple (Cumulatrice Halk Partisi, CHP) – le premier parti politique de la période républicaine refondé en 1992 par Deniz Baykal – qui a réussi à siéger de nouveau à la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) avec 19, 39% des suffrages exprimés. Contrairement au nombre limité des recherches universitaires, les développements récents concernant les dynamiques internes des partis, tant au niveau national que local, font souvent l’objet d’articles des journalistes spécialisés sur les partis ou même apparaissent à la une de la presse nationale notamment en période de congrès ou d’élections législatives ou locales. Dans cette perspective, nous proposons de faire une analyse sociologique, d’une manière comparative, des organisations partisanes de l’AK Parti et du CHP pour mettre en perspective les modes de gouvernement des partis politiques en Turquie. Afin de procéder à une telle étude, il nous semble nécessaire de prendre en compte certains éléments historiques et constitutifs du phénomène partisan en Turquie. Nous proposons de faire le point sur ces éléments par l’intermédiaire d’un état des lieux des travaux sur les partis turcs à travers une mise en perspective théorique. / No English summary available.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Mannheim, 1970. / Bibliography: p. 436-448.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Uppsala, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [368]-391).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Uppsala, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 307-316) and index.