Thesis advisor: Christopher Kelly / The question my dissertation addresses is the relationship between human passions and politics. It attempts to try to understand whether or not there is a standard in nature for judging how human passions ought to be ordered, if at all, taking as guides Montesquieu and Rousseau. I try to see if we can know this standard by reason, and if so, how? And I try to understand whether or not any natural passions might be preserved and ordered well in society. In addition, I try to investigate how society, or various forms of government, modify or transform the natural passions, for good and ill. In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu produces an ambitious yet politically practical vision of the best form of government. After evaluating and rejecting ancient republics animated by political virtue, monarchies animated by honor, and despotisms animated by fear as possible candidates for the best form of government, Montesquieu thinks he has found the best form of government in the modern English form of liberal commercial republicanism, rooted in political freedom, commerce, and a moderate and tolerant if diluted form of religion, which might triumph over the globe as the final rational and most humanly satisfying form of government. And according to Montesquieu, the principles of the modern commercial republic adhere to the political standards that have been rationally discovered through the final and correct understanding of men’s passions in the state of nature. Against this confident assertion and the ambitious scope of Montesquieu’s goals, nothing less than universal peace and prosperity, and the apparently true knowledge of the best form of government, Rousseau launches a no less ambitious critique of the early modern vision, casting doubt on its political feasibility, and on its awareness of the true core of human nature and happiness. Rousseau ultimately thinks that we cannot order the passions to create a best and enduring government, since human self-interest, irrationality, and corrupt social passions ultimately tend toward oppression, despotism, and universal misery. And according to Rousseau a return to nature is for virtually everyone impossible. I consider Rousseau’s account of the same passions that Montesquieu evaluates, which he examines primarily in the Second Discourse, Emile, Considerations on the Government of Poland, and Political Economy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Texte remanié de : Thèse doctorat : Philosophie : Paris 4 : 1991. / Bibliogr. p. [261]-267. Notes bibliogr. Index.

Adam Smith is often thought to be an unequivocal advocate of capitalism based on unfettered self-interest. Against this caricature, I argue that his attitudes towards commercial society are, in fact, more ambivalent. To ground this claim, I outline Smith’s account of ambition, a passion responsible for the dynamism of commercial economies but deleterious to individual happiness, and focus on the rhetoric Smith deploys in his portraits of three ambitious characters: the poor man’s son, the ambitious man, and the prudent man. Next, I challenge alternative interpretations. In particular, I contest Samuel Fleischacker’s view that Smith no longer sees ambition, motivated by vanity, as the driving force behind economic growth in commercial society by the time he writes the Wealth of Nations and, thus, is not meaningfully ambivalent. In the last section, I draw on recent work by Amelie Rorty to argue that Smith’s ambivalence towards commercial society is both appropriate and constructive.

<p>The study aims to explain the role of external causes in René Descartes’s (1594–1650) and Benedictus de Spinoza’s (1632–1677) accounts of the mastery of the passions. It consists in three parts: the mind-body union, the passions and their classification, and the mastery of the passions. </p><p>In the first part I argue that Descartes’s conception of the mind-body union consists in two elements: mind-body interaction and the experience of being one with the body. Spinoza rejects the first element because there cannot be psychophysical laws. He accepts the second element, but goes beyond Descartes, arguing that the mind and body are identical.</p><p>In the second part I discuss the classifications of the passions in the <i>Passions of the Soul</i> and the <i>Ethics</i> and compare them with the one Spinoza presents in the <i>Short Treatise</i>. I explain that <i>hilaritas</i> is an affect that expresses bodily equilibrium and makes it possible for the mind to be able think in a great many ways. Furthermore, I consider the principles of imagination that along with imitation and the striving to persevere provide a causal explanation for the necessary occurrence of the passions. </p><p>In the last part I argue that in Descartes the external conditions do not have a significant role in the mastery of the passions. For Spinoza, however, they are necessary. Commentators like Jonathan Bennett fail to see this. <i>Hilaritas</i> requires a diversity of sensual pleasures to occur. As Medea’s case shows, reason is not detached from Nature. Spinoza attempts to form a stronger human nature and to enable as many people as possible to think adequately. His recognition of the need for appropriate external conditions and a society in which ideas can be expressed freely allows him to present an ethics with a practical application, instead of another utopia or fiction.</p>

The study aims to explain the role of external causes in René Descartes’s (1594–1650) and Benedictus de Spinoza’s (1632–1677) accounts of the mastery of the passions. It consists in three parts: the mind-body union, the passions and their classification, and the mastery of the passions. In the first part I argue that Descartes’s conception of the mind-body union consists in two elements: mind-body interaction and the experience of being one with the body. Spinoza rejects the first element because there cannot be psychophysical laws. He accepts the second element, but goes beyond Descartes, arguing that the mind and body are identical. In the second part I discuss the classifications of the passions in the Passions of the Soul and the Ethics and compare them with the one Spinoza presents in the Short Treatise. I explain that hilaritas is an affect that expresses bodily equilibrium and makes it possible for the mind to be able think in a great many ways. Furthermore, I consider the principles of imagination that along with imitation and the striving to persevere provide a causal explanation for the necessary occurrence of the passions. In the last part I argue that in Descartes the external conditions do not have a significant role in the mastery of the passions. For Spinoza, however, they are necessary. Commentators like Jonathan Bennett fail to see this. Hilaritas requires a diversity of sensual pleasures to occur. As Medea’s case shows, reason is not detached from Nature. Spinoza attempts to form a stronger human nature and to enable as many people as possible to think adequately. His recognition of the need for appropriate external conditions and a society in which ideas can be expressed freely allows him to present an ethics with a practical application, instead of another utopia or fiction.

Lorsqu’il s’agit, aujourd’hui tout comme hier, de se mesurer à l’art de vivre des stoïciens, dans cette mise à l’épreuve de cette philosophie et de ces dogmes autant que de nous-mêmes, il convient de nous assurer d’un style, lequel sera assumé comme une méthode ; et cela, afin de provoquer cette altérité étrange, ces consonances et ces tensions qui ne manquent pas de s’installer au cœur de l’événement et du vivre philosophiques. C’est alors que la forme de l’essai épousera le mieux notre propos puisqu’il s’inscrit dans cette tentative moderne (depuis Montaigne) d’une assurance et d’une défiance de soi vis-à-vis de soi et, à la fois, vis-à-vis des pratiques étonnantes d’une subjectivité antérieure et déviante nous obligeant à rendre compte de ce que nous sommes. Cette situation, de fait, paradoxale nous amène à constituer un continuum fictionnel, mais qui a sa part de vérité fonctionnelle, dans la circonscription de la thématique envisagée : le champ de la sociabilité passionnelle et somatique du stoïcisme sera valorisé, dans l’essai de représenter ce que, pour eux et pour nous, signifierait l’attitude stylistique de composer l’imagination au service de la raison ; le refuge, chez Marc-Aurèle, dans la « citadelle intérieure » -le principe hégémonique- conduit et régule l’écriture d’une méditation à l’autre en sorte qu’elle ne se perde dans la transcription des émois du cœur et dans le vague à l’âme des sentiments diffus et chimériques ; mais l’effet thérapeutique se dissipe, une fois la méditation achevée. Hadot et Foucault dans leurs lectures conjointes, mais surtout différenciées, nous permettent de raviver cet art de vivre en mettant l’accent sur toutes une série de pratiques, d’exercices spirituels, sur cette tension entre l’expressivité somatique et thérapeutique au regard de la sagesse ou au regard de processus et de formes de subjectivation et d’éprouver, ainsi, une actualité littéraire, via le dandysme, à laquelle la formule l’esthétique de l’existence semble nous convier. / If we have to compare, today as much as yesterday, our lifestyle with that of the Stoics, in testing this philosophy and these dogmas as much as ourselves, we should adopt a style, which will be assumed as a method; and that in order to cause this strange otherness, the consonances and these tensions do not fail to settle in the heart of the event and the philosophical way of living. Then the form of the essay will best match our purpose as it is part of this modern attempt (since Montaigne) of assurance and suspicion in relation to ourselves and, at the same time, in relation to the amazing practices of previous and deviant subjectivity, forcing us to realize what we are. This, in fact, paradoxical situation leads us to constitute a fictional continuum, but it has a piece of functional truth in the realm of the envisioned topic: the field of sociability of passions and the somatic sociability of stoicism is valued, in trying to represent what, for them and for us, the stylistic attitude would mean, composing the imagination in service of reason; the refuge, in Marcus Aurelius, in the “inner citadel” - the guiding principle - leads and regulates the writing from one meditation to the next so that the writing does not lose itself in the mere transcription of the feelings of the heart and the melancholic, diffuse and deceptive emotions; but the therapeutic effect wears off, once the meditation is completed. Hadot and Foucault in their joint lectures, but especially differentiated lectures, allow us to revive this art of living by focusing on a whole series of practices, spiritual exercises, and on this tension between the somatic and therapeutic expression in view of wisdom or processes and forms of subjectivation and experience, as well as, a contemporary literary phenomenon, via dandyism, to which the formula aesthetics of existence seems to invite us.

Em Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, percebe-se uma referência frequente à natureza. Pela análise das situações em que ela se apresenta, podese notar que lhe são atribuídas funções e papéis variados e que, portanto, não é possível que se a defina como unidade. Ora o narrador a imputa o domínio de forças metafísicas, ora a determinação dos sentimentos humanos. De modo geral, o narrador recorre à natureza quando se evidencia o caráter condenável de sua conduta, sugerindo que suas ações não poderiam ter-se dado de outro modo, em vista de forças naturais. Em contraste com os contextos históricos apresentados na narrativa, os argumentos naturalistas de Brás Cubas são pouco convincentes, o que põe em relevo o cinismo irônico do defunto autor, de modo que seus pretextos e justificativas infundadas acabem por acusá-lo. Na tentativa de embasar seu discurso, o narrador distorce e se apropria de teorias e correntes de pensamento, como Positivismo, Naturalismo, Darwinismo Social. Ao instrumentalizar-se de conceitos filosóficos e teorias sociais, o romance redunda na paródia desconstrutiva destes e do próprio narrador. O modo como essa instrumentalização cômico-irônica se dá é o que se procurou demonstrar com este trabalho. / In Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, it can be noted a frequent reference to nature. Analyzing the situations in which it is presented, one can perceive that different roles and functions are ascribed to it; thus, as a consequence, it cannot be defined as a unity. At times the narrator makes it responsible for metaphysical forces, at other times he attributes to nature the power to determine human feelings. In general, Brás Cubas recurs to nature when the condemnable character of his conduct is evident, suggesting that his actions could not have been otherwise due to natural forces. In contrast with the historical contexts presented in the narrative, Brás Cubas naturalist arguments are little convincing, what highlights the self-accusing sarcasm of the dead author, in a way that his flimsy pretexts and justification end up turning against him. In the attempt to ground his discourse, the narrator distorts and makes use of theories and systems of thought, such as Positivism, Naturalism and Social Darwinism. By doing so, the novel results in a deconstructive parody of these systems and of the author himself. Demonstrating the way it happens in the narrative is the aim of this research.

O nosso trabalho consiste na tradução e no estudo do De Ira do filósofo estoico e político romano Lucio Anêu Sêneca. A obra é endereçada ao seu irmão Novato que, supostamente, o indaga como conter essa paixão. Assim, nos 3 livros, o filósofo apresenta a gênese dessa paixão e os males causados por ela para, por fim, apresentar meios para extirpa-la da alma. A defesa dos ensinamentos do Estoicismo ecoa explicitamente nos diversos exemplos dados pelo filósofo quando contraposta com as demais escolas filosóficas da época. Assim, a ira é tratada como a paixão mais danosa dentre todas as paixões do homem. / Our dissertation consists in the translation and study of De Ira from the Stoic philosopher and Roman politician Lucious Annaeus Seneca. The book is addressed to his brother Novato who supposedly inquires him how to restrain this passion. Thus, in three books, the philosopher presents the genesis of that passion and the evils caused by it to finally introduce ways to extirpate it from the soul. The defense of the Stoicism\'s teachings explicitly echoes in several examples given by the philosopher when contrasted with other philosophical schools of the time. So wrath is treated as the most damaging passion among all human passions.

Em Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, percebe-se uma referência frequente à natureza. Pela análise das situações em que ela se apresenta, podese notar que lhe são atribuídas funções e papéis variados e que, portanto, não é possível que se a defina como unidade. Ora o narrador a imputa o domínio de forças metafísicas, ora a determinação dos sentimentos humanos. De modo geral, o narrador recorre à natureza quando se evidencia o caráter condenável de sua conduta, sugerindo que suas ações não poderiam ter-se dado de outro modo, em vista de forças naturais. Em contraste com os contextos históricos apresentados na narrativa, os argumentos naturalistas de Brás Cubas são pouco convincentes, o que põe em relevo o cinismo irônico do defunto autor, de modo que seus pretextos e justificativas infundadas acabem por acusá-lo. Na tentativa de embasar seu discurso, o narrador distorce e se apropria de teorias e correntes de pensamento, como Positivismo, Naturalismo, Darwinismo Social. Ao instrumentalizar-se de conceitos filosóficos e teorias sociais, o romance redunda na paródia desconstrutiva destes e do próprio narrador. O modo como essa instrumentalização cômico-irônica se dá é o que se procurou demonstrar com este trabalho. / In Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, it can be noted a frequent reference to nature. Analyzing the situations in which it is presented, one can perceive that different roles and functions are ascribed to it; thus, as a consequence, it cannot be defined as a unity. At times the narrator makes it responsible for metaphysical forces, at other times he attributes to nature the power to determine human feelings. In general, Brás Cubas recurs to nature when the condemnable character of his conduct is evident, suggesting that his actions could not have been otherwise due to natural forces. In contrast with the historical contexts presented in the narrative, Brás Cubas naturalist arguments are little convincing, what highlights the self-accusing sarcasm of the dead author, in a way that his flimsy pretexts and justification end up turning against him. In the attempt to ground his discourse, the narrator distorts and makes use of theories and systems of thought, such as Positivism, Naturalism and Social Darwinism. By doing so, the novel results in a deconstructive parody of these systems and of the author himself. Demonstrating the way it happens in the narrative is the aim of this research.

The 'prevalence of the calm passions over the violent' is Hume's general formula for both virtue and happiness. I argue in this dissertation that Hume's detailed account of the causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in Treatise 2.3 is a main goal of Hume's project in the Treatise, Books I and II, and the reason why he published them together in 1739 as a "compleat chain of reasoning by themselves." However, despite widespread recognition of the general importance of this doctrine to Hume's 'science of man', no adequate attempt has been made to investigate those sections of Treatise 2.3 which bear directly on a deeper understanding of the causes of this 'prevalence of the calm passions'. Such attention is particularly warranted because, as I argue, these sections of the Treatise constitute Hume's attempt at an 'anatomy' of deliberation which accounts for the principles of human nature by which we successfully regulate our conduct and remain constant in pursuit of our long-term greater good. However, these sections also give rise to interpretative challenges that threaten the coherence of this central doctrine. Accordingly, my aim in this dissertation is to analyze Hume's anatomy of deliberation and of the prevalence of calm passions in Treatise 2.3 and to work through the interpretative difficulties it poses. I present a novel resolution of these interpretative problems which calls attention to the importance both of Hume's Treatise, Book I account of causal belief and of his neglected account of the influence of the passions on the imagination and understanding for his theory of motivation. I demonstrate that it is only when we attend to these key features of Hume's account of human nature that we can appreciate the coherent Humean theory of prudential motivation that emerges from Treatise 2.3.