Abstract This dissertation suggests that historical presentations should be understood as literary worlds. It studies how they are engaged with in the current media environment. The concept of a world offers a novel way of analysing how presentations are identified as being specifically historical presentations. In the case of the traditional written history, the identification of historical worlds is determined by contrasting their implied world-state at the present moment against the actual world’s world-state at the present moment with the help of counterfactual heuristics. This is done because the evidence of any e.g. past events can only be evaluated in the present as the past itself is inaccessible. The dissertation approaches the evaluation of history from a presentist point of view. It is argued that within the digital media environment, historical presentations are intuitively interpreted as incomplete presentations or as fragments of a larger whole. The functioning of historical presentations is examined as part of a large media network. History’s availability through a variety of media is then analysed through the concepts of transmedia and remediation. It is concluded that history is necessarily mediated and that the current media environment is changing how history is being engaged with. / Tiivistelmä Väitöskirja ehdottaa, että historiallisia esityksiä tulisi käsitellä kirjallisina maailmoina. Samalla tarkastellaan, kuinka historiallisia esityksiä kohdataan nykyisessä digitaalisessa mediaympäristössä. Maailmojen tarjoama käsitteellinen viitekehys antaa mahdollisuuden analysoida, kuinka historialliset esitykset tunnistetaan juuri historiallisiksi (eikä joksikin muuksi). Perinteisen kirjoitetussa muodossa esiintyvän historian tunnistamisen analyysin kohdalla esitetään, että historiallisten maailmojen implikoidun nykyhetken maailmantilaa verrataan kontrafaktuaalisen heuristiikan avulla aktuaalisen maailman nykyhetken maailmantilaan. Historiallisten väitteiden tueksi esitettävää todistusaineistoa on mahdollista arvioida vain nykyhetkessä, koska meillä ei ole pääsyä itse menneisyyteen. Näin ollen historiallisia maailmoja ei voida verrata suoraan aktuaaliseen menneisyyteen. Väitöskirja lähestyykin siis historian arviointia presentistisestä näkökulmasta. Väitöskirjassa esitetään myös näkemys, jonka mukaan nykyinen mediaympäristömme toimii siten, että se ohjaa meitä intuitiivisesti käsittelemään kaikkia historiallisia esityksiä epätäydellisinä sirpaleina, jotka näyttävät vain välähdyksen suuremmasta kokonaisuudesta. Historialliset esitykset nähdäänkin analyysissa osana laajempaa verkostoitunutta mediaa. Tämä laajennetaan transmedia-analyysiksi siitä, kuinka historiaa kohdataan ja levitetään populaarissa mediassa. Tämän pohjalta esitetään näkemys, jonka mukaan historia on välttämättä välittynyttä ja nykyinen mediaympäristö on muuttamassa suhdettamme historiallisiin esityksiin.

The work is focused on the evolution of Patočka's conception of movements of the human existence throughout his thoughts. My aim is to show sources of this conception, its explicite expressions and their structure and finally the meaning of this conception for the human life and its status in Patočka's whole-life philosophical project, all this by the analysis of three metodologically defined periods of Patočka's work. The inevitable past of this kind of rethinking of Patočka's conception is dealing with the question of succesion of his two great teachers, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger,and showing, that his conception of movements of the human existence can't be explained simply from the polarity of uncritical bulilding on them, neither the complete refusing them. Also I would like to show the conceptional kinship with other thinkers of western philosophical tradition, whose selection is selective, but in my opinion meaningful. I also hope, that this rethinking of the conception of movements of the human existance will show the place, which belongs to Patočka's thougt in the western philosophical tradition and, first of all, it's meaning for human life. Key words Phenomenology, movement, existence, philosophy of history, authenticity

Es heißt, man schreibe Begriffsgeschichte: Im Grunde jedoch ist es eine Bewegung des Lesens, die uns von Begriffen sprechen läßt. Begriffe gibt es nicht, sie müssen aus Texten herausoperiert werden, was seit dem Mittelalter durch entsprechende Lektüretechniken bewerkstelligt wird. Man unterstreicht, man wiederholt am Rand, man trägt in ein Register oder eine gesonderte Liste Wörter ein, die des Nachdenkens Wert erscheinen. So transformiert sich der durcbgeschriebene Text in eine Liste von Wörtern, von denen einige eigene Kommentare nach sich zehen und so zu Begriffen werden. Diese Bewegung der Lektilre ist eine Bewegung der Aneignung: Der ursprüngliche Text ist das Opfer solcher Operationen, die einen rhetorischen oder logischen Zusammenhang des Autors durch einen terminologischen Zusammenhang des Lesers ersetzt.

Durch Übersetzung werden philosophische Werke einem Publikum zugänglich gemacht, das zwar ein Interesse an Philosophie besitzt, nicht aber ausreichende Sprachenkenntnis. Mit dieser Minimaldefinition läßt sich die Geschichte der philosophischen Übersetzung von der Antike bis zur Frühen Neuzeit schon in einer ersten Phase charakterisieren, in der das Publikum mit dem Gelehrtenstand identisch war. Griechische, arabische und zuletzt englische und französische Werke wurden ins Lateinische übersetzt, damit Gelehrte in der ganzen Welt sie leichter lesen konnten. Die Übersetzung im Lateinische stellte bis ins 17. Jahrhundert für viele Wissenschaftler den internationalen Diskussionskontext her. Eine zweite Phase kann man daran festmachen, daß das Lateinische sein Kommunikationsprivileg verlor: Seit Herausbildung und Etablierung von nationalen Literaturen, also spätestens seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, waren es nicht mehr nur die Gelehrten, sondern die größere Gruppe der Gebildeten, deren Streben nach Aneignung, Aufnahme und Anverwandlung die Übersetzung ausländischer Denker in die verschiedenenen Landessprachen zum Bedürfnis machte. Die Übersetzung bereicherte die nationalen Diskussionskontexte. Davon noch einmal zu unterscheiden ist in einer dritten Phase die Arbeit an der philosophischen Übersetzung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, als die Expansion der Buchproduktion sowie bestimmte urheberrechtliche Freistellungen dazu führten, daß philosophische Werke in allen europäischen Sprachen vervielfältigt wurden und eine noch breitere Leserschaft fanden. Die Übersetzung dient nun jedem interessierten Leser schlicht zur umweglosen Kenntnisnahme.

Was kann man unter Kulturphilosophie verstehen? Umfaßt sie den Bereich alter Artikulationsbedingungen des philosophischen Denkens? Oder fällt darunter der Bereich eines sozusagen randständigen historischen Wissens, welches das Philosophieren nur nebenbei berührt? Was wollen wir wissen, wenn wir nach der Kulturgeschichte der Philosophie fragen? Wollen wir überhaupt etwas wissen? Oder interessiert uns an dieser Frage ihr irrationales Potential, ihre Abseitigkeit, die sie jedenfalls für Philosophen hat? Wollen wir vielleicht unsere Vorstellung von Philosophie ändern, erweitern, indem wir nach ihr auch kulturhistorisch fragen? Oder wollen wir uns willentlich in Abseits der varia et curiosa begeben und unsere Vorstellung von Philosophie lediglich ergänzen, sozusagen garnieren, indem wir die Rubrik \'interessante Einzelheiten\' eröffnen und darunter sammeln, was wir für bemerkenswert halten. weil es \'auch\' zur Philosophie gehört?

Though relatively unknown to non-specialists, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī is a fundamental member of the community of Muslims who founded Islamic Philosophy. In his tenth-century work, On the Perfect State, al-Fārābī tackles questions of eminent importance to society of Muslims still deciding who they were. These questions and their inevitable solutions were, for a time, a source of much turmoil for the young Ummah; and we argue that the Perfect State should be read as an effort to take part in, even to lead, the conversation that would decide how these questions were answered. A school of thought championed by Richard Walzer argues that the most important thing to know about al-Fārābī is that he repeated in Arabic many things already said better in Greek by the ancients. According to this school of thought, al-Fārābī’s main intention was to transmit specifically Greek learning to posterity, not to participate in the world of Islam and Muslims. It is our contention that this view is mistaken and misleading. Through an examination of tenth-century Islamic history, a close reading of al-Fārābī’s work in Arabic, and a thorough discussion of the mistakes made by the Walzerian school of thought, we will show that al-Fārābī used philosophy as a tool for solving problems particular to the Muslim community of his age. / Religion

This thesis explores Friedrich Nietzsche's use of history for philosophical purposes, focusing on two central themes in Nietzsche's writings: the genealogical methodology, and perspectival epistemology. My aim is to demonstrate how Nietzsche's concept of "historical philosophizing" is intricately connected to his moral philosophy. Using a genealogical methodology, Nietzsche traces the historical development of moral concepts back to their foundations, unveiling the underlying power structures and complex mechanisms that underpin moral discourse. Additionally, perspectival epistemology challenges conventional notions of truth and objectivity, serving as a critique of moral semantics. I argue that these elements are interconnected and should be studied as parts of a unified whole. By providing insights into an overlooked theme in Nietzschean methodology, this essay may enrich our understanding of his philosophy as well as contribute to broader debates within contemporary philosophy.

Is language a tool of empire or is empire a tool of language? This thesis examines the cultivation of Carolingian hegemony on a pan-European scale; one defined by a renewed interest in the study of language and its relationship to Carolingian eagerness for moral and spiritual authority. Intended to complement previous work on Carolingian cultural politics, this thesis reiterates the emergence of active philosophical speculation during the late eighth and early ninth centuries. Prior research has ignored the centrality of linguistic hermeneutics in the Carolingian literate programme. This thesis addresses this lacuna, demonstrating the symbiotic relationship between spirituality, language, and politics within the Carolingian world. The work appropriates prior investigations into the connection of semiotics and Christian philosophy and proposes the development of a renewed interest into ontology and epistemology by Carolingian scholars, notably Alcuin of York and Theodulf of Orléans. The correlation between linguistic philosophy and spiritual authority is confirmed by the 794 Synod of Frankfurt, at which accusations towards both the Adoptionist movement of northern Spain and the repeal of Byzantine Iconoclasm were based on the dangers of linguistic misinterpretation. The thesis also explores the manifestation of this emergent philosophy of language within the manuscript evidence, witnessed by the biblical pandects produced by Alcuin and Theodulf. Desire for the emendation of texts, not to mention the formation of a uniform script (Caroline Minuscule), abetted the larger goal of both infusing a text with authority (both secular and divine) and allowing for broader spiritual and intellectual understanding of a text. Increasing engagement with classical philosophy and rhetoric, the nature of Carolingian biblical revision, and the cultural politics as seen at the Synod of Frankfurt depict the primacy of language to the Carolingians, not only as a tool of imperialism, but the axis of their intellectual and spiritual world.

In the 1950s, scholars in Europe and the United States announced the end of political ideology in the West. With the rise of affluent welfare states, they argued, ideological movements which sought to overthrow prevailing liberal democracy would disappear. While these arguments were questioned in the 1960s, similar ideas were presented after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars now claimed that the end of the Cold War meant the end of mankind’s “ideological development,” that globalization would undermine the left/right distinction and that politics would be shaped by cultural affiliations rather than ideological alignments. The purpose of No alternatives is to compare the end of ideology discussion of the 1950s with some of the post-Cold War theories launched at the time of, or in the years following, the fall of the Berlin Wall. Juxtaposing monographs, essays and papers between 1950 and 2000, the dissertation focuses on three aspects of these theories. First, it analyzes their concepts of history, demonstrating that they tended to portray the existing society as an order which had resolved the conflicts and antagonisms of earlier history. Second, the investigation scrutinizes the processes of post-politicization at work in these theories, showing how they sought to transcend, contain or externalize social conflict, and at times dismiss politics altogether. Third, it demonstrates how the theories can be understood as legitimizing or mobilizing narratives which aimed to defend Western liberal democracy and to rally its citizens against internal threats and external enemies. As the title of the dissertation implies, the end of ideology discussion of the 1950s and the post-Cold War theories of the 1990s sought to highlight the historical or political impossibility of any alternatives to the present society.

This thesis examines the politics of foundations in modern political thought through a reading and immanent critique of Hobbes’s Leviathan. I argue that his thought exemplifies a specifically modern problem of foundations insofar as he must establish political and scientific foundations on the basis of precisely the impossibility of foundation. Hobbes’s account of political founding and the establishment of scientific foundations is first and foremost a response to a condition of finitude in which foundations are no longer given or available but nevertheless demanded. While it appears that Hobbes describes the finitude of ‘Man’ and natural bodies and derives his political theory from these, in fact for Hobbes these no longer provide given foundations for political thought, but must themselves be posited in acts of political and epistemological projection. Hobbes’s politics of foundations therefore demands that we fabricate political and scientific foundations for ourselves and act as if they are not incalculable postulations but calculable necessities. I call this the problem of projection, in which political knowledge is possible only because we make it and posit it ourselves. Through a reading of the role of the metaphor of making in Hobbes’s account of political origins and sovereignty, I argue that this reading of Hobbes’s politics of origins as the institution of foundations in the face of the impossibility of foundation exposes finitude as a groundlessness to which there is no necessary political response. It does not necessarily demand the production of foundations through the institution of sovereignty. Hobbes’s Leviathan therefore provides a site in which we might begin to ask more precise empirical and theoretical questions about the transformative possibilities in the modern politics of foundations. / Graduate