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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
31

Prudência e razão de Estado na obra de Gabriel Naudé / Prudence and reason of State in Gabriel Naudé

Gonçalves, Eugênio Mattioli 30 November 2015 (has links)
Esta pesquisa visa analisar a teoria dos golpes de Estado de Gabriel Naudé, um dos principais tratadistas da razão de Estado do século XVII. Através da leitura de Considérations politiques sur les coups dÉtat (1639), obra magna do autor, busca-se encontrar não apenas a base conceitual desse texto, mas inclusive identificar os percursos teóricos que deságuam nos escritos de Naudé. Por meio desta investigação é possível notar a noção de prudência como grande sustentáculo da referida teoria dos golpes de Estado, essencialmente influenciada pelas obras de Justo Lípsio e Pierre Charron. A partir daí, busca-se desconstruir a prudência naudeana para nela apontar o peso das idéias dos escritores mencionados, o que também permite demonstrar a existência de outras referências à razão de Estado da época, que não Nicolau Maquiavel. / This research aims to analyze Gabriel Naudés theory of the coups détat , one of the main authors of reason of State on the 17th Century. Interpreting Naudés magnum opus, Considérations politiques sur les coups dÉtat (1639), I intend to explore not only his conceptual basis but the theoretical tendencies leading to his writings. Through this investigation it is possible to deem prudence as the major supporting notion of the theory of the coups détat, which was essentially influenced by the works of Justus Lipsius and Pierre Charron. Thence, I intend to deconstruct Naudés notion of prudence in order to point out the weigh of Lipsius and Charrons ideas on his work, showing the existence of other references in the formulation of the reason of State on this epoch, besides Niccolo Machiavelli.
32

Justiça: prudência / Justice: prudence

Campelo, Olívia Brandão Melo 13 May 2010 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Olivia Brandao Melo Campelo.pdf: 254350 bytes, checksum: 5c20227d7411e7fb814e6aa1f3e0f96a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-13 / Introduction: Phrônesis, word that comes from the Greek, meaning the exercise of a capacity to apply truths about what is good for a certain type of person, people in general, in certain situations, for themselves in particular occasions. This term can be brought by prudence in which is a virtue that when applied to the concrete case has a human character by being contingent and variable depending on individuals and circumstances. Phrônesis was used by Aristotle during the construction of his theory of justice. In the Aristotelian prudence, all theoretical significance is removed in order to avoid more than one type of moral being, capable of orienting the action in the path which is considered fair. Aristoteles insisted on the vocation practice of this term and concerned himself in the direction which the human actions considered fair and virtuous should be guided with prudence General Objective: Analyze the Aristotelian prudence as a determinant factor of obtaining justice. Specific Objectives: Identify the direction of the Aristotelian justice; analyze the Aristotelian prudence present in the Ethics to Nicomacus; and verify in what way the prudence is a determinant in justice practice. Methodology: bibliographic and qualitative research. Expected Results: The demonstration that the prudence is not only an important criterion of justice, since is considered a sort of moral sense, presumes that all decisions that have as the end justice should observe the practical intelligence, under penalty of commit the effectiveness of the real justice / capacidade de aplicar verdades sobre o que é bom para tal tipo de pessoa ou pessoas fazerem em geral e, em certos tipos de situação, a si mesmas em ocasiões particulares. Este termo pode ser traduzido por prudência, que é uma virtude que, aplicada ao caso concreto, tem um caráter humano por ser contingente e variável segundo indivíduos e circunstâncias. Phrônesis foi usada por Aristóteles durante a construção da sua teoria de justiça. Na prudência aristotélica, toda significação teórica é retirada para que nela haja apenas uma espécie de senso moral, capaz de orientar a ação no caminho daquilo que é considerado justo. Aristóteles insistiu na vocação prática deste termo e na preocupação no sentido de que as ações humanas consideradas justas e virtuosas deveriam ser pautadas na prudência. Objetivo Geral: Analisar a prudência aristotélica como fator determinante de obtenção da Justiça. Objetivos Específicos: Identificar os sentidos da justiça aristotélica; analisar a prudência aristotélica trazida na obra Ética à Nicômaco e verificar de que forma a prudência é determinante na prática da justiça. Metodologia: pesquisa bibliográfica e qualitativa. Resultado Esperado: a demonstração de que a prudência, além de ser um importante critério de aferição de justiça, uma vez que é considerada uma espécie de senso moral, pressupõe que toda decisão que tenha como fim a justiça deve observar a inteligência prática, sob pena de comprometer a efetividade da justiça real
33

A ética das virtudes de Aristóteles

Silva, Sandro Luiz da 29 August 2008 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 29 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar a ética das virtudes de Aristóteles. Partindo de alguns pressupostos como a classificação do conhecimento, a concepção antropológica do homem como um animal racional político, pretende-se apresentar as virtudes éticas e dianoéticas como o meio para chegar-se à felicidade, ou eudemonia (euvdaimoni,a). Será enfatizado o aspecto racional da ética de Aristóteles, sobretudo pela prudência como um elemento essencial para a vida virtuosa. A prudência embora seja uma virtude intelectual, é imprescindível para o êxito da virtude moral, pois para ser virtuoso o homem deve ser prudente, e para ser prudente ele deve necessariamente ser virtuoso. A ética de Aristóteles e toda a sua filosofia é caracterizada pelo finalismo da razão. Esse finalismo da razão é a teleologia que será identificada como o bem. Por fim apresentar-se-á a felicidade, ou o bem supremo, que as pessoas procuram conquistar por alguma das quatro formas de vida, ou seja a vida em busca da riqueza, do praze / The objective of this work is to present the Ethics of Virtues from the greek philosopher Aristotle. According to some presuppositions like the classification of knowledge, the anthropological conception of man as a rational and political animal, it intends to present the ethical and intellectual virtues as the means to arrive to happiness or eudaemonia. It will be stressed the rational aspects of Aristotle’s Ethics, specially prudence as an essential element of virtuous life. Prudence, although being an intellectual virtue, is indispensable to the success of moral life, because to be virtuous man must be prudent and to be prudent he has necessarily to be virtuous. Finally, the four ways of life and happiness of the Aristotelian teleology will be presented emphasizing that contemplation is life’s perfect form. Some paradoxes of Aristotle’s Ethics will be appointed, and then some final conclusions will be presented.
34

O conceito de mediedade na ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles

Russo, Maria Flávia de Araujo 20 March 2014 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Flavia de Araujo Russo.pdf: 641056 bytes, checksum: 7df53316600dc0202007a0c47972240e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-20 / The purpose of this work is to understand the meaning of mean and its importance to acquire happiness, from the viewpoint of Aristotle, in his book Nicomachean Ethics. Therefore, the meaning of areté, resulting from the Greek ideal of education and equivalent to moral excellence, will be analyzed, as well as the meaning of ethics and its relationship to virtue. Happiness, eudaimonia or the highest good, will also be analyzed in the face of its close kinship to virtue, a moral quality that leads to man s doing things well. Next, mean and its opposites will be studied, which involves excessive and deficient actions and emotions. A study will be carried out on what mean constitutes, which in reality represents the apex, that is, the beautiful and fair conduct of the virtuous man. Afterwards, it will be necessary to understand the meaning of practical wisdom, prudence or phronesis, because it will guide actions and emotions in relation to doing things well. Lastly, final comments will be made, which will help us understand the importance of acting with the intention of being good, fair and virtuous for the transformation and improvement of man and society / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo compreender o significado de mediedade e a sua importância na aquisição da felicidade, sob a ótica de Aristóteles, em seu livro Ética a Nicômaco . Para tanto, será analisado o significado de areté, decorrente do ideal grego de educação e equivalente a excelência moral e o significado de ética e a sua relação com a virtude. A felicidade, eudaimonia ou bem supremo, também será analisada, em face de sua estreita ligação com a virtude, qualidade moral que conduz ao bom agir do homem. A seguir, adentraremos o estudo da mediedade e os seus opostos, que envolvem ações e emoções excessivas ou deficientes. Estudarse- á em que consiste a mediania, que representa, em verdade, o cume, ou seja, a conduta bela e justa do homem virtuoso. A seguir, será preciso compreender o significado da sabedoria prática, prudência ou phronesis, porque será ela que ordenará as ações e emoções com vistas ao agir com acerto. Por fim, serão tecidas as considerações finais, as quais levarão à compreensão da importância do agir com intenção de ser bom, justo e virtuoso, para a transformação e aprimoramento do homem e da sociedade
35

La rhétorique et sa critique. A la rencontre du discours et de la liberté.

Nicolas, Loïc 13 May 2011 (has links)
L’objet de cette thèse est d’engager une discussion concernant l’épistémologie de la discipline rhétorique et de formuler des propositions visant à la refonder. En partie spéculative, la réflexion que je mène à partir des travaux de Chaïm Perelman notamment, rattache cette antique discipline à la « raison pratique ». Une raison agissante qui donne l’occasion d’assumer et d’affronter l’indétermination du monde – sans pour autant faire de cette indétermination un chaos, ni en prendre ombrage pour sombrer dans le relativisme. Dans cette perspective, la rhétorique se trouve conçue comme un dispositif propre à accompagner les hommes dans le difficile exercice d’une liberté citoyenne. Une liberté au sens fort, ancrée dans la pratique du politique, telle que l’entendaient les Anciens. Je m’efforce tout d’abord de montrer que, dès l’origine, la rhétorique a représenté une compétence nouvelle, mais aussi une occasion unique de dire, d’habiter et de séculariser le monde. Ma démarche consiste donc à réfléchir l’émergence de la rhétorique dans la Grèce ancienne. À ce titre, j’analyse la fonction politique, sociale, symbolique, attribuée à la parole dans cette Cité démocratique dont elle a accompagné l’invention. Parole qui s’est vue accorder une place inégalée : comme support et comme condition de l’action citoyenne. Pourtant, force est de constater que, malgré ce succès, la rhétorique a très vite été dénoncée comme un art de tromper, de mentir, de dissimuler ses lacunes. Des générations de philosophes, d’hommes d’Église ou de scientifiques se sont attachés à démonter son fonctionnement, sa dynamique, à décrier son enseignement et, finalement, à souhaiter son évincement. C’est pourquoi, je m’intéresse aux critiques qui ont été adressées à la parole rhétorique depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’au XIXe siècle. Par là, j’entends donner une vision nouvelle de cette antique « fonction » du langage, par-delà la synthèse de ses caricatures. En outre, mon propos s’attache à mettre en lumière les lieux communs sur lesquels se fonde notre relation au discours. Dans une optique qui va d’Aristote à Perelman, je défends l’idée selon laquelle la rhétorique ne constitue pas (comme on pourrait le penser) une méthode pour apprendre à vivre ensemble dans la paix des mots, mais, avant tout, une façon de pratiquer la critique avec et contre l’autre : l’adversaire. Et ceci afin de prendre des décisions dans le monde contingent des affaires humaines. Or, c’est justement au titre de sa fonction agonistique que la rhétorique a perdu sa place et son sens dans nos démocraties. Face à cela, l’enjeu de mon travail est de mettre en évidence, après Perelman, l’existence d’une raison tout à la fois une et plurielle. En effet, la multiplicité des voies possibles, leur antagonisme, n’est pas le signe d’une raison anarchique et inconséquente, le signe d’une raison hantée par la déraison. Il s’agit, au contraire, d’une chance offerte à la raison de se mettre à l’épreuve et de risquer la liberté. Du reste, perdre cette dimension agonistique, la dénoncer, la condamner comme irrationnelle, ainsi que le font les théories normatives de l’argumentation, revient à manifester la coupure entre le langage et les ressources critiques de la rhétoriques qui permettent de faire de nos prises de parole un moyen et une ressource de l’émancipation.
36

La science politique d'Aristote : L'architecture de l'action

Cordell, Crystal J. 05 March 2010 (has links)
This dissertation is an examination of Aristotle’s political science. The first part begins by comparing the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a political animal with subsequent conceptions, notably in the political thought of Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This comparative analysis shows that human nature is increasingly conceived as apolitical, a major consequence of which is a rejection of the Aristotelian conception of logos (speech, reason) as a natural capacity for reasoning about justice and injustice. It is then demonstrated that modern political science rejects Aristotle’s argument that there is a good for human beings as such which is constitutive of their end (telos), in the same way that modern science abandoned Aristotelian natural teleology. While contemporary currents of political thought, including neo-Aristotelianism, republicanism and communitarianism, make use of certain elements of Aristotle’s thought, they largely fail to recover the critical notions of action and nature. Having cleared major obstacles that bar our access to Aristotle’s political science, the dissertation moves, in the second part, to a textual analysis of the Politics, which, it is argued, constitutes not a work fractured between its “realistic” and “idealistic” parts, but a unified inquiry into both defective political regimes and the best regime, the guiding question of which is: how to render human beings good. The analysis begins by a consideration of the naturalness of the city and examines the various ways in which the notion of “nature” is used by Aristotle. It is then argued that, according to Aristotle’s presentation, political life is the fulfillment of human nature insofar as it represents the possibility of an ethical and moral life. Accordingly, political science, and legislative or “architectonic” science in particular, is to be devoted to moral education. Aristotle is critical of an education that neglects the virtues necessary for leisure in favour of military virtues alone, while acknowledging that cities must be prepared for war. Through an examination of the legislative science and political prudence, it is shown that Aristotle’s political science is capable of providing action with a moral orientation, without having recourse to metaphysical cosmology.
37

La science politique d'Aristote : L'architecture de l'action

Cordell, Crystal J. 05 March 2010 (has links)
This dissertation is an examination of Aristotle’s political science. The first part begins by comparing the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a political animal with subsequent conceptions, notably in the political thought of Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This comparative analysis shows that human nature is increasingly conceived as apolitical, a major consequence of which is a rejection of the Aristotelian conception of logos (speech, reason) as a natural capacity for reasoning about justice and injustice. It is then demonstrated that modern political science rejects Aristotle’s argument that there is a good for human beings as such which is constitutive of their end (telos), in the same way that modern science abandoned Aristotelian natural teleology. While contemporary currents of political thought, including neo-Aristotelianism, republicanism and communitarianism, make use of certain elements of Aristotle’s thought, they largely fail to recover the critical notions of action and nature. Having cleared major obstacles that bar our access to Aristotle’s political science, the dissertation moves, in the second part, to a textual analysis of the Politics, which, it is argued, constitutes not a work fractured between its “realistic” and “idealistic” parts, but a unified inquiry into both defective political regimes and the best regime, the guiding question of which is: how to render human beings good. The analysis begins by a consideration of the naturalness of the city and examines the various ways in which the notion of “nature” is used by Aristotle. It is then argued that, according to Aristotle’s presentation, political life is the fulfillment of human nature insofar as it represents the possibility of an ethical and moral life. Accordingly, political science, and legislative or “architectonic” science in particular, is to be devoted to moral education. Aristotle is critical of an education that neglects the virtues necessary for leisure in favour of military virtues alone, while acknowledging that cities must be prepared for war. Through an examination of the legislative science and political prudence, it is shown that Aristotle’s political science is capable of providing action with a moral orientation, without having recourse to metaphysical cosmology.
38

"The wil of his wif": Discourse, power, and gender in Chaucer's The Tale of Melibee

Jenkins, Sara D 01 June 2005 (has links)
In the Tale of Melibee, Chaucer gives us an excellent illustration of a point French theorist Michel Foucault would make centuries later: That power is something that moves and shifts between people and within institutions, that it is not fixed nor permanent, that it is used as needed toward specific ends, and that it is enacted through the medium of discourse. In Melibee, Melibees wife Prudence achieves a place of authority and influence in her marriage via her use of discourse, and specifically by using a more male way of speaking. Chaucer is often considered feminist-friendly due to characters such as the Wife of Bath, but critics have also given us many reasons why the Wife fails as a truly empowered woman. Within Chaucers oeuvre, Prudence is often overlooked as an example of Chaucers proto-feminism because she is a wife who, despite her barrage of knowledge, at times is somewhat meek and subservient to her husband.
39

Emily Pfeiffer and Victorian women's religious poetry

Brand, Prudence January 2012 (has links)
As a Christian, Emily Pfeiffer (1827-1890) saw women's fight for emancipation as a crusade that transcends the earthly state. Yet, although her poetry was well-received during her life-time, Pfeiffer remains obscure. In order to challenge values that may have helped to perpetuate Pfeiffer's non-canonical status, I examine Pfeiffer's poetry against a broader definition of religious practice and worship than was traditionally applied to Victorian women's poetry. Responding to a recent re-evaluation of the criteria for what constitutes nineteenth-century religious literature, I demonstrate that Pfeiffer's poetry occupies a unique position in the canon of Victorian women's religious poetry. To determine what made Pfeiffer such an original thinker, my research considers childhood experiences from which the psychological imprint nev~r faded. In order to compensate for losses and disappointments, Pfeiffer learned to channel her frustrations into her poetry early in life. A Central Anglican, Pfeiffer belonged to a declining strand of the Established Church during a period when other branches of Christianity were expanding.
40

Tragic Rhetoric: Sophocles and the Politics of Good Sense

Atkison, Larissa 08 January 2014 (has links)
This dissertation investigates rhetoric and prudence in Sophocles through close readings of Antigone, Ajax, Philoctetes, and Oedipus at Colonus. Central to the project is a reconstruc-tion of a uniquely Sophoclean conception of prudence as “good sense”; good sense is distinguished from traditional conceptions of prudence as an inter-subjective capacity for good judgment that is born of experience and chance. The study finds that while good sense and persuasive rhetoric are occasionally paired, they are frequently divorced from one another. Thus, in place of heroic conflicts and tragic failings, these readings present an alternative tragic tension between the persuasive yet often solipsistic speech of heroes and protagonists and the good sense of marginalized characters. This project is situated within the “turn to rhetoric” in contemporary democratic theory; in this context, it presents Sophocles as a novel and under-theorized resource in three overarching ways. First, his dramas were performed in a democratic context and gave voice to perspectives otherwise marginalized within the polis; in this respect he offers more inclusive democratic resources than his Athenian contemporaries. Second, these plays offer sobering insight into the impact of contingency in shaping rhetorical contexts. They reveal that overconfidence in rhetorical technē underestimates the extent to which successful persuasion is often aligned with chance and social advantage. Third, he draws attention to pervasive structural inequalities that work against and silence good sense. In this final respect the plays themselves are considered as didactic resources that cultivate reflective judgments and good sense in the spectator and reader.

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