Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces should undertake significant doctrinal, training, and operational reforms to ensure the viability of support provided to U.S. led stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Such operations involve increased civilmilitary interactions and necessitate effective cross-cultural communications with not only the indigenous populace, but a host of transnational actors as well. Today's PSYOP training is reflective of a persisting "Cold War mentality" that fails to adequately prepare soldiers for effective post-conflict situations such as the reunification of the Korean peninsula, whether brought about either through a renewal of combat operations or the result of diplomatic means. Meanwhile, North Korea's formidable and adept propaganda machine has persisted in isolating its populace from external influences for more than a halfcentury. Post-Korean War generation North Koreans have been successfully indoctrinated since birth to despise the United States. Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment has been on the rise in South Korea for a number of years. Under the current training model, contemporary psychological operations forces are ill-prepared to conduct effective operations in an environment involving two-way, face-to-face communications such as those required while stabilizing and reconstructing a nation. The case of Korean reunification serves as an extreme scenario that nevertheless depicts the drastic need for improvements in the capabilities of modern PSYOP forces. / Captain, United States Army

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

In the current fight against Islamic extremism, the United States is challenged in its ability to isolate and target specific individuals and groups in select regional environments - efforts that are arguably symptomatic of broader shortfalls in US global influence and strategic reach. These particularly troublesome environments are characterized by a lack of State control and are populated with fiercely independent, largely Muslim, and decidedly anti-western communities. Unable to consistently penetrate and influence these "ungoverned" regions, operational intelligence remains sporadic and opportunities limited. No broader, structural change has yet been made that would weaken or sever the links among Islamic extremists and their regional hosts over a sustained period or enable greater cooperation between the US or its allies with indigenous tribal populations. Accordingly, these regions continue to provide ideal locations for terrorist sanctuary, bases of support and operation, and freedom of movement. A supplemental US policy option is required. The challenge thus becomes one of how to create more effective opportunities to gain influence and control over these select tribal regions while countering the influence of competitors over a sustained period. A policy of manipulating tribal fractures and rivalries in order to induce or heighten internal conflict could provide these opportunities.

We develop models for the spread of two opposing ideologies in a closed population based on epidemic models. Based on different interaction rules, we study deterministic and stochastic models of the problem. The goal of our work is to provide a tractable analytical framework for each situation, and to analyze the effect of different initial conditions on the proportion of the population affiliated with each ideology after a large time interval.

Pendant plus de quarante cinq ans l’atout maître de la diplomatie publique américaine a été l’Agence d’information des Etats-Unis (l’USIA, United States Information Agency), établie en 1953 à l’apogée de la guerre froide pour répondre à la propagande soviétique anti-américaine et coordonner les programmes culturels et d’information à l’étranger. En privilégiant une approche comparative, notre thèse se propose d’apporter un éclairage sur le rôle longtemps ignoré de la diplomatie publique au sein de la machine de la politique étrangère américaine en se concentrant sur trois Administrations présidentielles, Eisenhower, Kennedy et Reagan qui se distinguent comme des périodes charnières. Dans ce cadre, notre étude tente de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer les stratégies de la diplomatie publique américaine élaborées depuis Washington telles qu’elles furent pratiquées par les agents des services d’information (USIS) dans les pays de « la zone cruciale » (France, Italie et Allemagne) en Europe de l’Ouest, ou dans les nations captives. Notre thèse démontre que des premières campagnes de propagande des combattants de la guerre psychologique, dans les années 1950, aux émissions high-tech des champions de l’information et de la désinformation des années 1980, l’USIA fut au cœur des stratégies de persuasion de la puissance américaine en Europe. Au regard des succès et des échecs des activités officielles et officieuses pour lesquelles l’USIA a œuvré, nous abordons la délicate question de la réception des programmes d’information officiels et de l’efficacité des stratégies d’influence américaines dans les batailles européennes pour la liberté. / For 46 years, the centrepiece of U.S. public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA) established in 1953 at the height of the Cold War to counter anti-American propaganda from the Soviet Union and coordinate foreign information dissemination programs. The purpose of my dissertation - a comparative study - is to try to shed a new light on the too long neglected role of public diplomacy in the American foreign policy process over the course of three key presidential Administrations- Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan. Therefore in the course of my dissertation, through field centered case studies, I investigate the strategies set up by the USIA in Washington and by the USIS [United States Information Services] in the field for “the crucial zone” (defined as France, Italy and Germany), and for key “captive nations” (such as Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). In my dissertation I argue that since the first propag! anda campaigns of the cold warriors to the high-tech broadcastings of the champions of information and disinformation, USIA was at the core of the American strategies of persuasion and power in Europe. Indeed, in the field, between 1953 and 1991 the psychological warfare between the US and the USSR turned into a cultural Cold War and a war of information in which both public and private networks were involved. Considering the success and failures of the covert and overt activities of the USIA I may tackle the tricky issue of the effectiveness of American strategies of influence in the European battle for freedom.

Following the 2008 Georgian war, Russia identified major deficiencies in its warfare capability, which lead to an extensive reformation and modernization of Russian forces. The reformation was accompanied by a Russian theoretical discussion concerning the wars of tomorrow. Several eminent Russian theorists emphasized the growing importance of non-kinetic means and methods, of which psychological warfare was considered as one of the most primary. Western scholars also emphasized an increased Russian focus on psychological warfare. Despite the identified increased significance on the subject, there is a palpable lack of research on contemporary Russian psychological warfare. This study aims to decrease this lack of research on the subject. Using a theory consuming approach, Russian psychological warfare is analyzed from two cases, Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of open sources. By combining two theories on psychological warfare, an analytical tool is developed which is then used in the analysis of the two cases. The theories that form the study´s theoretical base derives from Martin Libicki and Ron Schleifer. The two cases are analyzed and then followed by a comparative analysis of the cases. The study’s result shows that psychological warfare is an important component in Russian warfare, especially in the case of Crimea. Furthermore the study indicates that psychological warfare was a main component in the Crimea case, whereas it was a mere supportive component in the Georgian case.   The results show that Russian psychological warfare is used above all to create a favorable strategic context, where the Russian society and neutrals appears to be the most important target audiences to influence. The results also indicates that psychological warfare contributes in misleading the opponent and could thereby also contribute with obvious operational and tactical advantages for Russian warfare.

<p>I USA infördes begreppet informationsoperationer i mitten av 1990-talet och det har sedan dess skett en stor utveckling inom detta fält. Även i den svenska Försvarsmakten har konceptetinformationsoperationer införts och en utveckling och uppbyggnad av förmågor inom detta koncept pågår. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida konceptet informationsoperationers uppkomst i Försvarsmakten kan utgöra ett exempel på idéspridning. Utgångspunkten är att USA som en av världens ledande försvarsmakter är trendsättare för andra försvarsmakter i västvärlden, däribland den svenska Försvarsmakten. Med utgångspunkt i teorin om idéspridning undersöks om den amerikanska idén om informationsoperationer har spridit sig och snappats upp av Försvarsmakten som sedan översatt idén efter sina egna förutsättningar. Uppsatsen beskriver informationsoperationers uppkomst i USA och hur begreppet har fått fäste och utvecklats i Försvarsmakten. Vidare beskrivs hur idén tagit organisatorisk form i Försvarsmakten i syfte att utifrån teorin om lokal översättning undersöka hur detta skiljer sig från det amerikanska konceptet. I slutsatserna konstateras att teorin om idéspridning är tillämpbar i det här fallet och att det också skett vissa anpassningar av idén när Försvarsmakten implementerat den i sin egen organisation.</p> / <p>The concept of information operations was introduced in the US in the middle of the 1990’s and has since that time developed and a lot of things have happened in that field during the last decade. The development of information operations is going on in the Swedish Armed Forces as well. The purpose of this essay is to study whether the introduction of the concept of information operationsin the Swedish Armed Forces can be seen as an example of the spreading of ideas according to new institutional theory. With the premise that the US, with one of the worlds leading armed forces, functions as a trend setter for other nations in the western part of the world this essay investigates if it is the American idea about information operations that has been adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces. Furthermore it investigates whether the idea, if it has been adopted, has been copied or translated to fit the new organization. The essay starts with describing the concept of informationoperations in the US, how it was introduced and how it is currently used. Then follows a presentation about how information operations, as a concept, has developed in the Swedish Armed Forces. Differences between how the concept of information operations has been implemented in the organizations is presented and discussed in order to try the theory about local translation of ideas. The major conclusions is that the concept of information operations’ introduction in the Swedish armed forces can function as an example of the new institutional theory about the spreading of ideas and that there has been some adaptations of the concept in order to fit the organization.</p>

I USA infördes begreppet informationsoperationer i mitten av 1990-talet och det har sedan dess skett en stor utveckling inom detta fält. Även i den svenska Försvarsmakten har konceptetinformationsoperationer införts och en utveckling och uppbyggnad av förmågor inom detta koncept pågår. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida konceptet informationsoperationers uppkomst i Försvarsmakten kan utgöra ett exempel på idéspridning. Utgångspunkten är att USA som en av världens ledande försvarsmakter är trendsättare för andra försvarsmakter i västvärlden, däribland den svenska Försvarsmakten. Med utgångspunkt i teorin om idéspridning undersöks om den amerikanska idén om informationsoperationer har spridit sig och snappats upp av Försvarsmakten som sedan översatt idén efter sina egna förutsättningar. Uppsatsen beskriver informationsoperationers uppkomst i USA och hur begreppet har fått fäste och utvecklats i Försvarsmakten. Vidare beskrivs hur idén tagit organisatorisk form i Försvarsmakten i syfte att utifrån teorin om lokal översättning undersöka hur detta skiljer sig från det amerikanska konceptet. I slutsatserna konstateras att teorin om idéspridning är tillämpbar i det här fallet och att det också skett vissa anpassningar av idén när Försvarsmakten implementerat den i sin egen organisation. / The concept of information operations was introduced in the US in the middle of the 1990’s and has since that time developed and a lot of things have happened in that field during the last decade. The development of information operations is going on in the Swedish Armed Forces as well. The purpose of this essay is to study whether the introduction of the concept of information operationsin the Swedish Armed Forces can be seen as an example of the spreading of ideas according to new institutional theory. With the premise that the US, with one of the worlds leading armed forces, functions as a trend setter for other nations in the western part of the world this essay investigates if it is the American idea about information operations that has been adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces. Furthermore it investigates whether the idea, if it has been adopted, has been copied or translated to fit the new organization. The essay starts with describing the concept of informationoperations in the US, how it was introduced and how it is currently used. Then follows a presentation about how information operations, as a concept, has developed in the Swedish Armed Forces. Differences between how the concept of information operations has been implemented in the organizations is presented and discussed in order to try the theory about local translation of ideas. The major conclusions is that the concept of information operations’ introduction in the Swedish armed forces can function as an example of the new institutional theory about the spreading of ideas and that there has been some adaptations of the concept in order to fit the organization.

Between 1960 and 1968 the United States conducted intensive psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam. To date, no comprehensive study of the psychological war there has been conducted. This dissertation fills that void, describing the development of American PSYOP forces and their employment in Vietnam. By looking at the complex interplay of American, North Vietnamese, National Liberation Front (NLF) and South Vietnamese propaganda programs, a deeper understanding of these activities and the larger war emerges. The time period covered is important because it comprises the initial introduction of American PSYOP advisory forces and the transition to active participation in the war. It also allows enough time to determine the long-term effects of both the North Vietnamese/NLF and American/South Vietnamese programs. Ending with the 1968 Tet Offensive is fitting because it marks both a major change in the war and the establishment of the 4th Psychological Operations Group to manage the American PSYOP effort. This dissertation challenges the argument that the Northern/Viet Cong program was much more effective that the opposing one. Contrary to common perceptions, the North Vietnamese propaganda increasingly fell on deaf ears in the south by 1968. This study also provides support for understanding the Tet Offensive as a desperate gamble born out of knowledge the tide of war favored the Allies by mid-1967. The trend was solidly towards the government and the NLF increasingly depended on violence to maintain control. The American PSYOP forces went to Vietnam with little knowledge of the history and culture of Vietnam or experience conducting psychological operations in a counterinsurgency. As this dissertation demonstrates, despite these drawbacks, they had considerable success in the period covered. Although facing an experienced enemy in the psychological war, the U.S. forces made great strides in advising, innovating techniques, and developing equipment. I rely extensively on untapped sources such as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service transcripts, Captured Document Exploitation Center files, and access to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives. Additionally, I have digitized databases such as the Hamlet Evaluation System and Terrorist Incident Reporting System for Geographic Information System software analysis. The maps provide examples of the possibilities available to the historian using these datasets.

No description available.