Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present a series of comparative studies to explore human adults' and Capuchin monkeys' ability to infer intentional objects from actions. First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult humans did not show a similar ability. We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the participants' belief about a ball's presence behind a hiding screen. We found no evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al's study, and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like Kovacs et al's might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as suggested by Heyes (2014). We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM' may be based upon the computation of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes.

A psicologia é uma atividade cultural humana de construção do conhecimento (Simão, 2004) e, assim sendo, sabemos da importância de estudar os aspectos históricos e filosóficos que envolvem sua construção. Acompanhamos, portanto, o seu fazer-se ciência, nos colocando diante de uma psicologia que se contextualiza em uma teia de teorias ora conexas ora desconexas, segundo critérios de cientificidade. Esse espaço psicológico se sustenta em dinâmicas tanto de rupturas - devido à diversidade teórica que pode resultar em um campo de dispersão, conforme propõe Figueiredo (2012) - como de unificação da psicologia. Ciente da pluralidade teórica e metodológica existente na psicologia, vejo, portanto, a necessidade de refletir sobre as escolhas do psicólogo por certas correntes, que, como veremos nesta pesquisa, estão intimamente relacionadas às suas experiências cognitiva-emocionais. A proposta neste trabalho foi analisar as bases do pensamento do filósofo Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), - criador de uma proposta filosófica, a antroposofia, que trata de temas centrais abordados pela psicologia. Para isso, buscou-se a interlocução entre alguns aspectos histórico-culturais da própria construção de conhecimento desse pensador e o fazer da psicologia, procurando situar o espaço ocupado por Steiner dentro daquilo que se compreende como espaço psicológico, segundo Figueiredo (2007). Foram analisados os relatos autobiográficos de Steiner, chamados nesta pesquisa de experiências cognitivo-emocionais, e como tais aspectos podem ter modulado o percurso do seu pensamento. Entre essas experiências está seu diálogo muito próximo com as ideias do poeta e romancista J.W. Goethe, que também recebeu destaque nesta pesquisa, visto que há um interesse na retomada ao pensamento goethiano na atualidade, principalmente no que toca a importância da intuição no desenvolvimento do ser humano. O processo desta pesquisa requereu movimentos de aproximação e distanciamento em especial em relação ao envolvimento da autora com seu objeto de pesquisa (os pensamentos de Steiner), para que se atingisse uma melhor compreensão dos aspectos envolvidos tanto na configuração do psicológico (no sentido de Figueiredo, 2007) como no percurso de Steiner. Tal análise proporcionou à pesquisadora um aprofundamento a respeito de alguns aspectos relativos à escolha por certas correntes de pensamento em psicologia - neste caso, às matrizes compreensivas de inspiração românticas e pós-românticas - e, que são reflexos das experiências histórico-culturais do profissional, orientando-o no espaço contemporâneo tanto para sua prática em consultório como em pesquisa / Psychology is a human activity of knowledge construction (Simão, 2004) and saying that we become aware of how important it is to study the historical and philosophical aspects which permeate its construction. We follow thus, its self-making process, putting ourselves before a psychology which contains a variety of theories either connected or disconnected to it regarding to scientific criteria This psychological dimension holds itself in a dynamic of ruptures which Figueiredo (2012) calls as dispersion field or sometimes even into the idea of the unifying psychology. Knowing that theoretical and methodological plurality I see the necessity for a deeper thinking regarding the psychologist´s choice or empathy towards a certain theory or stream. I believe that such choices are intrinsically connected to his or her cognitive-emotional experiences through life. The proposal of this work was to analyze the fundamental thoughts of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), who was the founder of anthroposophy philosophy which deals with some core themes of psychology. A dialogue was sought between some historical-cultural aspects which involved his own path of knowledge construction and the psychology-making. The proposal of this work was to make an attempt to place Steiner´s thoughts into the so called psychology space according to Figueiredo (2007). Steiner´s self- reported episodes were analyzed from his autobiography which I referred here as cognitive-emotional experiences and how those aspects may have shaped his way of thinking. One of those aspects is his very close dialogue with J. W. Goethe´s ideas which also deserved prominence in this research. Nowadays there is a new light upon Goethe´s thinking, mainly in regards to his conception of intuition, so, that is why psychology is also interested and concerned with how intuition can influence human development. Perhaps this will be the contemporaneity of this paper. It was required approximation and distancing movements from the researcher in special to her previous knowledge about Steiner, and in doing so, it has given her a better comprehension about both: psychology construction and Steiner path. As a result, there was a better understanding on how the process of making choice takes place when a psychologist decides on one or the other stream to conduct his professional approach, noticing that there are historical-cultural aspects which lead the psychologists to choose, guiding them either to counseling practice or in the research field

A psicologia é uma atividade cultural humana de construção do conhecimento (Simão, 2004) e, assim sendo, sabemos da importância de estudar os aspectos históricos e filosóficos que envolvem sua construção. Acompanhamos, portanto, o seu fazer-se ciência, nos colocando diante de uma psicologia que se contextualiza em uma teia de teorias ora conexas ora desconexas, segundo critérios de cientificidade. Esse espaço psicológico se sustenta em dinâmicas tanto de rupturas - devido à diversidade teórica que pode resultar em um campo de dispersão, conforme propõe Figueiredo (2012) - como de unificação da psicologia. Ciente da pluralidade teórica e metodológica existente na psicologia, vejo, portanto, a necessidade de refletir sobre as escolhas do psicólogo por certas correntes, que, como veremos nesta pesquisa, estão intimamente relacionadas às suas experiências cognitiva-emocionais. A proposta neste trabalho foi analisar as bases do pensamento do filósofo Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), - criador de uma proposta filosófica, a antroposofia, que trata de temas centrais abordados pela psicologia. Para isso, buscou-se a interlocução entre alguns aspectos histórico-culturais da própria construção de conhecimento desse pensador e o fazer da psicologia, procurando situar o espaço ocupado por Steiner dentro daquilo que se compreende como espaço psicológico, segundo Figueiredo (2007). Foram analisados os relatos autobiográficos de Steiner, chamados nesta pesquisa de experiências cognitivo-emocionais, e como tais aspectos podem ter modulado o percurso do seu pensamento. Entre essas experiências está seu diálogo muito próximo com as ideias do poeta e romancista J.W. Goethe, que também recebeu destaque nesta pesquisa, visto que há um interesse na retomada ao pensamento goethiano na atualidade, principalmente no que toca a importância da intuição no desenvolvimento do ser humano. O processo desta pesquisa requereu movimentos de aproximação e distanciamento em especial em relação ao envolvimento da autora com seu objeto de pesquisa (os pensamentos de Steiner), para que se atingisse uma melhor compreensão dos aspectos envolvidos tanto na configuração do psicológico (no sentido de Figueiredo, 2007) como no percurso de Steiner. Tal análise proporcionou à pesquisadora um aprofundamento a respeito de alguns aspectos relativos à escolha por certas correntes de pensamento em psicologia - neste caso, às matrizes compreensivas de inspiração românticas e pós-românticas - e, que são reflexos das experiências histórico-culturais do profissional, orientando-o no espaço contemporâneo tanto para sua prática em consultório como em pesquisa / Psychology is a human activity of knowledge construction (Simão, 2004) and saying that we become aware of how important it is to study the historical and philosophical aspects which permeate its construction. We follow thus, its self-making process, putting ourselves before a psychology which contains a variety of theories either connected or disconnected to it regarding to scientific criteria This psychological dimension holds itself in a dynamic of ruptures which Figueiredo (2012) calls as dispersion field or sometimes even into the idea of the unifying psychology. Knowing that theoretical and methodological plurality I see the necessity for a deeper thinking regarding the psychologist´s choice or empathy towards a certain theory or stream. I believe that such choices are intrinsically connected to his or her cognitive-emotional experiences through life. The proposal of this work was to analyze the fundamental thoughts of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), who was the founder of anthroposophy philosophy which deals with some core themes of psychology. A dialogue was sought between some historical-cultural aspects which involved his own path of knowledge construction and the psychology-making. The proposal of this work was to make an attempt to place Steiner´s thoughts into the so called psychology space according to Figueiredo (2007). Steiner´s self- reported episodes were analyzed from his autobiography which I referred here as cognitive-emotional experiences and how those aspects may have shaped his way of thinking. One of those aspects is his very close dialogue with J. W. Goethe´s ideas which also deserved prominence in this research. Nowadays there is a new light upon Goethe´s thinking, mainly in regards to his conception of intuition, so, that is why psychology is also interested and concerned with how intuition can influence human development. Perhaps this will be the contemporaneity of this paper. It was required approximation and distancing movements from the researcher in special to her previous knowledge about Steiner, and in doing so, it has given her a better comprehension about both: psychology construction and Steiner path. As a result, there was a better understanding on how the process of making choice takes place when a psychologist decides on one or the other stream to conduct his professional approach, noticing that there are historical-cultural aspects which lead the psychologists to choose, guiding them either to counseling practice or in the research field

In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

This dissertation has the task of highlighting the role of Nietzsche.s life experience in view of his philosophical and psychological production. Giving importance on how the philosopher understood himself, in his book Ecce Homo, in the Fragmentos Postumos and in his correspondence, and taking an interest in his |Clinica Moral| as a foundation for moral criticism, the present research aims at to demonstrate what Nietzsche´s philosophy owes to the meeting of his life.s experience and, especially, the disease. One sought to show that the philosopher, buy imputing his | moral psychology| to his illness, relating as well, like no other philosopher life and work, states that the illness is the nexus between one and another, being thus able to unfold the theme of Nietzsche.s health and disease to health and disease in Nietzsche and, more, psychology in Nietzsche to Nietzsche.s psychology . It is evident, therefore, that the first impulse and inspiration for Nietzsche´s philosophy arose from the need to take care of his own health, transforming all his work in medical records, a therapy that he himself used. Understanding the clinic as a space where one seeks healing, as a technique for restoring balance to the body and considering the body as the essence of nature (physis) that exists, one can take the philosophy of Nietzsche as engendering a new therapy: technique for the maintenance of the great health, departing from a new moral proposal, the moral of overcoming oneself. / Esta dissertação tem a tarefa de evidenciar o papel da experiência de vida de Nietzsche diante de sua produção filosófica e psicológica. Dando importância como o filósofo se autoentendeu, em seu livro Ecce Homo, nos Fragmentos póstumos e em sua correspondência, e interessando-se por sua Clínica Moral , enquanto fundamento da crítica à moral, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo demonstrar o que a Filosofia de Nietzsche deve ao seu encontro com a sua vivência e, sobretudo, a doença. Procurou-se mostrar que o filósofo, ao atribuir sua psicologia moral à sua doença, relacionando, assim, como nenhum outro filósofo, vida e obra, explicita que a enfermidade é o nexo entre uma e outra, podendo-se, dessa forma, desdobrar o tema em saúde e doença de Nietzsche para saúde e doença em Nietzsche e, mais, a psicologia em Nietzsche para psicologia de Nietzsche. Evidencia-se, assim, que o primeiro impulso e inspiração para o filosofar nietzschiano surgiu da necessidade de cuidar da própria saúde, transformando toda a sua obra em prontuário médico, uma terapia que ele próprio usou. Entendendo a clínica, espaço onde se procura a cura, como técnica de restaurar o equilíbrio do corpo e considerando o corpo como a essência da natureza (physis) existente, pode-se tomar a filosofia de Nietzsche como o engendramento de uma nova terapia: técnica de manutenção da grande saúde, a partir de uma nova proposta moral; a moral da superação de si.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de cibler l’un des rapports possibles entre psychologie et philosophie, à travers la lecture que fait Carl Gustav Jung des textes d’Emmanuel Kant. La théorie de la connaissance de Kant, telle que présentée dans sa Critique de la raison pure, apparaît comme étant l’un des piliers philosophiques à la base des développements conceptuels jungiens. Le psychiatre l’a affirmé à plusieurs reprises, notamment dans son ouvrage autobiographique (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). Il sera question, d’une part, d’évaluer la position scientifique de Jung en tant que construite à partir de celle proposée par Kant. Entre idéalisme et empirisme, Jung semble vouloir se frayer une place dans la science à la manière de l’idéalisme allemand. D’autre part, ce sera l’occasion d’étudier les structures élaborées par Jung, notamment l’inconscient collectif et les archétypes, qui selon lui, sont analogues à certains concepts de Kant tel que la chose en soi et les catégories a priori. Enfin, c’est à travers l’individuation, processus central de la recherche jungienne, que nous tenterons de comprendre de quelle façon les structures se dynamisent et peuvent faire écho à la dialectique de la Raison pure tel que présentée par Kant. Il sera dès lors possible de situer la psychologie analytique de Jung entre esthétique et éthique, telle une théorie éthique s’élaborant à même le développement du Soi. / This dissertation aims to target one of the possible relationships between psychology and philosophy, through Carl Gustav Jung's reading of Immanuel Kant's texts. Kant's theory of knowledge as presented in his Critique of Pure Reason appears to be one of the philosophical pillars at the basis of Jungian conceptual developments. The psychiatrist affirmed this on several occasions, notably in his autobiographical work (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). To do so, on the one hand, we will evaluate Jung's scientific position as constructed from the one proposed by Kant. Between idealism and empiricism, Jung seems to want to make his own way in science like the manner of German idealism. On the other hand, it will be the occasion to study the structures elaborated by Jung, in particular the collective unconscious and the archetypes, which, according to him, are analogous to certain Kant’s concepts such as the thing in itself and the a priori categories. Finally, it is through individuation, the central process of Jungian research, that we will try to understand how structures are dynamized and can echo the dialectic of Pure Reason as presented by Kant. It will then be possible to situate Jung's analytical psychology between aesthetics and ethics, as an ethical theory formulated within the development of the Self.

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation explores questions of personal change and the power of narrative with respect to both an individual and to the wider social environment. In chapter one, I explore the connections between the various facets of liminality and agency, with a focus on how it is that people can consciously craft specific ways of being an agent. In chapter two, I explore the nature of disagreements that involve our most fundamental commitments from within the context of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s posthumous <i>On Certainty</i>. Wittgenstein was pessimistic that argumentation could help in such cases, yet left it an open question as to whether they could be otherwise resolved. Here, I suggest the practice of storytelling as one strategy to resolve these disagreements. Finally, in chapter 3, I examine recent takes on conspiracy theories that include evaluating conspiracy theories as contrarian claims to secret knowledge as well as highlighting the political function that many conspiracy theories can play. Here, I will develop a claim that is common to both camps: conspiracy theories tell stories. By analyzing the characters and narrative structures at play in conspiracy theories, we can gain a deeper understanding of why conspiracy theorists think they know what they know, why particular conspiracy theories reference certain groups or agents rather than others, and why some tropes appear and reappear in conspiracy theories.</p>

This is a postmodernist dissertation contextualised within the new epistemology. The dissertation's descriptive methodology mirrors a personal journey from intrapsychic to ecosystemic psychology which operates within the domain of language and narrative discourse. As such it is founded on the principles of ecosystemic rather than Newtonian thinking. A conversation between various participants constructs the dissertatioi1 through polyphony and academic dialogue. This is then deconstructed through the use of metalogue thereby allowing the dissertation to operate simultaneously on a number of different levels. As it is a postmodernist text, the structure is in a sense an 'anti-structure' in that it is indirect while it is still acknowledged as a construction. In this way it is constructed and deconstructed in terms of its own premises. Expectations in terms of conventional dissertation formulae are challenged without negating academic requirements. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

This thesis presents descriptive and explanatory accounts of both non-theism, the lack of belief in the existence of supernatural agents, and strong atheism, the moral opposition to such beliefs on the grounds that they are both harmful and signs of weak character. Based on my fieldwork with non-theist groups and individuals in the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, an online survey of over 3,000 non-theists from over 50 countries, and theories from both the social and cognitive sciences, I offer a new account of why nations with low economic and normative threats produce high levels of non-theism. This account is offered in place of the common explanation that religious beliefs provide comfort in threatening circumstances, which I show to be both anthropologically and psychologically problematic. My account centres on the role of threats, both existential and normative, in increasing commitment to ingroup ideologies, many of which are religious, and the important role of witnessing displays of commitment to religious beliefs in producing such beliefs in each new generation. In environments with low levels of personal and normative threat, commitment to religious ideologies decreases, extrinsic reasons for religious participation decrease, and superstitious actions decrease. Given the human tendency to believe the communications of others to the extent that they are backed up by action, such a decrease in displays of commitment to religious beliefs leads to increased non-theism in the span of a generation. In relation to strong atheism, I document a correlation, both geographical and chronological, between strong atheism and the presence of religious beliefs and demands in the public sphere. I then offer an explanation of this correlation based on the effects of threats against a modern normative order characterized by philosopher Charles Taylor as a system of mutual benefit and individual liberty.

The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.