One of the core and primary functions of the school is to transmit knowledge from one generation to the next. The theory and practice of schooling (teaching and learning) should be founded on a sound concept of knowledge. A change in epistemology entails a change in approach to schooling. This study investigates how the postmodern idea of knowledge may affect schooling both in theory and practice. The author traces how the concept of knowledge has changed from modern to the postmodern era, in order to find the general features of the recent view of knowledge. The postmodern idea of knowledge is characterised by doubt about objective knowledge, the shift from universal reason to plural reason, criticism of foundationalism and awareness of the peculiar role of language. This study focuses on Richard Rorty's theory to analyse the postmodern idea of knowledge and its educational implication. In order to figure out the problems of postmodern epistemology, the author criticises Rorty's idea of knowledge immanently and transcendentally. Not only self-contradictions but also hidden foundations (or beliefs) in Rorty's idea of knowledge are revealed. This study comes to conclude that although the postmodern idea of knowledge reveals the shortcomings of the modern idea of knowledge, it also has many flaws in achieving a sound concept of knowledge. This study indicates an alternative view of knowledge from a Reformational perspective in order to overcome the shortcomings of postmodern epistemology. The author suggests a new possibility of objective knowledge based on the notion of creational law, and also various kinds of legitimate knowledge based on the multi-dimensional modality of reality. As a final point, this study suggests the notion of stewardship in education. Schooling should open up the multidimensional reality for students to become responsible stewards who care for the world and their fellow human beings. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Education))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007.

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Richard Rorty’s arguments in favour of a limited role for religion in the public sphere, both with regard to their practical value and their consistency with Rorty’s other philosophical commitments. A brief description of Rorty’s various philosophical commitments is followed by a detailed analysis of the negative practical consequences that can be foreseen resulting from Rorty’s approach to the topic of religion and any attempt to enforce his proposed treatment of religion. After looking at the practical problems with Rorty’s position, a closer look was taken at Rorty’s consistency across his philosophical writings. With a particular focus on Rorty’s pragmatism and his epistemic relativism the author concludes that Rorty’s arguments for reducing the influence of religion in the public sphere remain of questionable practicality and, furthermore, are at odds with his epistemological commitments. Rorty’s commitment to liberal democracy entails a commitment to protecting citizens’ rights to voice their opinions in hopes of influencing public policy. Despite his controversial writings with regards to the role of religion in society, authors such as Jeffrey Stout and Nicholas Wolterstorff provide alternative approaches to the appropriate treatment of religion in society that remain consistent with an anti-foundational commitment to liberal democracy and can expect to produce more favourable practical outcomes. / Graduate

This thesis is primarily a descriptive exploration of the related moral philosophies of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty. While Rorty is clear that his normative thinking descends from Sellars's positions, there are numerous differences between their two positions. For instance, though Rorty is a self-identified Sellarsian, he rejects the explicitly formal character of his predecessor's work. Further, Sellars's normative upshot may be seen as philanthropic whereas Rorty's is best understood as solidaristic. Chapter 1 works through Sellars's metaethical position, which gives an intentional account to experientially-imperative normative judgments. This description pays particular attention to the necessity of community and the action-motivating character of practical reasoning. Chapter 2 turns to Rorty's deployment of Sellars's insights, beginning with a brief account of the commonalities between their metaphysical and epistemological positions. The most significant extensions Rorty makes to Sellars's position are in limiting justificatory schemas to only one's own community and shifting the focus of this community from "we reasoners" to "we sufferers." The third and final chapter briefly compliments one of the benefits of Rorty's claims over Sellars's before turning to critique, arguing that unfortunately neither of their positions have much in the way of content to offer. Beyond this, it seems difficult to understand trans-traditional conversation or deliberation on their accounts, especially Rorty's. Nonetheless, by tracing the impact of Wilfrid Sellars's thought in the work of Richard Rorty, an important connection may be made and explored.

This thesis will examine the direct and indirect impact the Irish National theatre had upon American theatre in general and the African American theatre in particular. It discusses the relationship between the Irish theatrical movement during the Irish Literary Renaissance and the drama that was produced during the Harlem Renaissance. To do this Rorty’s concepts of the ‘strong poet’ and ‘ironist’ will be utilized. The bleeding and cross contamination of culture, it is contended, was due to the American tour that the Irish Players undertook in 1911/12. The tour, although staged in white theatre houses and attended by a mainly white audience, had a sizeable impact on the American theatrical landscape. This thesis will chart the course of this change, from the tour through to the beginnings of the Harlem Renaissance. From the Abbey Theatre to the Little Theatre movement and from there to the African American theatre a continuous thread of de-reification, of cultural awakenings is established. In essence, the source of the African American theatre, both the Artistic stylings and hopes of Alain Locke and the propaganda aspirations of W.E.B. DuBois will be referred back to the Irish tour.

<p>The central thesis of <em>Bergsonian Metaphysical Undercurrents in Rorty’s Liberal Gradualism</em> is that those who take the greatest risks for social reformations are always motivated by the feeling of being part of something indefinitely greater than themselves and their own moral communities (however capacious these may be): progress just is this vague sense of indefinite movement, or becoming. In works such as <em>Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution,</em> and <em>The Two Sources of Morality and Religion</em>, Henri Bergson identified this sense of movement with time, the evolution of life, and the emotion of love respectively. Though he would probably laud Bergson’s insistence that philosophy should be partisan, Richard Rorty would be less hasty in making Bergson’s identifications, for Rorty thinks social progress is best served by gradual increases in our local sense of “us” effected by imaginary identification with others through literary exposures, not a mystical sense of oneness with all creation. Improvising on a Bergsonian note, I hold that one must already be an aspiring mystic, or moral hero, for one to get an expanded sense of “us” from reading literature. But such a lifestyle is incredibly difficult to maintain, requiring superhuman courage and moral reflection. It is only in the inspiring, active presence of a genuine moral hero that a readership will be able to make such efforts, and reliably take to literature the way Rorty would like in order to form his goal of a maximally capacious liberal utopia. Mystics act out of the metaphysical or religious conviction, whether real or imagined, that they are instruments of a great force of love. Rorty’s own utopian project would then be dependent on (and, perhaps, even an unknowing product of) these spiritual, metaphysical undercurrents of social progress.</p>

<p>I propose a Deweyan understanding of the relationship between epistemology and politics. The standards of legitimate political debate are an irreducibly political concern and cannot be invoked to justify the politics they facilitate. Yet, such standards cannot be left outside of the scope of legitimate political discourse, because they are both politically contestable and politically significant. A Deweyan account of inquiry, extended to moral and political questions, provides fruitful ground for integrating epistemological concerns within a political framework without reducing either kind of consideration to the other.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

My recent compositions are situated within a postmodern theoretical framework. The heterogeneity of materials and hybridity of musical formation in these works are interpreted and contextualized within a personal reading of postmodern theories. The critical essay traces my aesthetics through a historical investigation into the definition of musical postmodernism. Through extensive citation and analysis of the writings of Julius T. Fraser, Italo Calvino, and Richard Rorty, the essay aims to provide a theoretical context for the interpretation of the musical examples. The creative documentation contains three newly-composed musical works: Piano Trio from Opus 3/c, Opus 6 for Violin, and Opus 7 for Piccolo. The works' postmodern features include creative approaches to the fragmentation of musical time into separate levels, historical allusions, and the exploration of multiplicity.