Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). / Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy.

Persistent Pasts: Historical Palimpsests in Nineteenth-Century Prose traces Victorian historical discourse with specific attention to the works of Thomas Carlyle and George Eliot and their relation to historicism in earlier works by Sir Walter Scott and James Hogg. I argue that the Victorian response to the tense relation between the materialist Enlightenment and the idealist rhetoric of Romanticism marks a decidedly ethical turn in Victorian historical discourse. The writers introduce the dialectic of enlightened empiricism and romantic idealism to invoke the historical imagination as an ethical response to the call of the past. I read the dialectic and its invitation to ethics through the figure of the palimpsest. Drawing upon theoretical work on the palimpsest from Carlyle and de Quincey through Gérard Genette and Sarah Dillon, I analyze ways in which the materialist and idealist discourses interrupt each other and persist in one another. Central to my argument are concepts drawn from Walter Benjamin, Emmanuel Levinas, Richard Rorty, and Frank Ankersmit that challenge and / or affirm historical materiality.

Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV).

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This thesis argues that in order to demonstrate the possibility and sensibility of Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo's 'weak religious belief', it should be understood as the becoming uncertain of traditional, metaphysical (strong) belief. The difference between weak belief and strong belief can thereby be understood not as two distinct modes of belief, but as an event of weakening in the history of belief that has yet to be realized by those who believe with the support of metaphysical certainty. Since Vattimo aligns metaphysics with violence, and since he aligns traditional belief with metaphysics, to demonstrate and defend the possibility of Vattimo’s weak belief amounts to the reduction of violence in the world. However, the possibility and validity of weak belief has been called into question by thinkers such as Richard Rorty. In light of a review of the arguments and counter-arguments between Rorty and Vattimo, I argue that it is possible to distinguish weak belief from strong belief as long as this remains a weak distinction.

Living Disability: Ways Forward from Decontextual Models of Disability consists of six articles that provide both theoretical and pragmatic commentaries on decontextual approaches to vulnerability and disability. In What Contemporary Models of Disability Miss: The Case for a Phenomenological Hermeneutic Analysis I argue many commonly accepted models for understanding disability use a vertical method in which disability is defined as a category into which people are slotted based on whether or not they fit its definitional criteria. This method inevitably homogenizes the experiences of disabled people. A hermeneutic investigation of commonly accepted models for understanding disability will provide an epistemological tool to critique and to augment contemporary models of disability. In A Phenomenological Hermeneutic Resolution to the Principlist- Narrative Bioethics Debate Narrative, I note narrative approaches to bioethics and principlist approaches to bioethics have often been presented in fundamental opposition to each other. I argue that a phenomenological hermeneutic approach to the debate finds a compromise between both positions that maintains what is valuable in each of them. Justifying an Adequate Response to the Vulnerable Other examines the possibility of endorsing the position that I, as a moral agent, ought to do my best to respond adequately to the other’s vulnerability. I contend that, insofar as I value my personal identity, it is consistent to work toward responding adequately to the vulnerability of the other both ontologically and ethically. Who Can Make a Yes?: Disability, Gender, Sexual Consent and ‘Yes Means Yes’ examines the ‘yes means yes’ model of sexual consent, and the political and ethical commitments that underpin this model, noting three fundamental Ph.D. Thesis – C. Kavanagh; McMaster University - Philosophy v disadvantages. This position unfairly polices the sexual expression of participants, particularly vulnerable participants such as disabled people, it demands an unreasonably high standard for defining sexual interaction as consensual, and allows perpetrators of sexual violence to define consent. In Craving Sameness, Accepting Difference: The Possibility of Solidarity and Social Justice I note realist accounts typically define solidarity on the basis of a static feature of human nature. We stand in solidarity with some other person, or group of people, because we share important features in common. In opposition to such realist accounts, Richard Rorty defines solidarity as a practical tool, within which there is always an ‘us’, with whom we stand in solidarity, and a ‘them’, with whom we are contrasted. I argue that by understanding Rorty’s pragmatic solidarity in terms of the relational view of solidarity offered by Alexis Shotwell, it is possible to conceptualise solidarity in a manner that allows for extending the boundaries of the community with whom we stand in solidarity. In Translating Non-Human Actors I examine Bruno Latour’s position that nonhuman things can be made to leave interpretable statements, and have a place in democracy. With the right types of mediators, the scientist can translate for non-humans, and those voices will allow for nonhuman political representation. I wish to suggest that, like scientists, people with disabilities are particularly capable of building networks that facilitate translation between humans and non-humans. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Living Disability: Ways Forward from Decontextual Models of Disability consists of six separate articles that provide both theoretical and pragmatic commentaries on decontextual approaches to vulnerability and disability. The first three articles examine contemporary approaches to understanding vulnerability and disability, and explore what a contextual theoretical approach, one that puts the experiences of people with disabilities at the centre, might look like. The second three articles provide a bioethical examination of practical ethical questions associated with the treatment of people with disabilities when it comes to social and political positions on disability and sexuality, solidarity with people with disabilities, and the relationship between people with disabilities and objects.

The focus of this practical theological study is Pentecostalism, and the relationship between the hermeneutics of Pentecostalism and Postmodernism. Through a literary search, we observe the points of congruency between the hermeneutics of early Pentecostals and the key tenets of Postmodernism. We note the unprecedented acceptance of Pentecostal scholars into the larger theological world and question whether this is a result of the increased Modernization of Pentecostal hermeneutics. The Postmodern world of youth is explored, and we observe their tremendous openness to spirituality. This thesis will show that Pentecostals may contribute to the Christian world a Pentecostal hermeneutic that will speak a relevant message to generations of youth. Chapters two and three examine the convergent viewpoints of Pentecostalism with Postmodernity, in terms of rationalism, narratives, and the place of experience in life and theology. Chapter four highlights the hermeneutical debate between Gordon D. Fee and his Pentecostal responders, noting the Modern approach in the principles debated. Chapter five seeks to provide interaction with a giant of theology seldom engaged by Pentecostals - Rudolf Bultmann - and his modern followers, and explores the world of Postmodern youth. Chapter six explores the work of Kenneth Archer, who has proposed a specific Pentecostal hermeneutical approach, and chapter seven discusses the role of the Holy Spirit in hermeneutics, including whether Pentecostal experience may be considered an ”edge” in hermeneutics. Chapter eight summarizes the findings of this study. / Practical Theology / D. Th (Practical Theology)

El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas. / El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas. / The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations.