Submitted by Pedro Hofmeister (pedromh@gmail.com) on 2018-03-23T13:18:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-MPA-Hofmeister-vf3.pdf: 832446 bytes, checksum: dc761531a703961644cef75bc4af9897 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Mayara Costa de Sousa (mayara.sousa@fgv.br) on 2018-03-26T18:58:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-MPA-Hofmeister-vf3.pdf: 832446 bytes, checksum: dc761531a703961644cef75bc4af9897 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-03-27T12:54:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-MPA-Hofmeister-vf3.pdf: 832446 bytes, checksum: dc761531a703961644cef75bc4af9897 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-27T12:54:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-MPA-Hofmeister-vf3.pdf: 832446 bytes, checksum: dc761531a703961644cef75bc4af9897 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-02 / This study focuses on the relation between the pay and performance of executives of Brazilian publicly listed firms. We used a series of multiple linear regressions with OLS estimation to investigate whether compensation is positively associated with shareholder return. Our sample includes 525 observations and comprises a three-year period (2014, 2015 and 2016). We find that, in general, pay is positively associated with performance but that this sensitivity is not sufficiently large. We also confirm that stock-based compensation and a higher governance level are important for aligning pay and performance. Firms with concentrated ownership tend to pay less, which suggests that monitoring decreases the need of pay to align incentives or reduces the power of executives to set their own compensation. Finally, our model suggests that fixed compensation is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent whereas variable compensation serves to address moral hazard. / Este estudo enfoca a relação entre remuneração dos executivos, desempenho da empresa e retorno para o acionista de executivos de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. Utilizamos uma série de regressões lineares múltiplas com estimativa de mínimos quadrados comuns (OLS) para investigar se a remuneração dos executivos está positivamente associada ao retorno do acionista. Nossos dados foram coletados do Formulário Referência da BM&FBOVESPA (equivalente ao SEC 20-F), Economatica e Bloomberg, e nossa amostra incluiu 525 observações e compreende um período de três anos (2014, 2015 e 2016) com dados de 175 empresas. Concluímos que, em geral, o pagamento está positivamente associado ao desempenho, mas que essa sensibilidade não é suficiente. Também confirmamos que a remuneração que inclui opções, bem como empresas com um nível de governança superior são fatores importantes para alinhar o salário e o desempenho. As empresas com controle concentrado tendem a pagar menos, o que sugere que o monitoramento diminui a necessidade de incentivos financeiros para alinhar interesses ou diminui o poder dos executivos para estabelecer sua própria remuneração.

Maintenir un accroissement soutenu de la valeur pour les actionnaires estaujourd'hui reconnu comme un des principaux objectifs stratégiques pour les institutions financières. Générer une croissance stable de la valeur pour les actionnaires nécessite une concentration intense sur une prestation de services de meilleure qualité aux clients, le recrutement, le maintien d'un effectif motivé, et l'entretien d'excellentes relations avec les différents partenaires de la firme bancaire.Cette thèse présente une évaluation analytique de la création de la valeur actionnariale dans le secteur bancaire. La première partie : Fournit un cadre pour l'analyse théorique de la valeur actionnariale en discutant comment la valeur actionnariale peut être définie, si elle peut être considérée comme un objectif valable et stratégique pour la banque, comment la valeur actionnariale peut être mesuré et comment elle peut être créé. La deuxième partie de la thèse présente des Investigations empiriques afin de mesurer la valeur actionnariale et certains de ses déterminants. La partie finale Analyses l'importance de Ces facteurs dans lacréation de valeur pour les actionnaires.L'échantillon utilisé comprend les dix banques tunisiennes cotées sur la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunisie entre 1995 et 2009. Nous utilisons un modèle de panel pour examiner les déterminants de la création de valeur pour les actionnaires (Mesuré par l'EVA et ses composante, c.-à-d. profits économiques et coût de capital) comme une fonction linéaire de variables spécifique aux banques et a l?industrie bancaire et des variables macro-économique. Nous trouvons que Divers facteurs semble être d'importants déterminants significatifs des profits économiques et de la valeur actionnariale créée par les banques. En cohérence avec la littérature antérieure, nous avons des efficiences coût et revenu qui sont liées positivement à la performance des banques: à savoir, les profits économiques ont eu un lien positif avec l'amélioration de l'efficience revenu, tandis que l'EVA est positivement liée a l'amélioration de l'efficience coût. Deuxièmement, nous trouvons une relation positive entre les pertes de crédit et la valeur actionnariale, ce qui explique que des pertes élevées inattendues impliquent un plus grand volume d'affaires et peut-être de moins bonne qualité du portefeuille de prêts. Troisièmement, nous avonsobservé un lien positif entre l'endettement bancaire et les profits économiques, mais non pas avec l'EVA. Cela est dû à la relation positive entre effet de levier financier et le coût du capital. Dans l'ensemble, plus le levier financier est important plus les profits économiques seront aussi importantes, mais cela est compensé par des coûts du capital plus élevés. / Creating sustainable shareholder value is at this time accepted as one of the mostimportant strategic objectives for financial institutions. Generating stable shareholder value growth requires an intense focus on delivering benefits to customers in the most efficient way, hiring and retaining motivated personnel, maintaining excellent relationship with other firm stakeholders.This thesis provides an analytical assessment of shareholder value creation in banking. The first part of the text provides a framework for analysing shareholder value theory by discussing how shareholder value can be defined, if it can be considered a valid strategic objective for banks, how shareholder value can be measured and how it can be created.The second part of the text presents empirical investigations in order to measureshareholder value and some of it drivers. The final part analyses the importance of these drivers in creating shareholder value. In order to have a broad view of the sector, the sample analysed comprises commercial Tunisian banks listed on Tunisian stock exchange between 1995 and 2009. We use a panel model to examine the determinants of bank's shareholder value reaction (measured by EVA and its components) as a linear function of various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic. We find that various factors are found to be statistically significantdeterminants of economic profits and shareholder value created by banks. Consistently with the previous literature, we find that cost and revenue efficiency are positively related to bank performance: namely, economic profits are found to have a positive link with revenue efficiency improvements, while EVA is positively related to cost efficiency improvements. Secondly, we find a positive relationship between credit losses and shareholder value providing evidence that higher unexpected losses imply larger business volume and perhaps lower loan portfolio quality. Thirdly, we observe a positive link between bank's leverage and economic profits, but not with EVA. This is due to the positive relationship between financial leverage and the cost of capital, overall, greater financial leverage increase economic profits but this is compensate by higher costs of capital.

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

Text in Afrikaans / Daar is 'n toenemende bewuswording van die noodsaaklikheid van effektiewe beskerming vir minderhede. Die rede vir hierdie toenemende erkenning aan die behoefte aan minderheidsbeskerming is waarskynlik toe te skryf aan die beset dat dit nie alleen die minderheidsaandeelhouers is wat skade ly in geval van benadelende optrede nie, maar ook die ekonomie. Maatskappye word ingevolge die beginsel van meerderheidsbewind bestuur, met die gevolg dat die minderheid onderworpe is aan die wil van die meerderheid. Die minderheid kan hulself hierdeur in 'n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind, veral indien die meerderheid hul mag aanwend om hul eie belange te bevorder. Gemeenregtelik is die reel in Foss v Harbottle 'n struikelblok vir minderheidsaandeelhouers wat gedingvoering beoog. In 'n poging om die gebrekkige gemeenregtelike beskerming van minderhede te ondervang, is bepaalde statutere maatreels ingevoer. Die evaluasie van hierdie maatreels geskied aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek na verskeie buitelandse stelsels, waarvan die van Nieu-Seeland en Kanada uit staan vanwee die innoverende aard van hul statutere beskermingsmaatreels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die beskerming wat die Suid-Afrikaanse statutere maatreels aan minderhede bied, onbevredigend is om verskeie redes. Eerstens is hierdie maatreels dikwels te eng bewoord wat daartoe lei dat die aanwendingsveld van die maatreels beperk is. Tweedens hou die maatreels nie tred met ontwikkelings elders in die wereld en veranderende omstandighede en behoeftes in die praktyk nie. Derdens ontbreek goed geformuleerde remedies wat aanvullend tot artikel 252 van die Wet sal wees. Daar is verder bevind dat ad hocwysigings van bestaande maatreels nie die gewenste resultaat gaan bereik nie en 'n algehele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg word aanbeveel. Ten slotte word konkrete voorstelle in die vorm van konsepwetgewing gemaak en word vergesel van verduidelikende notas. Hierdie wetgewing is hoofsaaklik aan die hand van die Nieu-Seelandse en Kanadese modelle geformuleer. / There is a growing awareness of the need for effective protection of minority shareholders. This can probably be ascribed to the acknowledgement of the fact that prejudicial conduct harms not only minority shareholders, but also the economy at large. Companies are governed by the principle of majority rule; consequently the minority is subjected to the will of the majority. This often places the minority in an invidious position, especially when the majority use their power to further their own interests. The rule in Foss v Harbottle presents a stumbling block to minority shareholder action. Certain statutory measures have been introduced in an effort to counter defective minority protection. These statutory measures are evaluated in the light of a comparative study of several foreign jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are New Zealand and Canada, because of the innovative nature of the measures which they employ. The conclusion arrived at is that, for various reasons, the protection afforded minorities by the South African statutory measures is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the wording of these measures is narrowly construed; this in turn results in a narrow field of application. Secondly, these measures are not in step with developments elsewhere in the world and with the changing circumstances and needs in practice. Thirdly, well-formulated remedies needed in order to supplement section 252 of the Act are non-existent. It has also been found that ad hoc amendments of existing measures will not achieve the required result, and consequently a complete reform of South African company law is recommended. Finally, specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation are made; these are accompanied by explanatory notes. This draft legislation was formulated primarily along the lines of the New Zealand and Canadian models. / Private Law / LL.D.

Esta dissertação estuda os mecanismos disponibilizados pelo artigo 264 da Lei das Sociedades Anônimas para proteção adicional dos interesses e dos direitos dos acionistas minoritários na incorporação de companhia controlada. Para tanto, são abordados os dispositivos legais, os posicionamentos doutrinários e as interpretações da jurisprudência administrativa e judicial sobre o assunto no Brasil. O primeiro capítulo do estudo analisa o conceito e a natureza jurídica da incorporação, a substituição de ações e de direitos dos acionistas na operação, o procedimento de incorporação, e a relação de controle existente entre as companhias incorporadora e incorporada. O segundo capítulo analisa a evolução histórica das disposições do artigo 264, partindo do Projeto de Lei que lhe deu origem até o texto do dispositivo atualmente vigente. O terceiro capítulo analisa a proteção adicional oferecida ao acionista minoritário pelo caput do artigo 264, atrelada à relação de substituição de ações adotada na operação. O quarto capítulo analisa a proteção adicional conferida ao acionista minoritário pelo §3º do artigo 264, vinculada ao direito de recesso na operação. Ao final, a conclusão arremata as principais discussões identificadas ao longo do estudo. / This thesis studies the mechanisms provided by Article 264 of the Brazilian Corporations Law for additional protection of the interests and rights of minority shareholders in the merger of a subsidiary corporation into its parent corporation. To this end, we discuss the legal provisions, the legal literature and the interpretations of administrative and judicial case law on the subject in Brazil. The first chapter of the study analyzes the concept and the legal nature of a merger, the substitution of shares and rights of the shareholders in the transaction, the merger procedure, and the control relationship that exists between the parent corporation and its subsidiary. The second chapter analyzes the historical development of the provisions of Article 264, from the bill from which it originated to the text of the provision currently in force. The third chapter analyzes the additional protection granted to minority shareholders by the chapeau of Article 264, regarding the share exchange ratio adopted in the transaction. The fourth chapter analyzes the additional protection afforded to minority shareholders by paragraph 3 of Article 264, relating to the right to withdraw from the transaction. Finally, the conclusion finalizes the main discussions identified throughout the study.

Idag förekommer det ett ökat tryck på företag att ta ett socialt ansvar, Corporate social responsibility (CSR). För att företag ska uppfattas som legitima måste de överensstämma med samhällets sociala normer, värderingar och förväntningar, vilket enligt legitimitetsteorin tros vara en stark drivkraft till att företag ökar sin omfattning kring frivilliga CSR-upplysningar. Begreppet CSR är nära relaterat till företagens ansvar i samhället som kan delas in i tre områden ekonomiskt-, miljömässigt- och socialt ansvarstagande. Gamerschlag, Möller och Verbeeten (2011) är några av många forskare som har studera varför tyska företag frivilligt ökar omfattningen på hållbarhetsredovisning i sina offentliga rapporter. Genom en kvantitativ undersökning på svenska börsnoterade företag är syftet att undersöka huruvida olika företagsfaktorer påverkar mängden CSR-upplysningar. För att beräkna mängden CSR-upplysningar har antalet nyckelord i företagens hållbarhetsrapportera räknats. Sambandet för den insamlade datan analyserades med en korrelationsanalys och en multipel regressionsanalys. De oberoende variablerna som undersöktes var lönsamhet, synlighet, ägarstruktur samt kontrollvariablerna storlek och branschtillhörighet. I den multipla regressionsanalysen finner vi ett signifikant positivt samband mellan mängden CSR-upplysningar och företagets synlighet samt ägarstrukturen. Denna studie kan inte tillstyrka att lönsamhet har något samband med mängden CSR-upplysningar. / Today there is an increasing amount of pressure on companies to take more social responsibility, often called Corporate social responsibility (CSR). In order for companies to be considered legitimate, they must comply with society's social norms, values ​​and expectations, which, according to the legitimacy theory, is believed to be a strong driving force for companies to increase their scope for voluntary CSR disclosures. The term CSR is closely related to corporate responsibility in society, which can be divided into three areas of economic, environmental and social responsibility. Gamerschlag, Möller and Verbeeten (2011) are some of the many researchers who have studied why German companies voluntarily increase the scope of sustainability reporting in their public reports. Through a quantitative survey of Swedish publicly traded companies, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether different business determinants affect the amount of CSR information. To calculate the amount of CSR information, the number of keywords in the companies sustainability reports has been counted. All the collected data was analyzed by a correlation analysis and a multiple regression analysis. The independent variables investigated were profitability, visibility, ownership structure, and for control variables the study used size and industrial sector. The multiple regression analysis shows a significant positive correlation between the amount of CSR disclosures and the company's visibility as well as the ownership structure. This study can not assure that profitability is related to the amount of CSR information.

La multiplication des scandales financiers depuis l'an 2000 suscite des débats et des controverses sur la gouvernance des entreprises cotées en bourse. Dans le paradigme contractuel, les débats sur la gouvernance ont largement consacré la valeur actionnariale comme modèle dominant, et dans lequel les actionnaires sont les seuls créanciers résiduels. Toutefois, la théorie des parties prenantes part du principe que la relation d'agence actionnaire-dirigeant doit s'élargir aux autres partenaires intervenant dans la chaîne de valeur, et qu'il faut abandonner l'hypothèse du statut de créancier résiduel exclusif des actionnaires. Cet abandon conduit à s'interroger sur le partage de la rente organisationnelle, ou valeur partenariale créée par la firme. Plus précisément, le concept de valeur partenariale soulève les questions de sa mesure, de son appropriation par les différents partenaires, et du rôle des mécanismes de gouvernance à ce niveau. L'objectif de cette recherche est, dans un premier temps, d'examiner le rôle joué par les mécanismes de gouvernance propres à la firme (caractéristiques du conseil, structure de propriété) sur la valeur partenariale créée, puis, dans un deuxième temps, sur l'appropriation de cette valeur partenariale par la firme et par ses parties prenantes explicites. Les tests empiriques portent sur un panel de 103 sociétés françaises cotées observées sur trois années (2006, 2008 et 2010). Les résultats suggèrent que quatre mécanismes ressortent globalement positivement associés à la valeur partenariale créée : la taille et l'indépendance du conseil, le pouvoir actionnarial des salariés, et la présence d'un comité d'éthique et/ou de gouvernance (CEG). En matière d'appropriation, deux mécanismes de gouvernance semblent jouer un rôle. Premièrement, la taille du conseil permettrait aux actionnaires et aux fournisseurs de capter davantage de rente organisationnelle, au détriment des clients et de la firme elle-même. Deuxièmement, la présence d'un CEG incite à une meilleure prise en compte des intérêts de certaines parties prenantes non-financières dans le partage de la rente (clients, salariés), alors que la part de rente que s'approprient les apporteurs de capitaux financiers (actionnaires et créanciers) diminue. Dans l'ensemble, nos résultats concernant la mise en place d'un CEG s'avèrent encourageant quant à la capacité de ce mécanisme à promouvoir une véritable gouvernance partenariale au sein des firmes cotées. / The multiplication of financial scandals since year 2000 induced debates and controversies about the governance of public companies. In the contracting paradigm, the debates on corporate governance have largely relied on shareholder value as a dominant model, in which shareholders are the only residual claimants. However, the stakeholder theory builds on the principle that the shareholder-manager agency relationship has to widen to the others stakeholders who intervene in the value creation chain, and that it is necessary to get rid of the hypothesis that shareholders are exclusive residual claimants. This move brings questions about the sharing of the organizational rent, or stakeholder value created by the firm. More specifically, the concept of stakeholder value raises questions about its measurement, its appropriation by the various stakeholders, and about the role of corporate governance mechanisms on that ground. The objective of this research is to investigate the role of firm-specific governance mechanisms (board characteristics, ownership structure) on the creation of stakeholder value on the one hand, and on the distribution of that stakeholder value to the firm and to its explicit stakeholders, on the other hand. Empirical tests are based on a panel of 103 French listed companies observed over three years (2006, 2008, and 2010). The main findings suggest that four mechanisms stand out globally positively associated to the stakeholder value created: board size and board independence, employees' voting rights (shareholder power), and the presence of an Ethics and/or Governance Committee (EGC). In terms of appropriation, two governance mechanisms seem to play a role. Firstly, board size would result in a larger part of the organizational rent captured by shareholders and suppliers, at the expense of customers and the firm itself. Secondly, the presence of an EGC results in a better consideration of the interests of some non-financial stakeholders (customers and employees), whereas the share of rent that is appropriated by financial capital providers (shareholders and debt-holders) decreases. Overall, our results concerning the implementation of an EGC turn out encouraging regarding the capacity of such mechanism to promote effective stakeholder governance within listed companies.

Shareholder activism has exploded in popularity since the turn of the century, due in large part to impressive relative returns generated by its major participants. The result has thus been a surge in assets invested in the category, to in excess of $170 billion today up from less than $3 billion in 2000 (Inglis 2015; Romito 2015). This influx of capital, in absolute dollars and pace of growth, has caused many to wonder whether activists truly create shareholder value and, if so, if the value generated is sustainable. Numerous studies of activist interventions prior to 2009 reveal significant stock price gains around the time of activist arrival and positive longer term buy-and-hold abnormal returns as well. The question remains, however, whether those trends have continued as volume of transactions and number of activists have increased post the recent global financial crisis. In this report, we perform an empirical analysis focused on a hand-collected dataset of 1,088 activist interventions from 1995-present. This dataset includes all 13D filings, as well as Under the Threshold activist campaigns. First, we analyze stock price returns for this group over short- and long-term periods and find that activists continue to unlock shareholder value in recent deals comparable to that of earlier ones. We then perform a proprietary regression to identify which factors drive the most successful returns. Such insights should prove informative for investors employing an activist strategy and companies looking to manage areas of vulnerability.

Esta dissertação estuda os mecanismos disponibilizados pelo artigo 264 da Lei das Sociedades Anônimas para proteção adicional dos interesses e dos direitos dos acionistas minoritários na incorporação de companhia controlada. Para tanto, são abordados os dispositivos legais, os posicionamentos doutrinários e as interpretações da jurisprudência administrativa e judicial sobre o assunto no Brasil. O primeiro capítulo do estudo analisa o conceito e a natureza jurídica da incorporação, a substituição de ações e de direitos dos acionistas na operação, o procedimento de incorporação, e a relação de controle existente entre as companhias incorporadora e incorporada. O segundo capítulo analisa a evolução histórica das disposições do artigo 264, partindo do Projeto de Lei que lhe deu origem até o texto do dispositivo atualmente vigente. O terceiro capítulo analisa a proteção adicional oferecida ao acionista minoritário pelo caput do artigo 264, atrelada à relação de substituição de ações adotada na operação. O quarto capítulo analisa a proteção adicional conferida ao acionista minoritário pelo §3º do artigo 264, vinculada ao direito de recesso na operação. Ao final, a conclusão arremata as principais discussões identificadas ao longo do estudo. / This thesis studies the mechanisms provided by Article 264 of the Brazilian Corporations Law for additional protection of the interests and rights of minority shareholders in the merger of a subsidiary corporation into its parent corporation. To this end, we discuss the legal provisions, the legal literature and the interpretations of administrative and judicial case law on the subject in Brazil. The first chapter of the study analyzes the concept and the legal nature of a merger, the substitution of shares and rights of the shareholders in the transaction, the merger procedure, and the control relationship that exists between the parent corporation and its subsidiary. The second chapter analyzes the historical development of the provisions of Article 264, from the bill from which it originated to the text of the provision currently in force. The third chapter analyzes the additional protection granted to minority shareholders by the chapeau of Article 264, regarding the share exchange ratio adopted in the transaction. The fourth chapter analyzes the additional protection afforded to minority shareholders by paragraph 3 of Article 264, relating to the right to withdraw from the transaction. Finally, the conclusion finalizes the main discussions identified throughout the study.

L’activisme actionnarial en France est un phénomène relativement récent comparé aux pays anglo-saxons. Les actionnaires activistes sont de plus en plus présents dans les entreprises françaises. Leur introduction dans le capital d’une société constitue une menace pour certains dirigeants, insoucieux des normes de bonne gouvernance et privilégiant leurs intérêts au détriment de ceux des autres actionnaires. Les moyens dont disposent les actionnaires et particulièrement les actionnaires minoritaires pour exercer un contrôle sur la direction diffèrent selon les pays. Cette différence s’explique par le degré de protection des actionnaires minoritaires et la réglementation en vigueur. En France, le recours aux projets de résolution externes par les actionnaires, constitue un des moyens disponibles pour contrôler les dirigeants et les obliger à maximiser la valeur actionnariale et servir les intérêts des actionnaires. Notre thèse étudie l’impact des projets de résolution sur la performance boursière des entreprises françaises, entre 2002 et 2015 et présente les déterminants de réussite d’une résolution déposée en Assemblée Générale. / Shareholder activism in France is relatively a new phenomenon compared to the Anglo-Saxons countries. Activist shareholders are increasingly present in French companies. Their introduction into the capital of a company is a threat to some managers, heedless of standards of good governance and favoring their interests over those of other shareholders. The tools used by shareholders (especially minority shareholders) to exercise control over the management are different from one country to another. This difference can be explained by the degree of protection of minority shareholders and the regulatory framework. In France, submitting an external resolution by activist shareholders, allows them to control the board of directors and force them to maximize shareholder value and serve their interests. Our study investigates the impact of proposals on the market performance of French listed companies between 2002 and 2015 and presents the determinants of success of submitting resolutions at General Annual Meetings.