Merger & Acquisitions has been one of the more central themes of the financial sphere since the beginning of the 19th century. It is an activity that is necessary for firms since it can give them competitive advantage in their markets. An acquisition can give the acquiring firms the possibility to enforce cost and revenues efficiencies, as well as the prospect of entering new markets in order to differentiate themselves. Due to the increased activity of acquisitions and its impact on global economy, there has been a development of several strategies and procedures of what shall be taken into account before and during the acquistion itself. One of the latest factors that has been on an uprising in this discussion is the importance of sustainable factors for the acquirer.  Sustainable finance has become a topic of high relevance in the past few years due to the effects of climate change, but also in regard to questions that concern the firms social and managerial contributions. New policies, regulations and standards have submerged and has therefore created a new environment for the firms to adapt after. A commonly discussed framework in the area of sustainability is ESG. ESG har the purpose of assessing and measuring a firm's contributions to sustainability from an environmental, social, and governance perspective. This framework has been lifted in many studies as one of the more influential factors among investors and managers when discussing the profitability of a firm, as well as its strategic prospects in the sector. Lately, it has also been a subject discussed among M&A researchers as well as professionals, with many arguing that ESG will be even. more important part of the merger process due to its influence on the value of the firm and its financial performance.  The aim of this study is to see what kind of correlation there is between the financial performance of an acquiring firm and its ESG scores. This will be analyzed among firms that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ stock exchange that have performed at least one acquisition between 2017 and 2023. This can give the managers a glimpse of a possible pattern that might be present between acquisitions and ESG scores, since the main aim of an acquisition is to improve the firm’s financial performance. The results that can be drawn from this study is that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between financial performance and ESG scores among these firms. This may create a new, more modern agent problem where the management is opening up more for external stakeholders over their shareholders, which can be viewed as a consequence of stronger corporate social responsibility taken by the firms.

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires. / If the role of shareholders is regarded as varying along a spectrum ranging from passivity to control of the company in which they have invested, it is safe to say that whereas institutional investors have exhibited a form of rational apathy in the past, this situation has changed significantly in recent years. Although institutional investors are still far from reaching the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that senior management and controlling shareholders are now faced with a limited number of institutional shareholders who know each other and who hold a significant share of the company's stock. In spite of the legal and organizational barriers that still impede the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights, it appears that the actions of institutional investors have transcended majority rule by resorting to unusual ways of reducing the risk of opportunism within publicly held Canadian companies. While the activism of institutional investors is a complex phenomenon embodying various forms which are often opaque and difficult to fully grasp, it can nevertheless be said that this mechanism of governance plays a critical role in slimming down agency costs arising from the realization of private benefits by managers and controlling shareholders. Indeed, in Canada, where most companies have a concentrated ownership structure, shareholder activism can serve as a counterbalance to the broad discretionary powers of company leaders and the influence of controlling shareholders, thus constituting a certain measure of protection for the rights of minority shareholders.

Could shareholder primacy, with its assumed short-termist practices, have had its day when it comes to managerial activity centered on creating corporate value? Many business and opinion leaders appear to take this position, not least Jack Welch who famously declared 'shareholder primacy is the dumbest idea in the world!' Indeed, in a post-Crash economy has a wider stakeholder focus with a longer-term outlook superseded any business notions of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization? This research examines these possibilities through a consideration of the narrative companies produce, such as annual reports. From this corpus material, an assessment is made of whether UK managers' perceptions about corporate value generation changed over the period covering the worldwide financial crisis, with respect to their relative favouring of shareholders and stakeholders. The corpus of narrative material used is visualized as a conceptual space in which a conversation reflecting perceptual bias to the generation of corporate value occurs. To explore such corpuses, in order to compare narratives at points either side of the 2008 Crash, a new methodology was devised called narrative staining. Hence, a detection and visual mapping over the period was made possible of managers' changing perceptions concerning primacy (shareholder or stakeholder orientation) with its mediation by termism (a short or long-term bias). Termism is also originally conceived as part of a larger temporal category, which includes a sense of urgency to act (urgent versus non-urgent) that is similarly examined. The investigation reveals that over time perceptual change about value creation happened, though in unanticipated ways. Companies pre-Crash were often short-term stakeholder oriented then moved post-Crash to a long-term shareholder orientation. A focus for this study was the corporate domain, consisting of a selection of FT250 companies. However, managerial perceptions about corporate value creation are influenced not simply by the conversation of the corporate domain but rather by a multi-actor conversation taking place throughout the business environment. To comprehend this effect, the research mines further corpuses that comprise the UK's regulatory domain (hard and soft law), the press (Financial Times and other newspapers), and relevant peripheral stakeholder organizations (including the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, and the Trades Union Congress). These organizations demonstrated more complex, unforeseen, perceptual effects as the financial crisis proceeded with many aligning according to their political or business agenda, which also impacted any sense of urgency to act they had. There appears to be no previous attempt at an extensive and multivariate analysis of this nature. And the findings challenge prevalent characterizations of shareholder and stakeholder behaviour. Moreover, the research shows that utilizing a wide set of stakeholder corpuses acts a viable proxy for broader financial perspectives amongst UK organizations. The technique of narrative staining therefore provides insights, hitherto inaccessible, for assessing and consolidating large-scale perceptual bias regarding value creation across the economy. The technique also has significant potential for other applications.

This diploma thesis poses the question of the legal status of partners in a private limited liability company compared to the legal status of partners (shareholders) in a joint stock company. Although both companies are in a theory of Czech business law classified as capital corporations, which means that they have much in common, the legal enactments which are regulating the area of the partner's legal status in both legal forms contain many significant differences. Some of them may well be considered as slight, unimportant details, whereas the others represent fundamental differences, which, for the partner's legal status, are more than crucial. The partner's participation in the company's activities and in its management could be mentioned as one of the examples. Meanwhile, the partners in a private limited liability company typically participate in the whole life of their corporation, the shareholders in a joint stock company only influence the life of their corporation implicitly, through their influence over the personal structure of the executive body (called board of directors), which is entrusted with the power of the company's management. The members of this executive body are usually represented by people outside of the company; the theory talks about professional, hired management, which is leading to a phenomenon called corporate governance. This diploma thesis not only contains chapters on the legal status of partners in the given types of corporations, it also includes a general interpretation of the terms private limited liability company and joint stock company. Only a correct representation of these terms can lead to an accurate understanding of the partner's legal status. Finally, there are also several comparative thoughts and tables, including some decisions of the business courts added at the end of the paper. Through the means of the above mentioned business court's decisions the author is attempting to demonstrate how the partner's rights and obligations are being performed in practice.

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires. / If the role of shareholders is regarded as varying along a spectrum ranging from passivity to control of the company in which they have invested, it is safe to say that whereas institutional investors have exhibited a form of rational apathy in the past, this situation has changed significantly in recent years. Although institutional investors are still far from reaching the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that senior management and controlling shareholders are now faced with a limited number of institutional shareholders who know each other and who hold a significant share of the company's stock. In spite of the legal and organizational barriers that still impede the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights, it appears that the actions of institutional investors have transcended majority rule by resorting to unusual ways of reducing the risk of opportunism within publicly held Canadian companies. While the activism of institutional investors is a complex phenomenon embodying various forms which are often opaque and difficult to fully grasp, it can nevertheless be said that this mechanism of governance plays a critical role in slimming down agency costs arising from the realization of private benefits by managers and controlling shareholders. Indeed, in Canada, where most companies have a concentrated ownership structure, shareholder activism can serve as a counterbalance to the broad discretionary powers of company leaders and the influence of controlling shareholders, thus constituting a certain measure of protection for the rights of minority shareholders.

公司法上股東會與董事會之定足數門檻（Quorum），規制股份有限公司作成決策時，應有一定比例之股份數及董事人數出席會議。然而隨著現代公司經濟規模擴張，面對眾多的股東人數，及瞬息萬變的資訊，既有規制方式是否應一併調整值得研議。為深入研究此議題，本文將先介紹定足數門檻所涉之上位概念，說明多數決原則下，為保障公司決議之作成具有一定民主基礎，應設定法定出席門檻規制，確保公司治理運行。 就股東會決議之定足數門檻，目前我國法院見解認為，此係股東會之法定成立要件，如未達定足數，股東會決議當然不成立，顯示公司法對於資本多數決原則「程序正義」與「實質正義」面向之重視。然而，我國法律實踐上，為使一般股東亦有意願出席股東會，以達定足數要求，部分公司股東會開會成本偏高。是以，本研究擬參酌外國法制及分析我國規範後，重新思考就目前規範放寬之可能性及其限度，以合理減輕實務負擔。 至於董事會決議部分，我國法亦定有定足數門檻要求，彰顯立法者認為在於追求議事效率同時，應同樣重視董事之出席義務及受任人義務。惟我國法上董事會決議區分普通與特別決議，而有不同之定足數門檻，係比較法上較為少見之立法模式。因此，本文將分析現行規範，對公司董事會運作產生何種影響、實務上發生之爭議，及是否有調整規範之必要性，期望能使公司運作更為流暢。

我國公司法在94年6月22 日通過增訂修正條文，新增通訊投票制度，並賦予股東提案權及董事、監察人提名制度。行政院金融監督管理委員會配合公司法新增通訊投票相關規定，於94年12 月15 日發布修正公開發行股票公司股務處理準則，以使公開發行公司採行書面或電子方式行使表決權時之股務作業有所依循，使我國上市上櫃公司正式跨入股東會通訊投票時代。不過法令修正後逾三年除台灣期貨交易所股東會採用通訊投票外，並無其他上市上櫃公司採行，使通訊投票制度徒託空言。 97年6月13日共計有637家上市櫃公司選在同一天召開，過度集中化的結果，不僅股東分身乏術無法參與公司一年一度股東會，也嚴重影響小股東參與監督、瞭解公司經營等權益。 股東會是小股東實踐股東權益及落實股東行動主義最佳的場合，也是公司實行公司治理具體表現。但近幾年股東會撞期情況始終未獲改善，為有效解決此一問題金管會證期局積極宣導通訊投票制度的優點，希望上市上櫃公司採行通訊投票制度，讓股東在親自出席和委託出席之外，多增加一項參與股東會方式。 股東會通訊投票制度亦新增股東會提案權和董監事提名董監事制度，讓少數股東權益能擴大參與公司決策與經營。我國通訊投票制度雖然已有法源和運作平台，但企業普遍對此制度仍不熟悉，未來要擴大推行，有賴主管機關政策輔導和提出獎勵措施，初期如果能鼓勵大型企業或法人持股比重較高公司帶頭做起，則我國通訊投票制度則可望步上正軌。 通訊投票制度最早由美國開始，目前英國、日本、澳洲、香港等國皆已實施多年，我國起步並不算晚，實施股東會通訊投票不僅與國際接軌對我國企業推動公司治理和股東行動主義亦有正面評價。

L’auteure traite des stratagèmes de propriété occulte et de vote vide orchestrés par l’entremise des instruments dérivés. Dans un premier temps, cette recherche expose les diverses perturbations occasionnées par ces stratagèmes sur le système d’alerte et de notification ainsi que sur le droit corporatif canadien. Pour illustrer ces propos, une revue de la jurisprudence est détaillée. De plus, de nombreuses solutions législatives sont proposées afin de pallier aux utilisations potentiellement abusives des instruments dérivés. La solution la mieux adaptée au contexte des marchés financiers canadiens est finalement sélectionnée. / The research paper herein deals with hidden morphable ownership schemes and empty voting strategies orchestrated through derivatives. Initially, the author exposes the various disturbances caused by these schemes on early warning systems and follows up with repercussions that reverberate through to the Canadian corporate laws framework. Detailed case reviews are also presented to highlight the practical implications of these aforementioned schemes. Legislative solutions to mitigate the potential misuse of derivatives are proposed and ultimately the preferred solution tailored to Canadian financial markets is selected.

L’article 1844 C. civ. suggère que seuls les associés sont titulaires du droit de vote. Une telle affirmation suscite cependant des interrogations. Elle laisse insatisfait, de prime abord, au vu de l’imprécision des contours de la notion d’associé. Elle invite, en outre, à s’interroger sur sa justification. Une analyse attentive des textes montre que pour déterminer le titulaire du droit de vote, ceux-ci se réfèrent indifféremment, à la qualité d’associé ou à la qualité de propriétaire de parts sociales ou d’actions – les deux étant censées se confondre. Et cela s’explique par le fait que les associés sont supposés supporter l’aléa social, aléa inhérent à la propriété de parts sociales ou d’actions. Mais seule la propriété dotée de l’absolutisme que les rédacteurs du Code civil voulaient lui conférer permet de présumer l’aléa social. Or le développement de propriétés temporaires ou pour autrui a conduit à attribuer le droit de vote à des associés ne le supportant pas, ébranlant ainsi la construction sociétaire. A cela, s’ajoutent des pratiques permettant à un non-associé de voter, sans garantie qu’il agisse pour le compte d’un associé. La recherche d’une solution cohérente et complète invite à redéfinir la notion d’associé en la fondant sur l’aléa social. Le droit de vote bénéficierait ainsi aux seuls acteurs courant un tel aléa. Cette solution peut être aisément mise en oeuvre moyennant quelques aménagements des modalités de reconnaissance de la qualité d’associé et des prérogatives sociales. Un encadrement spécifique des mécanismes d’accès au vote par un non-associé reste cependant nécessaire. / Article 1844 of the Civil Code suggests that only shareholders hold voting rights. Such an assertion gives rise to several questions. It leaves dissatisfied, prima facie, considering the vagueness of the concept of shareholder. In addition, it leads to a question about the justification of the allocation of voting rights to shareholders. A careful analysis of the texts shows that, in view of defining the holders of voting rights, they indifferently refer to the capacity of shareholder or to the capacity of owner of shares – as both are supposed to coincide. And this can be explained by the idea that shareholders are meant to bear the corporate hazard. However, this hazard can only be inferred from an ownership corresponding to the absolutist conception of the Civil Code’s authors. Yet, the development of temporary ownerships or ownerships for others has lead to assign voting rights to shareholders who do not bear this hazard, and has undermined the corporate construction. In addition to this, practices allowing a non-shareholder to vote, without assurance that the vote will be cast on behalf of a shareholder, have a similar effect. The pursuit of a coherent and complete solution prompts to redefine the notion of shareholder, basing it on the concept of corporate hazard. Voting rights would thus only benefit to persons who bear such a hazard. This solution can easily be implemented by slightly adapting the current methods for recognizing shareholder’s capacity and corporate rights. Nevertheless, a specific legal framework for devices allowing non-shareholder to vote remains necessary.

Les pays de la zone OHADA observent, depuis une dizaine d’années, un accroissement significatif des opérations de capital-investissement. Les perspectives économiques encourageantes, la relative stabilité politique dans la région ainsi que les prévisions démographiques font de la zone OHADA une cible de premier choix pour les fonds d’investissement, qui y trouvent de formidables opportunités d’investissement et de croissance. Cette nouvelle dynamique nous appelle à nous interroger sur la faculté du droit OHADA à répondre aux exigences juridiques exprimées par ces nouveaux acteurs économiques lors de la conduite de leurs opérations. Cette thèse se propose d’analyser, dans une perspective comparative avec le droit français, les principaux enjeux juridiques du capital-investissement en droit OHADA. Ainsi, y seront étudiés les outils juridiques de prise de participation, la gestion des sociétés cibles, notamment à travers la pratique des pactes d’actionnaires, et enfin, les modalités de sortie de l’investissement. L’objectif annoncé est de déceler les forces et les faiblesses du régime actuel du droit OHADA à l’épreuve des exigences du capital-investissement / In the last decade, the OHADA countries have seen a significant increase in private equity transactions. The OHADA region’s economic outlook, relative political stability and projected population growth make the region of prime interest to investment funds due to tremendous growth and investment opportunities. This new dynamic makes it important to consider OHADA law’s ability to meet the legal requirements of private equity funds in structuring and conducting their operations.This thesis (i) analyses the main legal issues for private equity under OHADA law and (ii) compares the handling of such issues under OHADA law with their handling under French law. As such, this thesis addresses the legal instruments for taking ownership interests, management rules for target companies (including shareholder agreements), and exit strategies. The objective of such analysis is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current OHADA law regime from a private equity perspective