Le préjudice de l'actionnaire est un sujet encore peu étudié en France alors qu'il soulève de nombreuses interrogations. A l'inverse de nombre de solutions reçues dans les droits étrangers, le droit français n'admet que peu sa réparation tant il reste lié à la distinction jurisprudentielle fondamentale entre préjudice purement personnel (réparable) et préjudice simple corollaire du préjudice social (non réparable). Pourtant, cette distinction n'est pas des plus satisfaisantes ni sur le plan théorique, ni sur le plan pratique. Elle est en outre remise partiellement en cause dès lors que le préjudice trouve sa source dans une infraction pénale, telle que la communication d'informations mensongères. Par ailleurs, l'internationalisation des mouvements de capitaux soulève de plus en plus fréquemment la question de la loi applicable ou du juge compétent (judiciaire ou arbitral également) relativement aux actions en justice des actionnaires. Cette étude se propose dès lors de fournir une appréciation critique du droit positif afin de tenter l'élaboration d'un droit prospectif. Les solutions existantes peuvent-elles et doivent-elles changer ? Pour adopter quel type de solutions ? / The subject of shareholder damages has seldom been studied in France. Nonetheless, it is a topic of much discussion and debate in legal circles. Unlike under some foreign laws, French law rarely permits the direct compensation of shareholder damages because of the summa divisio between the personal damage (recoverable) and the damage of the company (not recoverable). However, this distinction is not relevant both in terms of theory and practice. More doubt is cast on this distinction where the potential damage arises from an infringement of the penal law, such as the use of false or misleading information to induce shareholder reliance or action. Furthermore, the internationalisation of capital introduces conflicts of law and jurisdictional questions, asking the courts to first determine whether they are the proper authority to hear a shareholder’s case, and which nation’s laws to apply.This study presents a critical analysis of the positive law and proposes avenues of reforming French laws concerning shareholder damages. Should the existing remedies be changed ? Which remedies should be adopted to reverse the strict trends in French law against adequately compensating shareholders’ losses ?

O presente trabalho acadêmico procura construir um referencial teórico baseado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para definir o papel da empresa estatal no mundo contemporâneo. Trata-se do ponto de partida para compreender a atuação do Estado como acionista controlador e as regras de convivência com acionistas privados em posição minoritária e com outros grupos de interesse afetados pela atividade empresarial. A abordagem do tema apóia-se na idéia central de que toda empresa estatal está investida de uma missão pública, explícita ou implicitamente incorporada no objeto social, que varia conforme a natureza da atividade exercida e está sujeita a adaptações ao longo do tempo. A missão pública coexiste com a finalidade lucrativa inerente ao modelo de companhia e serve para condicionar a ação do Estado enquanto acionista controlador e dos administradores, dando conteúdo a seus deveres fiduciários. / This dissertation aims at establishing a theoretical framework according to Brazilian law to identify the role of state-owned enterprise in contemporary world. This is the first step to understand what the governments behavior should be as a controlling shareholder and the legal rules applied to its relationship with equity investors and others stakeholders. The approach is based on the assumption that every state-owned enterprise has a public mission implicitly or explicitly included in its bylaws objectives. The public mission varies according to the nature of the business and should be redefined from time to time to keep adherence to the external environment. The public mission coexists with the companys profit scope and guides the States actions, as well as those of directors and officers. For that reason the public mission is embedded in their fiduciary duties.

Este trabalho procura ampliar os conhecimentos a respeito da influência do enfoque na geração do valor aos acionistas sobre as práticas de gestão de pessoas, com ênfase no ambiente da produção. Inicialmente, o trabalho resgata as origens e os fundamentos da concepção financeira e da concepção da geração de valor ao acionista das empresas, em que o principal foco é a valorização do preço das ações. Em seguida, é analisada a interface que estas concepções possuem com as práticas de gestão de pessoas, explorando o caráter bidirecional desta interface, uma vez que a função recursos humanos não só é influenciada pelas diretrizes das empresas, mas também é tida como uma das principais formas para ajudar a difundi-las, tendo em vista seu papel de agente de mudança de comportamento nas empresas. Neste sentido, são aprofundados três principais elementos que compõem, segundo a literatura, esta interface: a remuneração variável, gestão de desempenho e autonomia no trabalho. Por fim, é apresentado um estudo de casos múltiplos que busca verificar como a concepção financeira das empresas vem influenciando, de fato, estas práticas relacionadas à gestão de pessoas no nível da produção de organizações que atuam no Brasil, assim como o quanto estas práticas têm contribuído para a difusão da mentalidade de geração de valor ao acionista. O resultado deste estudo indica que, no plano conceitual, a influência da orientação à geração de valor ao acionista sobre as práticas de gestão de pessoas é nítida, mas que, na prática, ainda é pouco efetivada, apesar de mudanças já estarem ocorrendo nesta direção. / The objective of this paper is to increase knowledge about the influence of the shareholder value on people management practices, with emphasis on the production environment. Initially, the paper takes a step backwards to the origins and fundaments regarding the finance conception and the shareholder value conception of the firm, where the main focus resides in increasing share prices. The paper then goes on to analyze the interface that these concepts possess with people management practices, exploring the two-way nature of said interface, in view that the human resources function is not only influenced by company guidelines, but is also deemed one of the main forms for helping disseminate it, due to its role as a change agent of behaviors in companies. As such, it delves into the three main elements that, according to literature, comprise this interface: variable compensation, performance management and work autonomy. Lastly, the paper presents a multiple case study that aims to verify how the finance concept of companies has, in fact, been influencing these practices relating to people management at the production level of companies that operate in Brazil, as well as how much these practices have contributed to disseminate the shareholder value mentality. The result of this study shows that, at the conceptual level, the influence of shareholder value on people management practices is quite clear, but that in practice it is still used very little, despite changes that are already occurring in this sense.

L’investissement éthique est un investissement fondé sur des critères extra-financiers : l’investisseur cherche un enrichissement tout en poursuivant une fin non matérielle tirée du respect de certaines valeurs La coloration éthique a vocation à rejaillir sur le régime de cet investissement. Elle dicte le contenu de la politique d’investissement, oblige les intermédiaires financiers à informer les investisseurs de manière adéquate, et les contraint à veiller à la conformité éthique de l’investissement jusqu’à son dénouement.L’investissement éthique ne saurait toutefois se limiter à cela. Adoptant une démarche conséquentialiste, les investisseurs peuvent s’engager auprès des émetteurs pour y défendre leurs valeurs. D’un point de vue théorique, cet activisme actionnarial met en lumière l’échec des thèses traditionnelles à définir la finalité des sociétés. Plutôt que de raisonner en termes d’intérêt social, il conviendrait à présent de recourir à la Stakeholder Theory. / Ethical investment is based on non-financial criteria: the investor expects a return on the investment while pursuing a non-material objective, based on the respect of certain values. Ethics bring a nuance, which impacts the set of rules for this type of investment. It establishes the content of the investment policy and requires financial intermediaries to inform investors adequately. It also forces them to ensure ethical compliance of the investment to its ending. Ethical investment, however, is not limited to this. By adopting a consequentialist approach, investors can engage with issuers to defend their values. From a theoretical point of view, this shareholder activism highlights the failure of traditional theories to define the purpose of companies. Because the concept of “intérêt social”, which the French doctrine struggles to define, leads to a deadlock, a cross-disciplinary approach, the Stakeholder Theory, should be preferred.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Abreu dos Santos Tourinho.pdf: 1153194 bytes, checksum: f5a573ee7c27d41958b5c0071bcddbb1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-14 / This work aims to analyze and explore the controversial aspects related to mandatory bid rule under Brazilian Corporate Law (Law 6,404/76), which extends to voting minority shareholders the right to sell their shares in case of a control transfer. For this purpose we analyze (i) the nature of control , as a power to direct the corporation s business; (ii) the legal definition of controlling shareholder under Brazilian law; (iii) the history of the Brazilian institutional framework; (iv) the different justifications for the rule under Brazilian and foreign doctrines; (v) the elements for the characterization of the transfer of control, taking into consideration the key precedents of Comissão de Valores Mobliários - CVM; and (vi) the mandatory bid rule procedures / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar e explorar os aspectos controversos envolvendo a regra da oferta pública de aquisição de ações prevista no art. 254-A da Lei 6.404/76, que estende aos minoritários titulares de ações votantes o direito de alienar suas ações em casos de alienação de controle. Para tal analisamos (i) a natureza do controle , entendido como poder de direcionar a atividade empresarial; (ii) a definição legal de acionista controlador de acordo com a legislação brasileira; (iii) o histórico do instituto; (iv) as diferentes justificativas para o instituto, segundo as doutrinas brasileira e estrangeiras; (v) os elementos para a caracterização da alienação de controle, abordando os principais precedentes da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários CVM; e (vi) o procedimento para a realização de uma oferta pública

Segundo a teoria da firma, uma empresa é um nexo de relações contratuais entre os seus diversos participantes. Nessas relações contratuais, que não são perfeitas, surgem os problemas de agência, decorridos da assimetria informacional e dos conflitos de interesses entre o contratado e o contratante, no caso, agente e principal. Neste caso, quando se tem a intenção de alinhar os interesses entre eles, aparece a governança corporativa, atuando como um meio de minimizar os conflitos e diferenças existentes e corrigir as falhas presentes no processo de comunicação e informação das firmas. No Brasil, diante da fraca proteção legal aos acionistas minoritários, da alta concentração de propriedade nas empresas e da separação dos acionistas entre ordinários e preferenciais, algumas medidas institucionais e governamentais têm sido tomadas ao longo dos anos com o objetivo de contribuir com a evolução das práticas de governança corporativa no país. Uma dessas iniciativas foi a criação em 2000 do segmento Novo Mercado pela Bovespa, composto por regras e exigências crescentes em relação às boas práticas de governança. Nesse sentido, é coerente pensar que a política de dividendos, antes influenciada pela necessidade de atuar também como instrumento de redução de conflitos entre os acionistas, passou a ser decidida a partir de um foco preponderantemente gerencial pelas companhias deste segmento, ou seja, tomada do ponto de vista financeiro de maximização da riqueza dos acionistas. Para testar esta suposição, adotou-se o modelo conceitual da Teoria Residual dos Dividendos, estabelecidos pioneiramente por Modigliani e Miller (1961) e revisitado por Jensen (1986) na Teoria Free Cash Flow. Assim, conduziu-se um levantamento do Fluxo de Caixa Livre do Acionista (FCLA) para todas as companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa desde a sua criação até o ano de 2011. O objetivo foi investigar o perfil da política de dividendos dessas empresas, a partir da avaliação de como elas administram o FCLA. Além disso, foi testado se as decisões sobre a destinação do saldo de FCLA impactaram na rentabilidade do acionista, expressa pela Taxa de Retorno da Ação (TRA). Como proposta secundária, foram pesquisados também os fluxos de reinvestimento dos lucros destas companhias, buscando verificar se os acionistas são recompensados por maiores ganhos de capital em contrapartida pelo não recebimento de dividendos e, também, onde são alocados os lucros reinvestidos. Como resultado, constatou-se que grande parte das companhias apresentaram elevados níveis de sobreinvestimento no período, provocado pela retenção do FCLA, e que este problema pode ter sido a causa de uma Taxa de Retorno da Ação menor em alguns setores. Adicionalmente, foi observado que as empresas que mais retiveram lucro, ao longo do tempo, foram também as que proporcionaram os maiores retornos de ganhos de capital aos seus acionistas. Por fim, detectou-se que os lucros retidos pelas companhias foram reaplicados, em sua grande maioria, em investimentos relacionados à expansão ou manutenção de suas capacidades produtivas (capital fixo), embora a maior parcela deles acabasse não sendo identificada em nenhum dos ativos expressos pelo balanço patrimonial contábil. / According to the theory of the firm, the firm is a nexus of contractual relationships between its various participants. Such contractual relations, which are not perfect, agency problems arise, elapsed the information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between the engaged and the contractor, where, agent and principal. In this case, when it is intended to align the interests between them, appears to corporate governance, acting as a means to minimize conflicts and differences existing and correct the faults present in the process of communication and information firms. In Brazil, due to the weak legal protection for minority shareholders, the high concentration of ownership in firms and the separation between common and preferred shareholders, some institutional and government measures have been taken over the years in order to contribute to the evolution of corporate governance practices in the country. One such initiative was the creation in 2000 of the Novo Mercado segment by the Bovespa, composed of rules and increasing requirements in relation to good governance practices. Therefore, it is coherent to think that the dividend policy before influenced by the need to act as an instrument for reducing conflicts between shareholders, has to be decided from a managerial focus by companies in this segment, that is, the financial point of view of maximizing shareholder wealth. To test this assumption, we adopted the conceptual model of the Residual Theory of Dividends, established pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1961) and revisited by Jensen (1986) in the Free Cash Flow Theory. Thus, we conducted a survey of Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) for all companies listed on the Novo Mercado of the BM&FBovespa since its inception until the year 2011. The aim was to investigate the profile of the dividend policy of these companies, based on the evaluation of how they manage the FCFE. Furthermore, was tested whether if decisions on the allocation of the balance of FCFE impacted the profitability of the shareholder, expressed by the Rate of Stock Return (RSR). As proposed secondary, were surveyed the flows of reinvestment of profits these companies, seeking first check whether the shareholders are rewarded by higher capital gains in return for non-receipt of dividends, and also where they are allocated reinvested earnings. As a result, it was found that most companies had high levels of overinvestment during the period, caused by retention of FCFE and that this problem may have been the cause of a Rate of Stock Return lower in some sectors. Additionally, it was observed that companies that retained earnings, over time, were also the ones that provided the highest returns of capital gains to its shareholders. Finally, it was found that profits retained by the companies were reapplied mostly in investments related to the expansion or maintenance of their productive capacity (capital assets), while the largest portion of them end up not being identified in any of the assets of the balance sheet accounting.

<p>Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. </p><p>Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. </p><p>Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.</p>

Thesis (M.Com. (Accounting))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.

El objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral consiste, en primer lugar, en investigar si la influencia de los accionistas principales sobre el valor de la empresa se encuentra condicionada por la existencia de conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos, de manera que cuanto más alto sea el beneficio público esperado mayor será la disposición del accionista a asumir los costes derivados de la supervisión. Nuestro segundo objetivo consiste en analizar si en el mercado de capitales español la adquisición de bloques accionariales se encuentra condicionada por el beneficio público que puede derivarse de la supervisión o por la ventaja informativa que poseen los adquirentes, que pondría de manifiesto la necesidad de la aplicación estricta de los códigos de conducta y de un seguimiento más exhaustivo de las empresas con mayor asimetría informativa. El análisis empírico realizado, utilizando la metodología de datos de panel y la regresión logística, nos permite establecer las siguientes conclusiones. En primer lugar, el carácter supervisor de la propiedad accionarial es más intenso en aquellas empresas en las que el potencial conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos es mayor. Asimismo, la existencia de mecanismos de gobierno alternativos en la empresa, que garanticen la supervisión de las decisiones directivas, resta significatividad a la función de vigilancia que ejercen determinados inversores. Por último, los inversores principales de la empresa tratan de compensar los costes de supervisión mediante transacciones en el mercado de control parcial, de manera que se observa un comportamiento comprador cuando se anticipa una mejora en la gestión empresarial derivada de un incremento en la supervisión y cuando existe una mayor asimetría informativa de manera que pueden beneficiarse de su posición de inversores mejor informados. / The aim of this thesis is, firstly, to analyse if the influence of majority shareholders over company value depends on the existence of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore, the higher the expected social benefit is, the higher interest of shareholders to assume the costs derived form monitoring. The second aim of this study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading, which would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. The empirical analysis is accomplished using panel data methodology and a logistic regression. Our empirical analysis allow us to conclude that the supervisory role of ownership is more intense in firms where the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is greater, and therefore the value of the firm can be increased through a specific composition of its shareholders. Moreover, the existence of alternative governance mechanisms, that guarantee managerial decisions monitoring, reduce the importance of the investor's supervision role. Lastly, we observe a purchase behaviour when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the supervision, and when there is more asymmetric information and therefore the acquirers can benefit from their position of better informed investors.