中文摘要 公司治理的強化已成為世界各國所共同重視的議題，我國亦不落其後自1997年起逐步推動各項公司治理政策，若仔細觀察其發展過程，主管機關應是甚為期盼公司治理能正本清源的從董事、監察人獨立性的強化這個源頭紮實做起。 惟自民國94年起引進了董監候選人提名制度，特別是上市櫃公司的獨立董事，更強制採候選人提名制度，然近幾年我國上市櫃公司掏空、內線交易、不正當利益輸送、背信、董事自肥、財報不實等案件仍時有所聞，究竟我國引進董監候選人提名制度是改進公司治理的有效解決方案嗎?即是本文探討的主題。 首先，本文先研究公司治理與董監選任制度的關聯程度，分析公司治理的意義、目標、監督機制、架構以及董監選任於公司治理的重要性。隨後簡介美國及日本的董監選任制度，希望能對我國的現行董監選任制度有所借鏡。 接著，分析我國現行董監選任制度的主要問題，包括第192-1條第1項限制股東應就董事候選人名單中選任之，係對股東權的限制而非強化；允許股東選任自己認定的理想人選與董監候選人提名制度並不衝突，在現行制度下，所當選之董監較公司法第192條之選任方式更不具獨立性，對公司治理的提升並無助益，故實無限制之必要。第192-1條第3項對於無表決權之股份，為避免計算基礎過度膨脹，保障真正少數股東之權利，應限縮解釋。第216-1條監察人選舉準用第192-1條之規定，監察人之候選人可由董事會提名，將違反公司治理精神，恐造成監察人成為董事會之附屬而無法執行監督義務。而上市櫃公司依公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法第5條強制採候選人提名制度選任獨立董事，依新近大法官釋字第733號精神涵攝，關於選舉方式之強制，恐有限制團體內部組織與事務之自主決定已逾必要程度，而有違反憲法第二十三條所定比例原則及侵害基於結社自由所含的自治精神之嫌。另現行主管機關發佈董事、監察人提名委員會組織章程參考範例，也可能因獨立性不足、權限劃分不明等原因而形同聊備一格。同時，本文亦將現行公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則(以下簡稱委託書規則)其與董監候選人提名制度法律條文進行比較，發現主要差別除持股比例之要求外，委託書規則對董監資格限制可謂更為嚴謹。此外，委託書規則遇有股東會董監選舉徵求時，被選舉人資格審查無須經董事會或提名委員會審議，亦無強制公司股東僅能就委託書徵求人本人或所擬支持之候選人名單選任，但反而強制將候選人經營理念予以公開，故本文以為委託書規則不僅有董監候選人提名制度之實，又不失為一種更直接訴諸「股東民主」的制度，同時也是對股東行動主義正面回應的一種機制。 最後，本文認為，董監選任應回歸公司法第192條規定，使董監選任更具獨立性， 也無違反大法官第733號解釋之虞。若希望對散戶股東進行董監選舉時能有參考依據而堅持採董監候選人提名制度之精神，亦無需疊床架屋，另立新法條，只需放寬或廢除徵求門檻及上限，回歸現行委託書規則即可。否則，至少現行制度應針對董事會等審查機關若違法濫權等，授權審理法院得在股東會召開前或召開後，視情況採取緊急保全處分，以保障股東提名權。同時對獨立董事形式或實質獨立要件亦宜擴大認定，並可考慮拉長獨立董事的冷卻期間，來淡化利害關係並強化獨立董事之獨立性。

Le droit des investissements internationaux est largement présenté au travers de la jurisprudence arbitrale, notamment celle du CIRDI. Une telle approche a paru insuffisante. En effet, dans l'examen des questions touchant le droit des investissements internationaux, la jurisprudence de la CIJ et de sa devancière semble être un passage obligé à certains égards. S'agissant de règles primaires, c’est dans la jurisprudence de la Cour qu’ont émergé et pris forme certaines règles substantielles relatives aux investissements internationaux, et dont la désuétude est loin d'être établie par l'avènement du CIRDI. Par ailleurs, le rôle général de la Cour dans le fonctionnement de l'ordre juridique international à travers les règles juridictionnelles, procédurales, d’interprétation ou encore de responsabilité internationale, est indéniable. Or, certaines de ces règles se présentent comme des chapitres incontournables du droit des investissements internationaux. Ce sont là autant de raisons qui ont conduit à entreprendre une étude sur Le droit des investissements internationaux vu par la CIJ et le CIRDI en l’abordant au travers de la question de savoir si les tribunaux CIRDI puisent dans l’héritage de la Cour sur les problématiques juridiques relatives aux investissements internationaux ou s’en départissent. La confrontation des jurisprudences de la Cour et des tribunaux CIRDI a permis de conclure que le droit des investissements internationaux vu par la CIJ n’est que partiellement le droit des investissements internationaux vu par les tribunaux CIRDI. Globalement, sur une problématique donnée, en même temps que certaines solutions retenues par la jurisprudence des tribunaux CIRDI dénotent un emprunt aux règles et principes posés par la Cour, d’autres s’en départissent, qu'il s'agisse des règles primaires en la matière, ou bien des règles secondaires du droit international dans leur déclinaison dans le cadre du droit des investissements internationaux. Parce qu’elle livre, entre autres, une vue d’ensemble de la jurisprudence de la Cour de la Haye en matière d’investissements internationaux – démarche inédite –, la thèse se présente comme une piste pour les arbitres sur le chemin de l’émergence d’une jurisprudence arbitrale cohérente en droit des investissements internationaux. / To international investment law questions, the ICJ decisions are materials that must be taken into consideration. Indeed, substantive rules in international investment law and their issues are older than the ICSID creation. The legal issues had already been raised in the Court which set rules and principles covering international investment law principles. Thus, it is into the Court’s decisions that some rules relating to international investments was created. From this perspective, the ICJ cases could be seen as a legitimate forerunner for substantive rules in international investment law. In the other hand, the ICJ has a main role in the development and promotion of the rules of international litigation, some of which are of relevance in international investment law. The present work, by using the ICJ cases as guidance precedents, challenges the ICSID decisions to determine if the ICSID follows or not the rules and principles raised by the Court in international investment law. The analysis shows that if some ICSID decisions borrow the principles and rules established by the ICJ, others follow new ways in both primary and secondary rules in international investment law.

Die Dissertation befasst sich mit den Folgen negativer kritischer Ereignisse und gibt Hinweise, was Manager vor und nach dem Ereignis tun könnten, um potentiell negative Effekte zu minimieren. Während sich die ersten zwei Aufsätze mit der Wirkung kritischer Ereignisse aus Sicht der Konsumenten befassen, widmen sich die Aufsätze 3 und 4 der Shareholder-Perspektive. Aufsatz 1 untersucht die Wahrnehmungsveränderungen in Folge verschiedener Ereignisse mit Hilfe des Konzepts der Markenpersönlichkeit. Die Ergebnisse des Online-Experimentes implizieren, dass die negative Wirkung von der Markenstärke, der Geschäftsbeziehung vor bzw. während des Vorfalls und der Art des Ereignisses abhängt. Aufsatz 2 analysiert, ob die Effekte auch mit Hilfe des Konzepts des kundenbasierten Markenwerts bestätigt und erweitert werden können. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Reaktionen nach Bekanntwerden derselben kritischen Ereignisse für die Markenwertdimension „Perceived quality“, „Perceived value“, „Brand personality“, „Organizational associations“, und „Loyalty“ quantifiziert. In Übereinstimmung mit den in Aufsatz 1 gewonnenen Erkenntnissen deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass sowohl ein hoher Markenwert und das anhaltende persönliche Produkterlebnis während eines kritischen Ereignisses den negativen Effekt mindert, als auch eine zwischen tatsächlichen und potentiellen Kunden differenzierende Kommunikationsstrategie im Nachgang sinnvoll sein könnte. Die Aufsätze 3 und 4 untersuchen auf Basis einer „Event study“ den Zusammenhang zwischen der Veröffentlichung von „Corporate Reputation-Rankings“ des Manager Magazins und dem Shareholder Value. Die gefundenen Ankündigungseffekte weisen darauf hin, dass, über die gezeigte Verbindung zwischen Reputation und Shareholder Value, die in Folge kritischer negativer Ereignisse resultierende Reputationsänderung durch Investoren berücksichtigt wird. / The doctoral dissertation analyzes effects of negative critical incidents and points out, what manager could do before and after an incident in order to minimize possible negative impacts. While the first two essays take a closer look at effects of critical incidents from the consumer’s point of view, the essays 3 and 4 deal with the shareholder perspective. Essay 1 examines perceptional changes in consequence of various incidents using the concept of brand personality. The results of the online experiment imply that the negative impact depends on brand strength, type of event and business relation before respectively during the incident. Essay 2 analyzes whether or not effects can be confirmed and extended using the concept of customer based brand equity. For this purpose, reactions of respondents are measured after getting exposed to the same critical incidents as in the previous essay. The reactions are quantified for brand equity dimensions such as perceived quality, perceived value, brand personality, organizational associations and loyalty. The results are in line with findings of Essay 1. They indicate, on the one hand, that high brand equity and persistent product experience during crisis reduce negative effects and, on the other hand, that a communication strategy which differs between actual and potential customers could be favorable after the incident. Using event study methodology, the Essays 3 and 4 examine the linkage between publications of corporate reputation rankings of the Manager Magazin and shareholder value. The existence of negative announcement effects indicates that investors consider a reputational loss in consequence of negative critical incidents via the observed linkage between reputation and share prices.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Guarilha P de Freitas.pdf: 880892 bytes, checksum: 40e48c5886660a2ffbfb45835061694f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-06 / This work aims to analyze and explore the controversial and relevant aspects inserted in the context of the working control, giving special emphasis to the aspects related to the mandatory bid rule and to the responsibility of the controlling shareholder for the misuse of his control power. Therefore, we have analyzed (i) the origin and the economic justification of the pattern of dispersion of the company s capital stock, which permits the appearance of the working control; (ii) the dynamism of the corporate control; (iii) the main aspects associated to the definition of the working control; (iv) the mandatory bid for the changing of the corporate control; (v) the responsibility of the minority shareholders for the misuse of the corporate power / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar e explorar os aspectos controversos e relevantes presentes num contexto de controle minoritário, sobretudo aqueles relacionados à oferta pública por alienação de controle e à responsabilidade do acionista controlador. Para tanto, analisamos (i) a origem e a justificativa econômica do modelo de dispersão acionaria, modelo esse que propicia o surgimento do controle minoritário; (ii) a dinâmica do poder de controle; (iii) os principais contornos relacionados à definição do controle minoritário; (iv) a oferta pública por alienação de controle; e (v) a responsabilidade do acionista controlador minoritário por abuso do poder de controle

Corporate governance practice differs regionally and nationally, depending on how each legal environment protects minority investors, capital markets and company ownership structure. Governance can also change spectacularly in regions or countries with comparatively high levels of institutional investment. The notion of institutional investors' activism is increasingly important in developed markets as the ideal corporate governance mechanism to monitor corporate managers and overcome agency problems arising from dispersed corporate ownership in modern companies. These institutions can work together on an improved corporate governance framework more effectively than individual investors, monitoring corporate controllers of listed companies in emerging and developing markets, using their influence more vigorously and in ways more fitting to a concentrated ownership environment such as that in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the role of institutional investors in emerging and developing markets will depend strongly on institutional investors' activism and the arrangements determined and undertaken by the corporate governance regulatory framework in these markets. In considering the influential role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance practice, a high level of minority shareholder protection thus remains an indicator of good corporate governance and regulatory pressure of rights and incentives, which are necessary to empower non-controlling shareholders in these concentrated ownership markets to exert a strong activist influence in monitoring corporate activities, thus improving the corporate governance practices of investee companies. In this context, this thesis contends that in Saudi Arabia in particular, shareholder involvement in corporate governance is inadequate, as a result of a variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. It goes on to identify what improvements are necessary and where, to ensure a sound framework for effective institutional investor activism and to improve the level of minority shareholder protection. It also cautions Saudi legislators against erecting hurdles to the future engagement of Saudi and foreign institutional investors in monitoring corporate activities which may affect the conditions for access, allocation and monitoring of equity, which is so important for value creation and sustainable economic growth. The main benefit to be derived from this research is that it facilitates a fuller understanding of the Saudi approach to corporate governance, the corporate ownership environment and trends in the capital market. The analysis also deepens knowledge of corporate governance regimes, including the role of institutional investors, and of their characteristics and investment behaviours. In short, it considers whether institutional investors are willing or have been encouraged to use their power to engage in the companies in which they invest and whether they are qualified to solve the agency problem.

關於股東會決議之瑕疵，依我國目前法律與實務通說下，共有三種類型：股東會決議無效、不存在與得撤銷。惟我國公司法並未規範一旦法院判決認定股東會決議無效、不存在或撤銷股東會決議後之法律效果為何，若將具瑕疵之決議限縮於選任董事之決議上，則不具董事身分之人擔任公司董事一職下，由於訴訟程序冗長，此段期間公司對外之法律關係(或董事代表公司所為之法律行為)、公司與不具董事身分之人間之法律關係及公司後續的程序召集上，其法律效果為何？日本學說上提出「連鎖瑕疵」闡述此問題。我國公司法學者通說採取對外類推適用表見代理、對內適用無因管理之見解；惟本文以為此見解將生諸多疑問，故本文參考英國法、美國法與日本學說上之見解，介紹英國公司法第161條規定並採取「事實上董事理論」以嘗試解決此問題。最後並進一步探究股東會決議瑕疵所產生的後續相關法律問題。 / According to the current law and common practice, there are three types of the defect of shareholder meeting of the company. There are void resolution, no resolution, and annulment of such resolution. However, our corporate law didn’t regulate the results once the court makes the verdict of the above mentioned types of defects of shareholder meeting of the company. If the defect of shareholder meeting of the company could be restrained on the election of directors of the resolution, while the person who was disqualified to act as a director is still in charge, the legal effect of the company’s external legal affairs, also the relationship between the company and the disqualified director, and the assembly of the meeting remain discussible. The Japanese scholars bring up a theory called the chain of defect to elaborate the upper mentioned problem. Our corporate law scholars mainly consider that the legal effect of the company’s external legal affairs should be an apparent agent situation. The company’s internal legal affairs, such as the relationship between the company and the disqualified director, and the assembly of the meeting should think as a management of affairs without mandate situation. However, my article considers that the previous perspective remains plenty of doubtful points. For this reason, my article would refer to the Companies Act 2006 (United Kingdom Company Law), Laws of the United States, and Japan’s legal theories. Moreover, I would introduce the Sec.161 of the Companies Act 2006, and adopt the theory of de facto directors in order to solve the problem. Eventually, I would analyze the extended and related legal problems of the defect of shareholder meeting of the company.

Good corporate governance should be the cornerstone of all company management. Directors ought to know in whose interests the company should be managed. This thesis attempts to answer the following question: whose interests must be granted primacy in the management of a company? In chapter 1 it is stated that shareholders' interests are traditionally granted primacy in the management of a company. There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards recognition of a wider variety of interests that should be considered than only those of the shareholders. These interests include, inter alia, environmental interests and those of the investors, employees and consumers. This thesis thus focuses on the primary stakeholders, namely individual shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers and suppliers. In chapter 2 a theoretical foundation is provided on the nature of a company. The different theories on the nature of a company, emphasising either shareholder primacy or stakeholder protection, are discussed. A combined new theory is proposed. It is suggested that the confusion relating to the meaning of "the company" needs to be eliminated. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide an international comparison of the company law in Botswana, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The focus falls, firstly, on directors' duties, secondly, on the question in whose interests directors should manage a company and, thirdly, on the codification of their duties. In chapter 6 the South African position is evaluated. First, the possible stakeholders are identified and the protection currently afforded them is explained. The reports of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Policy Document on company law reform as well as the Companies Bill of 2007 are discussed. Draft clauses are recommended to be incorporated in new company legislation to provide directors with clarity on what is expected of them. It is the aim of this thesis to provide clarity on whose interests should receive primacy when directors manage a company. The outcome of this research should provide a clear indication to South African directors of what is expected of them and who the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties are. / Law / LL.D.

Submitted by Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho (sarah.momm@gmail.com) on 2015-04-30T14:02:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2015-04-30T18:42:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-04T12:38:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-01 / O BNDES tem o objetivo de financiar empreendimentos que se relacionem com o desenvolvimento do país, sendo uma de suas modalidades o investimento por subscrição de ações. De um lado, tem-se que as regras elaboradas na estruturação societária de uma empresa podem variar de acordo com a origem do financiamento obtido, em função dos interesses que os diferentes investidores procuram proteger a partir da separação entre a sua propriedade e o controle. Por outro lado, o cenário econômico brasileiro passou por mudanças profundas nos últimos 60 anos, já que o modelo de industrialização baseado no dirigismo estatal – que marcou as décadas de 1950 a 1980 – transformou-se com o movimento de desestatização dos anos 1990. O Estado não se afastou da propriedade empresarial, mas atua agora principalmente como acionista minoritário. Hoje, paira dúvida acerca, em primeiro lugar, das reais motivações que levam determinadas empresas a receber participação do Sistema BNDES. Além disso, há pouca compreensão sobre os veículos jurídicos que viabilizam essas relações público-privadas. A partir de algumas pesquisas sobre o banco, conclui-se que a atuação da sua subsidiária de participações, a BNDESPAR, não ultrapassa objetivos de maximização de valor dos seus ativos. Não se descartou, no entanto, que a função do banco de desenvolvimento – incluindo a do seu braço de renda variável – fosse implementar políticas industriais, por mais que falhas pudessem vir a ocorrer nesse intento, reconhecido como um processo experimental. Assim, revelou-se quais interesses as regras de governança corporativa das companhias abertas financiadas pela BNDESPAR por participação acomodam para a subsidiária, elucidando-se importantes características do modelo contemporâneo de atuação empresarial do Estado e lançando-se luz sobre os objetivos que o levam a investir diretamente como acionista no cenário atual. No caso da BNDESPAR, trata-se de agente em busca de equilíbrio entre a maximização de retornos e a política industrial. De uma maneira mais geral, o BNDES procura ser auto-sustentável – como pré-requisito para existir e cumprir sua missão –, tratando sua subsidiária como a principal personagem desse objetivo dentro do Sistema. A BNDESPAR, por sua vez, acabou por se tornar executora de política voltada a apoiar a negociação das companhias brasileiras no mercado de capitais – atividade emanada da sua própria burocracia. / BNDES has the objective of financing projects related to Brazil’s development and equity purchases are one of its types of investment. On one hand, rules drawn up in a company’s corporate governance structure can vary according to the capital’s origin, since different interests that different investors seek to protect emerge from the separation of their property from the corporate control. On the other hand, Brazilian economic scenario went trough deep changes over the last 60 years, considering that the industrialization model based on State intervention, mainstream between the 1950s and the 1980s, was transformed by the privatization movement in the 1990s. This change, however, did not eliminate the State in corporate property: now it only acts more commonly as a minority shareholder. The present time is marked by doubt over the real motivation that leads some companies to receive equity investments by the BNDES System. Besides that, there is a lack of comprehension on the contractual vehicles that structure these public-private relations. Some researches concerning the bank indicate that its subsidiary investments would not undermine the objective for profit maximization. We have not ignored, however, that the development bank function – including its equity arm – might be executing industrial policies, even though failures are likely to occur during this effort, understood here as an experimental process. Thus, the research has revealed which BNDESPAR’s interests are protected through the corporate governance rules of the public traded companies invested, also revealing important features of the contemporary model of the State as an entrepreneur and clarifying some objectives that could lead the institution to purchase equity participations nowadays. BNDESPAR is an agent motivated by a balance pursuit between profit maximization and industrial policy purposes. Broadly speaking, BNDES seeks self-financial sustainability in order to continue and accomplish its mission, seeing its equity arm as the main executor of this objective inside its System. In this search for sustainability, BNDESPAR became executor of a policy effort for stock markets negotiation raised up among its own bureaucracy activities.

Notre thèse développe une nouvelle méthode pour analyser les capitaux propres des banques, basée sur la distinction entre capital actionnarial (dit ‘shareholder equity’) et capital de l’entité bancaire (dit ‘entity equity’). Cette nouvelle mesure –du capital actionnarial permet de distinguer les capitaux propres bancaires effectivement apportés par les actionnaires. Cette mesure s’avère pertinente pour interpréter les transformations récentes de la relation entre actionnaires et entités bancaires. Elle identifie et comptabilise les transactions entre les entités bancaires et leurs actionnaires, en permettant ainsi : l'analyse des origines du capital bancaire et de son évolution ; l’impact des stratégies d'entreprise financiarisées qui cherchent à économiser l’apport en capital actionnarial ; une mesure améliorée du capital actionnarial prudentiel qui est censé apporter une protection contre les risques encourus et les pertes éventuelles. De nos jours, une tension fondamentale pèse sur les capitaux propres bancaires, entre les actionnaires demandant des politiques de distribution généreuses, et l’intérêt général qui nécessite d’un système bancaire stable et résilient. Cette tension entre les exigences des actionnaires et la constitution d’un capital actionnarial suffisant est documenté par notre analyse dans la période avant et après la crise financière globale. Nous analysons les capitaux propres de neuf banques européennes entre 2001 et 2015. Ces cas montrent des distributions importantes en faveur des actionnaires et au détriment des objectifs de solvabilité financière.Les apports des actionnaires aux capitaux propres de l'entité bancaire ainsi qu'au capital prudentiel ont été limités avant la crise, et ne s’améliorent que modestement après celle-là,malgré des injections nouvelles importantes. Nos résultats suggèrent que, à l'ère des stratégies d'entreprise financiarisées, des niveaux suffisants de capital bancaire de haute qualité sont essentiels pour protéger l'intérêt général et empêcher les banques de devenir des véhicules d'investissement financiarisés pour certains actionnaires. Cela amène à repenser les capitaux propres des banques dans la recherche d’un arrangement plus durable et soutenable avec leurs actionnaires. / The thesis introduces a new accounting method based upon the distinction between shareholder equity and the residual entity equity. Shareholder equity presents the actual contributions of shareholders to the bank entity. It allows for the analysis of bank’s equity position in light of a transformed idea of shareholding as experienced in recent years. The measure identifies and visualises equity transactions of banks relating to shareholders; and with it, allows for the analysis of the two main shaping forces of bank equity: financialized corporate strategy which seeks to economize the bank equity position; and regulatory capita lwhich provides a risk buffer to absorb eventual losses. Addressees of these two forces are shareholders who pressure banks to follow generous distribution policies and society at largewhich demands a safe and sound banking system. This trade-off between return to shareholders and a sufficient equity base is well documented in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Our analysis of shareholder equity position applies to nine European banks between 2001 and 2015. It reveals substantial distributions at the detriment of financial solvency concerns. Shareholder contributions to the bank entity as well as to regulatory capital werelimited in the pre-crisis period, with rather modest improvements in the post-crisis perioddespite substantial capital injections. Findings suggest that, in an era of financialized corporate strategy, sufficient levels of high quality capital are essential to safeguard general interest and prevent banks to become financial investment vehicles for their shareholders.

Ce travail vise à déterminer dans le cadre des sociétés s’introduisant en bourse les facteurs explicatifs de la présence d’engagements contractuels par les principaux actionnaires d’une part et leur impact sur la valeur de la firme d’autre part. Le terme « engagement contractuel » fait référence à deux mécanismes mis en place au moment de l’introduction en bourse : les engagements de conservation d’actions par les dirigeants et les pactes d’actionnaires. Notre étude porte sur un échantillon de 292 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1996 et 2000 sur le nouveau marché et le second marché de la bourse de Paris. Nos résultats montrent que la présence et la durée des engagements de conservation d’actions des dirigeants servent à signaler la valeur de la firme lorsque l’asymétrie d’information est grande mais aussi à compenser certaines inefficiences du système de gouvernance de l’entreprise. Nous observons également un impact négatif sur la valeur de la firme des engagements de conservation des dirigeants alors que ceux concernant les sociétés de capital risque l’influence positivement. Concernant les pactes d’actionnaires, nos travaux montrent que leur mise en place est d’autant plus probable que les dirigeants anticipent une cession future de l’entreprise. Ils ont par ailleurs une influence positive sur la valeur de la firme tant qu’ils ne protègent pas les signataires d’une prise de contrôle hostile ; dans ce dernier cas l’effet sur la valeur de la firme est négatif. Finalement, nous montrons qu’il existe une réaction négative du cours de bourse autour du jour de l’expiration des engagements de conservation. / Using a sample of IPO firms, we try to figure out what are the factors influencing the adoption of lockups and shareholder agreements and we also try to assess the impact on firm value of these two commitments. Our study is based on a sample of 292 IPOs made between 1996 and 2000 on the French nouveau marché and second marché. We found that the adoption of lockups and their length may serve to alleviate information asymmetry at the IPO time. Our results also give pieces of evidence that this mechanism may compensate for some inefficiencies of the corporate governance setting. We found that lockups undertaken by managers have a negative effect on firm value whereas lockups by venture capital firms have a positive one. With regards to shareholder agreements, our tests show that the probability of adopting such a commitment is positively related to managers’ anticipation of a future sale of the firm. We also found that shareholder agreements have a positive effect on firm value as long as they do not insulate the company from the threat of a hostile takeover. In this latter case, the effect on firm value is negative. Finally, we found a negative return around the day where lockups are released.