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481	O instituto da incorporação de ações / Stock for stock exchange transactions Ponczek, Daniel Kalansky 06 April 2011 (has links) O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years. Abuse of law Acionista majoritário Acionista minoritário Appraisal Business judgment rule Business purpose test Comitê de empresas Companys acquisition Controlling shareholder Corporate restructure CVM CVM opinions 34 and 3 Delisting Exchange ratio Fraud to law Indirect business Interest conflict Intrinsic fairness test Legal nature Merger Minority shareholders Parent-subsidiary merger Particular benefit Shares Simulation Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Special committee Statutory merger Stock for stock exchange Subsidiary Tag along Tender offer Two-step acquisition Vote impediment Wholly owned subsidiary
482	A atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário: possibilidades e limites / The State action in the economy as minority shareholder: possibilities and limits Filipe Machado Guedes 15 August 2014 (has links) A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies. Direito Administrativo Empresas público-privadas Participações públicas minoritárias Estado Empresário Estado Regulador Estado Fomentador Estado Investidor Limites Controle societário estatal Administrative law Public-private companies Minority equity stakes Entrepreneurial state Regulatory state State as a promoter of private action Investor state Limits Disguised corporate control Simulation of administrative procurement DIREITO PUBLICO
483	A atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário: possibilidades e limites / The State action in the economy as minority shareholder: possibilities and limits Filipe Machado Guedes 15 August 2014 (has links) A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies. Direito Administrativo Empresas público-privadas Participações públicas minoritárias Estado Empresário Estado Regulador Estado Fomentador Estado Investidor Limites Controle societário estatal Administrative law Public-private companies Minority equity stakes Entrepreneurial state Regulatory state State as a promoter of private action Investor state Limits Disguised corporate control Simulation of administrative procurement DIREITO PUBLICO
484	O instituto da incorporação de ações / Stock for stock exchange transactions Daniel Kalansky Ponczek 06 April 2011 (has links) O presente trabalho tem por objeto o estudo do instituto da incorporação de ações. Para tanto, será analisado, (i) no primeiro capítulo, o regime legal vigente e sua natureza jurídica, apresentando-se as diferenças em relação à operação de incorporação de sociedade, fazendo inclusive um contraste com o direito norte-americano; (ii) no segundo capítulo, a proteção dos acionistas minoritários em operações de incorporação de controlada e eventual impedimento de voto do acionista controlador, analisando-se os recentes pareceres de orientação emitidos pela CVM; (iii) no terceiro capítulo, o estudo do instituto do tag along e do fechamento de capital e necessidade de realização de oferta pública em operações de incorporação de ações que impliquem transferência de controle ou cancelamento de registro de companhia aberta, à luz das últimas operações realizadas no mercado; (iv) no quarto capítulo, a discussão dos principais precedentes nos quais a CVM decidiu impor restrições ou impedir a realização de operações de incorporação de ações por entender ter havido um tratamento não equitativo entre os acionistas minoritários e controladores, com o objetivo de demonstrar a alteração do comportamento do órgão regulador no decorrer dos anos / The present work aims the study of the stock-for-stock exchange transactions (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, it will be examined (i) in the first part, the current legal regime and legal nature, contemplating differences with the statutory merger (incorporação de sociedade), including a comparison with the US law, (ii) in the second part, the protection of minority shareholders in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers and possible exclusion from voting of the controlling shareholder, taking into account the recent opinions issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), (iii) in the third part, the study of the tag along rights and the regulation for delisting companies and the need to conduct a tender offer in stock-for-stock exchange transactions involving transfer of control or delisting of a publicly-held company in light of recent transactions, and (iv) in the fourth part, the discussion of the key precedents on which CVM has decided to impose restrictions or prevent the conduct of stock-for-stock transaction under the understanding that there was inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, in order to demonstrate the change of the CVMs understanding over the years. Acionista majoritário Acionista minoritário Comitê de empresas Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Abuse of law Appraisal Business judgment rule Business purpose test Companys acquisition Controlling shareholder Corporate restructure CVM CVM opinions 34 and 3 Delisting Exchange ratio Fraud to law Indirect business Interest conflict Intrinsic fairness test Legal nature Merger Minority shareholders Parent-subsidiary merger Particular benefit Shares Simulation Special committee Statutory merger Stock for stock exchange Subsidiary Tag along Tender offer Two-step acquisition Vote impediment Wholly owned subsidiary
485	論現金逐出合併下少數股東之保護—以日本法為借鏡 / A study on protections for minority shareholders in cash-out mergers: in comparison with Japanese law 陳健豪, Chen, Chien Hao Unknown Date (has links) 自我國企業併購法容許以現金作為併購對價後，現金逐出合併即成為我國法制上適法之併購類型。惟現金逐出合併通常為控制股東利用股權優勢，以現金對價剝奪少數股東留存於併購後公司之手段，故控制股東是否濫用資本多數決侵害少數股東權益以獨占併購利益乃成為現金逐出合併上不可忽視之討論重點。本文以比較日本法之觀點，針對專屬於併購之保護機制及公司法上既有之救濟機制進行比較分析，以釐清及了解現行制度於實際操作上是否確實能夠在現金逐出合併之實行過程中發揮保護少數股東之功能。討論範圍上，前者，包含「資訊揭露制度」與「股份收買請求權」；後者，包含「股東制止請求權」與「爭執併購決議效力之訴訟」。比較內容圍繞在此四項制度於解釋適用上之學說與實務觀點。除保護機制之討論外，本文另從二階段收購之角度探討少數股東之權益侵害。討論範圍上，主要以與股份收買請求權具有密切關係之控制權溢價分配及公開收購壓迫性兩者作為討論之對象，並從日本法之比較分析觀點，探討是否可透過股份收買請求權使少數股東分享控制權溢價，及解決二階段收購下可能引發之壓迫性問題。最後，本文針對現行制度提出檢討與建議。在保護機制部分，資訊揭露制度應補強揭露內容與強化非公開發行公司之保護，股份收買請求權應調整目前實務採用之計算方式，股東制止請求權與爭執決議效力之訴訟應作一體性之調整。至於二階段收購部分，則應容許少數股東可分享控制權溢價，並暫以股份收買請求權解決公開收購之壓迫性問題。現金逐出合併少數股東資訊揭露股份收買請求權股東制止請求權二階段收購控制權溢價公開收購壓迫性 Cash-out merger Minority shareholder Information disclosure Appraisal right Cease-to-act right Two-tier tender offer Control premium Tender offer Coercion
486	Development Finance Institutions’ Effect on The Fund Manager’s Investment Decisions : Balancing Financial Performance Goals and Development Impact Objectives Adolfssson, Alexander, Åström, Marie January 2016 (has links) Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have played a crucial role in moving socially responsibility considerations up on the private equity industry’s agenda. DFIs add a development impact criterion to traditional financial performance goals in the investment industry and play a catalytic role by mobilizing other investors. The gap in research regarding DFIs implications and significance in the investment community from a SRI perspective is evident. The development impact objective introduced by the DFIs is examined to understand its effects on fund managers’ decision-making and if it exists a trade-off between this objective and financial performance. An understanding of how DFIs control fund managers to act in accordance to their objective as well as how they determine compensation schemes to incentivize them to pursue high return on investments, is discussed in relation to the agency theory. Furthermore, stakeholder/shareholder consideration is examined in relation to the subject. The aim of this study is to examine how the behavior of fund managers is affected by the involvement of a DFI investor and try to add to the understanding of their significance as institutional investors in developing markets. Previous studies have been more focused on determining the financial performance of socially responsible investments by using very similar quantitative data collection methods. This thesis undertakes an in-depth approach with the purpose to understand the fund manager’s drives as well as how a DFI involvement affects the behavior and decision-making process. This thesis undertook a qualitative research strategy and semi-structured interviews were used as the tool to understand the fund managers’ personals beliefs and perceptions of how the relationship with DFIs affect them. The selection criteria for the fund managers was that they needed to work in a fund in which a DFIs has invested. We also included DFI investors in order to understand their point of view. The interview was recorded, transcribed and later divided into themes in accordance with the thematic approach, following six steps. Our findings show that Development Finance Institutions plays an important role in emerging markets and affect fund manager behavior to a certain extent. They did not perceive a trade-off between financial performance goals and development impact objectives. We conclude that DFIs increase fund manager focus on ESG/SEE elements in the investment process. DFIs requirements and reporting obligations is used as a tool to ensure that the fund manager act in accordance to DFI objective. The fund managers were neither willing to sacrifice commercial return in favor of development impact. Lastly, the interest among the DFIs and commercial investors is fairly similar, hence reducing the conflict of interest between investors. DFI Development Finance Institutions MDFI SEE SRI Socially Responsible Invesments CSR NGO SIDA DEG FM SME Multiplier Effect Agent Theory Stakeholder Theory Qualitative Subjectivism Objectivism Postitivsm Intepretivism Investment Behavior Standard Asset Pricing Model ESG Sin Industries Principle-agent Theory Positivist Agent Thoery Agent Conflict Incentives Investment Behvaior Optimal contracts Descriptive Stakeholder Thoery Convergent Stakeholder Theory Stakeholder Shareholder Financial Performance Development Impact Hands-off model Direct-involvement model Affirmative Behavior Aviodance Behavior Tripple Bottom Line Agent Principle Control Fund Manager Business Administration Företagsekonomi
487	La société anonyme unipersonnelle en droit OHADA : étude critique / The one-person limited company under the OHADA LAW : A Critical Study N'Takpé, Adjoua Marie-Hortense 30 June 2016 (has links) Le régime juridique de la société anonyme unipersonnelle (SAU) de droitOHADA est défini par renvoi au régime prévu pour la SA pluripersonnelle, avec desadaptations minimales. En réalité, le caractère unipersonnel de la SA lui confère une certaineparticularité qui rend inappropriée la transposition pure et simple des règles du modèlepluripersonnel. Outre les difficultés d’application qu’elle entraîne souvent, la technique durenvoi laisse irrésolues de nombreuses questions suscitées par l’unipersonnalité. Le régimejuridique de la SAU dans son ensemble en ressort insuffisamment adapté à l’unicitéd’actionnaire.Une adaptation du régime juridique de la SAU de droit OHADA au particularisme del’unipersonnalité devient alors nécessaire. Elle doit être entreprise sous fond de simplificationdes règles, d’une part à l’égard de la société, à travers les règles relatives à sa constitution et àson évolution, d’autre part, à l’égard des acteurs que sont l’actionnaire unique, les organesd’administration et de contrôle.Au-delà de son approche critique, l’étude a surtout pour ambition de proposer unmodèle de société anonyme unipersonnelle au régime juridique plus lisible, simple et attractif. / The one-person limited company under the OHADA LAW has seen itslegal regime being defined with reference to the regime of the multi-persons limited company,with minimum adaptations. In fact the one-person character of the Limited company gives it a certain peculiarity that renders inappropriate the pure and simple transportation of rules of the multi-person limited company model. Besides the difficulty of implementation that it oftenentails, the technique of referring leaves unresolved many questions raised by the one-personlimited company model. The legal regime of the one-person limited company as a whole thatarises is insufficiently adapted to the unique shareholder.An adaptation of the one-person limited company legal regime of the OHADA LAWto the particularity of the one-person thus becomes necessary. It has to be undertaken underthe simplification of rules, on the one hand with regards to the company, through rules relatedto its constitution and its evolution, on the other hand, with respect to the actors that are thesole shareholders, administrative and control bodies. Acte unilatéral Acteur Actionnaire unique Adaptation Administrateur général Aménagement Constitution ab initio Constitution par réunion des actions Contrat avec soi-même Étude critique Dissolution-confusion Dissolution-liquidation Droit OHADA Harmonisation Pluripersonnalité Régime juridique Réunion des actions en une main SA classique SA pluripersonnelle Séparation des patrimoines Société anonyme unipersonnelle Transmission universelle du patrimoine Unipersonnalité Unilateral act Actor Sole shareholder Adaptation General administrator Planning Constitution ab initio Constitution by shares Contract with oneself Critical study Dissolution-confusion Dissolution-liquidation OHADA LAW Harmonisation Multi-persons Legal regime Meeting of shares in one hand Classical limited company Multi-persons limited company Separation of property One-person limited company Transfer off assets One-person 340
488	La protection des actionnaires minoritaires dans les sociétés anonymes : étude comparative du droit français et du droit chinois / The protection of minority shareholders of companies limited by shares : a comparative study of french law and chinese law Li, Xiaoshan 22 June 2011 (has links) La présente étude a pour objet de montrer que les moyens de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires en droit chinois et en droit français ne sont pas soumis à des critères fondamentalement différents. Dans les sociétés anonymes, les règles juridiques visent à trouver un équilibre des rapports entre les actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires, ainsi qu’entre les actionnaires et la société ou le groupe de sociétés.C’est l’intérêt social et le principe d’égalité qui guident le législateur et le juge de proposer des solutions convenables.Il importe de noter qu’en droit français, les dispositions sur les responsabilités et les moyens de recours pour les minoritaires sont d’applications faciles qu’en droit chinois. D’ailleurs, la recherche de l’acquisition des sociétés cotées chinoises sous l’angle de la protection des minoritaires, tout à fait différent à l’offre publique en droit français, présente les particularités du marché réglementé chinois et mérite que les investisseurs étrangers découvrent davantage. / The dissertation aimed to point out that the methods of the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese law and in French law are not subject to the different criteria. In company limited by shares, the legal provisions intend to find a balance of relation between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and between the shareholders and the company or group of company. It is corporate profits and the principal of equality that direct legislators and judges to suggest applicable solutions.It is important to notify that in French law, legal provisions about the responsibility of majority shareholders or company leaders and the ways of resort of minority shareholders provide reference for improvement of Chinese law. Besides, the study of acquisition of chinese listed companies, looked from the angle of the protection of minority shareholders, very different from tender offer in French law, demonstrate the characteristics of Chinese stock market and deserve foreign investors’ enough attention. Droit chinois Actionnaire minoritaire Droit à l'information Droit de vote Abus de majorité Intérêt social Droit aux bénéfices Action sociale ut universi Action sociale ut singuli Marché financier chinois Négociation d'un bloc de contrôle Offre publique Devoir de loyauté Principe d'égalité France Chine Chinese law Minority shareholder Voting right Abuse of majority Company profits Property rights of minority shareholders Rights of profit sharing Shareholders derivative suit Direct action Chinese stock market Takeover agreement Tender offer Fiduciary duty Principal of equality Company limited by shares Listed company Minority stockholders Legal protection France China

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