SAMMANFATTNINGAktieägaravtal, det vill säga avtal mellan ägare i ett aktiebolag som reglerar aktiebolagets struktur och hur verksamheten ska styras, är vanligt förekommande i näringslivet. Aktieägaravtalet kan betraktas som ett komplement till bolagsordningen, som är aktiebolagets grundläggande dokument. Aktieägaravtal förekommer i många former och skepnader. Det står aktieägarna i princip fritt att avtala om vad som helst som rör bolaget och deras ägande. En annan sak är att ett aktieägaravtal aldrig i frånvaro av lagstöd kan få aktiebolagsrättsliga verkningar. Det är en konsekvens av den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen. På motsvarande sätt innebär den avtalsrättsliga separationsprincipen att avtalet inte är bindande för tredje man samt att aktiebolagsrätten inte åstadkommer någon verkan på aktieägaravtalet. Avtalet gäller mellan parterna. I aktieägaravtal är det mycket vanligt med så kallade överlåtelse- och beslutsbindningar. Överlåtelsebindningar reglerar förutsättningarna för hur avtalsparterna får överlåta sina aktier. Beslutsbindningar reglerar det sätt på vilket beslut i till exempel bolagsstämman eller styrelsen ska fattas, vilka majoritetskrav som ska gälla, om det föreligger vetorätt och så vidare. I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag beslutsbindningar i aktieägaravtal som ingås av aktieägare i banker och värdepappersbolag. Utgångspunkten är att aktieägaravtal, genom att reglera beslutsfattandet, kan användas som ett viktigt bolagsstyrningsinstrument för aktieägarna. Banker och värdepappersbolag är emellertid föremål för omfattande, näringsrättslig reglering vars ändamål kan komma i konflikt med ändamålen bakom den avtalsfrihet som ligger till grund för aktieägarnas fri- och rättighet att ingå aktieägaravtal. Uppsatsen bygger på en traditionell rättsvetenskaplig metod. Det övergripande syftet med ämnesvalet är att berika förståelsen för aktieägaravtal genom att tillföra ett kapitalmarknadsrättsligt perspektiv på användningen av sådana avtal i just banker och värdepappersbolag. / Shareholder agreements are contractual arrangements among shareholders in a limited liability company that describe the structure of the company and how it should be operated.  The shareholder agreement can be seen as a supplement to the articles of association, the main constitutional document in the company.  Shareholder agreements exist in a variety of formats. The shareholders are free to regulate whatever they prefer regarding the company and their ownership. Whereas an agreement creates obligations for the parties involved, the agreement can never have company law effects unless there is explicit legal support for this. This is the essence of the company law separation principle. Correspondingly, company law can never have any effect on the contractual obligations between the shareholders that are party to an agreement. This is commonly referred to as the contractual separation principle.  It is common for shareholder agreements to contain transfer obligations and decision obligations. Transfer obligations regulate the conditions under which ownership of shares can be transferred. Decision obligations regulate how decisions are made in general meetings, the board of directors and so on. This thesis examines decision obligations in shareholder agreements between shareholders in banks and investment firms. The starting point is that shareholder agreements, by regulating decision-making, can be used as an important corporate governance tool for the shareholders. Banks and investment firms are subject to a comprehensive framework of capital markets regulations. Capital markets regulations have goals and objectives that may conflict with the shareholders’ fundamental freedom of contract, which is the base for their right to enter into shareholder agreements. The thesis builds on the method of traditional jurisprudence. The overall objective of the thesis is to enrich the understanding of shareholder agreements by applying a capital markets law perspective on the use of such agreements in banks and investment firms.

Les pays de la zone OHADA observent, depuis une dizaine d’années, un accroissement significatif des opérations de capital-investissement. Les perspectives économiques encourageantes, la relative stabilité politique dans la région ainsi que les prévisions démographiques font de la zone OHADA une cible de premier choix pour les fonds d’investissement, qui y trouvent de formidables opportunités d’investissement et de croissance. Cette nouvelle dynamique nous appelle à nous interroger sur la faculté du droit OHADA à répondre aux exigences juridiques exprimées par ces nouveaux acteurs économiques lors de la conduite de leurs opérations. Cette thèse se propose d’analyser, dans une perspective comparative avec le droit français, les principaux enjeux juridiques du capital-investissement en droit OHADA. Ainsi, y seront étudiés les outils juridiques de prise de participation, la gestion des sociétés cibles, notamment à travers la pratique des pactes d’actionnaires, et enfin, les modalités de sortie de l’investissement. L’objectif annoncé est de déceler les forces et les faiblesses du régime actuel du droit OHADA à l’épreuve des exigences du capital-investissement / In the last decade, the OHADA countries have seen a significant increase in private equity transactions. The OHADA region’s economic outlook, relative political stability and projected population growth make the region of prime interest to investment funds due to tremendous growth and investment opportunities. This new dynamic makes it important to consider OHADA law’s ability to meet the legal requirements of private equity funds in structuring and conducting their operations.This thesis (i) analyses the main legal issues for private equity under OHADA law and (ii) compares the handling of such issues under OHADA law with their handling under French law. As such, this thesis addresses the legal instruments for taking ownership interests, management rules for target companies (including shareholder agreements), and exit strategies. The objective of such analysis is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current OHADA law regime from a private equity perspective

Submitted by Alexandra Cisotto Belline (alexandrabelline@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-14T19:42:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 14 06 2016.pdf: 8341218 bytes, checksum: 387a098a147e1b777b282c181b5bbe1c (MD5) / Rejected by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br), reason: Seu trabalho foi rejeitado devendo fazer alterações on 2016-06-14T20:01:27Z (GMT) / Submitted by Alexandra Cisotto Belline (alexandrabelline@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-15T19:08:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 14 06 2016.pdf: 8341218 bytes, checksum: 387a098a147e1b777b282c181b5bbe1c (MD5) / Rejected by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br), reason: Trabalho rejeitado. on 2016-06-15T19:24:58Z (GMT) / Submitted by Alexandra Cisotto Belline (alexandrabelline@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-15T21:22:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 15 06 2016.pdf: 8349846 bytes, checksum: 06c7baecfb96c1fde4d0888192b79639 (MD5) / Rejected by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br), reason: Trabalho rejeitado. Arrumar a numeração das páginas, conforme informado por telefone. Att. on 2016-06-15T21:51:14Z (GMT) / Submitted by Alexandra Cisotto Belline (alexandrabelline@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-06-15T22:46:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 15 06 2016 V2.pdf: 8347795 bytes, checksum: 78b9bb6d1a74cee3c4b50a58f24ea70e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-06-15T22:58:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 15 06 2016 V2.pdf: 8347795 bytes, checksum: 78b9bb6d1a74cee3c4b50a58f24ea70e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-16T12:16:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Alexandra Versão Entregue 15 06 2016 V2.pdf: 8347795 bytes, checksum: 78b9bb6d1a74cee3c4b50a58f24ea70e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-09 / Since the mid-1990s the Brazilian business environment has experienced a significant increase in the sophistication of modeling corporate structures for large enterprises, a type of knowledge, however, mostly restricted to participants in these ventures and its legal and financial counsel. In the case of the corporate structure of Brazil Telecom, however, it was possible to access all documents and information in order to study this structure, due to the massive litigation involving this company for almost ten years , where most part of the documents analyzed in this dissertation were found. This material is precious because the case of Brazil Telecom - known as one of the major in Brazilian corporate law - has a very important peculiarity: the group was managed by a minority shareholder, Opportunity group, which exercised power control during those ten years, despite its diminished equity interest and strong opposition suffered from major shareholders for most of the time in which that power was exercised. The aim of this study is to reveal the legal techniques that allowed the exercise of this power, as well as to seek to understand why, in spite of so much opposition from other shareholders and the massive litigation, it took years for the Opportunity to be definitely removed from the administration and the exercise of controlling power of Brazil Telecom. / Desde meados dos anos 1990 o ambiente de negócios brasileiro tem passado por um relevante incremento na sofisticação da modelagem de estruturas societárias para grandes empreendimentos, um tipo de conhecimento que, porém, fica na maior parte restrito aos participantes desses empreendimentos e seus assessores jurídicos e financeiros. No caso da estruturação societária da Brasil Telecom, entretanto, foi possível ter acesso a todos os documentos e informações necessários ao estudo dessa estrutura, devido à enorme quantidade de litígios judiciais em que essa companhia esteve envolvida por quase dez anos, nos quais se pode obter a maior parte dos documentos analisados neste trabalho. Esse material é precioso, pois o caso da Brasil Telecom, conhecido como um dos maiores do direito societário brasileiro, tem uma peculiaridade muito importante: o grupo era gerido por um acionista minoritário, o grupo Opportunity, que exerceu poder de controle durante esses dez anos, apesar de sua diminuta participação societária e da forte oposição que sofreu dos acionistas majoritários por quase todo o tempo em que exerceu esse poder. O objetivo desse trabalho é revelar as técnicas jurídicas que permitiram o exercício desse poder, bem como buscar entender por que, apesar de tanta oposição dos demais acionistas e da enorme litigiosidade, anos transcorreram até que o Opportunity fosse definitivamente afastado da administração e do exercício do poder de controle da Brasil Telecom.

Toute législation en matière économique se doit d’être souple et adaptée àl’évolution du monde des affaires. Le droit des sociétés OHADA, de même que celui français,n’échappe pas à ce principe. Très rigide à l’origine, et caractérisé par un ordre publicomniprésent, le droit des sociétés commerciales OHADA est gagné par le mouvement decontractualisation des sociétés, apparu en France depuis les années 1990. Le droit des contratss’est avéré un excellent moyen pour les praticiens d’apporter de la flexibilité au droit dessociétés. Les aménagements conventionnels, ou conventions sociétaires ou encore pactesd’actionnaires permettront aux associés d’adapter les règles légales sociétaires aux besoins deleurs activités économiques. Cession de titres sociaux, droit de vote, pouvoir de représentationdans la société, règlement des différends sont autant de domaines où se manifeste la libertécontractuelle des associés. Au-delà du caractère rigide du droit des sociétés français etOHADA, cette étude permet de rendre compte de l’importance de ces espaces de liberté dontdisposent les associés. Ces pactes d’actionnaires, statutaires ou extrastatutaires, devront êtreencadrés par des critères précis de validité. Aussi, l’efficacité de ces aménagements dépendraen grande partie de la sanction applicable en cas d’inexécution par une des parties de sesobligations. Le dynamisme de la pratique et de la jurisprudence française permettrad’éprouver les solutions posées par le législateur OHADA en la matière. Cette étude participeainsi de l’élaboration d’un régime juridique adapté, permettant de sécuriser ces aménagementsconventionnels, signe d’une contractualisation du droit des société / Any legislation concerning economic matters is expected to be flexible and adaptedto the evolution of business. Company law in the OHADA (Harmonizing Business Law inAfrica Organization) as well as French company law, cannot be excluded from this principal.Although it was very strict to begin with, and characterized by omnipresent public order,company law in the OHADA was caught up by the contractualization movement whichappeared in France in the 1990s. Contract law turned out to be a perfect means forpractitioners to bring flexibility to company law. Contracting adjustments, companyconventions or even shareholder agreements enable shareholders to adapt their legal companyrules to their economic needs. Transferring titles, voting partners, ensuring the power ofrepresentation inside the company, or settling disagreements, are some examples amongst thevariety of situations where the contracting freedom of partners can be seen. Despite therigorous characteristic of French and OHADA company law, this study puts forward theimportance of spaces of freedom that partners can use. These shareholders agreements, eitherstatutory or extra statutory, will be dependent on precise validity criteria. Consequently, theefficiency of these adjustments will mainly depend on the sanction implemented when one ofthe parties does not execute the required obligation. The strength of both the practice andFrench case law will enable to test the proposals set down by the OHADA legislator.Therefore this study will contribute to the development of an adapted judicial system whichwill permit to secure these contracting agreements, as signs of the contractualization ofcompany law

Ce travail vise à déterminer dans le cadre des sociétés s’introduisant en bourse les facteurs explicatifs de la présence d’engagements contractuels par les principaux actionnaires d’une part et leur impact sur la valeur de la firme d’autre part. Le terme « engagement contractuel » fait référence à deux mécanismes mis en place au moment de l’introduction en bourse : les engagements de conservation d’actions par les dirigeants et les pactes d’actionnaires. Notre étude porte sur un échantillon de 292 entreprises introduites en bourse entre 1996 et 2000 sur le nouveau marché et le second marché de la bourse de Paris. Nos résultats montrent que la présence et la durée des engagements de conservation d’actions des dirigeants servent à signaler la valeur de la firme lorsque l’asymétrie d’information est grande mais aussi à compenser certaines inefficiences du système de gouvernance de l’entreprise. Nous observons également un impact négatif sur la valeur de la firme des engagements de conservation des dirigeants alors que ceux concernant les sociétés de capital risque l’influence positivement. Concernant les pactes d’actionnaires, nos travaux montrent que leur mise en place est d’autant plus probable que les dirigeants anticipent une cession future de l’entreprise. Ils ont par ailleurs une influence positive sur la valeur de la firme tant qu’ils ne protègent pas les signataires d’une prise de contrôle hostile ; dans ce dernier cas l’effet sur la valeur de la firme est négatif. Finalement, nous montrons qu’il existe une réaction négative du cours de bourse autour du jour de l’expiration des engagements de conservation. / Using a sample of IPO firms, we try to figure out what are the factors influencing the adoption of lockups and shareholder agreements and we also try to assess the impact on firm value of these two commitments. Our study is based on a sample of 292 IPOs made between 1996 and 2000 on the French nouveau marché and second marché. We found that the adoption of lockups and their length may serve to alleviate information asymmetry at the IPO time. Our results also give pieces of evidence that this mechanism may compensate for some inefficiencies of the corporate governance setting. We found that lockups undertaken by managers have a negative effect on firm value whereas lockups by venture capital firms have a positive one. With regards to shareholder agreements, our tests show that the probability of adopting such a commitment is positively related to managers’ anticipation of a future sale of the firm. We also found that shareholder agreements have a positive effect on firm value as long as they do not insulate the company from the threat of a hostile takeover. In this latter case, the effect on firm value is negative. Finally, we found a negative return around the day where lockups are released.