Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

Text in Afrikaans / Daar is 'n toenemende bewuswording van die noodsaaklikheid van effektiewe beskerming vir minderhede. Die rede vir hierdie toenemende erkenning aan die behoefte aan minderheidsbeskerming is waarskynlik toe te skryf aan die beset dat dit nie alleen die minderheidsaandeelhouers is wat skade ly in geval van benadelende optrede nie, maar ook die ekonomie. Maatskappye word ingevolge die beginsel van meerderheidsbewind bestuur, met die gevolg dat die minderheid onderworpe is aan die wil van die meerderheid. Die minderheid kan hulself hierdeur in 'n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind, veral indien die meerderheid hul mag aanwend om hul eie belange te bevorder. Gemeenregtelik is die reel in Foss v Harbottle 'n struikelblok vir minderheidsaandeelhouers wat gedingvoering beoog. In 'n poging om die gebrekkige gemeenregtelike beskerming van minderhede te ondervang, is bepaalde statutere maatreels ingevoer. Die evaluasie van hierdie maatreels geskied aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek na verskeie buitelandse stelsels, waarvan die van Nieu-Seeland en Kanada uit staan vanwee die innoverende aard van hul statutere beskermingsmaatreels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die beskerming wat die Suid-Afrikaanse statutere maatreels aan minderhede bied, onbevredigend is om verskeie redes. Eerstens is hierdie maatreels dikwels te eng bewoord wat daartoe lei dat die aanwendingsveld van die maatreels beperk is. Tweedens hou die maatreels nie tred met ontwikkelings elders in die wereld en veranderende omstandighede en behoeftes in die praktyk nie. Derdens ontbreek goed geformuleerde remedies wat aanvullend tot artikel 252 van die Wet sal wees. Daar is verder bevind dat ad hocwysigings van bestaande maatreels nie die gewenste resultaat gaan bereik nie en 'n algehele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg word aanbeveel. Ten slotte word konkrete voorstelle in die vorm van konsepwetgewing gemaak en word vergesel van verduidelikende notas. Hierdie wetgewing is hoofsaaklik aan die hand van die Nieu-Seelandse en Kanadese modelle geformuleer. / There is a growing awareness of the need for effective protection of minority shareholders. This can probably be ascribed to the acknowledgement of the fact that prejudicial conduct harms not only minority shareholders, but also the economy at large. Companies are governed by the principle of majority rule; consequently the minority is subjected to the will of the majority. This often places the minority in an invidious position, especially when the majority use their power to further their own interests. The rule in Foss v Harbottle presents a stumbling block to minority shareholder action. Certain statutory measures have been introduced in an effort to counter defective minority protection. These statutory measures are evaluated in the light of a comparative study of several foreign jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are New Zealand and Canada, because of the innovative nature of the measures which they employ. The conclusion arrived at is that, for various reasons, the protection afforded minorities by the South African statutory measures is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the wording of these measures is narrowly construed; this in turn results in a narrow field of application. Secondly, these measures are not in step with developments elsewhere in the world and with the changing circumstances and needs in practice. Thirdly, well-formulated remedies needed in order to supplement section 252 of the Act are non-existent. It has also been found that ad hoc amendments of existing measures will not achieve the required result, and consequently a complete reform of South African company law is recommended. Finally, specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation are made; these are accompanied by explanatory notes. This draft legislation was formulated primarily along the lines of the New Zealand and Canadian models. / Private Law / LL.D.

Syfte: Avsikten med studien är att undersöka relationen mellan CSR och corporate governance, från teori och praktik.     Metod: Med bakgrund av forskningsfrågorna tillämpas den induktiva vägen eftersom vi ser på praktiken, men tolkar teorin utifrån den teorietiska referensramen tillsammans med empirisk data från två företag som undersökningsobjekt, vilket även leder till abduktion. En kvalitativ datainsamling bestående av främst sekundär-, men även primärdata har även genomförts.   Teori: Utgångspunkten ligger i teorierna CSR och corporate governance. För att öka förståelsen för dessa begrepp har teoriavsnittet utökats med angränsande teorier, som till exempel intressentteorin, legitimitetsteorin och triple bottom line.   Empiri: I empirin presenteras Swedbanks och Sveaskogs perspektiv och arbetssätt med CSR tillsammans med en djupintervju med en respondent från Sveaskog, vilket visar på ett välutvecklat engagemang med CSR där etik och miljö är framstående områden.      Slutsatser: Vår studie visar att det föreligger samband mellan CSR och corporate governance, vilket kan tolkas ur flera olika perspektiv. En av dessa kopplingar återfinns i de två fenomens etiska ansvarstagande, när det gäller integritet i affärer och styrelsers implementering av etiska standards. Sambandet mellan CSR och den svenska koden ligger inte i Kodens riktlinjer, utan i dess syfte och mål.  Andra relationer återfinns i förtroendet och det är inom de båda ägarstrukturerna viktigt att visa upp ett starkt CSR-engagemang, eftersom detta bidrar till att skapa en positiv bild av företaget, stärka varumärket samt ge företaget legitimitet inför sina intressenter. Ett vidare intressentperspektiv är tydligt i statligt ägda bolag på grund av statens ägarpolicy, där CSR är en central del för ett föredömligt agerande. När det gäller börsnoterade bolag kan CSR istället användas som ett medel för att övertyga samhället och kapitalmarknaden om det tagna ansvaret för ökad tilltro. / Purpose: The thesis aspires to explore the relationship between CSR and corporate governance from a theoretical towards an experiential approach.   Methodology: With background of the research questions we applied the inductive approach when it comes to the experiential approach, but since we interpreters the theory on the basis of the theoretical perspectives along with two companies, we also used abduction. We have implemented a qualitative survey which is based on both reports and an interview.   Theoretical perspectives: The theoretical perspectives uses CSR and corporate governance as a starting point and is complemented with other related theories such as the stakeholder theory, the legitimacy theory and triple bottom line.    Empirical foundation: Swedbanks and Sveaskogs perspectives and approaches on their CSR-implementation are presented in the empirical foundation along with an interview with one respondent from Sveaskog.    Conclusions: Our study shows that it exist connections between CSR and corporate governance, which can be interpreted from several different perspectives and a number of conclusions can be made. One of these relationships is found in the ethical responsibility, when concerning the integrity in business and implementation of ethical standards. Other relationships are found in the issue of trust and it is, within both ownership structures, important to present an involvement in CSR. This is because it provides stakeholders with a positive image of the company and its trademark, which leads to legitimacy.  A wider stakeholder perspective is found in State owned companies because of the State's ownership policy where CSR is a central part. When it comes to the listed companies CSR can instead be used as a means in order to convince the society and the capital market about the taken responsibility for increased trust. A final conclusion is that the connection between CSR and the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance can not found within its regulations, but rather in its purpose and aspiration.

Les actionnaires sont au centre du gouvernement des entreprises. Bien qu'une certaine passivité leur soit parfois reprochée, simultanément, des craintes existent qu'une démocratie des actionnaires ne limite excessivement la gestion quotidienne des entreprises. Loin d'être incompatibles, ces deux remarques reflètent la diversité des actionnaires. En pratique, leurs attentes et leur comportement dépendent fortement de deux éléments : la part du capital ou des voix qu'ils détiennent de même que leur identité. Notre recherche porte sur la protection des actionnaires minoritaires dans le cadre d'opérations de prises de contrôle de sociétés publiques. Le sujet soulève une problématique d'une grande actualité dans le contexte canadien, contexte caractérisé par une concentration de l'actionnariat des sociétés publiques. Le sujet fait la conjonction de deux problèmes d'actualité. D'une part, la multiplication des prises de contrôle s'est accrue lors des dernières décennies et ce phénomène semble, plus que jamais, promis à un brillant avenir. D'autre part, le problème de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires se pose de façon toujours plus aiguë, dans le cadre des sociétés par actions de plus en plus importantes où leur rôle tend à s'amenuiser. / Shareholders are at the heart of corporate governance. While some reproach them a certain passivity, others, at the same time, fear that a shareholders' democracy could unduly limit the daily management of corporations. Far from being incompatible, these two statements reveal the wide diversity that surrounds shareholders. In practice, their expectations and their behavior strongly depend on two items: their share in capital or their share of votes, as well as their identity. Our thesis deals with the issue of minority shareholders' protection in the context of takeover operations involving public companies. This topic raises issues of great relevance and is particularly current in the Canadian context that is characterised by a shareholding concentration of public companies. Our topic brings together two current problems. On the one hand, the rise in takeover operations has, in the last decades, been significant and this phenomenon seems, more than ever, to be destined to a very bright future. On the other hand, the issue of minority shareholders' protection also arises, ever so sharply, in the context of growing shareholding companies where shareholders' role seems to be fading.

Le phénomène de concentration du pouvoir entre les mains d'un groupe restreint de dirigeants, la rupture du lien entre le pouvoir décisionnel et le risque capitalistique, ont poussé le législateur à intervenir pour renforcer le contrôle des sociétés anonymes et ce, de manière à permettre un équilibre des forces et donc de faire contre poids au pouvoir de direction. L'exercice du contrôle par les actionnaires est assuré en premier lieu au sein de l'assemblée générale, en délibérant et en votant, dans ladite assemblée. Mais ce contrôle doit poser des règles impératives, dépassant les intérêts catégoriels, et visant la protection de l'intérêt social. Ainsi, le contrôle du bon fonctionnement de la société suppose que les actionnaires possèdent les moyens de contrôler la gestion de la société. Sur ce point, l'information va jouer un rôle très important car elle permet à tous les actionnaires de pouvoir bien exercer ce contrôle. Elle est donc un instrument privilégié de contrôle des dirigeants. Par ailleurs, le conseil d'administration exerce aussi un véritable rôle de contrôle de la direction pour éviter la concentration des pouvoirs; l'émergence du conseil d'administration comme organe de surveillance visant une meilleure séparation des pouvoirs entre la direction et son contrôle. Le législateur a cherché à renforcer le pouvoir de contrôle par un contrôleur légal, le Commissaire aux comptes. Ce contrôle consiste à contrôler la situation comptable et financière de la société. Le commissaire a un devoir de révélation des faits délictueux. Ce contrôle a pour but le bon fonctionnement de la société, et surtout de prévenir les différentes crises qui peuvent toucher la société. / The power concentration phenomenon which is between the hands of a restricted group of leaders, the breach of link between the decisional power and the capitalist risk, have prompted the legislature to intervene to strengthen the control of the public limited companies and to allow a balance of forces and thus to prevent the excessive power practiced by management. The exercise of control by shareholders is first made possible in the chore of the shareholder's general assembly, by deliberation and voting. Yet, this exercise must subject to mandatory rules, beyond the vested interests in order to protect the social interest. Thus, controlling the smooth functioning of company requires that shareholders have the means to control the management of the company. On this point, information will play a very important role because it will allow all shareholders to exercise such control. So, it is a privileged instrument of control of managers. In addition, the board of directors also has a real role in management control to avoid the concentration of power; the emergence of the board of directors as a surveillance organ for better separation of powers between management and control. The legislature has sought to strengthen the power of control by an auditor; the Legal Auditor. This control is to control the accounting and financial situation of the company. The Legal Auditor has a duty of disclosure of offenses. This control is for the advantage of the good functioning of the company, and especially to anticipate crises that can affect that company.

As relações entre investidores e executivos são abordadas pela Teoria da Agência que, entre outras tratativas, afirma que a remuneração executiva é um instrumento que investidores dispõem para controlar as ações de executivos. No entanto, há a assimetria de informações e os executivos possuem maneiras de gerenciar informações contábeis de modo a atingir as metas estabelecidas pelas políticas de remuneração e aumentar a própria riqueza em detrimento do aumento da riqueza do acionista. Neste sentido, esta tese investigou se a informação contábil influencia nos determinantes da remuneração executiva de companhias europeias para o período de 2008 a 2017. Para isto, lançou mão de três artigos independentes que juntos constroem esta tese. O primeiro uma revisão de literatura em que se traçou um retrato temporal, geográfico e temático das publicações acerca do problema de agência. Os dois artigos seguintes são empíricos e abordaram duas vertentes contábeis de suma importância para a sustentação de uma companhia: o resultado e o caixa. O segundo artigo investigou se os pacotes de remuneração executiva sofrem influência da qualidade do resultado e o terceiro artigo investigou acerca da influência do fluxo de caixa operacional sobre a remuneração executiva. A pesquisa utilizou dados secundários, tal que o estudo bibliográfico foi elaborado a partir de um levantamento bibliométrico e os dois trabalhos empíricos foram construídos a partir de dados coletados da base Thomson Reuter/s Eikon©. A técnica estatística aplicada foi a regressão com dados em painel. O estudo bibliométrico indicou uma lacuna no conhecimento preenchida pelos dois artigos empíricos. O primeiro identificou que as companhias não determinam os pacotes de remuneração a partir da qualidade do resultado. O segundo identificou uma bonificação paga ao executivo em função da geração de caixa operacional. A contribuição da tese se dá no alerta aos investidores acerca da determinação das políticas de remuneração executiva a partir de indicadores de desempenho de curto prazo e nenhuma relação destas compensações com indicadores que indicam qualidade da informação contábil e sustentabilidade de resultados no longo prazo / The relationship between investors and executives are addressed by the Agency Theory which, among other subjects, says that the CEO Compensation is an instrument that investors have to control the actions of executives. However, there is the asymmetry of information and executives have ways to manage accounting information to achieve the goals established by the remuneration policies and increase their wealth at the expense of growing shareholder wealth. In this sense, this thesis investigated whether the accounting information can influence the determinants of CEO Compensation of European companies for the period 2008 to 2017. For this, they have resorted to three independent articles that together build this thesis. The first is a literature review in which we drew a picture temporal, geographic and thematic of publications about the problem of agency. The following two articles are empirical and addressed two statements of paramount importance to sustain a company: earnings and cash. The second article investigated whether CEO Compensation packages are influenced by the earnings quality and the third article investigated the influence of cash flow of operating on executive remuneration. The research used secondary data, such that the bibliographic study was prepared from a bibliometric survey and the two empirical studies were constructed from data collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon©, companies established in countries of the European Union, for the period 2008 to 2017. The statistical technique applied was the regression with panel data. The bibliometric study indicated a gap in knowledge filled by two empirical articles. The first identified that companies do not determine remuneration packages from the earnings quality. The second recognized a subsidy paid to the executive in function of the cash flow of operating. The contribution of this thesis is on the alert for investors concerning the determination of CEO Compensation policies from performance indicators of short-term and no relation of these compensations with signs that indicate the quality of accounting information and sustainability of results in the long term

Bakgrund: Världsekonomin har länge präglats av en linjär ekonomi, ett system som inte är hållbart och ett hot mot en framtida stabil ekonomi. Cirkulär ekonomi har lyfts fram som ett mer hållbart alternativ. Företagen är de som behöver vara drivande för att en omställning från linjär ekonomi till cirkulär ekonomi ska vara möjlig och en del företag har redan idag påbörjat detta arbete genom att implementera en cirkulär affärsmodell i sin verksamhet. En del tidigare forskning visar på ekonomiska fördelar för företag som arbetar med cirkulära affärsmodeller, en del visar på ekonomiska nackdelar. Denna studie vill bidra både teoretiskt och praktiskt genom att studera företags drivkrafter till att styra till en cirkulär affärsmodell och därmed undersöka om det finns andra drivkrafter än ekonomisk lönsamhet.  Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka vilka drivkrafter som motiverat företag till att börja arbeta med cirkulär ekonomi. Genom att studera företagens syn på intäkter och kostnader i samband med att ställa om till en cirkulär ekonomi ämnar studien bidra med bättre förståelse för vilken påverkan ekonomisk lönsamhet har på företags beslut om hur verksamheten ska styras. Syftet är även att undersöka om det finns andra drivkrafter än ekonomisk lönsamhet som påverkar motivationen till att styra till en cirkulär affärsmodell. Då studien ämnar bidra med förståelse för vilka drivkrafter företag har haft till att börja arbeta på detta sätt bör studien vara av intresse för de beslutsfattare som verkar för att företag ska styra sin verksamhet till en cirkulär ekonomi. Metod: För att svara på studiens frågeställning och uppfylla syftet har kvalitativ metod använts i form av semistrukturerade intervjuer med företag som påbörjat sitt arbete med en cirkulär affärsmodell. De teorier som används i studien för att analysera den empiri som samlas in är aktieägarteorin, intressentteorin och självbestämmandeteorin. Resultat och slutsats: Resultatet från de företag som deltagit i studien visar att möjlighet till positiv påverkan på intäkter och kostnader på kort sikt inte haft särskilt stor inverkan på beslutet att styra till en cirkulär affärsmodell. En del arbetar med cirkulär ekonomi trots att de i dagsläget ser negativ ekonomisk påverkan av det, att kortsiktigt öka vinsten tycks inte varit vad som motiverat till att styra mot en cirkulär affärsmodell. Det som snarare tycks motivera företagen är att en cirkulär affärsmodell hjälper dem leva upp till svensk lagstiftning och ökade miljökrav, samt att det finns en vilja att minska sin klimatpåverkan. Förutom detta framkommer det att kundernas och marknadens efterfrågan på miljövänliga alternativ är något som i stor utsträckning motiverat företagen att arbeta för en cirkulär ekonomi. Resultatet går till viss del i linje med tidigare forskning. Det som skiljer sig är att lagar och miljökrav samt miljöintresse är mer framträdande än tidigare forskning visat. Det vore därför intressant att i vidare studier undersöka drivkrafter till cirkulära affärsmodeller utifrån institutionell teori. Det vore även intressant att studera skillnader vid en jämförelse mellan små, medelstora och stora företag eller börsnoterade och onoterade företag. / Background: For a long time, the world economy has been built on a linear economy, a system that is not sustainable and a threat to a sustainable future economy. A circular economy has been raised as a more sustainable alternative. It has been brought forward that the firms will have to lead the work towards a circular economy for the transition from a linear economy to a circular economy to be possible, and some firms have already started this work by implementing a circular business model. Some previous studies have shown that a circular business model generates economic benefits, some have shown economic disadvantages. This study aims to give theoretical and practical contributions by studying the drivers that has determined companies to implement a circular business model, and thereby examine if there are other drivers than economic profitability. Purpose: The aim of the study is to explore which drivers have motivated firms to start working towards a circular economy. By studying the firm’s view on revenues and costs in conjunction with their work for a circular economy the study aims to contribute with knowledge regarding to which extent economic profitability has an impact on the decision to change the business model. An additional aim with the study is to explore if there are other drivers that has had an impact on the motivation to direct the business towards a circular business model. Since the study aims to contribute with understanding regarding which drivers that have motivated firms to work this way, the study should be of interest for decision makers who want firms to start working towards a circular economy. Method: To answer the research question, and to achieve the purpose of the study, a qualitative method has been used by conducting semi-structured interviews with firms which are working with a circular business model. The theories that have been used to analyse the empirical data are the shareholder theory, the stakeholder theory and the self-determination theory. Result and conclusion: The result shows that the opportunity to have a positive impact on revenues and costs in the short term has not had an impact on the decision to direct the business towards a circular business model for most of the companies that have been a part of this study. Some of them work toward a circular economy even though it currently has a negative impact on their profit. Economic profitability in the short term does not seem to have been what has motivated them into directing the business towards a circular business model. It seems that they would rather have been motivated to work with a circular business model because they need to follow environmental regulations and live up to certain environmental requirements in procurement, together with a will to lower their impact on the environment. Besides this it appears that the demand for environmentally friendly products from the company's customers and the market in general is something that has motivated the companies to work towards a circular economy. The results comply with earlier studies to some extent. Differences are that drivers in terms of laws and environmental requirement in procurement are mentioned more in this study than in earlier studies. For further studies it would therefore be interesting to study drivers for a circular economy using institutional theory. It would also be interesting to study differences between drivers for small, medium and large companies, or differences between listed and unlisted firms.

A pesquisa procurou levantar a relação entre concentração acionária e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores no Brasil. O universo amostral compreendeu as empresas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa no período de 1997 a 2011. Foram traçados dois objetivos na pesquisa: (i) verificar se empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido apresentam maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que aquelas que não apresentam concentração acionária; e (ii) verificar entre as empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido se maior participação no controle gera maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros. O suporte teórico do trabalho se deu em estudos sobre estrutura de capital, controle de capital, mercado de crédito e custo de capital de terceiros no Brasil. As variáveis estudadas foram o percentual de ações ON pelos principais acionistas e o custo da dívida medido pelo Ki. Os procedimentos estatísticos se deram pelos testes não paramétricos U de Man-Whitney e Kruskal-Wallis com comparações múltiplas entre grupos. A primeira resposta apresentou indícios, com significância estatística de 5%, que empresas com controle acionário definido tendem a apresentar maior risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros do que as demais. Entretanto, quando o controle é exercido por um único acionista que possui 50% ou mais das ações com direito a voto, as empresas tendem a apresentar menor risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que as demais. A segunda resposta encontrada, também com significância estatística de 5%, apontou que, em empresas com a presença de um único acionista na posse de 50% ou mais das ações ON, à medida que esse principal acionista aumenta a participação no controle, o custo da dívida, variável explicativa de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros, tende a diminuir. Portanto, acredita-se que o presente estudo cumpre a proposta de investigação apresentada ao não encontrar evidências que permitam descartar a ideia de que existe relação entre controle acionário definido e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores.Palavras-chave: Apreçamento de opções, Modelo HJM Gaussiano, Regressão não paramétrica. / The survey tried to raise the relationship between ownership concentration and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth in Brazil. The sample universe consisted of publicly traded companies listed on Bovespa in the period 1997-2011. Two main objectives were outlined: (i) verify if companies with the presence of defined shareholder control have a higher perception of risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than those who do not have shareholder control, and (ii) check between companies with defined shareholder control set if greater participation in the control creates higher perception of risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth. The theoretical basis of the work was in studies on capital structure, capital controls, credit market and cost of third party capital in Brazil. The variables studied were the percentage of ON shares by principal shareholders and the cost of debt measured by Ki. Statistical procedures were given by nonparametric tests U of Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis with multiple comparisons between groups. The first response, with statistical significance of 5%, showed that companies with defined shareholder control set tend to have a higher risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth than others. However, when the control is exercised by a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of voting shares, companies tend to have lower risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than others. The second one, also with a statistical significance of 5%, pointed out that in companies with a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of ON shares, as this principal shareholder increases his participation in the control, the cost of debt, explanatory variable risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth, tends to decrease. Therefore, it is believed that this study fulfils the investigation proposal presented to find no evidence to discard the idea that there is a relationship between defined shareholder control and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth.

A pesquisa procurou levantar a relação entre concentração acionária e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores no Brasil. O universo amostral compreendeu as empresas de capital aberto listadas na Bovespa no período de 1997 a 2011. Foram traçados dois objetivos na pesquisa: (i) verificar se empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido apresentam maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que aquelas que não apresentam concentração acionária; e (ii) verificar entre as empresas com a presença de controle acionário definido se maior participação no controle gera maior percepção de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros. O suporte teórico do trabalho se deu em estudos sobre estrutura de capital, controle de capital, mercado de crédito e custo de capital de terceiros no Brasil. As variáveis estudadas foram o percentual de ações ON pelos principais acionistas e o custo da dívida medido pelo Ki. Os procedimentos estatísticos se deram pelos testes não paramétricos U de Man-Whitney e Kruskal-Wallis com comparações múltiplas entre grupos. A primeira resposta apresentou indícios, com significância estatística de 5%, que empresas com controle acionário definido tendem a apresentar maior risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros do que as demais. Entretanto, quando o controle é exercido por um único acionista que possui 50% ou mais das ações com direito a voto, as empresas tendem a apresentar menor risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores do que as demais. A segunda resposta encontrada, também com significância estatística de 5%, apontou que, em empresas com a presença de um único acionista na posse de 50% ou mais das ações ON, à medida que esse principal acionista aumenta a participação no controle, o custo da dívida, variável explicativa de risco de expropriação de riqueza de terceiros, tende a diminuir. Portanto, acredita-se que o presente estudo cumpre a proposta de investigação apresentada ao não encontrar evidências que permitam descartar a ideia de que existe relação entre controle acionário definido e risco de expropriação de riqueza dos credores.Palavras-chave: Apreçamento de opções, Modelo HJM Gaussiano, Regressão não paramétrica. / The survey tried to raise the relationship between ownership concentration and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth in Brazil. The sample universe consisted of publicly traded companies listed on Bovespa in the period 1997-2011. Two main objectives were outlined: (i) verify if companies with the presence of defined shareholder control have a higher perception of risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than those who do not have shareholder control, and (ii) check between companies with defined shareholder control set if greater participation in the control creates higher perception of risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth. The theoretical basis of the work was in studies on capital structure, capital controls, credit market and cost of third party capital in Brazil. The variables studied were the percentage of ON shares by principal shareholders and the cost of debt measured by Ki. Statistical procedures were given by nonparametric tests U of Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis with multiple comparisons between groups. The first response, with statistical significance of 5%, showed that companies with defined shareholder control set tend to have a higher risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth than others. However, when the control is exercised by a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of voting shares, companies tend to have lower risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth than others. The second one, also with a statistical significance of 5%, pointed out that in companies with a single shareholder who holds 50% or more of ON shares, as this principal shareholder increases his participation in the control, the cost of debt, explanatory variable risk of expropriation of third parties\' wealth, tends to decrease. Therefore, it is believed that this study fulfils the investigation proposal presented to find no evidence to discard the idea that there is a relationship between defined shareholder control and risk of expropriation of creditors\' wealth.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:45:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Fernando da Silva.pdf: 1204358 bytes, checksum: af6d5edea1d708cb854beda7241a491c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-26 / The segment of vehicles rental is characterized as an industry that requires intensive, long-term capital for the financing of the renewal of its fleet and implementation of growth strategies. Going public is a good alternative of access to one s own capital, once the funding cost should be lower, in theory. The adoption of this financing strategy depends on principles and good corporate governance practices that are necessary for entering in the differentiated segments of corporate governance of Bovespa (São Paulo State Stock Exchange). The globalization of the markets is compelling companies to focus their attention on the management based on performance measures to check if the company and its administrators are creating value for the shareholders. In a world with fast changes, where the search for results is constant, the aggregated value aspect has been more and more questioned and debated at companies. This dissertation's purpose is to determine if a Brazilian company within the vehicles rental going public can generate value to its shareholders and increase its wealth. In order to do that, this work studied and presented results on the following aspects: the first one, a research on the vehicles rental sector in Brazil, checking, among other items, the scenery, its indicators and perspectives for 2007; the second, a determination of the history of the company Localiza Rent a Car, case study object, presenting its governance model, mapping the best corporate governance practices recommended by IBGC and by CVM in order to check the adhesion level; third, an analysis of the results disclosed by Localiza before and after OPA; and, finally, an analysis of the capital cost and the EVA® , checking if the cost of source of funds diminished and if value was generated to the shareholders after going public. Through the results obtained, we can affirm that, after OPA, Localiza generated value to its shareholders and increased its wealth, and the cost of source of founds also diminished; however, we cannot attribute this growth only to going public, because of the diversity of variables that impact the segment of vehicles rental / O segmento de locação de veículos caracteriza-se como uma indústria que requer capital intensivo de longo prazo para financiamento da renovação de sua frota e implementação de estratégias de crescimento. A abertura de capital em bolsa de valores apresenta-se como uma boa alternativa de acesso a capital próprio, uma vez que o custo de captação em tese deveria ser menor. A adoção dessa estratégia de financiamento depende de princípios e boas práticas de governança corporativa necessários para o ingresso nos segmentos diferenciados de governança corporativa da Bovespa. A globalização dos mercados está obrigando as empresas a focarem sua atenção para a gestão baseada em medidas de desempenho para verificar se a empresa e seus administradores estão criando valor para os acionistas. Num mundo de rápidas mudanças, onde a busca por resultados é uma constante, o aspecto valor agregado tem sido cada vez mais questionado e discutido nas empresas. A presente dissertação teve por objetivo verificar se a abertura de capital de uma empresa brasileira do segmento de locação de veículos pode gerar valor aos seus acionistas e aumentar suas riquezas. Para tanto este trabalho estudou e apresentou resultados sobre os seguintes aspectos: o primeiro, uma pesquisa sobre o setor de locação de veículos no Brasil, verificando, entre outros itens, o cenário, seus indicadores e perspectivas para 2007; o segundo, um levantamento da história da empresa Localiza Rent a Car, objeto do estudo de caso, apresentando seu modelo de governança, mapeando as melhores práticas de governança corporativa recomendadas pelo IBGC e pela CVM para verificar seu nível de adesão; em terceiro, uma análise dos resultados divulgados pela Localiza antes e após a OPA; e em quarto e último, uma análise do custo de capital e do EVA® , verificando se o custo de captação de recursos diminuiu e se foi gerado valor para seus acionistas após a abertura de capital. Através dos resultados obtidos podemos afirmar que após a OPA a Localiza gerou valor para os seus acionistas e aumentou suas riquezas, além do custo de captação de recursos ter diminuído, entretanto, não podemos atribuir este crescimento somente a sua abertura de capital, devido à diversidade de variáveis que atingem o setor de locação de veículos