Zugleich: Diss. Regensburg, 2008. / Literaturverz.

Zugleich: Diss. Wirtschaftswiss. Zürich. / Literaturverz.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser l’existence de spécificités dans l’utilisation par les banques de la politique de dividende comme moyen de résolution des conflits d’intérêts. Il s’agit également de s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation visant à imposer aux firmes le versement de dividendes, dans une perspective d’amélioration de la qualité de la gouvernance. Le premier chapitre analyse l’influence de deux conflits majeurs, dirigeants vs actionnaires et actionnaires vs créanciers. Il montre que les banques prennent en compte les deux types de conflits, la résolution des conflits entre actionnaires et dirigeants revêtant toutefois une importance prédominante. Les banques utilisent les dividendes comme un substitut à de faibles degrés de protection des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers. Le second chapitre explore ces conflits d’intérêt plus avant en analysant l’impact de la concentration de l’actionnariat et du degré d’opacité des banques. Que l’actionnariat soit dispersé ou concentré, un plus fort degré d’opacité favorise les comportements d’expropriation par les insiders (dirigeants ou actionnaires majoritaire) et conduit à des dividendes plus faibles. Un environnement institutionnel plus protecteur des droits des actionnaires ou un régime de supervision strict permettent de limiter l’expropriation. Une réglementation limitant le versement de dividendes, telle que définit dans Bâle III, pourraient renforcer de tels phénomènes. Le dernier chapitre s’interroge sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation de la politique des dividendes et s’intéresse au cas de l’Indonésie caractérisée un faible taux de versement et un faible degré de protection des actionnaires. En cohérence avec la théorie du cycle de vie, une telle réglementation devrait tenir compte du stade de développement de la firme et contraindre uniquement les firmes ayant atteint un stade de maturité, une réglementation uniforme de la politique de dividende n’étant donc pas souhaitable. / This dissertation aims first to investigate whether banks, which have unique characteristics, use dividends to reduce the agency conflicts between their different stakeholders. Another objective is to investigate if the implementation of a regulation of dividend policy is necessary to oblige firms to pay dividends for good governance purposes. In Chapter 1, we examine if bank managers use dividends to reduce agency cost of equity (managers vs. shareholders) and agency cost of debt (shareholders vs. creditors). We show that bank managers use dividends as substitute to weak legal protection and strike a balance in their dividend policy with however a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt. Chapter 2 further explores if the degree of ownership concentration and the level of asymmetric information (opacity) faced by outsiders influence banks’ dividend payouts. In either concentrated or dispersed ownership structure insiders (managers or majority shareholders) pay lower dividends when the degree of opacity is high. In line with the entrenchment behavior for banks, insiders extract higher levels of private benefits when it might be more difficult to detect such opportunistic behavior. Higher level of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain such behavior. These findings have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel 3 with restrictions on dividend payouts that might reinforce this entrenchment behavior. In the Chapter 3, we investigate if the implementation of a regulation to oblige firms to pay dividends for better governance is desirable. We consider the case of Indonesia, where the regulator plans to implement a mandatory regulation on dividends in a context of declining dividend payments and weak shareholder rights. The findings recommend that firms should only be required to pay dividends when they reach a certain development stage, and action should only be taken against those firms which do not pay dividends, although they should be able to. Overall, dividend policies should not be regulated by one-policy-for-all regulation.

Despite claims made by the UK Government in 2015 that the process of banking reform had come to an end, the debate about how to reform banks very much continues. There is now an increasing willingness to question both whether banks should be owned by, and run for, their shareholders, and whether the role they play in creating and allocating credit can safely be left to be determined solely by private interests. Where banking reform goes from here is not entirely certain. It could even be said to have reached something of a fork in the road. The obvious way open to us is to continue down the path forged by the neoliberal agenda, trusting market forces to determine credit-creation and allocation, and continuing to champion the banking sector as a sort of national treasure to be preserved in its own right. An alternative course could be to more radically control what banks do, to have more of a say about what activities they should finance more or less generously and to treat the sector not as an end in itself, but more as a means, an essential engine for economic growth which needs to be more carefully controlled and driven. Whichever way we go from here, the question of 'ownership' and whether it needs to be reformed remains relevant. Indeed, it is doubtful whether banks can really be trusted to behave themselves and to serve our interests if the requirement to maximise shareholder returns provides conflicting incentives for them to be reckless, self-serving and exploitative. Ultimately, how important the issue of ownership is depends upon how far the way banks are owned drives them to misbehave. This thesis seeks to explore that relationship and its relevance to banking reform. It does so by looking at how pressures arising from the way banks are owned encourage bad strategic decisions and bad behaviours in a number of UK banks. It conducts case studies of two stakeholder-owned banks and two shareholder-owned banks, and analyses a body of evidence which tends very strongly to suggest that the way banks are owned is indeed liable to contribute towards the adoption of unsafe strategies, and bad behaviours. The thesis proceeds to argue that we still need to tackle this 'ownership' problem which continues to drive much of the dysfunctionality in banking. Fixing 'ownership' will not necessarily ensure that credit is created in sensible quantities and allocated in sensible ways where needed in the economy, and it will not be the only reform needed to discourage bad behaviour. It is however a necessary reform, and one which still needs to be made. The entire notion that banks are owned by and should be run for their shareholders needs radically to be reigned in, and we need to be far more experimental and creative in exploring ways of making banks act more like stewards or trustees administering other people's assets - and in safe and productive ways which are in fitting with the interests of the state, its citizens and tax-payers. This thesis explores ways of doing that by making banks more 'ownerless', including creating any National Investment Bank, such as that recently proposed by the Labour Party, as a truly 'ownerless' institution.

Les opérations de leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) suscitent de nombreux questionnements quant à leur rôle dans le financement des entreprises. Les risques endogènes et le développement récent de cette forme d’acquisition révèlent que les LBO constituent non seulement un enjeu théorique et empirique mais également sociétal. L’objectif de cette thèse, qui s’empare de ces trois enjeux, est une analyse de la nature des LBO, des déterminants institutionnels de son développement et de ses effets pour les entreprises et leurs acteurs. La genèse des LBO participe d’un processus de transformation du capitalisme et d’un renouveau théorique sur la nature de la firme et des intérêts qu’elle est supposée servir. Elle nous conduit à définir les LBO, qui véhiculent une conception actionnariale de la nature de la firme, comme une manifestation du processus de financiarisation. Cette hypothèse est alors appréhendée à deux niveaux distincts. L’analyse macroéconomique se focalise sur le développement des LBO en Europe, elle met en évidence que l’essor des LBO permet de caractériser les transformations hétérogènes des modèles de capitalisme. L’analyse microéconomique se centre sur les effets de cette forme d’acquisition sur la performance, l’emploi et la défaillance des entreprises européennes. Il en ressort que les conséquences des opérations des LBO sont contrastées, de sorte qu’il n’est possible ni d’inférer des conclusions de portée générale quant aux effets positifs de cette forme d’acquisition ni de considérer que le développement de la pratique des LBO est souhaitable. / Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) operations provoke a number of inquiries for their role in the finance of firms. The recent development of this form of acquisition and endogenous risks associated with it reveal that LBOs constitute not only a theoretical and an empirical but also a social issue. Based on these three issues, the aim of this study is to analyze the nature of LBO, institutional determinants of its development and its effects on firms and their actors. The origin of LBO pertains to the transformation of capitalism and a revival of the theory on the nature of firm and its beneficiaries. Such a reference leads to define LBO as an expression of financialization which conveys to a shareholding conception of the nature of the firm. This hypothesis can then be grasped at two different levels. The macroeconomic analysis focused on the development of LBO in Europe provides evidence that the rise of LBO allows to define the transformations of the heterogeneous models of capitalism. On the other hand, the microeconomic analysis centered on the effects of this form of acquisition on the performance, employment and failure of European firms shows the contrasting features of the consequences of LBO operations that neither to draw general conclusions for positive effects of this form of acquisition nor to consider the development of the LBO is desirable.

Submitted by Vitor Frango (vitorpollo@yahoo.com.br) on 2014-03-10T14:51:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by JOANA MARTORINI (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2014-03-10T14:58:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-03-10T15:43:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Vitor Frango.pdf: 552731 bytes, checksum: be98ecc9e672434717e644336c1c4c32 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-30 / This study aims to estimate the control premium in the Brazilian stock market, based on the price differential between classes of stocks with different voting rights. In Brazil for the period from 01/07/2003 to 28/06/2013 the average control premium is positive, a result that differs from those found in previous studies, where the control premium is negative. This paper investigates the determinants that imply this voting shares valuation relative to the non-voting share. Particularly, the paper analyzes the impact of the liquidity, dividends differential, the negative impact of the extension of the right of the Tag Along for non-voting shares, the negative impact of ADR companies, a negative impact when firms are classified with upper level corporate governance in BMF&Bovespa. Finally, the positive impact when the major shareholder holding more than 50% of the voting shares and government holding more than 20% of voting shares. / Este trabalho visa estimar o prêmio por controle no mercado acionário brasileiro, com base no diferencial de preços entre espécies de ações com direitos diferenciados de voto. No Brasil para o período de 01/07/2003 a 28/06/2013 a média do prêmio por controle foi positivo, resultado que difere dos encontrados em estudos anteriores, onde o prêmio por controle é negativo. Este trabalho investiga os determinantes que implicam na valorização da ação ordinária em relação à ação preferencial. Em particular, o trabalho analisa os impactos da liquidez, do diferencial dos dividendos, o impacto negativo da extensão do direito do Tag Along para ações preferenciais, o impacto negativo das empresas que possuem ADR, impacto negativo quando a empresas está classificada com nível superior de governança corporativo da BMF&Bovespa e pro fim, o impacto positivo para quando o acionista majoritário detêm mais de 50% das ações ordinárias e da participação do governo nas empresas que possui 20% das ações ordinárias.

Submitted by Amelie Pedersen (ameliepedersen22@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-09T20:36:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Luiza Holme (ana.holme@fgv.br) on 2016-05-10T12:25:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-10T12:29:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Amelie Pedersen - The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of State-owned Companies - Case of Petrobras Brasil 14-04-2016 VF.pdf: 1430141 bytes, checksum: 82b174df20d7a214894eb1544bfc9f55 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-14 / State-owned companies are often considered as crucial components of a country’s economy. They are responsible for the creation of numerous jobs and are often providing essential services that require heavy capital investment. However, in countries with weak institutions where the accountability of politicians is poor and the management of SOEs’ financial resources undergo little control, officials are often inclined towards corruption. Huge amounts of public funds are easily diverted, and money which should have been invested in capital expenditure, in paying back company debt or in increasing shareholder return, are used to increase private patrimony or illegally fund political parties. Company performance suffers from such divestments as parts of the company’s profits are not reinvested in the company and as managers’ incentives are unaligned with shareholder interests. Petrobras, Latin America’s biggest company in terms of assets and annual revenues, suffered in 2014 and 2015 from an immense corruption scandal the economic impact of which is considerable, as investor confidence in Brazil weakened following the event. The scandal exposed an extensive corruption scheme through which contractors were colluding to increase prices of construction contracts, with the approval of Petrobras’ management who required in return either personal gains or funds for the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The exposure of the scandal in the Brazilian press has had a great impact on Petrobras’ credibility as a firm: the company’s accounts were hiding immense irregularities as it had been paying too much for construction contracts which weren’t priced at market value. Throughout this paper, we will use the example of Petrobras to illustrate how corruption within State-Owned companies undermines company’s performance and how it impacts the company’s various stakeholders. / As empresas estatais são freqüentemente consideradas como componentes cruciais da economia de um país. Eles são responsáveis pela criação de vários postos de trabalho e proveem serviços essenciais que exigem um grande investimento de capital. Porém, em países com instituições fracas, onde a responsabilidade dos políticos é limitada e a gestão dos recursos financeiros das empresas estatais sofre pouco controle, os funcionários são muitas vezes tentados pela corrupção. Enormes quantidades de fundos públicos são facilmente desviados, e dinheiro que deveria ter sido investido nas despesas de capital, no pagamento de dívida da empresa ou no aumento do retorno para os acionistas, é usado para aumentar a riqueza privada de indivíduos ou para financiar ilegalmente partidos políticos. O desempenho da empresa sofre com essas alienações visto que parte dos lucros da empresa não são reinvestidos na empresa e dado que incentivos dos gestores estão desalinhados com os interesses dos acionistas. Petrobras, a maior empresa da América Latina em termos de ativos e receitas anuais, sofreu em 2014 e 2015 um escândalo de corrupção imenso, cujo impacto económico foi considerável, levando ao enfraquecimento da confiança de muitos investidores no Brasil após o evento. O escândalo expôs um extenso esquema de corrupção através do qual os contratantes foram conspirando para aumentar os preços de contratos de construção, com a aprovação da administração da Petrobras que pediu em troca ganhos pessoais ou fundos para o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). A exposição do escândalo na imprensa brasileira teve um grande impacto sobre a credibilidade da Petrobras: as contas da empresa estavam escondendo imensas irregularidades dado que a empresa tinha pago demais para os contratos de construção que não foram precificados no valor do mercado. Ao longo deste estudo, usamos o exemplo da Petrobras para ilustrar como a corrupção dentro empresas estatais prejudica o desempenho da empresa e como ela afeta as várias partes interessadas da empresa.

Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T16:46:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_final.pdf: 699787 bytes, checksum: 2c7f4669c8ae8ce09d6df21d2d9b8923 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Flávia, Para que possamos dar andamento ao seu trabalho é necessário fazer alguns ajustes. Vou encaminhar para seu e-mail e apos as modificações submete-lo novamente, qualquer duvida estamos a disposição. att, Pâmela Tonsa on 2017-02-06T16:55:35Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T16:56:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_final.pdf: 699787 bytes, checksum: 2c7f4669c8ae8ce09d6df21d2d9b8923 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Segue e-mail com as instruções. on 2017-02-06T17:13:20Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T21:56:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 V_Final_Dissertação.pdf: 663080 bytes, checksum: f0dd7f728566fbdf6508116ee4f3b840 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Bom dia Flávia, Para que possamos aprovar seu trabalho é necessário alguns ajustes conforme norma ABNT/APA. * Conforme a norma é necessário ter AGRADECIMENTO, RESUMO E ABSTRACT deve ser em letra maiúscula. Após os ajustes você deve submete-lo novamente para analise e aprovação. Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição, Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2017-02-07T10:27:49Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Furtado Pessoa de Mendonça (flaviafurtpessoa@gmail.com) on 2017-02-07T11:54:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-02-07T12:20:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-07T17:13:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação 7 fev.pdf: 663438 bytes, checksum: da318f2809429d14d0837b10759e9367 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-20 / A dissertação teve o objetivo de investigar de que forma os Mecanismos Externos de Governança (MEG) impactam a alavancagem da empresa, em uma amostra de 40 países, que engloba um total de 12.968 empresas. O diferencial do estudo está na distinção entre os MEG que afetam a proteção dos acionistas daqueles que afetam os direitos dos credores. Os resultados sugerem que as empresas se alavancam de maneira coerente ao previso pela Teoria da Pecking Order. Observou-se os MEG associados à proteção dos investidores, de fato, influenciam na escolha pela estrutura de capital da empresa. Empresas com alta proteção aos direitos dos acionistas foram, em média, menos alavancadas do que empresas com baixa proteção aos acionistas. Alta proteção dos credores possui impacto positivamente relacionado com a alavancagem, o que sugere que alta proteção aos credores diminuem o custo da dívida e fazem com que as empresas deem preferência a este tipo de financiamento externo. Os resultados se mostraram robustos diante de algumas variações no modelo. / This study aimed to investigate how the External Governance Mechanisms (EGM) impact the company’s leverage, in a sample of 40 countries, including a total of 12,968 companies. The differential of the research lies in the distinction between EGMs that affect the protection of shareholders from those that affect the creditors rights. The results suggest that firms leverage are consistent to what was predicted by the Pecking Order Theory. It was observed that EGMs associated with investor protection do in fact influence the choice of the firm’s capital structure. Companies with high protection of shareholder rights were, on average, less leveraged than companies with low shareholder protection. High creditors protection has a positive impact on leverage, which suggests that high creditors protection reduces the cost of debt and makes companies prefer this type of external financing. The results were robust considering some variations in the model.

Submitted by Luiz Carlos Moura (lcarlos_moura@hotmail.com) on 2017-06-22T12:12:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-07-12T16:46:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-20T20:21:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Luiz Carlos Moura.pdf: 2925493 bytes, checksum: aa0b6504529bc4a71035f39aef7b6b02 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-10 / Research on corporate governance has made a substantial effort to determine its impact on the stock market, albeit little attention has been given to testing the value of distinct listing segments of transparency. Building on the asymmetric information and investor awareness literatures, we test the relative importance of each level of corporate governance in the Brazilian Stock Exchange and how they are perceived among shareholders. Using an event study methodology, we provide clear evidence that investors are willing to reward high levels of transparency, although it is not the smartest investment choice in the short-term as one might expect. Finally, our last analysis explores situations in which the relationship between transparency and the firms’ cumulative abnormal returns can be enhanced. For this purpose, we make use of the Altman Z-score (2000) and present clear reasons of whether and how this strong relationship can be moderated. The results are robust to alternative event windows, different time-periods in the comparison, alternative sets of control variables, and distinct measures of financial health.

Submitted by Roberta Lorenzon (roberta.lorenzon@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T17:43:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100254.pdf: 267421 bytes, checksum: 0f696fc0e74e1f9339d385cfc7e9b03b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia(suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T17:51:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100254.pdf: 267421 bytes, checksum: 0f696fc0e74e1f9339d385cfc7e9b03b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia(suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T17:53:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100254.pdf: 267421 bytes, checksum: 0f696fc0e74e1f9339d385cfc7e9b03b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-10T18:09:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100254.pdf: 267421 bytes, checksum: 0f696fc0e74e1f9339d385cfc7e9b03b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-01-27 / A securitização é uma operação estruturada bastante popular no EUA e que vem crescendo no Brasil. A securitização traz benefícios aos investidores, tomadores de crédito, originadores de recebíveis e a economia como um todo e é vista como fonte alternativa de financiamento dentro da teoria de finanças. Utilizando a técnica do estudo de evento, este artigo testa se o anúncio de que uma empresa listada no Bovespa vai securitizar ativos via FIDC causa algum impacto no preço da ação dessa empresa. Foram testadas 38 emissões de FIDCs realizadas de 2000 a 2008. Os resultados encontrados indicam que tal efeito não ocorre na amostra testada, contrariando resultados de experimentos semelhantes nos EUA. Atribui-se tal resultado ao fato que: i) a securitização ainda é relativamente pouco significativa nas empresas e bancos brasileiros, quando comparada ao mercado americano; ii) a estrutura de garantias que a estrutura do FIDC impõe é considerada um hard credit enhancement, diferentemente do caso americano, onde securitizações podem ser feitas com soft credit enhancements; iii) Por último, devido a restrições legais, os bancos brasileiros não conseguem administrar seu capital regulatório via cessão de recebíveis a FIDCs, estando em posição mais conservadora do que as normas internacionais / Securitization is a very popular structured transaction in the USA and has been growing in Brazil. Securitization creates benefits to investors, receivables originators, borrowers and to economy as a whole and it is seen as an alternative source of funding on current literature. Using an event study technique, this papers tests whether the announcement that a Bovespa listed company will securitize assets using FIDCs causes impact on its stock price. We tested 38 issues made from 2000 to 2008. Results founded shows that this effect doesn’t happen in Brazilian case, in contrast with similar studies in north-american market. The possible reasons for the results are: i) securitization stills very small in Brazilian companies and banks, when matched with securitization in USA; ii) the FIDC credit enhancement structure is considered a hard credit enhancement, in contrast with the north-american case, where securitizations can be done with soft credit enhancements; iii) Finally, due to a more conservative position of Brazilian authorities, Brazilian banks are not allowed to manage its regulatory capital using the FIDCs in contrast with the international standards.