Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2010 / Bibliografia: f.87-89 / A dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer e apontar a fundamentação de uma 'metafísica imanente' como o mais importante dos feitos do filósofo, que através dela efetua o passo considerado como impossível de ser dado por Ka / The dissertation aims to analyze the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and point out the reasons for a immanent metaphysics as the most important feats of the philosopher, which means it performs the step considered impossible to be given by Kant, namely,

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Orientador: Prof. Dr. Antonio Edmilson Paschoal / Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 27/09/2017 / Inclui referências : f. 123-126 / Resumo: Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar como o filósofo Arthur Schopenhauer apresenta a intuição (Anschauung) no contexto do conhecimento, e as diferentes formas que tal termo assume em seu pensamento único, a saber, intuição empírica/intelectual e intuição estética ou pura, para então compreender se é possível uma aproximação maior entre elas. Para tal, serão consideradas principalmente as obras O mundo como vontade e representação (tomo I e tomo II), Sobre a quádrupla raiz do princípio de razão suficiente e Metafísica do Belo, nas quais se encontra o cerne da sua filosofia, olhada a partir do viés do conhecimento, seja ele submetido ao princípio de razão e suas formas, ou independente de tal princípio. Em um primeiro momento, será apresentada a teoria do conhecimento de Schopenhauer, com o intuito de apresentar a intuição empírica, assim como tudo que está pressuposto a ela, o que se sucede dela, e sua importância no que diz respeito à representação do mundo empírico. Em seguida, será demonstrada a estética do filósofo, denominada de metafísica do belo, na qual está descrita uma forma de conhecimento mais essencial e verdadeira que aquela primeira, e o papel da intuição estética nesse processo, como sua condição necessária e suficiente, o que reforçará ainda mais o caráter intuitivista da filosofia schopenhaueriana. Por fim, será feita uma comparação entre essas duas formas de intuição, apontando, a partir de suas semelhanças e diferenças, a possibilidade de uma unidade entre elas. Palavras- chave: intuição, conhecimento, estética, Schopenhauer. / Abstract: This research aims to investigate how the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer presents the intuition (Anschauung) in the context of knowledge, and the different forms that such term takes on his unique thinking, namely, empirical / intellectual intuition and aesthetic or pure intuition, for then understand if a greater approximation between them is possible. For this, will be considered the books The world as will and representation (volume I and volume II), On the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason and Metaphysics of Beauty, in which is founded the crux of his philosophy, looked from the bias of knowledge, whether it be subject to the principle of reason and its forms, or independent of that principle. In the first place, Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge will be presented, with the intention of presenting the empirical intuition, as well as everything that is presupposed to it, what happens to it, and its importance with respect to the representation of the empirical world. Next, the aesthetics of the philosopher, called Metaphysics of beauty, will be demonstrated, in which a form of knowledge, more essential and true, is described, and the role of aesthetic intuition in this process, as its necessary and sufficient condition, what will further strengthen the intuitivist character of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Finally, a comparison will be made between these two forms of intuition, pointing out, from their similarities and differences, the possibility of a unity between them. Keywords: intuition, knowledge, aesthetics, Schopenhauer

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2016-01-26T20:29:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TarcisioAlvesDosSantos_DISSERT.pdf: 990441 bytes, checksum: bc500bc95076ed1f1154ce2b642c9592 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-01-29T21:28:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TarcisioAlvesDosSantos_DISSERT.pdf: 990441 bytes, checksum: bc500bc95076ed1f1154ce2b642c9592 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-29T21:28:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TarcisioAlvesDosSantos_DISSERT.pdf: 990441 bytes, checksum: bc500bc95076ed1f1154ce2b642c9592 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-17 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / O escopo desse trabalho pretende investigar at? que ponto o sentimento da compaix?o ? importante para as fundamenta??es morais. Desse modo, tomaremos como base de an?lise a fundamenta??o moral do fil?sofo Arthur Schopenhauer, em seu ensaio ?Sobre o Fundamento da Moral?, que foi um defensor do sentimento da compaix?o em sua fundamenta??o ?tica. A fim de aprofundarmos as discuss?es sobre a dicotomia do ser humano, que o divide entre raz?o e sensibilidade no campo moral, investigaremos, tamb?m, a cr?tica de Schopenhauer ? moral kantiana, que ? fundamentalmente racional. Entendemos que analisando tanto a sua fundamenta??o moral, quanto sua cr?tica ? moral kantiana, conseguiremos entender o verdadeiro significado do sentimento da compaix?o no campo moral. Sendo assim, acreditamos que se deve levar em considera??o o valor desse sentimento nas fundamenta??es ?ticas. Como proposta, tentaremos uma aproxima??o no que diz respeito ? raz?o e ? sensibilidade no campo moral. / The scope of this study was to investigate to what extent the feeling of compassion is important for the moral reasons. Thus, we will build on the analysis of moral reasoning of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, in his essay ?On The Basis of Morality?, who was a supporter of the feeling of compassion in their ethical reasoning. In order to deepen the discussion on the dichotomy of the human being, that the split between reason and sensibility in the moral field, also investigate Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian moral, which is fundamentally rational. We believe that analyzing both its moral foundation, as his critique of Kantian morality, we can understand the true import of the feeling of compassion in the moral field. Thus, we believe that one must take into account the value of this feeling on ethical grounds. As proposed will try an approach with regard to reason and sensitivity in the moral field.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciada en Filosofía / La filosofía occidental, de profunda raigambre racionalista, nos presenta a la ética como una cuestión exclusivamente humana. De forma transversal y con muy contadas excepciones, la filosofía moral arraigada entre nosotros no ha sido más que un cúmulo de cavilaciones milenarias sobre la libertad, el deber, la virtud o la felicidad del llamado “animal racional”. Con su cenit en la máxima kantiana del imperativo categórico ―rector de la ética― de no tratar jamás al hombre como un medio, sino siempre como un “fin en sí”, hemos sido testigos a lo largo de la tradición filosófica de la exclusividad antropocéntrica de todo pensar la moral, expresión dogmática del engaño de diferencia que repercute en la separación absoluta entre el yo y el no-yo que, según el filósofo alemán A. Schopenhauer ―autor central en nuestra investigación― nace de la pluralidad de nuestro mundo como representación y se alimenta del superficial tratamiento en la filosofía de conceptos clave como los de intelecto y entendimiento, arbitraria y erróneamente censurados en la reflexión que incorpora a los animales no humanos. En orden a superar esta ética restrictiva, Schopenhauer sugiere un cambio de paradigma: la apertura hacia una ética extensionista y esencialista fundada en el reconocimiento de la unidad de la voluntad de vivir, de la cosa en sí como esencia común a todos los seres sintientes, para así de abandonar la artificial excelencia humana y abrazar el reconocimiento del otro en su mismidad, en la absoluta unidad metafísica que tiene como resultado la compasión.

Submitted by isabela.moljf@hotmail.com (isabela.moljf@hotmail.com) on 2017-02-14T14:33:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf: 656586 bytes, checksum: e0b366e2a8fcab968346707f26e21baf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-02-15T13:54:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf: 656586 bytes, checksum: e0b366e2a8fcab968346707f26e21baf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-15T13:54:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lademirrenatopetrich.pdf: 656586 bytes, checksum: e0b366e2a8fcab968346707f26e21baf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-07 / O filósofo alemão Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860) é conhecido por seu acentuado pessimismo. O mundo não é o melhor dos mundos possíveis e a sua não existência é preferível a sua existência. O mundo carrega em sua existência um caráter de culpabilidade. O pessimismo schopenhaueriano não é decorrente da somatória de eventos tristes e dolorosos ou da verificação da ausência de eventos felizes. Ele está alicerçado sobre a sua metafísica. Schopenhauer identifica a essência íntima do mundo – a Vontade – como a raiz de toda dor e sofrimento. A Vontade é a fonte de dores porque ela é querer. O querer da Vontade está lançado ao infinito. Schopenhauer propõe a fuga destes sofrimentos através da libertação proporcionada pelo conhecimento melhor. É esse excedente de conhecimento que capacita o reconhecimento de que toda a natureza partilha da mesma essência. É esse conhecimento que origina a compaixão pela mesma essência sofredora e que capacita a liberdade. O ser humano não mais quer. Ele deliberadamente – partilhando com a Vontade do atributo da liberdade – nega em si mesmo aquilo que a Vontade quer. Ele se resigna. Nesta resignação, ele busca o ascetismo da castidade, da pobreza voluntária e de condições mínimas de existência. É mediante a resignação que ele alcança a bemaventurada paz do nada. / The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 - 1860) is known by his accentuated pessimism. The world is not the best of the possible worlds and his no existence is preferable his existence. The world carries in it existence a guilt character. Schopenhauer's pessimism is not due to the sum of sad and painful events or of the verification of the absence of happy events. It is found on his metaphysics. Schopenhauer identifies the intimate essence of the world – the Will – as a root of every pain and suffering. The Will is the source of pains because it is to want. The want of the Will is thrown to the infinite. Schopenhauer proposes the escape of these sufferings through the suitable liberation by the better knowledge. It is this surplus of knowledge that qualifies the recognition that the whole nature shares of the same essence. It is this knowledge that originates the compassion for the same suffered essence and that qualifies the freedom. The human being no more wants. He deliberately - sharing with the Will of the attribute of freedom - denies in himself that the Will wants. He is resigned. In this resignation, he looks for the asceticism of chastity, the voluntary poverty and of minimum conditions of existence. It is by the resignation that he reaches the blessed peace of anything.

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T12:42:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigues_EliVagnerFrancisco_M.pdf: 4134537 bytes, checksum: 41fc7c4a70c67b1c90f9bbdcde372081 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1999 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / El objetivo de esta tesis es analizar el egoísmo en el ser humano y su posible relación con el daño ambiental, recurriendo para talefecto a la doctrina del filósofo alemán Arthur Schopenhauer.En esta línea de pensamiento, los temas a desarrollar consideran el estudio de la voluntad de vivir en los seres vivos; la subordinación de la razón al nóumeno volente; el egoísmo y la maldad como móviles antimorales y finalmente, el puente hacia el camino de la negación de dicha voluntad a través de una tregua estética y del actuar ético, pasando por la caridad y la compasión como actos de excepción.Esta tesis demostrará cómo el ser humano, estimándose superior a los demás seres vivos por estar dotado de racionalidad, y cediendo a los designios de su voluntad, ha dispuesto arbitraria y descontroladamente de muchas especies de seres vivos, ha alterado gravemente su hábitat y ha puesto en peligro su propia existencia.

Thesis advisor: Marius Stan / This dissertation is about the immortality of the self and whether from a transcendental idealist perspective, one could sustain this notion based on theoretical grounds. It is well known that Kant closed this door in the Critique, and this is the position that Kantian scholars defend. But has Kant set up a series of dogmatic premises that presuppose that we accept conclusions for which Kant offers no argument? Thus, this dissertation aims at a minimal ontology of the human self within an idealist framework. To do this, I turn to Schopenhauer’s ‘perfected system of criticism.’ Without abandoning idealism, Schopenhauer introduces an objective perspective that suggests a more ontological robust understanding of the self. Although Schopenhauer’s position can be interpreted in a way favorable to theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self, his commitment to an identity of brain/mind, and the consequences that he draws from this, obscures some of his most important contributions. To tackle this issue and others, I analyze the Plotinian perspective, a philosophical position that blends epistemology and ontology which I think solidifies my interpretation of Schopenhauer and breaks the supposed identity between brain/mind. Thus, theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self are possible when idealism is an account in which epistemology and ontology intermingle. Specifically, an argument is supported by a premise that is accepted by both Plotinus and Schopenhauer, namely, that of the existence of Ideas, real objects external to the human mind which are responsible for the existence of sensible individuals. These ideas are in themselves unified by a higher principle which Plotinus names the One and Schopenhauer the Thing in Itself. In absolute terms, this ultimate reality is the root of our true self, but we are not identical to it because in human beings there is multiplicity which manifests itself in us by how we cognize things as external to ourselves (understanding) and how we desire things that we do not find within us (will). Chapter 1 opens with a discussion about the ‘true self’ according to Kant. Although this true self could be identified with the pure apperception of the Transcendental Deduction given that Kant argues that it is the source of unity of experience, after examining the different degrees of unity in representations, I conclude that the unifying principle of all sensible experience and the subject itself exist in a non-sensible world. The intelligible character of the Third Antinomy could be that principle, but I reject this in favor of the thing in itself. Nevertheless, the intelligible character’s residence as an individual in the non-sensible world hints at the construction of theoretical arguments for the immortality of the true self. Chapter 2 argues that Schopenhauer also rejects the role assigned to the pure apperception: only the thing in itself is the original source of unity. Schopenhauer accepts the Kantian intelligible character with clear indications that it is an ontologically real entity. The ontological import of the intelligible character reinforces its role in seeking a theoretical argument for the immortality of our true self. I propose that a pathway to a theoretical argument in favor of the immortality of the true self is also suggested in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of Ideas. The subject of cognition, through the alteration of its cognitive faculties in aesthetic contemplation, discovers itself as the correlate of a Pure Subject of Cognition whose objects are Pure Objects or, as Schopenhauer calls them, Ideas. In this alteration, the empirical subject of cognition is ‘elevated’ to the intuitive grasping of Ideas as a Pure Subject. Among Ideas, I argue that Schopenhauer points to something that can be interpreted as an idea of individual. Given the immortal nature of Ideas, we must also be immortal. Chapter 3 focuses on the question about immortality in both Kant and Schopenhauer. On the one hand, I show that Kant has not abandoned the notion of the human soul or its immortality. Instead, he claims to have clarified the origin of all disputes regarding the human soul while laying out the rules for guarding ourselves against future errors. On the other hand, Schopenhauer has no problem accepting that immortality is a fact of common sense, but he rejects that the individual survives. He bases this conclusion on his conviction that individuality emerges with the intellect, while the intellect only emerges with the brain. The subjection of the intellect to the brain is one of the most salient features of Schopenhauerian psychology. However, I propose that Schopenhauer’s objective perspective, a perspective whose implications are hardly at the center of attention in Schopenhauer’s studies, cannot be used to its full potential – as for example to defend that the individual human being is immortal too – unless this identification of intellect and brain is abandoned. To find arguments that can be used to differentiate the mind from the brain, I propose the study of Plotinus. Chapter 4 aims to provide a framework to illuminate the possibilities built into Schopenhauer’s objective perspective. The survey of Plotinus’ philosophy of self and immortality in this chapter suggests interesting starting points for a new interpretation of some of Schopenhauer’s insights. An important consequence of this study is the formulation of arguments to show that the mind or intellect cannot be characterized as identical to the brain. After studying Plotinus, a fact becomes clear, namely, that Schopenhauer, although critical of the concept ‘soul’, does not discard its content; instead, he finds ample use of it for his own unique purposes. Chapter 5 concludes that the discussion of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s psychology reveals the flaw in their respective projects, namely, their demand that cognition of the human soul should mirror cognition of sensible objects. This is a conclusion that is also revealed by the study of Plotinus. However, I reaffirm my position that Schopenhauer’s idealism is a step forward in the right direction. I discuss four ‘great themes’ – born from the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus – which provide the general context that helps me propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self works in transcendental idealism. I argue that these four great themes, areas where ontology and epistemology intersect, refocus not just Schopenhauer’s philosophy by helping us to become aware of the nonverbalized implications of his metaphysics, it even suggests that Plotinus’ metaphysics could benefit from the Schopenhauerian reflection. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

As a writer who composed some of the most formidable American prose of the twentieth century, William Faulkner wrote modernist novels the numerous complexities and ambiguities of which require continued decipherment. Critics have attempted to interpret If I Forget Thee, Jerusalem; Absalom, Absalom!; As I Lay Dying; The Sound and the Fury; and Light in August through various critical approaches, yet none has successfully pinpointed Faulkner's aesthetic philosophy. This dissertation satisfies the critical deficiency by studying Faulkner's work through the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, namely the latter's view of reality as will and representation, or truth and illusive manifestation. Ultimately, this endeavor leads to the discovery that Faulkner used literature to commemorate and immortalize the human spirit in its continual fight to persevere against the constraining nature of causality. Analyzing the themes and formal permutations of each novel, this dissertation notes Faulkner's concern with the spatial and temporal boundaries characteristic of the human condition and the limits they present for Reason and the maintenance of joy. The argument identifies Faulkner's Schopenhauer-esc advocacy for one's temporary denial of the "individual will" or ego in moments of aesthetic transcendence that permit an alleviation of suffering. This previously overlooked connection between Schopenhauer and Faulkner recognizes the author's desire to produce the conditions necessary for the reader to glimpse the universal will in an extension of the present moment. / English