<p>Försvarsmaktsorganisationen har varit i förändring sedan försvarsbeslutet 2004, då Försvarsmakten gick från ett invasionsförsvars till ett rörligt insatsförsvar. Denna nya inriktning innebär att de svenska enheter skall kunna genomföra uppdrag långt ifrån den svenska kusten och infrastruktur, vilket kan medföra en del nya intressanta frågeställningar.</p><p>Ett exempel på en sådan frågeställning är om de svenska enheterna är lämpliga för sådana uppdrag då det gäller att ta hand om och transportera eventuella skadade ombord. Har sjukvårdsorganisationen och Försvarsmakten medel till att transportera och ge adekvat vård vid större krissituationer internationellt?</p><p>Uppsatsen syfte är att genom ett organisationsteoretiskt perspektiv undersöka hur Försvarsmaktens förmåga att ta hand om skadade vid internationella missioner ser ut, samt vilka brister i organisationen som kan påvisas.</p><p>Den metod som har använts är den deskriptiva metoden tillsammans med fallstudier. Det som har studerats är svenska reglementen, doktriner samt den utländska Nato doktrinen <em>AJP 4-10</em>. Fallstudierna har utgjorts av ML 01-02 samt ME 01. Maslows teori om säkerhetsbehov har hela tiden verkat som utgångspunkt vid presenterande av fakta samt assisterande för att besvara frågeställningarna.</p><p>Slutsatsen som har dragits är att svenska enheter inte är direkt anpassade för denna verksamhet. Avsaknaden av egen helikopter är en av orsakerna. En bristande organisation kan ge en försämrad stridsmoral, vilket kan resultera i förödande konsekvenser för hela fartyget.</p> / <p>The Swedish armed forces have been through a big reformation since the Parliamentary Resolution 2004. The Resolutions biggest statement was that the armed forces should change from a invasiondefence to a mobile armed force. This means that Swedish troops and ships are meant to operate far from the Swedish coast line and infrastructure; this can give many new interesting problems.</p><p>One of these problems is if the Swedish units are fit for the missions that they now are entitled to take part in. I particularly if they have the capability to take care of injured personal far from Swedish infrastructure.</p><p>Have the medical organisation and the armed forces the right means to give adequate medical treatment and transportation?</p><p>The methods that the writer has used to solve these questions have been the descriptive method combined whit fall studies on ML 01-02 and ME 01. The literature consists part of reglements, doctrines both Swedish and domestic, in particular the Nato doctrine <em>AJP 4-10</em>. </p><p>The conclusions that have been made are that the Swedish ships are not adjusted for this kind of missions, the abcens of the helicopter capability is one of the arguments for this. The effect of what this can mean for the soldier is a decreased will to fight, which can be drastic for the ship.</p>

<p>In today’s society, serious organizations need protection against both internal and external attacks. There are many different technologies available that organizations can incorporate into their organization in order to enhance security for their networking applications. Unfortunately, security is way to often considered as an afterthought and therefore implemented as an external part of the applications. This is usually performed by introducing general security models and technologies.</p><p>However, an already developed, well structured and considered security approach – with proper implementation of security services and mechanisms – different security models can be used to apply security</p><p>within the security perimeter of an organization. It can range from built into the application to the edge of a private network, e.g. an appliance. No matter the choice, the involved people must possess security expertise to deploy the proposed security models in this paper, that have the soul purpose to secure applications.</p><p>By using the Recommendation X.800 as a comparison framework, the proposed models will be analyzed in detail and evaluated of how they provide the security services concerned in X.800. By reasoning about what security services that ought to be implemented in order to prevent or detect diverse security attacks, the organization needs to carry out a security plan and have a common understanding of the defined security policies.</p><p>An interesting finding during our work was that, using a methodology that leads to low KLOC-values results in high security, though low KLOC-values and high security go hand-in-hand.</p>

During the 19th century the European states experienced a new kind of threat to their existence. The military threats from other countries were now accompanied by civilian threats that inspired mass protest, terrorism and other menaces to the established order. In Sweden, these threats were mainly seen as connected to the rising labor movement and to a growing number of foreign citizens. The aim of the dissertation is to examine surveillance for national security carried out by the Stockholm Criminal Investigation Department and its Police Bureau between 1885 and 1922. Apart from examining what specific surveillance methods that were used, the dissertation gives an answer to the question why the surveillance was carried out, and why it was carried out the way it was. It also discusses how differences and similarities between the surveillance in Sweden and other countries can be explained and how the surveillance between 1885 and 1922 relates to the corresponding activities during the latter part of the 20th century. The main conclusions are that there was a lack of formal rules regulating the surveillance, and that it therefore was based on the following of routines. The bureaucratization process that characterized the period influenced the surveillance, which came to be performed as a bureaucratic machine, characterized by a tendency of expansion. This meant that the surveillance activities were constantly expanded and became more and more extensive. The expansion is connected to the surveillance phenomenon, which could be said to have an unlimited scope. Furthermore, it is suggested that this specific historic legacy has affected the development of Swedish security police activity during the second half of the 20th century.

Il existe une distinction entre les civils et les membres des forces armées. Cette distinction est implicitement la question de fond de cette étude sur la détermination du statut juridique des salariés des sociétés militaires privées (SMP) participant aux conflits armés. Par ailleurs, la défense et la sécurité de l'État sont assurées par divers acteurs de statuts différents qui ont des rôles bien définis par un cadre juridique : les civils et les membres des forces armées. La distinction sus-évoquée ne se limite pas là, mais elle concerne aussi les seuls membres des forces armées car il existe une distinction interne et une autre externe. Tous les membres des forces armées n'ont pas droit au statut de combattant. En revanche, la négation du statut de combattant à certains militaires n'est que relative et elle n'influence pas leur droit au statut de prisonnier de guerre. Ces militaires sont différents des personnes employées en dehors des forces armées et mandatées par leur employeur pour fournir des prestations auprès des armées sur un théâtre d'opérations. Cette utilisation soulève plusieurs questions en DIH. Les SMP fournissent des prestations qui vont de la logistique à la participation directe aux hostilités. Cette participation directe ou indirecte aux hostilités débouche sur une « hémorragie de langage » pour qualifier les salariés des SMP de mercenaires, de nouveaux mercenaires, de « security contractors », des soldats à vendre, des combattants irréguliers, etc. Ainsi, les salariés de ces sociétés exercent-ils une activité de mercenariat ? Leurs sociétés-employeurs constituent-elles des sociétés de secours ? ... / A distinction is made between civilians and military personnel. This distinction is implicit in the substantive issue of this study on determining the legal status of employees of private military companies (PMCs) involved in armed conflicts. Moreover, the defense and State security are provided by various actors of different statuses that have defined roles for a legal framework. Civilians and members of the armed forces are indeed links in this chain. The distinction mentioned over is not confined there, but it is also about the only members of the armed forces because there is a distinction between internal and one external. All members of the armed forces are not entitled to combatant status. However, the denial of combatant status to certain military is only relative and does not affect their right to prisoner of war status. These soldiers are different from those employed outside the armed forces and mandated by their employer to provide benefits to the armies in a theater of operations. This use raises several issues in IHL. PMCs provide services that go from logistics to direct participation in hostilities. This direct or indirect participation in hostilities leads to a “hemorrhage of language” to describe employees of PMCs as mercenaries, new mercenaries, defense and security contractors, soldiers for sale, irregular combatants, etc. Thus, the employees of these companies undertake specific activities of mercenaries? Their companies-employers do they constitute relief societies ? Are they combatants, noncombatants or irregular combatants ? This is so prompt questions that this thesis attempts to answer.

In today’s society, serious organizations need protection against both internal and external attacks. There are many different technologies available that organizations can incorporate into their organization in order to enhance security for their networking applications. Unfortunately, security is way to often considered as an afterthought and therefore implemented as an external part of the applications. This is usually performed by introducing general security models and technologies. However, an already developed, well structured and considered security approach – with proper implementation of security services and mechanisms – different security models can be used to apply security within the security perimeter of an organization. It can range from built into the application to the edge of a private network, e.g. an appliance. No matter the choice, the involved people must possess security expertise to deploy the proposed security models in this paper, that have the soul purpose to secure applications. By using the Recommendation X.800 as a comparison framework, the proposed models will be analyzed in detail and evaluated of how they provide the security services concerned in X.800. By reasoning about what security services that ought to be implemented in order to prevent or detect diverse security attacks, the organization needs to carry out a security plan and have a common understanding of the defined security policies. An interesting finding during our work was that, using a methodology that leads to low KLOC-values results in high security, though low KLOC-values and high security go hand-in-hand.

In my project I addressed the security of the National Park of Šumava in terms of emergencies. The objective of my thesis was to find out how the safety of people is ensured and if the Integrated Rescue System works effectively in case of extraordinary events in this area. When processing my work I have to reach final values upon which I would propose higher efficiency of activities in National Park of Šumava, based on that I processed the model of operating range of Integrated Rescue System units in the National Park. Furthermore, the method by which I came to the result of work consisted of data collection and their evaluation. National Park Šumava is large and rugged territory, and has its own specifics and differences in dealing with emergencies. In my work I have proposed measures to ensure security for the various bodies of the Integrated Rescue System, in terms of different spheres of security. The issue of safety and security of residents and visitors have been partially addressed by the Administration of the National Park Šumava, but the activities of the Integrated Rescue System is currently still not effective. In the proposals I have discussed adding activities in the Integrated Rescue Systems and measures that would from my perspective more effectively improved the quality of Integrated Rescue System activities and thereby to achieve better security of visitors and other people in the park. The results of my work will be used for more effective work of Fire Protection Business Units of National Park and Protected Landscape Area and for suggestions for further changes in security in the National Park.

Governments, military, corporations, financial institutions and others exchange a great deal of confidential information using Internet these days. Protecting such confidential information and ensuring their integrity and origin authenticity are of paramount importance. There exist protocols and solutions at different layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack to address these security requirements. Application level encryption viz. PGP for secure mail transfer, TLS based secure TCP communication, IPSec for providing IP layer security are among these security solutions. Due to scalability, wide acceptance of the IP protocol, and its application independent character, the IPSec protocol has become a standard for providing Internet security. The IPSec provides two protocols namely the Authentication header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Each protocol can operate in two modes, viz. transport and tunnel mode. The AH provides data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and anti replay protection. The ESP provides all the security functionalities of AH along with confidentiality. The IPSec protocols provide end-to-end security for an entire IP datagram or the upper layer protocols of IP payload depending on the mode of operation. However, this end-to-end model of security restricts performance enhancement and security related operations of intermediate networking and security devices, as they can not access or modify transport and upper layer headers and original IP headers in case of tunnel mode. These intermediate devices include routers providing Quality of Service (QoS), TCP Performance Enhancement Proxies (PEP), Application level Proxy devices and packet filtering firewalls. The interoperability problem between IPSec and intermediate devices has been addressed in literature. Transport friendly ESP (TF-ESP), Transport Layer Security (TLS), splitting of single IPSec tunnel into multiple tunnels, Multi Layer IPSec (ML-IPSec) are a few of the proposed solutions. The ML-IPSec protocol solves this interoperability problem without violating the end-to-end security for the data or exposing some important header fields unlike the other solutions. The ML-IPSec uses a multilayer protection model in place of the single end-to-end model. Unlike IPSec where the scope of encryption and authentication applies to the entire IP datagram, this scheme divides the IP datagram into zones. It applies different protection schemes to different zones. When ML-IPSec protects a traffic stream from its source to its destination, it first partitions the IP datagram into zones and applies zone-specific cryptographic protections. During the flow of the ML-IPSec protected datagram through an authorized intermediate gateway, certain type I zones of the datagram may be decrypted and re-encrypted, but the other zones will remain untouched. When the datagram reaches its destination, the ML-IPSec will reconstruct the entire datagram. The ML-IPSec protocol, however suffers from the problem of static configuration of zones and zone specific cryptographic parameters before the commencement of the communication. Static configuration requires a priori knowledge of routing infrastructure and manual configuration of all intermediate nodes. While this may not be an issue in a geo-stationary satellite environment using TCP-PEP, it could pose problems in a mobile or distributed environment, where many stations may be in concurrent use. The ML-IPSec endpoints may not be trusted by all intermediate nodes in a mobile environment for manual configuration without any prior arrangement providing the mutual trust. The static zone boundary of the protocol forces one to ignore the presence of TCP/IP datagrams with variable header lengths (in case of TCP or IP headers with OPTION fields). Thus ML-IPSec will not function correctly if the endpoints change the use of IP or TCP options, especially in case of tunnel mode. The zone mapping proposed in ML-IPSec is static in nature. This forces one to configure the zone mapping before the commencement of the communication. It restricts the protocol from dynamically changing the zone mapping for providing access to intermediate nodes without terminating the existing ML-IPSec communication. The ML-IPSec endpoints can off course, configure the zone mapping with maximum number of zones. This will lead to unnecessary overheads that increase with the number of zones. Again, static zone mapping could pose problems in a mobile or distributed environment, where communication paths may change. Our extension to the ML-IPSec protocol, called Dynamic Multi Layer IPSec (DML-IPSec) proposes a multi layer variant with the capabilities of dynamic zone configuration and sharing of cryptographic parameters between IPSec endpoints and intermediate nodes. It also accommodates IP datagrams with variable length headers. The DML-IPSec protocol redefines some of the IPSec and ML-IPSec fundamentals. It proposes significant modifications to the datagram processing stage of ML-IPSec and proposes a new key sharing protocol to provide the above-mentioned capabilities. The DML-IPSec supports the AH and ESP protocols of the conventional IPSec with some modifications required for providing separate cryptographic protection to different zones of an IP datagram. This extended protocol defines zone as a set of non-overlapping and contiguous partitions of an IP datagram, unlike the case of ML-IPSec where a zone may consist of non-contiguous portions. Every zone is provided with cryptographic protection independent of other zones. The DML-IPSec categorizes zones into two separate types depending on the accessibility requirements at the intermediate nodes. The first type of zone, called type I zone, is defined on headers of IP datagram and is required for examination and modification by intermediate nodes. One type I zone may span over a single header or over a series of contiguous headers of an IP datagram. The second type of zone, called type II zone, is meant for the payload portion and is kept secure between endpoints of IPSec communications. The single type II zone starts immediately after the last type I zone and spans till the end of the IP datagram. If no intermediate processing is required during the entire IPSec session, the single type II zone may cover the whole IP datagram; otherwise the single type II zone follows one or more type I zones of the IP datagram. The DML-IPSec protocol uses a mapping from the octets of the IP datagram to different zones, called zone map for partitioning an IP datagram into zones. The zone map contains logical boundaries for the zones, unlike physical byte specific boundaries of ML-IPSec. The physical boundaries are derived on-the-fly, using either the implicit header lengths or explicit header length fields of the protocol headers. This property of the DML-IPSec zones, enables it to accommodate datagrams with variable header lengths. Another important feature of DML-IPSec zone is that the zone maps need not remain constant through out the entire lifespan of IPSec communication. The key sharing protocol may modify any existing zone map for providing service to some intermediate node. The DML-IPSec also redefines Security Association (SA), a relationship between two endpoints of IPSec communication that describes how the entities will use security services to communicate securely. In the case of DML-IPSec, several intermediate nodes may participate in defining these security protections to the IP datagrams. Moreover, the scope of one particular set of security protection is valid on a single zone only. So a single SA is defined for each zone of an IP datagram. Finally all these individual zonal SA’s are combined to represent the security relationship of the entire IP datagram. The intermediate nodes can have the cryptographic information of the relevant type I zones. The cryptographic information related to the type II zone is, however, hidden from any intermediate node. The key sharing protocol is responsible for selectively sharing this zone information with the intermediate nodes. The DML-IPSec protocol has two basic components. The first one is for processing of datagrams at the endpoints as well as intermediate nodes. The second component is the key sharing protocol. The endpoints of a DML-IPSec communication involves two types of processing. The first one, called Outbound processing, is responsible for generating a DML-IPSec datagram from an IP datagram. It first derives the zone boundaries using the zone map and individual header field lengths. After this partitioning of IP datagram, zone wise encryption is applied (in case of ESP). Finally zone specific authentication trailers are calculated and appended after each zone. The other one, Inbound processing, is responsible for generating the original IP datagram from a DML-IPSec datagram. The first step in the inbound processing, the derivation of zone boundary, is significantly different from that of outbound processing as the length fields of zones remain encrypted. After receiving a DML-IPSec datagram, the receiver starts decrypting type I zones till it decrypts the header length field of the header/s. This is followed by zone-wise authentication verification and zone-wise decryption. The intermediate nodes processes an incoming DML-IPSec datagram depending on the presence of the security parameters for that particular DML-IPSec communication. In the absence of the security parameters, the key sharing protocol gets executed; otherwise, all the incoming DML-IPSec datagrams get partially decrypted according to the security association and zone mapping at the inbound processing module. After the inbound processing, the partially decrypted IP datagram traverses through the networking stack of the intermediate node . Before the IP datagram leaves the intermediate node, it is processed by the outbound module to reconstruct the DML-IPSec datagram. The key sharing protocol for sharing zone related cryptographic information among the intermediate nodes is the other important component of the DML-IPSec protocol. This component is responsible for dynamically enabling intermediate nodes to access zonal information as required for performing specific services relating to quality or security. Whenever a DML-IPSec datagram traverses through an intermediate node, that requires access to some of the type I zones, the inbound security database is searched for cryptographic parameters. If no entry is present in the database, the key sharing protocol is invoked. The very first step in this protocol is a header inaccessible message from the intermediate node to the source of the DML-IPSec datagram. The intermediate node also mentions the protocol headers that it requires to access in the body portion of this message. This first phase of the protocol, called the Zone reorganization phase, is responsible for deciding the zone mapping to provide access to intermediate nodes. If the current zone map can not serve the header request, the DML-IPSec endpoint reorganizes the existing zone map in this phase. The next phase of the protocol, called the Authentication Phase is responsible for verifying the identity of the intermediate node to the source of DML-IPSec session. Upon successful authentication, the third phase, called the Shared secret establishment phase commences. This phase is responsible for the establishment of a temporary shared secret between the source and intermediate nodes. This shared secret is to be used as key for encrypting the actual message transfer of the DML-IPSec security parameters at the next phase of the protocol. The final phase of the protocol, called the Security parameter sharing phase, is solely responsible for actual transfer of the security parameters from the source to the intermediate nodes. This phase is also responsible for updation of security and policy databases of the intermediate nodes. The successful execution of the four phases of the key sharing protocol enables the DML-IPSec protocol to dynamically modify the zone map for providing access to some header portions for intermediate nodes and also to share the necessary cryptographic parameters required for accessing relevant type I zones without disturbing an existing DML-IPSec communication. We have implemented the DML-IPSec for ESP protocol according to the definition of zones along with the key sharing algorithm. RHEL version 4 and Linux kernel version 2.6.23.14 was used for the implementation. We implemented the multi-layer IPSec functionalities inside the native Linux implementation of IPSec protocol. The SA structure was updated to hold necessary SA information for multiple zones instead of single SA of the normal IPSec. The zone mapping for different zones was implemented along with the kernel implementation of SA. The inbound and outbound processing modules of the IPSec endpoints were re-implemented to incorporate multi-layer IPSec capability. We also implemented necessary modules for providing partial IPSec processing capabilities at the intermediate nodes. The key sharing protocol consists of some user space utilities and corresponding kernel space components. We use ICMP protocol for the communications required for the execution of the protocol. At the kernel level, pseudo character device driver was implemented to update the kernel space data structures and necessary modifications were made to relevant kernel space functions. User space utilities and corresponding kernel space interface were provided for updating the security databases. As DML-IPSec ESP uses same Security Policy mechanism as IPSec ESP, existing utilities (viz. setkey) are used for the updation of security policy. However, the configuration of the SA is significantly different as it depends on the DML-IPSec zones. The DML-IPSec ESP implementation uses the existing utilities (setkey and racoon) for configuration of the sole type II zone. The type I zones are configured using the DML-IPSec application. The key sharing protocol also uses this application to reorganize the zone mapping and zone-wise cryptographic parameters. The above feature enables one to use default IPSec mechanism for the configuration of the sole type II zone. For experimental validation of DML-IPSec, we used the testbed as shown in the above figure. An ESP tunnel is configured between the two gateways GW1 and GW2. IN acts as an intermediate node and is installed with several intermediate applications. Clients C11 and C21 are connected to GW1 and GW2 respectively. We carried out detailed experiments for validating our solution w.r.t firewalling service. We used stateful packet filtering using iptables along with string match extension at IN. First, we configured the firewall to allow only FTP communication (using port information of TCP header and IP addresses of Inner IP header ) between C11 and C21. In the second experiment, we configured the firewall to allow only Web connection between C11 and C21 using the Web address of C11 (using HTTP header, port information of TCP header and IP addresses of Inner IP header ). In both experiments, we initiated the FTP and WEB sessions before the execution of the key sharing protocol. The session could not be established as the access to upper layer headers was denied. After the execution of the key sharing protocol, the sessions could be established, showing the availability of protocol headers to the iptables firewall at IN following the successful key sharing. We use record route option of ping program to validate the claim of handling datagrams with variable header lengths. This option of ping program records the IP addresses of all the nodes traversed during a round trip path in the IP OPTION field. As we used ESP in tunnel mode between GW1 and GW2, the IP addresses would be recorded inside the encrypted Inner IP header. We executed ping between C11 and C21 and observed the record route output. Before the execution of the key sharing protocol, the IP addresses of IN were absent in the record route output. After the successful execution of key sharing protocol, the IP addresses for IN were present at the record route output. The DML-IPSec protocol introduces some processing overhead and also increases the datagram size as compared to IPSec and ML-IPSec. It increases the datagram size compared to the standard IPSec. However, this increase in IP datagram size is present in the case of ML-IPSec as well. The increase in IP datagram length depends on the number of zones. As the number of zone increases this overhead also increases. We obtain experimental results about the processing delay introduced by DML-IPSec processing. For this purpose, we executed ping program from C11 to C21 in the test bed setup for the following cases: 1.ML-IPSec with one type I and one type II zone and 2. DML-IPSec with one type I and one type II zone. We observe around 10% increase in RTT in DML-IPSec with two dynamic zones over that of ML-IPSec with two static zones. This overhead is due to on-the-fly derivation of the zone length and related processing. The above experiment analyzes the processing delay at the endpoints without intermediate processing. We also analyzed the effect of intermediate processing due to dynamic zones of DML-IPSec. We used iptables firewall in the above mentioned experiment. The RTT value for DML-IPSec with dynamic zones increases by less than 10% over that of ML-IPSec with static zones. To summarize our work, we have proposed an extension to the multilayer IPSec protocol, called Dynamic Multilayer IPSec (DML-IPSec). It is capable of dynamic modification of zones and sharing of cryptographic parameters between endpoints and intermediate nodes using a key sharing protocol. The DML-IPSec also accommodates datagrams with variable header lengths. The above mentioned features enable any intermediate node to dynamically access required header portions of any DML-IPSec protected datagrams. Consequently they make the DML-IPSec suited for providing IPSec over mobile and distributed networks. We also provide complete implementation of ESP protocol and provide experimental validation of our work. We find that our work provides the dynamic support for QoS and security services without any significant extra overhead compared to that of ML-IPSec. The thesis begins with an introduction to communication security requirements in TCP/IP networks. Chapter 2 provides an overview of communication security protocols at different layers. It also describes the details of IPSec protocol suite. Chapter 3 provides a study on the interoperability issues between IPSec and intermediate devices and discusses about different solutions. Our proposed extension to the ML-IPSec protocol, called Dynamic ML-IPSec(DML-IPSec) is presented in Chapter 4. The design and implementation details of DML-IPSec in Linux environment is presented in Chapter 5. It also provides experimental validation of the protocol. In Chapter 6, we summarize the research work, highlight the contributions of the work and discuss the directions for further research.

This research focusses on crime prevention on farms with Transvaal Sugar Limited as a selected study. The printed media, quantitative and qualitative research principles were used to gather data and to determine to what extend crime is experienced by the respondents. The primary aim of the quantitative research principles is to investigate the nature and extent of crime on the company`s agricultural sites. Existing crime prevention measures on the different agricultural sites are also evaluated and recommendations made where necessary. Interviews with various respondents brought to the fore interesting opinions related to crime based on the empirical-phenomenological method. The support farmers received from the SAPS is discussed in full. The value of the primary physical barriers or obstructions with regard to crime prevention were emphasised in this study. Without the support of conventional electronics, together with the inputs of the human factor, physical crime prevention measures will be of little value, especially on geographical far reached agricultural estates. Farm attacks as a separate phenomenon is part of this study and serves as a comprehensive discussion regarding media reports and previous research on this subject. The ADSC crime prevention model is developed as a result of this study with the aim of contributing to the prevention of crime on farms. Good interpersonal and loyal attitudes are identified as key factors on which the farmers must concentrate in order to prevent crime. / Criminology / D. Litt. et Phil.(Criminology)

This research focusses on crime prevention on farms with Transvaal Sugar Limited as a selected study. The printed media, quantitative and qualitative research principles were used to gather data and to determine to what extend crime is experienced by the respondents. The primary aim of the quantitative research principles is to investigate the nature and extent of crime on the company`s agricultural sites. Existing crime prevention measures on the different agricultural sites are also evaluated and recommendations made where necessary. Interviews with various respondents brought to the fore interesting opinions related to crime based on the empirical-phenomenological method. The support farmers received from the SAPS is discussed in full. The value of the primary physical barriers or obstructions with regard to crime prevention were emphasised in this study. Without the support of conventional electronics, together with the inputs of the human factor, physical crime prevention measures will be of little value, especially on geographical far reached agricultural estates. Farm attacks as a separate phenomenon is part of this study and serves as a comprehensive discussion regarding media reports and previous research on this subject. The ADSC crime prevention model is developed as a result of this study with the aim of contributing to the prevention of crime on farms. Good interpersonal and loyal attitudes are identified as key factors on which the farmers must concentrate in order to prevent crime. / Criminology and Security Science / D. Litt. et Phil.(Criminology)

The private security industry is tasked with protecting lives and property against an evolving array of personal and property threats. Rendering such services comes with many market related challenges for private security providers. These services are rendered to various types of clients like government departments, hospitals, universities and shopping malls amongst others. These clients have unique and different needs and expectations, therefore shopping malls as clients of the private security industry were selected for the purpose of this research. The qualitative research approach was used for this study wherein a questionnaire was used to obtain information from private security and shopping mall personnel working in shopping malls in Gauteng. The findings of this study reveals that there are indeed client retention challenges that are facing private security companies providing services to shopping malls. Based on the findings, recommendations for the private security providers and further research in shopping mall security management are made. / Security Risk Management / M.Tech. (Security Management)