Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda hur rätten till liv har ett samband med tvångsförsvinnande enligt den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter. För att uppnå uppsatsens syfte genomförs en rättsutredning kring gällande rätt, där en rättsdogmatisk metod och fallstudie applicerats. Uppsatsen kommer vidare att analyseras mot bakgrund av en rättsvetenskaplig teori, där relevant rättspraxis som den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter bemött samt en kortfattad genomgång av kontexters påverkan. Under utredningen av de konventionella källorna finns vissa krav för att uppfylla om en stat kan hållas ansvarig. Utifrån det och med de grova mänskliga rättighets kränkningarna staten utfärdat i åtanke, är bevisbördan och statsansvar av stor relevans för att klargöra sambandet mellan rättigheten och handlingen. Uppsatsen avslutas med att konkludera att det råder brister i hur den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter arbetar mot att förvara och skydda Mänskliga Rättigheter i fall som berör tvångsförsvinnande. / The aim of this paper is to evaluate how the right to life has a connection with the forced disappearance of persons, according to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In order to reach this purpose, a legal dogmatic approach and a case study is used, in the light of a legal theory. The research concerns relevant cases that the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has been confronted with, and, to clarify the contextual importance, a brief explanation on the surroundings is provided. With the grave human rights violations committed by State authorities in mind, the thesis shows that the standard of proof, and principle of state responsibility, becomes of importance, in order to be able to determine whether the right to life is violated in cases of forced disappearance. The essay will conclude that the issue prevails defectiveness in relation to preventing and protecting human rights in cases of forced disappearance of persons.

Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, often hired by states to fulfil functions that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. In this context, PMSCs have performed a wide range of activities including offensive combat, prisoner interrogation, military advice and training, armed security, intelligence and logistics. The proliferation of PMSCs during the past two decades has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power in the international arena. Nonetheless, this Thesis argues that the traditional state-centred frameworks of international law remain vitally relevant to the regulation of private security activity in contemporary armed conflict. Three states are in a strong position to influence PMSCs in this context—the state that hires the PMSC, the state in which the company is based or incorporated, and the state in which the company operates—and this capacity for influence enables international law to regulate PMSC activities indirectly using these states as an intermediary. This Thesis critically analyses the pertinent international obligations on these three categories of states and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility in each case. It also examines the recent practice of certain key states in order to evaluate their compliance with these obligations. By providing a clear and in-depth analysis of states' international obligations to control PMSCs in armed conflict, this Thesis may not only facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct; it may also play an important prospective role in setting standards of conduct for states in relation to the private security industry. This in turn may encourage and assist states to develop their domestic laws and policies in order to improve overall PMSC compliance with international law.

So-called obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, including all States, now form part of positive international law. These obligations protect some of the most basic values of present-day international relations. Examples include the obligations not to commit genocide or torture, to uphold the most basic human rights, to respect the self-determination of peoples, and so on. However, there is little agreement as to what these obligations imply, how they have come about, and how to identify them. In the literature, at least, there is widespread agreement that obligations erga omnes are different in essence and in nature from obligations owed by one State to another State, so-called obligations inter partes. In turn, this —alleged— radical conceptual break severs obligations erga omnes from a wealth of norms that exist in present-day, general international law, but whose origins lie farther back in time. This thesis attempts to reconcile obligations erga omnes with obligations arising in classic, general international law. It explores what it means to be owed an obligation and how it came to pass that most obligations were owed inter partes. The particular way in which sovereignty came to be conceived and the furtherance of sovereignty, at the expense of other values, forms the pattern that gave rise to obligations inter partes. But even at that time, exceptions to this pattern existed which brought about obligations analogous to those owed erga omnes today. Relevant state practice will be analysed. If obligations erga omnes could have been created in classic international law, it is unjustified to maintain that obligations erga omnes represent so radical a break with the past. Obligations erga omnes are aggregates of bilateral, primary obligations. From this perspective, it is possible to identify these obligations, their consequences, and to discern their origins.

Almost four decades have passed since the European Court of Human Rights introduced the concept of positive obligations. Positive obligations mean that the member states must take affirmative action in order to secure the rights and freedoms provided for by the European Convention on Human Rights. Since then, the scope of positive obligations has extended tremendously, and today all substantive rights generally contain positive obligations. The reason behind the development is to maintain the full effectiveness of human rights enforcement within the European context, and it has been enabled, inter alia, through dynamic interpretation and because the European Convention on Human Rights is considered a living instrument.  The fact that European companies operating transnationally, i.e. in a non-European context, sometimes through its commercial activities violates human rights has given rise to discussion in legal doctrine on whether the scope of positive obligations should be further extended so that the member states to the European Convention on Human Rights will incur state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial human rights violations. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to examine whether the European Court of Human Rights can and should proceed with such expansion. An expansion creates methodological and technical problems as it challenges the traditional notion of jurisdiction, however, it is not impossible. Whatever the European Court of Human Rights will decide to do, the thesis will provide arguments both for why home state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial activities that violates human rights can and should be imposed, as well for why it is beyond its (the European Court of Human Rights) competence.

Les conditions d'exécution de toute mesure privative de liberté sont déterminantes de son sens et de son efficacité en termes de réinsertion et lutte contre la récidive. La préservation de l'intégrité physique et psychique des personnes détenues constitue un facteur de légitimité indéniable de l'institution carcérale et de son rôle au sein d'une société démocratique. En vertu des articles 2 et 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, qui protègent respectivement le droit à la vie et la prohibition des traitements inhumains et dégradants, la jurisprudence européenne a identifié une pluralité d'obligations mises à la charge des États. Les atteintes portées à l'intégrité des personnes détenues dans le cadre de la détention carcérale peuvent être directement imputable à l'État lorsqu'elles résultent du fonctionnement officiel de l'institution, en particulier des fouilles, des placements à l'isolement, des rotations de sécurité, ou des conditions de détention. Elles peuvent aussi lui être indirectement imputables, lorsque la défaillance étatique a permis ou toléré la réalisation d'un acte particulier violant ces droits absolus protégés. L'élaboration des critères d'imputation à l'État de ces atteintes au droit à l'intégrité des personnes détenues et les limites de la responsabilité étatique sont précisément déterminées par la définition et l'intensité des obligations européennes. Si la Cour de Strasbourg apparaît comme le premier facteur de la mutation du droit pénitentiaire et d'une protection renforcée des droits des personnes incarcérées, les lacunes de sa jurisprudence pourraient avoir des effets contradictoires et faire obstacle à l'élaboration d'une théorie cohérente et systématisée des obligations conventionnelles européennes. / The conditions of enforcement of any custodial measure are crucial for its meaning and effectiveness in tenns of reinsertion and the prevention ofreoffending. The preservation of the prisoners' physical and psychological integrity is a source oflegitimacy for the prison institution and its function in a democratic society. Under articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which are respectively protecting the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, the European Court ofHuman Rights, in its case law, bas identified numerous obligations imposed on Member States. The violations of the prisoners' integrity during custody can be directly imputable to the State when resulting from the official functioning of the institution, especially bodil searches, solitary confinements, security rotations, or conditions of imprisonment. The violations can also be indirectly imputable to the State when its own failure pennitted or tolerated a violation of these absolute rights by a private person. The development of the criteria for violations of prisoners' integrity and the limits of the State responsibility are precisely delineated by the definition and the intensity of European obligations. If the European Court ofHuman Rights appears to be the primary cause of the changing nature of prison and of an increased protection of the prisoners' rights, the loopholes of its case law might have contradictory effects and stand in the way of a coherent theory of the obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

La première étude porte sur les conditions de l’acceptabilité des politiques de l’Etat face aux drogues: 225 sujets tout-venant ont jugé du degré d’acceptabilité dans 28 scénarios issus de la combinaison de trois facteurs: campagnes d’information, demande intérieure en drogue, action de l’État (du laissez-faire à l’interdiction). La seconde étude porte sur les conditions de la responsabilité de l’État dans le cas d’un décès lié à la consommation de substance: 234 sujets ont jugé du degré de responsabilité dans 80 scénarios issus de la combinaison de cinq facteurs: relation consommation/maladie, temps depuis lequel la nocivité est connue, généralité du risque, consommation, action de l’État (du monopole à l’interdiction des ventes). Nos études s’appuient sur une méthode issue de la théorie fonctionnelle de la cognition (Anderson, 1981). La première étude permet d’identifier trois clusters: les régulationnistes (42%), en faveur d’une réglementation totale par l’État, les radicaux (32%), pour qui aucune des politiques n’est acceptable, les prohibitionnistes (26%), en faveur d’une interdiction totale à condition que des campagnes soient menées. La politique du laissez-faire est jugée par tous comme étant la plus inacceptable. La seconde étude fait apparaître trois clusters: un plus au centre (44%), un plus à gauche (38%), un plus à droite (17%). Celui de droite a tendance à attribuer moins de responsabilité à l’État et est plus sensible aux preuves scientifiques. Un consensus montre que l’État se dégage de toute responsabilité seulement s’il interdit totalement les ventes. Dans les autres cas, l'État est perçu comme partiellement responsable quand la santé d'un consommateur se détériore. / Our first study relates to the conditions of perceived acceptability of State policies regarding drugs: 225 randomly selected subjects judged the degree of State policy acceptability in 28 scenarios derived from the combination of three factors: information campaigns, interior drug demand, State policy (from laisser-faire to prohibition). Our second study relates to the conditions of perceived State responsibility when a death linked to substance consumption occurred: 234 subjects judged the degree of State responsibility in 80 scenarios derived from the combination of five factors: relationship between consumption/disease, amount of time since the substance toxicity is known, risk generality, consumption, State action (from State monopoly to sale interdiction). Our studies rely on a method derived from the functional theory of cognition (Anderson, 1981). The first study identifies three clusters: the regulationists (42%), who favor total regulation by the State, the radicals (32%), for who none of the policies are acceptable, and the prohibitionists (26%), who favor a total interdiction with the condition of information campaigns. The policy of the laissez faire is judged by all groups as being the most inacceptable. In the second study, three clusters are separated: centrist-dominated (44%), leftist-dominated (38%) and rightist-dominated (17%). The rightists tend to attribute less responsibility to the state and are less sensitive to scientific evidences than the leftists. A consensus between groups is that the State is freed from responsibility when sales are totally forbidden. In other cases, the State is perceived as partially responsible when a consumer’s health deteriorates.

State responsibility is central to modern politics and international relations. States are commonly blamed for wars, called on to apologize, punished with sanctions, admonished to keep their promises, bound by treaties, and held liable for debts and reparations. But why, and under which conditions, does it make sense to assign responsibilities to whole states rather than to individual leaders and officials? The purpose of this thesis is to resurrect and develop a forgotten understanding of state responsibility from the political thought of Thomas Hobbes. Chapters 1 and 2 examine the two dominant theories of state responsibility and propose a Hobbesian alternative. According to the agential theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents like human beings, with analogous capacities for deliberation and intentional action. According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they act vicariously through their organs, much as principals act vicariously through agents. What makes Hobbes unique is that he considers states to be 'persons'-entities to which actions, rights, and responsibilities can be attributed-even though they are neither agents nor principals. Hobbes' idea of state personality relies on the concepts of authorization and representation, not of agency and intentionality, nor of functions and organs. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 develop the Hobbesian theory of state responsibility and apply it to three sets of problems. Chapter 3 addresses problems of attribution, such as whether the actions of dictators count as acts of state and whether states can commit crimes. Chapter 4 addresses problems of identity, such as whether revolutions and annexations negate the state's identity and hence its responsibilities. Chapter 5 addresses problems of distribution, such as whether the subjects of the state ought to bear the costs of debts and reparations that their state incurred before they were born. I argue that the Hobbesian theory provides better answers to each set of problems than the agential and functional alternatives.

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Submitted by Jamile Barbosa da Cruz (jamile.cruz@ucsal.br) on 2016-09-14T17:35:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FIGUEIREDO, AMSP-2016.pdf: 2009454 bytes, checksum: 9788d68b85a4dcaadf577be871600b92 (MD5) / Rejected by Maria Emília Carvalho Ribeiro (maria.ribeiro@ucsal.br), reason: Alterar título on 2016-09-14T19:21:33Z (GMT) / Submitted by Jamile Barbosa da Cruz (jamile.cruz@ucsal.br) on 2016-09-29T17:27:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FIGUEIREDO, AMSP-2016.pdf: 2009454 bytes, checksum: 9788d68b85a4dcaadf577be871600b92 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Emília Carvalho Ribeiro (maria.ribeiro@ucsal.br) on 2016-11-21T20:39:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FIGUEIREDO, AMSP-2016.pdf: 2009454 bytes, checksum: 9788d68b85a4dcaadf577be871600b92 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-21T20:39:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIGUEIREDO, AMSP-2016.pdf: 2009454 bytes, checksum: 9788d68b85a4dcaadf577be871600b92 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-29 / Agência 2 / Este estudo toma como objeto a proteção do crédito trabalhista nas parcerias de Organizações Não-Governamentais com o Governo brasileiro para prestação de serviços públicos na área de saúde entre os anos de 2010 a 2014. O objetivo geral é investigar o Regime Jurídico proposto pela Lei nº 13.019/14 sob a ótica do interesse dos trabalhadores envolvidos. A partir daí será analisada a utilização, pelo Estado, da intermediação como uma estratégia de desresponsabilização e a vinculação deste fenômeno com a insuficiência dos mecanismos de proteção trabalhista. / This study is about the protection of labor credit on Non-Governmental Organization´s partnerships with the Brazilian government to provide public services in health care between the years 2010 to 2014. The overall objective is to investigate the legal regime proposed by the law nº 13.019/14 from the perspective of the interest of the workers involved. From there, will be analyzed the use of intermediation as a disclaimer strategy and the connection of this phenomenon with the lack of labor protection mechanisms.