Den här avhandlingen handlar det underhåll till sårade och gamla soldater som den svenskastatsmakten organiserade under tidigmodern tid. Undersökningen tar sin utgångspunkt i den tid närstatsmakten började organisera mer omfattande hjälp för soldater, vilket var slutet på Gustav Vasasoch under Erik XIV:s regeringstid i mitten av 1500-talet. Motiven till att statsmakten organiseradehjälp för en del soldater var att dessa skulle ha offrat sin hälsa och arbetsförmåga i kronans tjänst, menså länge statsmakten fortsatte att vara relativt löst organiserad var även hjälpen till soldaterna avganska liten omfattning. Det ändrades under Gustav II Adolfs regering då planerna på att skapa ettkrigsmanshus i Vadstena etablerades, vilka senare genomfördes efter hans död och institutionen kundeta emot de första soldaterna senast 1640. I krigsmanshuset fick ett trettiotal soldater med familjeruppehälle, samtidigt som soldater boende i andra delar av landet fick stöd från krigsmanshuskassansom också administrerades från Vadstena. Mot slutet av 1600-talet blev kassan proportionellt merbetydelsefull än krigsmanshuset och runt år 1700 försörjde kassan flera tusen soldater runtom i riket.1700-talet innebar stora förändringar, bland annat genom att krigen blev färre, att krigaryrket intelängre var lika attraktivt som karriärväg för adelsmän och att statsmakten utvecklade andra mer civiladelar. Behovet av ett krigsmanshus fanns till sist inte längre och institutionen i Vadstena stängde förboende våren 1784, men kassan fanns kvar in på 1970-talet. / This dissertation focuses on the maintenance of wounded and old soldiers organized by the Swedishstate in the Early Modern Period. The thesis starts at the time when the government began to organizemore help for soldiers, which was the end of Gustav Vasa’s reign and during that of his son Erik XIVin the mid-16th century. The reasons why the government organized help for some soldiers weremainly that the soldiers would have sacrificed their health and ability to work in their service of theCrown. But as long as the government continued to be relatively loosely organized, the aid to thesoldiers remained on a relatively small scale. This changed under the reign of Gustav II Adolf (ruled1611–1632) when plans for the establishment of the Veteran's Home in Vadstena were established.These plans were later executed after his death and the institution was able to welcome the firstsoldiers by 1640. At the Veteran's Home, some 30 soldiers were kept with families while othersoldiers lived in their home parishes in other parts of the country and were supported by the Veteran’sFund, which was also administered in Vadstena. Towards the end of the 17th century, the fund becameproportionally more important than the Veteran’s Home and around 1700 the fund delivered support toseveral thousand soldiers. The 18th century meant major changes in society, including fewer wars, thatbecoming an officer was no longer as attractive as career path for the nobility, and that the governmentdeveloped other more civilian functions. The need for a Veteran’s Home was no longer the same underthose circumstances and the Veteran’s Home closed for residents in the spring of 1784, but the fundremained until the 1970s.

The thesis focuses on the contemporary CSDP missions of the European Union from the point of view of critical literatures on imperialism, state-building and capacity-building. State-building and capacity-building gradually became dominant approaches towards weak and failing states which are associated with the exercise of power and influence in the critical literature, e.g. in David Chandler on whose argument this thesis draws on. The thesis develops Chandler's argument by means of analysis of intervention practices in the selected cases.

The master thesis examines the involvement of the United States of America, Germany and the Czech Republic in post-conflict reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan through their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The aim of the thesis is to find out to what extent the Provincial Reconstruction Teams represent their founder countries' effort of state building in Afghanistan, and to deduce the differences among their attitudes to state building in Afghanistan by comparing their PRTs' activities. Countries directly found their PRTs and therefore their attitude to state building in Afghanistan should be reflected in the activities of their PRTs. The PRTs should reflect the priorities of their founder countries in reconstruction of Afghanistan. This thesis begins with outlining the links among the PRTs, state building and NATO's comprehensive approach and counterinsurgency strategy which pays attention to the civilian aspects of fighting wars. The U.S., German and Czech preferences regarding the state building are examined through their foreign policy documents. Activities of the U.S., German and Czech PRTs are analysed to verify, whether they correspond to their countries' proclaimed aims in the field of state building in Afghanistan.

After the fall of the Soviet Union a number of violent ethnic disputes were concluded through the establishment of ceasefires but have yet to be finalized through peace accords. This development resulted in the creation of de facto states in a setting known as ‘frozen conflicts’. These de facto states have managed to endure decades of unrecognition, stuck in a situation of “no war, no peace” and constitutes today “effective” political entities. The post-war development in these frozen conflicts has continuously surprised academia, defying pessimistic prediction of their sustainability. Following the positive, hybridized peace etymology laid out by Oliver Richmond, this thesis aims at exploring the peace- and state processes that has occurred during the Nagorno Karabakh peace process in order to explain the ambiguous developments that have been going on despite the limbo-like state of unrecognition. The relation between external and internal processes is interrogated through a periodization of key events, and thereafter a comprehensive analysis of how the processes relate to each other over time. The thesis concludes that the strong presence of identity politics regarding the historical Nagorno Karabakh favors the often violent and protective state formation process but is at least partially controlled by the international attempts at peace building. Local formations of peace do not allow for a reintegration of Nagorno Karabakh into Azerbaijan, at least not without explicit and extensive security and autonomy guarantees. Likewise, the external processes of peace and state building does not allow for local agency from Nagorno Karabakh, as it is viewed through a negative ontology of peace. The processes does provide some rather successful developments, as the almost finalized Land swap deal and the Madrid principles, but lacks the momentum of conquering the dominance of perceived or actualized violent state formation processes.

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Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as often and intervened almost exactly as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states developed before 1950 tended to survive an average thirty years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive only three years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host nation security forces that tended to endure ten times longer than interventions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military deeply embeds within and inhabits host-nation institutions (institution inhabiting strategies) then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness (institution influencing strategies) then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in tabula rasa or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in both governance and security development and the latter low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1912-1933 and Vietnam 1964-1972. The former employed a high degree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between degree of embeddedness in developing security and governance and state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institution influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent efficaciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. / PHD / Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as often and remained just as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states developed before 1950 tended to survive an average 71.4 years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive on average only 3.25 years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host nation security forces that tended to endure almost twenty-four times longer than interventions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military embeds deeply within and inhabits host-nation institutions then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in non-existent or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in governance and security development while the latter utilized low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1927-1933 and Vietnam 1965-1973. The former case employed a high degree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter case employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between the degree of embeddedness used in developing security and governance and the duration of state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institution influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent efficaciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions.

This dissertation provides an in-depth study of police transformation in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It draws upon interviews with police, NGO workers, politicians and international practitioners, and employs a comparative-historical approach. Contra to democratic policing approaches, advocating the diffusion of police power and implementation of police reform concurrently with wider democratisation, reform was relatively successful in Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution because of state-building. The new government monopolised executive power, fired many police, recruited new personnel, raised police salaries and clamped down on organised crime and corruption. Success also depended on the elite's political will and their appeal to Georgian nationalism. Prioritisation of state-building over democratisation limited the reform's success, however. The new police are politicised and have served elites' private interests. Reform has failed in Kyrgyzstan because of a lack of state-building. Regional, clan and other identities are stronger than Kyrgyz nationalism. This has hindered the formation of an elite with capacity to implement reform. The state has limited control over the police, who remain corrupt and involved in organised crime. State-building has not precipitated police reform in Russia because of the absence of political will. The ruling cohort lacks a vision of reform and relies on corruption to balance the interests of political factions. The contrasting patterns of police reform have a number of implications for democratic police reform in transitioning countries: First, reform depends on political will. Second, institutionalising the police before democratising them may be a more effective means of acquiring the capacity to implement reform. Third, such an approach is likely to require some sort of common bond such as nationalism to legitimate it. Fourth, ignoring democratisation after institutionalisation is risky as reformers can misuse their power for private interests.

What causes post-conflict violence to occur in some places emerging from extended violent conflict and not in others? Why does episodic post-conflict violence take different forms? And what causes episodic violence to escalate into larger renewed extended violence? This thesis contributes towards answers to these questions by examining the experience of Indonesia. Six provinces saw civil war or large-scale inter-communal unrest around the turn of the century. In each, war ended. Yet levels and forms of post-conflict violence vary significantly between areas. The Indonesian cases are used to build a theory of the sources of spatial and temporal variance in post-conflict violence. Multiple methods are employed. A new dataset, containing over 158,000 coded incidents, maps patterns of extended and post-conflict violence. Six districts in three provinces are then studied in depth. Comparative analysis of districts and provinces—drawing on over 300 field interviews—identifies the determinants of variations in post-conflict violence levels and forms. Adopting a political economy approach, the thesis develops a novel actor-based theory of post-conflict violence. Violence is not the result of failed elite bargains, dysfunctional inter-group relations, enduring grievances, or weak states. Instead, it flows from the incentives that three sets of actors—local elites, local violence specialists, and national elites—have to use violence for accumulation. Violence is used when it is beneficial, non-costly, and when other opportunities for getting ahead do not exist. How post-conflict resources are deployed, the degree to which those who use violence face sanctions, and the availability of peaceful means to achieve goals shape incentives and hence patterns of violence. Where only violence specialists support violence, post-conflict violence will take small-scale forms. Where local elites also support violence, escalation to frequent large episodic violence occurs. Extended violence only occurs where national elites also have reason to use violence for purposes of accumulation.

After the invasion of Iraq and the destruction of Saddam regime in 2003, the US administration undertook the complete remaking of Iraq as a national-state. The initial steps of the US administration were the quasi eradication of the old Iraqi State. Then, this nation-building endeavor has been based on a federal constitution promoting an Ethno- sectarian power sharing and the attempt to transform what was once a centralized economy into a comprehensive market driven society. However, the post-2003 period had been marked by the rising of identity politics, the constant delegitimisation of the new political order and successive episode of massive violence. Obviously, the question of violence and its apex in 2006-2007, is central to understand the post-2003 period in Iraq. For the first time in Iraqi history, waves of ethno-sectarian violence seriously challenged the possibility of a common life for all the diverse components of the Iraqi society. The Iraqi nation seemed to have been consumed in an existential conflict between components and communal identifications once relatively integrated. Therefore, there is a need to render an analytical account of the aggressive rise of identity politics, the outbreak of violence and finally the episodes of civil war in 2005-2007 in Iraq. This study aims to answer these questions by tracking the different political and social processes that have been at play during the American occupation of Iraq and that lead to the events of 2005-2007. In order to do so, I will consider the dynamical relations that link political institutions, violence and self-identifications in regard to the Iraqi society and Iraq as a National State. This research is built as a case study based mostly on qualitative analysis and the collection of empirical data, interviews, and fieldwork observations as well as primary and secondary sources. I set out to identify actors and processes and determine a complex chain of reactions (a trajectory) that led to the current state of affairs in Iraq. This trajectory could be summarized in few sentences: The destruction of the old Iraqi State and the brutal implementation of Neo-liberal rationality and re- regulations policies by the US occupation ended into a dystopian economy and the creation of an "absent state" (Davis, 2011). Since its very first day, this US lead nation-building endeavor has been flawed by a complete lack of legitimacy and its substitution with coercion by the US and the New Iraqi "State" security apparatus. Meanwhile, the imposition and the institutionalization of Ethno-sectarian affiliations as a principle of political legitimacy contributed to transform the different communities of Iraq into main avenues for access and control of scarce economic and political resources. In a way, US occupation and new Iraqi elites were deflecting the political question of right following a movement similar to what Mamdani and Brown describe as a "Culturalisation of Politics" (2004, 2006). The result was a failure to establish a legitimate and functional political and economic order. This led to the rise of a System of Violence, organized around networks of violence. Within the System of Violence, Culturalisation of Politics would be translated into Culturalisation of Violence. This would contribute to the sectarianisation of space in Baghdad and other localities of Iraq, as well as "manufacturing" (Gregory, 2008) and essentialising sectarian representations and identifications within the society.