Interorganizational arrangements, such as partnerships between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations (GOs), are increasingly regarded by policymakers as critical to effective social sector development. This is particularly true in the arena of housing provision for residents of slums and squatter settlements. The recent pursuit of collaboration between NGOs and government housing agencies in large urban agglomerations such as Mumbai, India marks a significant shift from the adversarial climate that previously characterized NGO-GO interactions. In other words, NGOs engaged in housing issues appear to be evolving from ''housing rights advocates'' to ''housing developers''. However, very little research has examined the struggles and pressures facing organizations as they travel from confrontational to collaborative relationships. This dissertation provides an empirical and theoretical basis for examining the evolution of NGO-GO relationships over time and, in doing so, links research on urban political economy of housing to research on organizational life cycles and strategic institutional change. Two questions are central to the dissertation: 1) How do shifts in state housing policies influence the strategies pursued by advocacy NGOs in housing the poor? 2) What are the factors that influence the emergence and sustenance of NGO-government housing partnerships? To address these, I use a multiple-case study analysis of critical incidents in the history (from 1981 to 2003) of three NGOs in Mumbai: Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti, Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action, and Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres. In addition, I examine five state and city level housing authorities. The dissertation's findings address three broad themes of literature: i) NGO-GO Interaction Styles; ii) Institutional Isomorphism; and, iii) NGO Development Continuum. Findings related to these broad streams of literature suggest that NGO behavior is shaped both by public policy orientation and by internal strategies and decisions. In efforts to gain and retain legitimacy, NGOs will likely use multiple interaction styles both simultaneously and sequentially. Analysis of internal institutional processes in NGOs suggests that organizational responses to isomorphic demands are circumscribed by path-dependent factors and the variability in NGO resource environments. NGO development strategies have evolved towards greater complexity and sophistication. / Ph. D.

From 1689 through 1746 the supporters of the deposed House of Stuart, known as Jacobites and composed largely of Highland Scots, staged periodic rebellions against the new Hanoverian rulers in London. During this period, the Highlanders of Scotland experienced a period of military triumph unlike any other in their history. Through the combination of the ancient tactic of the charge, the use of the broadsword as their primary weapon, and the implementation of the musket, the Highlanders blended the best elements of the ancient and early modern military tactics and technology to develop a unique tactic, the Highland Charge. Essentially, the Highlanders would assemble preferably on high ground, charge down upon their enemy, fire their muskets and throw them to the ground, regroup into wedge shaped formations behind the musket-fire smokescreen, and then charge sword-in-hand into the opposing army's lines. The Highland Charge repeatedly defeated the British forces, which should have been superior in virtually every respect. The British army was an early modern force using the latest tactics and technology. The British forces that fought the Highlanders were a mix of militiamen and seasoned veterans of the continental wars. In essence the military engagements between the Jacobites and British were a contest between an undisciplined archaic force and a disciplined thoroughly modern force. The combination of ancient and early modern elements, the change in formation, and the great success of the Highland Charge generates immense interest in this subject. / Master of Arts

<p>Uppsatsen gör en första ansats till redogörelse för smygteknikens taktiska implikationer.</p><p>Vilka möjligheter finns med smygtekniken mot en kvalificerad motståndare under väpnad strid? Detta koncentreras till tre olika områden: duellstrid, underrättelseinhämtning och vilseledning. Med avstamp i flottans gamla reglemente, TRFL, via litteratur i ämnet, och slutligen med intervjuer dras slutsatser på huruvida sjötaktiken påverkats, eller kan påverkas av signaturanpassningen.</p><p>Slutsatserna är, förutom att fortsatt forskning behövs på området, att det är av största vikt att fartygschef har adekvata beslutsunderlag angående fartygets signaturer, och att signaturanpassningen, rätt nyttjad, ger taktiska fördelar.</p> / <p>This study examines how stealth technology affects Swedish tactics in the naval arena. Could stealth technology improve the chances of successful naval warfare? This puts focus on three underlying questions: how stealth technology affects your odds, in a duel, in deceptive action, and during reconnaissance/information gathering?</p><p>This requires a description of stealth technology, benefits and disadvantages, and a thorough picture of Swedish naval tactics. With this in mind, an analysis is conducted where the benefits of stealth technology are compared with Swedish naval tactics. The main results of this study shows that, firstly, the subject needs more careful research, secondly that stealth technology gives, if properly used, a tactical advantage.</p>

<p>De senaste åren har Försvarsmakten genomgått en stor förändring från invasionsförsvar till ett flexibelt insatsförsvar. I takt med denna förändring har även karaktären på de uppgifter som insatsförsvaret ställs inför ändrats. Ett exempel på detta är insatsen i Adenviken där hotet är i form av små snabba fartyg med mål och medel som sträcker sig utanför en reguljär styrkas. En av Sjökrigets grundregler är förmågan till taktikanpassning. Detta innebär att man drar erfarenheter från de attacker eller anfall som genomförs, tar lärdom av dessa och utefter denna lärdom tänker nytt för att nå framgång i nästa drabbning. Denna förmåga ses som extra eftersträvansvärd i dagens försvar då tempot i krigföringen och förvirringen ökat i samband med att hotet tenderar att bete sig asymmetriskt. Syftet med denna uppsats är att på ett övergripande plan undersöka förhållandet mellan den ledningsmetod och den ledarskapsmodell Försvarsmakten antagit och de koncept för krigföring försvaret förfogar över, dvs. ledningen och ledarskapets förhållande till taktiken. Det undergripande målet har varit att undersöka vad som förutsätter effektiv taktikanpassning och om de ledar- och ledarskapsmetoder Försvarsmakten antagit bidrar till en effektivare taktikanpassning. Detta är gjort utifrån två fallstudier från det andra slaget om Syrtenbukten 1942 och slaget om Latakia 1973.</p> / <p>In the recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have undergone a great change from the invasion oriented defence to a flexible operational defence. This change has also meant that the character of the missions given to the Navy has changed. One example is the effort in the Gulf of Aden where the threat is in the form of small fast ships with means and ends that extend beyond a regular part. One of the basic rules of naval warfare is the ability to adapt tactics. This means that you draw experience from the attack carried out, learn from these lessons, and along this new thinking to achieve success in the next battle. This ability is seen as additional desirable in contemporary warfare when the tempo and the confusion are increased when the threat tends to behave asymmetrically. The purpose of this paper is to globally examine the relationship between the management approachand the leadership model adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces and the concept of warfare that the Swedish Armed Forces possess, i.e. management and leadership relative to the tactics. The arrest in the case has been to explore what requires adaptation and effective tactics of the leadership and management practices adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces contribute to more effective tactics adjustment. This is done based on two case studies from the Second Battle of Sirte in 1942 and the Battle of Latakia in 1973.</p>

<p>Den svenska marinen likväl som världens handels sjöfart nyttjar alltmer satellitnavigering för sin positionering. Enligt totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut kan sådana system störas med förhållandevis enkla medel. Nu när den svenska marinen alltmer engagerar sig i insatser utomlands mot irreguljära motståndare väcks frågan om hur en irreguljär motståndare kan påverka den svenska marinen och den svenska marinens taktik. I denna uppsats kommer frågor kring en irreguljär motståndares förmåga att påverka GNSS att ställas. Samt frågan om vilken påverkan detta har för såväl den svenska marinens fartyg som handelssjöfarten. Uppsatsen kommer även att behandla möjligheterna till skydd mot störning samt hur den svenska marinens taktik kommer påverkas om en irreguljär motståndare försöker störa ut GNSS-system.</p> / <p>The Swedish Navy as well as the worlds shipping industries use more and more satellite navigation for positioning purposes. According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, those types of systems can relatively easily and at a low cost be jammed. With the Swedish Navy becoming more and more involved in missions overseas against insurgents, the question is whether an insurgent can affect the Swedish Navy and its tactics. This paper investigates the questions about what opportunities an insurgent have to affect the GNSS-system and how that can affect the Swedish Navyas well as the shipping industries. This paper is also about how the tactics of the Swedish Navy will be affected if an insurgent attempts to jam the GNSS-systems and the possibility of protection against jamming.</p>

De senaste åren har Försvarsmakten genomgått en stor förändring från invasionsförsvar till ett flexibelt insatsförsvar. I takt med denna förändring har även karaktären på de uppgifter som insatsförsvaret ställs inför ändrats. Ett exempel på detta är insatsen i Adenviken där hotet är i form av små snabba fartyg med mål och medel som sträcker sig utanför en reguljär styrkas. En av Sjökrigets grundregler är förmågan till taktikanpassning. Detta innebär att man drar erfarenheter från de attacker eller anfall som genomförs, tar lärdom av dessa och utefter denna lärdom tänker nytt för att nå framgång i nästa drabbning. Denna förmåga ses som extra eftersträvansvärd i dagens försvar då tempot i krigföringen och förvirringen ökat i samband med att hotet tenderar att bete sig asymmetriskt. Syftet med denna uppsats är att på ett övergripande plan undersöka förhållandet mellan den ledningsmetod och den ledarskapsmodell Försvarsmakten antagit och de koncept för krigföring försvaret förfogar över, dvs. ledningen och ledarskapets förhållande till taktiken. Det undergripande målet har varit att undersöka vad som förutsätter effektiv taktikanpassning och om de ledar- och ledarskapsmetoder Försvarsmakten antagit bidrar till en effektivare taktikanpassning. Detta är gjort utifrån två fallstudier från det andra slaget om Syrtenbukten 1942 och slaget om Latakia 1973. / In the recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have undergone a great change from the invasion oriented defence to a flexible operational defence. This change has also meant that the character of the missions given to the Navy has changed. One example is the effort in the Gulf of Aden where the threat is in the form of small fast ships with means and ends that extend beyond a regular part. One of the basic rules of naval warfare is the ability to adapt tactics. This means that you draw experience from the attack carried out, learn from these lessons, and along this new thinking to achieve success in the next battle. This ability is seen as additional desirable in contemporary warfare when the tempo and the confusion are increased when the threat tends to behave asymmetrically. The purpose of this paper is to globally examine the relationship between the management approachand the leadership model adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces and the concept of warfare that the Swedish Armed Forces possess, i.e. management and leadership relative to the tactics. The arrest in the case has been to explore what requires adaptation and effective tactics of the leadership and management practices adopted by the Swedish Armed Forces contribute to more effective tactics adjustment. This is done based on two case studies from the Second Battle of Sirte in 1942 and the Battle of Latakia in 1973.

Den svenska marinen likväl som världens handels sjöfart nyttjar alltmer satellitnavigering för sin positionering. Enligt totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut kan sådana system störas med förhållandevis enkla medel. Nu när den svenska marinen alltmer engagerar sig i insatser utomlands mot irreguljära motståndare väcks frågan om hur en irreguljär motståndare kan påverka den svenska marinen och den svenska marinens taktik. I denna uppsats kommer frågor kring en irreguljär motståndares förmåga att påverka GNSS att ställas. Samt frågan om vilken påverkan detta har för såväl den svenska marinens fartyg som handelssjöfarten. Uppsatsen kommer även att behandla möjligheterna till skydd mot störning samt hur den svenska marinens taktik kommer påverkas om en irreguljär motståndare försöker störa ut GNSS-system. / The Swedish Navy as well as the worlds shipping industries use more and more satellite navigation for positioning purposes. According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, those types of systems can relatively easily and at a low cost be jammed. With the Swedish Navy becoming more and more involved in missions overseas against insurgents, the question is whether an insurgent can affect the Swedish Navy and its tactics. This paper investigates the questions about what opportunities an insurgent have to affect the GNSS-system and how that can affect the Swedish Navyas well as the shipping industries. This paper is also about how the tactics of the Swedish Navy will be affected if an insurgent attempts to jam the GNSS-systems and the possibility of protection against jamming.

Uppsatsen gör en första ansats till redogörelse för smygteknikens taktiska implikationer. Vilka möjligheter finns med smygtekniken mot en kvalificerad motståndare under väpnad strid? Detta koncentreras till tre olika områden: duellstrid, underrättelseinhämtning och vilseledning. Med avstamp i flottans gamla reglemente, TRFL, via litteratur i ämnet, och slutligen med intervjuer dras slutsatser på huruvida sjötaktiken påverkats, eller kan påverkas av signaturanpassningen. Slutsatserna är, förutom att fortsatt forskning behövs på området, att det är av största vikt att fartygschef har adekvata beslutsunderlag angående fartygets signaturer, och att signaturanpassningen, rätt nyttjad, ger taktiska fördelar. / This study examines how stealth technology affects Swedish tactics in the naval arena. Could stealth technology improve the chances of successful naval warfare? This puts focus on three underlying questions: how stealth technology affects your odds, in a duel, in deceptive action, and during reconnaissance/information gathering? This requires a description of stealth technology, benefits and disadvantages, and a thorough picture of Swedish naval tactics. With this in mind, an analysis is conducted where the benefits of stealth technology are compared with Swedish naval tactics. The main results of this study shows that, firstly, the subject needs more careful research, secondly that stealth technology gives, if properly used, a tactical advantage.

Sveriges ytstridskrafter hade länge en förmåga att hävda sig mot fiendens stridskrafter ute till havs på 1950- och 60-talen. Nedrustningsprogrammet av försvaret på 1960-talet innebar att teknikutvecklingen bromsade upp och flottans större fartyg kryssare, fregatter och jagare skulle bytas ut till en lätt flotta med små snabba enheter. Detta resulterade i att flottans taktik anpassades till ett tillbakadraget uppträdande längs med kustbandet och inom skärgården. Svenska officerare bevittnade på när Sovjetunionen rustade upp och utvecklade nya vapen och fartyg med robotar av högsta kvalité i Östersjöområdet. Detta hot medförde att officerarna i flottan ville satsa på ett långräckviddigt vapen för att bli mer jämbördig mot fiendens styrka ute till havs. Resultatet blev en svenskutvecklad sjömålsrobot, Robotsystem 15 (RBS 15), som infördes i marinen i början av 1980-talet. RBS 15:s höga kvalité och förmåga medförde en satsning på utvecklingen av flera tekniska kringutrustningar som behövdes för att fulländat utföra en sjörobotstrid. Studiens syfte är att studera RBS 15:s införande i den svenska flottan och vilken påverkan detta hade på taktiken. Fallet RBS 15 prövas utifrån hypoteser grundade från teorier om hur tekniken påverkar taktiken. Tekniken påvisas påverka taktiken via de hypoteser som bestyrks i studien. Slutsatser från studien är att RBS 15 påverkade taktiken genom att den: möjliggjorde ett offensivt handlande, initierade utvecklingen av nya tekniska resurser och var den avgörande faktorn för att den marina organisationen medvetet ville utveckla ytstridstaktiken. Den nya förmågan innebar en markant skillnad i det svenska taktiska uppträdandet. Flottans ytstridskrafter tillämpade ett mer framskjutet uppträdande och kunde bestrida fiendens kontroll till sjöss. / During the 1950’s and 1960’sSweden’s surface warships had an ability to match enemy forces at sea. The disarmament of the Swedish Defense in the 1960’s implied a retardation of technique development and major warships like cruisers, frigates and destroyers were planned to be changed to a lighter fleet consisting of small, fast units. The result of this change was that the Navy tactics were adjusted to a retired behavior. Swedish officers witnessed the rearmament of the Soviet Union that developed new weapons and vessels with high class long-range anti-ship missiles in theBaltic Searegion. The consequence of this threat was that the naval officers wanted to develop a long-range weapon to equal enemy forces at sea. The result was a Swedish innovation of an anti-ship missile system (RBS 15) which was introduced in the Swedish Navy in the beginning of the 1980’s. RBS 15’s high quality and ability also implied a development of several peripheral technical equipments that were necessary for perfection in naval missile combat. The aim of the current study is to clarify whether or not the introduction of RBS 15 into the Swedish Navy was affecting tactics. The case RBS 15 is tested by hypotheses outgoing from theories how technologies affect tactics. It is demonstrated that the technologies affect tactics from the hypotheses that are confirmed in the study. Conclusions from the study are that the RBS 15 affected tactics since it: Facilitated to take offensive action, initiated development of new technical resources and was the crucial factor implementing that the naval organization decided to develop the tactics for the new Swedish surface warships. This new capability implicated a marked difference in the Swedish tactical behavior at sea. Naval warships were applying a more offensive tactic and had the ability to fight the enemy’s control of the sea.

For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10th Century to the 20th Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional plane,limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , two-dimensional model. Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter as one of engagement as cross and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects were frequently excessive and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold War in Europe,the importance of field artillery wanded relative to other arms. Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace with implications for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimensions, since targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace with values of indetermined by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space and new types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes in the relationship between the land and air components, mindful of those novel factors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower.