This dissertation examines streaming media both as a technological innovation and cultural practice that co-configures audience and industry. Strategies and tactics provide a theoretical framework for understanding streaming media. Streaming is theorized as a tactic; wherein audiences momentarily buck against the strategic logic of media conglomerates and copyright regimes. However, streaming, concomitantly, is an audience tactic and a strategic logic of an emergent streaming industry. This results in the blurring between first and third party and sanctioned and unsanctioned streaming. In this dissertation, I parse out what are the nascent streaming logics within this burgeoning industry and how they constitutively shape and re-shape audiences and traditional broadcasting logics. Five typologies of streaming serve as conceptual tools for deepening our understanding of streaming media and technology. The first is streaming as a recent technological advancement, divided into software and hardware categories. The second conceptual framework is a typology of streaming that divides streaming into first and third party sanctioned and unsanctioned streaming. The third is streaming as an emergent industry. The fourth is streaming as a discourse, and the final typology divides streaming based on geography as transnational streaming, national streaming, and diasporic streaming. All of these classifications lay the groundwork for the further conceptualization of this important and emergent socio-technical practice.

Comment quelques grammes de plomb propulsés par quelques grammes de poudre peuvent-ils avoir raison, à distance, du plus robuste des soudards ? Pourquoi le même projectile peut-il tuer l’un et épargner l’autre ? Depuis le XVe siècle, ces questions effraient le combattant, intriguent le chirurgien et agitent la communauté scientifique.Croisant données historiques, comptes rendus médico-légaux et expérimentation scientifique, cette étude tente de répondre à ces interrogations pluriséculaires. Les sources consultées reposent principalement sur les écrits chirurgicaux, mais explorent également les ouvrages traitant d’armes, de munitions et de tactique, partant du principe que tous ces facteurs jouent un rôle dans ce drame parfois définitif qu’est la rencontre tumultueuse entre un projectile et la cible particulière que constitue l’organisme humain. Les réponses apportées sont contrastées et souvent contradictoires : à ceux qui estiment qu’une plaie par projectile d’arme à feu est une plaie comme les autres répondent ceux qui considèrent que le mécanisme qui l’a produit doit être pris en compte dans l’étude de ces effets et dans la décision thérapeutique. Ce travail expose, au travers de ces polémiques, l’extrême diversité des effets vulnérants des armes à feu, aucun traumatisme balistique n’étant strictement superposable à un autre. Ce caractère non reproductible, en dehors de l’expérimentation scientifique, exclut toute conclusion formelle et définitive quant aux effets des projectiles d’armes à feu. Être touché par une balle reste une aventure individuelle aux conséquences imprévisibles. / How can a few grams of lead expelled with a few grams of powder remotely take out the toughest boor? Why can the same projectile kill one and spare the other? Since the 15th century, these questions frighten the fighter, intrigue the surgeon and stir the scientific community.Crossing historic data, medicolegal reports and scientific experiments, this study tries to answer these centuries-long questions. The consulted sources are mostly based on surgical writing but also explore books dealing with weapons, ammunition, tactics, given all these factors interneve in this, something definitive, drama that is the tumultuous encounter between a projectile and the particular target that the human body is. The results are mixed and often contradictory, opposing those who think a projectile-induced wound is a common wound and those who consider the igniting mechanism has to be taken into account to study and treat its effects efficiently. This work shows, apart from these polemics, the great diversity of firearms wounding effects, no ballistic trauma being strictly comparable to another. This non-reproductible specificity, aside from scientific experiments, rules out any formal and definitive answer regarding the effects of firearms projectiles. Being shot with a bullet remains an individual adventure with unpredictable consequences.

The study sought to examine tactics used in family conflict and the relationship between these tactics and measures of self esteem and cognitive development. One of the questions which flow from this analysis is whether there is a safe level of conflict which is related to higher levels of cognitive development and/or self esteem or does any level of conflict have a negative effect on these aspects. Subjects consisted of 251 year nine and ten students from a Canberra Catholic high school. Using Straus's (1979) Conflict Tactics Scale for various family dyads, measures of Piaget's stages of cognitive development, and Rosenberg's Self-esteem Scale (1965), no significant differences were found between cognitive development and conflict tactics, self esteem or gender. Adolescents from violent families had lower self-esteem than those from non-violent families, however verbal aggression was very common and the sole use of reasoning was atypical.

<p>I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan.</p><p>Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften.</p> / <p>Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan.</p><p>The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.</p>

<p>NATO, USA, Storbritannien och Ryssland m.fl. använder sig av stridsuppgiften räd för markstridskrafter och erfarenheter från bl.a. Irakkriget 2003 visar att de kan få stor betydelse. Räder anses överensstämma med manöverteorin, men räder återfinns inte som stridsuppgift för svenska markstridskrafter.</p><p>Denna uppsats analyserar stridsuppgiften räd för markstridskrafter, operationaliserar två indikatorer för räder och med hjälp av dessa undersöks hur räder är förenligt med FM nuvarande doktrin och Reglemente för Markoperationer (RMO).</p><p>Undersökningen visar att räder inte är förenliga med nuvarande doktrin och RMO. Bl.a. så uppfattas det sakna överensstämmelse att avsiktligt inte bibehålla öppna landförbindelser. Däremot är delar av indikatorerna direkt eller indirekt att anse som förenliga.</p> / <p>NATO, USA, Great Britain and Russia are among others using the task raid for ground forces and experiences from e.g. the war in Iraq 2003 have shown that they could have great importance. Raids are considered to correspond to manoeuvre theory, but raids are not to be found as a task for Swedish ground forces.</p><p>This paper is analyzing the task raid for ground forces, developing two indicators for raids and with the help of these examining how raids are compatible with the armed forces present doctrine and field manual for ground operations.</p><p>The investigation shows that raids are not compatible with the present doctrine and field manual for ground operations. E.g. is it considered to disagree not to keep land lines of communications open. Parts of the indicators are however directly or indirectly considered compatible.</p>

<p>Manövertänkandet har vuxit fram som ett resultat av ny tekniks tillämpning i gammal krigföring. Framförallt Tyskland och England har utvecklat det vi idag kallar manöverkrigföring. Kopplat till den utvecklingen uppkom nya teorier om framgångsfaktorer i striden. Idén om den indirekta metoden var banbrytande och fick stort genomslag för dagens syn på krigföring. Inom manöverkriget fick även en ny ledningsmetod utrymme att växa sig stark, uppdragstaktiken är nu vida spridd runt om i världens försvarsmakter.</p><p>Svenska försvarsmaktens grundläggande koncept för insatser med alla svenska förband är manövertänkandet. Detta manövertänkande har sina grunder i de tyska och engelska teorierna från mellankrigstiden. Dess ledningsmetod är uppdragstaktiken och genomsyrar hela den svenska militära strukturen. </p><p>Uppsatsen undersöker och diskuterar tempots betydelse för manöverkrigföringen, dels som fysisk rörelse men även som en beslutscykel. Jag har kommit fram till följande resultat; initiativet är nyckeln till framgång, initiativ vinns genom ett offensivt agerande med uppdragstaktiken som grund.</p> / <p>Maneuver warfare has gradually developed as a result of new technology being used in old ways to wage war. Especially Germany and England have developed what we today call maneuver warfare. As a natural result in the development of how to wage war, new ideas of how success would be achieved also came forth. The idea of an indirect approach was revolutionary and gained a strong foothold in how we today perceive war making.  In maneuver warfare a new philosophy of leadership has also been given wide recognition, today mission tactics is spread throughout the world.</p><p>The Swedish armed forces basic concept of operations is maneuver thinking. This has its roots in the German and English doctrines developed during the time between the first and second world wars. Its leadership philosophy is mission tactics and can bee seen and identified throughout the Swedish armed forces structure.</p><p>This essay researches and discusses the meaning of the term tempo in maneuver warfare, both as physical movement and as a decisive cycle. I have come to these conclusions; initiative is key to success, initiative is won thru acting offensively with mission tactics as a base.</p>

This paper thoroughly studied the childhood, education, and job experiences of Hu Jintao, the present leader of Chinese Communist Party, and analyzed his personalities and cultural cultivation to understand his political character, behavior, and the thinking about policy on Taiwan. This paper includes six chapters. Chapter one includes the motive, objective, and the research method. Chapter two talks about the childhood of Hu Jintao. Chapter three describes how Hu became the fourth successive leader of Communist Party of China. Chapter four compares the 4 successive leaders and their policies on Taiwan. Chapter five discusses the consideration of Communist Party of China between its policy on Taiwan and international situation. Chapter six, the conclusion of this paper, brings out some suggestions for future thinking about foreign strategy toward China. After the 1949 civil war in China, the Government reined by Kuomintang withdrew to Taiwan and the Communist Party of China won the political power of China. It has been 60 years since the People¡¦s Republic of China was established on October 1st 1949. All of the 4 successive leaders claimed that there is only on China in the world, and Taiwan is part of China. Therefore, there were Mao Zedong¡¦s force liberation to peaceful liberation, Deng Xiaoping¡¦s peaceful liberation to ¡§one country with two systems,¡¨ Jiang Zemin¡¦s continuous ¡§one country two systems¡¨ based on Hong Kong experience, and Hu Jintao¡¦s two-side strategy ¡X ¡§milder for the milds, and firmer for the firms¡¨ and ¡§One country two systems for peaceful union.¡¨ Based on the above-mentioned background, this study compared the successive 4 leaders¡¦ breeding, learning, personalities, statecraft, leadership, value of life, and the policy on Taiwan collection and analysis of papers, periodicals, dissertations, scholars¡¦ writings, governmental publication, statistics, researches, records issued in China, and foreign periodicals, dissertations, and writings. Hopefully, the results were expected to be helpful to reveal China¡¦s strategies for Taiwan by describing in detail about the origins, historical causes, and possible future development between Taiwan and China. The final goal is helping China and Taiwan to understand each other more deeply and to have more friendly interactions, thus there would be more opportunities for the two parities to cooperate and benefit both sides.

Manövertänkandet har vuxit fram som ett resultat av ny tekniks tillämpning i gammal krigföring. Framförallt Tyskland och England har utvecklat det vi idag kallar manöverkrigföring. Kopplat till den utvecklingen uppkom nya teorier om framgångsfaktorer i striden. Idén om den indirekta metoden var banbrytande och fick stort genomslag för dagens syn på krigföring. Inom manöverkriget fick även en ny ledningsmetod utrymme att växa sig stark, uppdragstaktiken är nu vida spridd runt om i världens försvarsmakter. Svenska försvarsmaktens grundläggande koncept för insatser med alla svenska förband är manövertänkandet. Detta manövertänkande har sina grunder i de tyska och engelska teorierna från mellankrigstiden. Dess ledningsmetod är uppdragstaktiken och genomsyrar hela den svenska militära strukturen.  Uppsatsen undersöker och diskuterar tempots betydelse för manöverkrigföringen, dels som fysisk rörelse men även som en beslutscykel. Jag har kommit fram till följande resultat; initiativet är nyckeln till framgång, initiativ vinns genom ett offensivt agerande med uppdragstaktiken som grund. / Maneuver warfare has gradually developed as a result of new technology being used in old ways to wage war. Especially Germany and England have developed what we today call maneuver warfare. As a natural result in the development of how to wage war, new ideas of how success would be achieved also came forth. The idea of an indirect approach was revolutionary and gained a strong foothold in how we today perceive war making.  In maneuver warfare a new philosophy of leadership has also been given wide recognition, today mission tactics is spread throughout the world. The Swedish armed forces basic concept of operations is maneuver thinking. This has its roots in the German and English doctrines developed during the time between the first and second world wars. Its leadership philosophy is mission tactics and can bee seen and identified throughout the Swedish armed forces structure. This essay researches and discusses the meaning of the term tempo in maneuver warfare, both as physical movement and as a decisive cycle. I have come to these conclusions; initiative is key to success, initiative is won thru acting offensively with mission tactics as a base.

I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan. Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften. / Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan. The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.

NATO, USA, Storbritannien och Ryssland m.fl. använder sig av stridsuppgiften räd för markstridskrafter och erfarenheter från bl.a. Irakkriget 2003 visar att de kan få stor betydelse. Räder anses överensstämma med manöverteorin, men räder återfinns inte som stridsuppgift för svenska markstridskrafter. Denna uppsats analyserar stridsuppgiften räd för markstridskrafter, operationaliserar två indikatorer för räder och med hjälp av dessa undersöks hur räder är förenligt med FM nuvarande doktrin och Reglemente för Markoperationer (RMO). Undersökningen visar att räder inte är förenliga med nuvarande doktrin och RMO. Bl.a. så uppfattas det sakna överensstämmelse att avsiktligt inte bibehålla öppna landförbindelser. Däremot är delar av indikatorerna direkt eller indirekt att anse som förenliga. / NATO, USA, Great Britain and Russia are among others using the task raid for ground forces and experiences from e.g. the war in Iraq 2003 have shown that they could have great importance. Raids are considered to correspond to manoeuvre theory, but raids are not to be found as a task for Swedish ground forces. This paper is analyzing the task raid for ground forces, developing two indicators for raids and with the help of these examining how raids are compatible with the armed forces present doctrine and field manual for ground operations. The investigation shows that raids are not compatible with the present doctrine and field manual for ground operations. E.g. is it considered to disagree not to keep land lines of communications open. Parts of the indicators are however directly or indirectly considered compatible.