Background:           This thesis was written in context of the debate concerning gender equality and female representation on company boards. Gender quota legislation have been implemented by various countries on a national level, and a similar regulation was proposed by the European Commission. Legislation regarding board gender diversity have given rise to the discussion on the actual effects of female director’s on board effectiveness and firm financial performance.   Purpose:                  The aim of the study is to evaluate the relationship between gender diversity on boards and firm financial results. A sample of 100 Swedish companies listed on Nasdaq Stockholm for the time period 2013-2016 is analysed.    Method:                    The study had a quantitative approach and used a panel data methodology. The data analysis was conducted using Ordinary Least Square Regression. Board gender diversity was measured by four variables including the diversity measurements Blau and Shannon indices, and Tobin’s Q was deployed as the market-based measurement of financial performance.   Conclusion: The results of the data analysis indicate that the presence of one or more women has a positive effect on financial performance, which contradicts previous findings. Also, it is found that higher gender diversity on boards influenced firm performance positively, which conformed to the majority of the previous findings.

There are no clear studies that explain whether there is a relationship, but many authors point out advantages of having female participation in boards of directors; Catalyst (1995) states that increasing diversity, there is a plurality of opinions in the boardroom; and Bilimoria (2006) states that women deliver the best strategies and ensure better behavior at meetings. Likewise, Kuczynski (1999), said that a more diverse boardroom can handle problems between members better and it can lead to better decisions, so it is seen as a less risky company, therefore, it is expected that the presence of women improve organizational performance.This study aims to identify the participation of women on the boards of directors of 60 companies in Fortune 500 in 2014 (Fortune, 2014). A qualitative Logit regression was applied in order to establish a relationship between genderdiversity in directive boards and the company’s performance.The participation of women in American companies has increased; however, numbers remain low compared to men because, on average a board of directors has 11 members, and on average 9 are men and 2 are women. There are companies that do not include women in the boardroom. In this research, we conclude that gender is not a significant statistical variable involved in the performance of a company. / No existen estudios claros que expliquen si existe una relación entre el sexo de los directores y su rendimiento; sin embargo, muchos estudios señalan ventajas de contar con participación femenina dentro de los consejos de administración.Catalyst (1995) indica que, al aumentar la diversidad, incrementa la pluralidad en las opiniones del directorio.Por su parte, Bilimoria (2006) expresa que el género femenino entrega mejores estrategias y asegura un mejor comportamiento en las reuniones. A su vez, Kuczynski (1999) afirma que un directorio más diverso puede enfrentar de mejor manera los problemas entre miembros y genera mejores decisiones, por lo que una compañía es vista como menos riesgosa; por ello, una directora debería mejorar el desempeño de la compañía.A partir de ello, este estudio pretende identificar la participación de la mujer en los directorios de una muestra de 60 empresas del ranking Fortune 500 año 2014 (Fortune, 2014), con el fin de establecer una relación entre la diversidadde sexo en los directorios y el rendimiento de una empresa, mediante una regresión cualitativa Logit.La participación de la mujer en los directorios de compañías estadounidenses ha aumentado; no obstante, sigue siendo débil en comparación con la de los hombres: en promedio, el directorio está compuesto por once miembros, de loscuales, aproximadamente, nueve son hombres y dos, mujeres. Hay compañías que no incluyen mujeres en las juntas.En esta investigación, se concluye que el sexo no es una variable estadísticamente significativa que interviene en el rendimiento de una organización. / Não há estudos claros que explicam a existência de uma relação entre o gênero dos diretores e o desempenho empresarial. No entanto, muitos estudos apontam vantagens de ter participação feminina na diretoria. Catalyst (1995) indica quea diversidade aumenta a pluralidade de opiniões. Enquanto isso, Bilimoria (2006) afirma que as mulheres proporcionam melhores estratégias e garantem um melhor comportamento nas reuniões. Por sua vez, Kuczynski (1999) afirmaque uma diretoria mais diversificada pode enfrentar melhor os problemas entre os membros e gerar melhores decisões, de modo que uma empresa é vista como menos arriscada; portanto, uma diretora deve melhorar o desempenho daempresa.Este estudo tem como objetivo identificar a participação das mulheres na diretoria de 60 empresas da Fortune 500, 2014 (Fortune, 2014), a fim de estabelecer uma relação entre a diversidade de gênero na diretoria e o desempenho de uma empresa através da regressão Logit qualitativa.A participação das mulheres na direção de empresas norte-americanas aumentou; no entanto, continua baixa em comparação com a dos homens: em média, o conselho de administração é composto por 11 membros, dos quais 9 são homens e 2 mulheres. Ainda existem empresas que não incluem mulheres nos conselhos. Nesta pesquisa, concluímos que o gênero não é uma variável estatisticamente significativa que afete o desempenho de uma organização.

A governança corporativa visa aumentar a probabilidade dos fornecedores de recursos garantirem para si o retorno sobre seu investimento, por meio de um conjunto de mecanismos no qual se inclui o Conselho de Administração. O tema possui importância crescente, por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que a estrutura de governança afeta o valor da empresa. A questão é descobrir se existe uma estrutura de governança corporativa "melhor" ou "ideal". Vários códigos de governança foram elaborados com este intuito. No Brasil, destacam-se os códigos do Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa (IBGC) e da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). Esta dissertação investiga se a estrutura de governança corporativa foi relevante para as companhias abertas brasileiras de 1998 a 2000 e se as companhias adequadas às recomendações do IBGC e da CVM alcançaram maior valor de mercado ou melhor desempenho. Três variáveis de governança foram consideradas: separação dos cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho (DE), tamanho do conselho (TOT) e independência do conselho (INDEP). Utilizou-se uma regressão múltipla do tipo seção transversal entre as variáveis dependentes de valor e desempenho e as variáveis independentes de governança corporativa. A variável diretor executivo como presidente do conselho (DE) apresentou os resultados mais importantes, com forte evidência de que, em média, as empresas que têm pessoas distintas ocupando os cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho são mais valorizadas pelo mercado. A variável tamanho do conselho (TOT) apresentou uma relação certamente não linear, sugerindo que as empresas com um número intermediário de conselheiros alcançam melhor desempenho. A variável independência do conselho (INDEP) não apresentou relação significativa contra as variáveis de valor e desempenho. / Corporate governance seeks to increase the probability that suppliers of financial resources will assure themselves the return on their investment through a set of mechanisms including the Board of Directors. The subject has growing importance, because it is well spread the hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value. The question is to find out if there is a "better" or "ideal" corporate governance structure for the firm. Several corporate governance codes were prepared with this purpose. In Brazil, we highlight the IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance) and the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) codes. This dissertation investigates if the corporate governance structure was important to Brazilian listed companies from 1998 to 2000 and if the companies more adjusted to the IBGC and CVM recommendations achieved higher market value or superior performance. Three governance variables were considered: the separation of chief executive officer and chairman positions (DE), board size (TOT), and board independence (INDEP). The multiple regression method with cross sectional data was applied between firm value and performance dependent variables and corporate governance independent variables. The variable chief executive officer as chairman (DE) has showed the most important results, with strong evidence that, on average, firms with different people in charge of the chief executive officer and chairman positions have higher market value than the others. The variable board size (TOT) has showed a clear non linear relation, suggesting that firms with an intermediate number of directors achieve superior performance. The variable independence of the board (INDEP) has not showed a significant relation against the variables of value and performance.

Atuando como principal mecanismo interno para a diminuição dos custos de agência entre acionistas e gestores, entre acionistas controladores e minoritários, o conselho de administração possui um papel fundamental na governança corporativa das empresas. Por esta razão, o objetivo deste estudo é analisar o papel do conselho de administração. Analisamos o caso concreto da maior instituição financeira do país: o caso do Banco do Brasil e busca-se identificar a sua contribuição para a atual política de governança corporativa adotada pela instituição. É importante destacar a relevância do Banco do Brasil no cenário econômico, político e social nacional. Trata-se da maior instituição financeira da America Latina, alcançando recentemente a marca de R$ 755.706 milhões de ativos administrados. Como uma empresa de economia mista, tem como seu principal controlador o governo federal, com participação de 59,2% do capital total, tornando a sua administração, constantemente, alvo de dúvidas e incertezas por parte dos investidores. Veremos que o Banco do Brasil através de sua alta cúpula e principalmente do conselho de administração vêm sinalizando estar engajado em diminuir estas incertezas do mercado e demonstrar mais transparência em suas operações, adotando melhores práticas de governança corporativa em sua gestão. Esta forte preocupação já lhe rendeu resultados, pois em junho de 2006 o BB tornou-se a primeira empresa federal a ser listada no Novo Mercado da Bovespa. / Acting as the main internal mechanism to reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority shareholders, the board has a key role in corporate governance of companies. For this reason, the objective of this study is to analyze the role of the board. We analyze the case of the largest financial institution in the country: the case of Bank of Brazil and try to identify their contribution to the current corporate governance policy adopted by the institution. Importantly, the relevance of the Bank of Brazil in the economic, political and social national. It is the largest financial institution in Latin America, recently reached the mark of R $ 755,706 billion of assets under management. As a mixed economy company, has as its main controller the federal government, with participation of 59.2% of total capital, making its administration, constantly subject to doubt and uncertainty among investors. We will see that the Bank of Brazil through its high dome and above the board have indicated to be engaged in reducing these uncertainties in the market and demonstrate greater transparency in its operations by adopting best corporate governance practices in its management. This concern has earned him strong results, because in June 2006, BB became the first federal company to be listed in the New Market from Bovespa.

Em virtude de sucessivas crises e fraudes envolvendo grandes empresas ocorridas nos últimos anos, a sociedade e os governos passaram a buscar novas formas de controle, além de revitalizar antigas formas que haviam sido deixadas de lado. Sendo o Comitê de Auditoria (CA) uma das fontes mais importantes de controle dentro das atuais necessidades das organizações, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo identificar e analisar os aspectos mais relevantes que o caracterizam. Diversos regulamentos e orientações para regular este órgão (CA), tal como a lei Sarbanes-Oxley, foram criados tanto no Brasil como no exterior e uma comparação entre os normativos e orientações das autoridades e organismos brasileiros com os normativos internacionais foi efetuada. Como contribuição ao conhecimento sobre o tema, uma pesquisa documental foi desenvolvida em 112 empresas de grande porte no Brasil, identificando as principais informações sobre o comitê de auditoria, evidenciadas por essas organizações, utilizando o canal de comunicação da internet. Um índice para efetuar comparações entre as empresas foi criado: o Índice de Disclosure do Comitê de Auditoria (IDCA). Os resultados mostraram que a maioria das empresas componentes da amostra não apresentou um grau de evidenciação sobre o Comitê de Auditoria que permita uma visualização efetiva sobre esse organismo nas organizações pesquisadas. / Successive crises and frauds involving large companies in recent years have driven the society and the governments to seek new forms of control and to revive old forms previously set aside. Since the Audit Committee (AC) is one of the most important sources of control within present needs of the organizations, this research aims to identify and analyze the most relevant aspects that characterize audit committees. Various regulations and guidelines, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were created to regulate AC in Brazil and other countries as well, so a comparison was performed between the Brazilian regulations and guidelines produced by Brazilian and international authorities and regulatory bodies. As a contribution to the knowledge on the subject, a documental research was performed in 112 large companies in Brazil to identify the main information on audit committees disclosed by these organizations using the Internet communication channel. An index to compare companies disclosure on audit committees was created (IDCA). The findings show that most companies of the sample did not present a level of disclosure on the IDCA index to allow an effective view of the audit committee in these organizations.

O estudo da responsabilidade civil dos administradores de companhias abertas na doutrina nacional trata usualmente dos deveres fiduciários, do ato regular de gestão e da teoria ultra vires, da culpa ou dolo do administrador, das ações ut universi e ut singuli e da solidariedade entre a responsabilidade do administrador e a da companhia. Poucos abordam as causas extintivas dessa responsabilidade, e raro são os que tratam da hipótese de exclusão de responsabilidade do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76. Como a disciplina dos deveres fiduciários prevista na lei societária brasileira tem forte influência do Direito norte-americano, buscou-se na legislação, doutrina e jurisprudência daquele país os fundamentos necessários à melhor interpretação e aplicação da regra de exclusão e, em especial, na business judgment rule, doutrina que protege os administradores contra responsabilização por prejuízos à companhia decorrentes de decisões por eles adotadas, proteção esta também conferida pela hipótese do artigo 159, § 6º, da Lei nº 6.404/76, ao administrador leal e de boa-fé. / The study of corporate directors civil liability in national doctrine usually deals with fiduciaries duties, regular management act and the ultra vires theory, directors malpractice or deceit, ut universi and ut singuli actions and solidarity between directors and companies responsibility. Few address the extinctive causes of such liability, and rare are those who address the liability exclusion hypothesis of the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76. Whereas that the fiduciary duties discipline provided for in Brazilian corporate law has strong influence of American law, was sought in the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of that country the fundamentals for a better understanding and application of the exclusion rule and, particularly, in the business judgment rule, a doctrine that protects directors against liability for damages to the company arising from their acts, protection also afforded by the Article 159, § 6º, of the Law n. 6.404/76, to the loyal and good faith director.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gaudencio Mitsuo Kashio.pdf: 603228 bytes, checksum: c719c552bef66acd8c789eee5e763c59 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-16 / A full-fledged capital market calls for mechanisms that favor the channeling of private funds into long-term investments. The presence of Brazil in the global financial scenario has translated into a robust inflow of foreign capital for investment purposes. Along with this factor, the credibility crisis that affected corporate disclosures (notably prompted by the recent frauds detected in US corporations) has highlighted the importance of institutional practices that focus on greater transparency and on the instrumental role of a body in charge of monitoring and assessing corporate management activities. These practices targeted at protecting investor rights have evolved into what is currently known as corporate governance. The adoption of corporate governance as an institutional policy demands an active presence of the Board of Directors, which is the company s decision-making body that has legal authority (among other duties) to ensure corporate transparency and to control the quality of corporate disclosures. All things considered, a developed capital market counts on the Board of Directors as an effective mechanism for the adoption of good corporate governance practices. / Um mercado de capitais desenvolvido pressupõe mecanismos que favoreçam os recursos privados a financiar investimentos de longo prazo. A inserção do Brasil no processo de globalização financeira resultou em um forte fluxo de ingresso de capital estrangeiro para investimento. Aliado esse fator à crise de credibilidade das informações divulgadas pelas empresas provocada, principalmente, pelas recentes fraudes de companhias norte-americanas, ressaltaram a importância de práticas institucionais que enfatizem maior transparência e atuação de um órgão responsável pela fiscalização e avaliação da gestão social. Essas práticas que visam à proteção do direito dos investidores sintetizam os conceitos de governança corporativa. O exercício da política institucional de governança corporativa demanda a atuação do Conselho de Administração, que é um órgão social deliberativo investido pela lei para, entre outras competências, garantir transparência e um controle de qualidade das informações divulgadas pela empresa. Assim, o desenvolvimento do mercado de capitais passa pelo Conselho de Administração como mecanismo das boas práticas de governança corporativa.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à la gouvernance d’entreprises dans le secteur bancaire. Son objectif est de montrer que la relation linéaire entre le contrôle exercé par le conseil d’administration et la rentabilité des entreprises telle qu’elle est appréhendée dans la littérature peut être perturbée dans le contexte bancaire. La réglementation sur le capital et la prise de risque sont analysées comme variables modératrices et médiatrices de la relation entre l’indice de la qualité du conseil d’administration et la prise de risque d’une part, et entre l’indice de la qualité du conseil d’administration et la rentabilité bancaire d’autre part. L’analyse est menée suivant une démarche comparative internationale entre la France et le Cameroun. En effet, depuis la fin des années 1980, la littérature sur la gouvernance d’entreprises s’est développée dans le sens de trouver des meilleures pratiques de contrôle des dirigeants susceptibles de garantir la performance des entreprises. Or, une revue de cette littérature montre que les différences sectorielles et culturelles ne sont pas suffisamment considérées. Ce constat justifie le choix sectoriel et l’approche comparative de la présente recherche. En employant un système d’équations structurelles résolues par la méthode des moindres carrés partiels sur un échantillon de banques en France et au Cameroun sur la période 2006-2013, et en déterminant un indice composite du conseil d’administration, il s’est avéré qu’un bon score de conseil d’administration a une influence négative et significative sur la rentabilité sur les données françaises mais positive et significative sur les données camerounaises. Il est mis en évidence que la réglementation prudentielle joue le rôle de variable modératrice entre l’indice du contrôle exercé par le conseil d’administration et la prise de risque sur les données camerounaises mais pas sur les données françaises. Par ailleurs, la taille de la banque a un effet quasi-modérateur sur la relation entre l’indice de qualité du contrôle exercé par le conseil d’administration et la prise de risque au Cameroun mais pas en France et un effet quasi-modérateur sur la relation entre l’indice de qualité du conseil et la rentabilité en France et au Cameroun. / This thesis is interested in the governance of firms in the banking sector. Its objective is to show that the linear relationship between the board of directors control and the profitability of firms such as it is analyzed in the literature can be disrupted in the banking sector. The regulatory capital and the banking risk-taking are analyzed as playing a moderating and mediating role respectively on the relation between the board of directors quality index and the banking risk-taking, and between the board of directors quality index and the banking profitability. The analysis is led according to an international comparative approach between France and Cameroon. In fact, since the end of 1980s, the literature on governance of firms developed in the sense to find best practices of control of managers susceptible to guarantee the performance of companies. However, a review of this literature shows that the sectorial and cultural differences are not enough considered. The consideration of this state of thing justifies the sectorial choice and the comparative approach of the present research. We find by using a system of Structural Equations Models resolved by the Partial Least Squares regression method on a sample of banks in France and in Cameroon over the period 2006-2013, and employed and board of directors index that, a good index of board control has a negative and significant association with the profitability in France data but positive and significant impact on the Cameroonian data. It is highlighted that the prudential regulation plays a moderating role between the board control index and the risk-taking on the Cameroonian one but not on the French data. Besides, the size of the bank has a quasi-moderation effect on the relation between the board control index and the risk-taking in Cameroon but not in France and a quasi-moderation effect on the relation between the board control index and the profitability in France and in Cameroon.

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

Diploma thesis in its first part characterizes the executive authority of a joint stock company - the directors and the supervisory body - the Supervisory Board. It focuses on the creation and termination functions of members of those bodies, scope and responsibilities of the institutions and the rights of members of the institutions. The second part focuses on the work of a corporation under U.S. law, a single body - the Governing Council, namely the creation and termination functions, powers, internal relations within the institution, etc. At the end of the thesis two systems are compared, given the common and different features, lists advantages and disadvantages of the systems.