<p>The study aims to explain the role of external causes in René Descartes’s (1594–1650) and Benedictus de Spinoza’s (1632–1677) accounts of the mastery of the passions. It consists in three parts: the mind-body union, the passions and their classification, and the mastery of the passions. </p><p>In the first part I argue that Descartes’s conception of the mind-body union consists in two elements: mind-body interaction and the experience of being one with the body. Spinoza rejects the first element because there cannot be psychophysical laws. He accepts the second element, but goes beyond Descartes, arguing that the mind and body are identical.</p><p>In the second part I discuss the classifications of the passions in the <i>Passions of the Soul</i> and the <i>Ethics</i> and compare them with the one Spinoza presents in the <i>Short Treatise</i>. I explain that <i>hilaritas</i> is an affect that expresses bodily equilibrium and makes it possible for the mind to be able think in a great many ways. Furthermore, I consider the principles of imagination that along with imitation and the striving to persevere provide a causal explanation for the necessary occurrence of the passions. </p><p>In the last part I argue that in Descartes the external conditions do not have a significant role in the mastery of the passions. For Spinoza, however, they are necessary. Commentators like Jonathan Bennett fail to see this. <i>Hilaritas</i> requires a diversity of sensual pleasures to occur. As Medea’s case shows, reason is not detached from Nature. Spinoza attempts to form a stronger human nature and to enable as many people as possible to think adequately. His recognition of the need for appropriate external conditions and a society in which ideas can be expressed freely allows him to present an ethics with a practical application, instead of another utopia or fiction.</p>

No description available.

<p> In his book <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language </em>(1982)<em> </em>Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book <em>Philosophical Investigations </em>(1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´<em> </em>different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.</p><p>This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it <em>is</em>. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.</p> / <p>I <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages</em> (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i <em>Filosofiska undersökningar </em>(1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening.</p><p>Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det <em>är</em>. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet</p>

No description available.

The aim of the present study is to develop a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world ("skepticism", for short), inspired primarily by Hume's "skeptical solution" to the problem of skepticism about induction, but also by epistemological externalism and Wittgenstein's discussion of skeptical doubts in On Certainty. The author accepts certain elements in P. F. Strawson's interpretation of Hume and Wittgenstein, but rejects the "psychological" argument against skepticism which Strawson ascribes to the two philosophers. The problem of skepticism is understood as that of showing that we can know what we in common sense claim to know about external objects, despite skeptical arguments to the contrary. A "moderate" skepticism is accepted, according to which it is possible that we are globally mistaken in our beliefs about external objects, and it is argued that there is in fact no conflict between this moderate skepticism and common sense. A distinc-tion is drawn between two types of "strong" skepticism, which does conflict with common sense: prescriptive skepti-cism, the recommendation to abandon our common sense ways of forming beliefs, by suspend-ing judgement or in other ways; and theoretical skepti-cism, the thesis that we can have no rational grounds for our beliefs about external objects. An argument against prescriptive skepticism is devel-oped, according to which each of three possible forms of prescriptive skepticism is unacceptable. An externalist argument against theoreti-cal skepticism is developed, according to which it is suffi-cient for knowledge that one is in fact not globally mis-taken, whether or not one has grounds for believing this to be the case. It is argued that this variant of externalism constitutes a form of natu-ralistic epistemology, and that it as such fills a gap in Quine's argument for the natu-ralization of epistemology. An interpretation of On Certainty is defended, according to which Wittgen-stein accepts a form of moderate skepticism and presents an argu-ment against strong skep-ticism similar to Hume's.

The study aims to explain the role of external causes in René Descartes’s (1594–1650) and Benedictus de Spinoza’s (1632–1677) accounts of the mastery of the passions. It consists in three parts: the mind-body union, the passions and their classification, and the mastery of the passions. In the first part I argue that Descartes’s conception of the mind-body union consists in two elements: mind-body interaction and the experience of being one with the body. Spinoza rejects the first element because there cannot be psychophysical laws. He accepts the second element, but goes beyond Descartes, arguing that the mind and body are identical. In the second part I discuss the classifications of the passions in the Passions of the Soul and the Ethics and compare them with the one Spinoza presents in the Short Treatise. I explain that hilaritas is an affect that expresses bodily equilibrium and makes it possible for the mind to be able think in a great many ways. Furthermore, I consider the principles of imagination that along with imitation and the striving to persevere provide a causal explanation for the necessary occurrence of the passions. In the last part I argue that in Descartes the external conditions do not have a significant role in the mastery of the passions. For Spinoza, however, they are necessary. Commentators like Jonathan Bennett fail to see this. Hilaritas requires a diversity of sensual pleasures to occur. As Medea’s case shows, reason is not detached from Nature. Spinoza attempts to form a stronger human nature and to enable as many people as possible to think adequately. His recognition of the need for appropriate external conditions and a society in which ideas can be expressed freely allows him to present an ethics with a practical application, instead of another utopia or fiction.

No description available.

In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher. This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life. / I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening. Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

Inom kognitionsvetenskapen växer det på flera håll fram konkurrenter till det synsätt på språklig kognition som förespråkats främst av lingvisten Noam Chomsky. Han har argumenterat för att barns förmåga till att snabbt förvärva språks grammatiska komplexitet, beror på att all världens språk delar en underliggande universell grammatik som finns inkodad i människohjärnan från födseln. Enligt denna syn betraktas grammatik som ett abstrakt regelstyrt system, slutet och utan direkt påverkan från omgivningen. Efterföljande forskning har kommit att visa på många svårigheter för denna hypotes, varvid alternativa ansatser har trätt fram. Som ett resultat försöker många forskare numera istället förklara färdigheter i grammatik som en förlängning av kognitiva och kommunikativa förmågor. Uppsatsen ger en kort bakgrund om Chomskys idéer och hur han resonerade sig fram till sin hypotes. Via en rad olika överväganden utifrån empiriska observationer och experiment, och på området nyutvecklad teori, söks därmed andra förklaringsvägar. Uppsatsen undersöker ett antal implikationer och hur de påverkar forskningen kring språkförmågan.

In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., which attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to facts about how speakers are disposed to employ words - fail to ground the factuality of semantic statements. From this, and other arguments, the far reaching conclusion was drawn by Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there are no semantic facts, that every application of a word is “a leap in the dark”. This position has become known as meaning scepticism. In the present essay, it will be argued that meaning scepticism is incoherent, but that the normativity argument is interesting in its own right. The development of the debate will be traced, primarily through detailed consideration of the writings of Paul Boghossian, who has shifted the focus from the normativity of linguistic meaning to that of belief. It will be contended that even though Boghossian’s attempt to locate a normativity of belief fails, there is a related form of normativity that has to do with the intrinsic badness of false beliefs. Also, suggestions made by Kripke regarding the normativity of intentions will be investigated, and related to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of rationality. The tentative conclusion is that there are some interesting kinds of normativity associated with the intentional, but of a somewhat different variety than those usually discussed.