<p>Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.</p> / <p>This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.</p>

<p>Through the notions of <em>the</em> <em>untimely</em> (l'intempestif) and <em>untimeliness</em> (intempestif) this paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the problematic surrounding and determining the concept of time in Deleuze. By tracing Deleuze's development of the concept of the untimely through Nietzsche and Kant, we are allowed to concretize the concept of time as pertaining to an experience of modernity (modern life), thus enabling us to better determine the place it holds within the philosophy of Deleuze itself - as a constitutive and productive problematic relating directly to the activity of thinking and being philosophically.</p>

This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning. Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world. The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning. It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.

This dissertation treats of the problem of attributing the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause — a problem commonly understood either as a question of distinguishing the cause from the mere conditions or as a matter of singling out, from several causes, one cause, as the cause. The main purpose of the study is to clarify some basic concepts, and some criteria of ascertainment of the cause, that may be discerned in the literature on causal attribution. Special attention is devoted to how the adequacy of causal attributions depends on pragmatic factors. The study begins with an analysis of J. S. Mill’s distinction in A System of Logic between a scientific and a common-parlance approach to the problem of causal attribution. Mill’s assumption that causal attribution in science always requires a universal-law subsumption is then examined in the context of a general discussion of the range of applicability of the covering-law model of explanation. Mill’s scientific and common-parlance notions of cause are compared with R. G. Collingwood’s historical (sense-I) and scientific (sense-II and -III) notions of cause. It is argued that there are purposes of inquiry for which Mill’s common-parlance approach is more relevant to causal attribution in natural science than his scientific approach. And, more generally, it is argued that although law subsumptions are necessary for the ascertainment of the causes, more is often required for explaining the effect. Samuel Gorovitz’s differentiating-factor analysis is discussed, and limitations of the model are identified. The relevance of Morton White’s abnormalistic approach to historical research is also examined. Further, a number of objectivistic approaches are discussed, and it is argued that objectivity is not attainable in causal attributions in a sense in which it always implies an improvement of our ability to attribute the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause.

The thesis investigates how the notion of ‘ontology’ has been used in the field of medical informatics and knowledge representation. Partly to investigate what an ‘ontology’ can be said to represent and what requirements we can have on a good ‘ontology’. The author studies the already existing medical terminologies and ‘ontologies’ to elucidate what theories they are based on. The terminological theories of Eugen Wüster and his legacy in medical informatics are studied. It is noted that terminological theories handling linguistic entities are not suited for describing and representing medical theories, since these are assumed to refer to the real world, which consists of more than linguistics entities. In order to find a metaphysical theory in accordance with the world view that medical theories describe, the author turn to the critical realism of Karl Popper, Roy Bhaskar and Ilkka Niiniluoto. These theories, taken together with the metaphysical theories regarding universals of David M Armstrong and Ingvar Johansson, are used as a basis to find out what an ‘ontology’ can be said to represent, and what criteria and requirements we can have on a good ‘ontology’. Among the requirements presented in the thesis are stability, interoperability and the requirement that a good ‘ontology’ must be in accordance with our best available theories. Finally, it is discussed how these requirements and criteria can come into conflict with one another, and how one should reason when handling these trade-offs. The author emphasises the importance of including the medical expertise in the process of creating ‘ontologies’, in order to produce as useful and relevant ‘ontologies’ as possible. / Avhandlingen undersöker hur begreppet ’ontology’ används inom den medicinska informatiken och kunskapsrepresentation. Dels ämnar avhandlingen att utreda vad en ’ontology’ kan sägas representera och dels vilka krav man kan ställa på en god ’ontology’. Utifrån historiska studier av redan existerande medicinska terminologier och ontologier studeras vilka teorier som ligger till grund för dessa. Bland annat studeras Eugen Wüsters teorier rörande terminologi och hur dennes efterföljare inom medicinsk informatik ser ut. Författaren konstaterar att terminologiska teorier som behandlar språkliga entiteter inte är lämpliga för att beskriva och representera medicinska teorier, då dessa antas handla om en verklighet bestående av mer än språkliga entiteter. För att hitta en metafysisk teori som stämmer överens med den världsbild som de medicinska teorierna beskriver, vänder sig författaren till Karl Poppers, Ilkka Niiniluotos och Roy Bhaskars syn på kritisk realism, vad det gäller vetenskapliga teorier. Detta tillsammans David M Armstrongs och Ingvar Johanssons metafysiska teorier rörande immanent realism och universalia, används som grund för att försöka analysera vad en ’ontology’ kan sägas representera, och vilka krav vi kan ställa på en god ’ontology’. Bland de krav som presenteras i avhandlingen finns stabilitet, interoperabilitet och kravet på att en god ’ontology’ ska vara i enlighet med de bästa tillgängliga vetenskapliga teorierna. Avslutningsvis diskuteras hur dessa krav kan komma i konflikt med varandra, och hur man bör resonera när man hanterar dessa ’trade-offs’. Författaren poängterar vikten av att man tar med medicinska expertisen i skapandeprocessen av ’ontologies’, för att man ska producera så användbara och relevanta ’ontologies’ som möjligt.

The study argues that implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of immigration as human rights is supported by principle of positive freedom, negative freedom, and equal autonomy. The study endorses a liberal egalitarian perspective by claiming that human right to immigrate promotes equal autonomy. The study also investigates why the principle of immigration as a human right has been dismissed by doctrines within Liberalism. It argues that a state lacks a legitimacy to employ a principle of national self-determination against the immigration issue. Instead, a state has a moral obligation to the protection of a human right to immigrate; it also has a duty to provide equal social rights to the immigrants in compared with those of the citizens.

Through the notions of the untimely (l'intempestif) and untimeliness (intempestif) this paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the problematic surrounding and determining the concept of time in Deleuze. By tracing Deleuze's development of the concept of the untimely through Nietzsche and Kant, we are allowed to concretize the concept of time as pertaining to an experience of modernity (modern life), thus enabling us to better determine the place it holds within the philosophy of Deleuze itself - as a constitutive and productive problematic relating directly to the activity of thinking and being philosophically.

The writer has attempted to discuss the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. It begins with a criticism against the possibility for a so-called ‘a possible worlds realism’ to give a “philosophical explanation” of this distinction. The writer argues that this is impossible, since it requires that a notion of this distinction be already accepted (more precisely that the necessity of such a theory is already accepted). After this specific criticism, the writer intends to show that this is a more general problem that follows any explanation of the contingent/necessary distinction. The writer then discusses the counter-argument that the requirements placed on these explanations are set to high, therefore the writer shows in theory the problem can be solved and sketches a more specific way how to explain and show the basis for this distinction. / Författaren har avsett att diskutera distinktionen mellan det nödvändiga och det kontingent. Det börjar med en kritik mot möjligheten för en så kallad ’möjliga världars realism’ att ge en ”filosofisk förklaring” av denna distinktion. Författaren argumenterar för att detta är omöjligt, eftersom det kräver att en sådan distinktion redan är accepterad (mer specifikt att nödvändigheten av en sådan teori redan är accepterad). Efter denna specifika kriticism, så avser författaren visa att detta problem är generellt och att det följer alla försök att förklara den kontingenta/nödvändiga distinktionen. Författaren diskuterar sedan motargumentet att de krav som ställts på dessa förklaringar är för högt ställda, därför visar författaren hur problemet kan lösas i teorin och visar också en förenklad modell av en lösningsmetod.

<p>Uppsatsen presenterar hur högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen (killar respektive tjejer) hanterar informationssökning och källkritik på Internet i samband med studier. Syftet med studien är att se skillnader och likheter i tre sökaspekter (informationsbehov, sökstrategi och källkritik). Sedan vill jag se hur tre sökaspekter används av båda könen bland högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever. Undersökningen är en både kvantitativ och kvalitativ studie. Det kvantitativa inslaget bygger på enkätfrågor och öppna frågor medan det kvalitativa inkluderar intervjufrågor. Teoretisk referensram består av litteratur och vetenskapliga artiklar som ger teoretiskt stöd åt ett operationaliseringsschema och ger grund åt hela studien. Studien begränsas till högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen som går medieinriktade studier, oberoende av årskursnivå. Ett oväntat resultat som studien visade är, att både högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen tittar mest på sina träffar ”Till mitten pålistan”. I studien upptäcktes att högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen har kunskap om källkritik, men det stora problemet hos båda grupperna är ”Tidsbrist” och ”Har inte lust”, så att de undviker granska källor på Internet. Högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen är medvetna om konsekvenserna som kan uppstå om de inte kritisk granskar källor på Internet. Det sökmönster som högskolestudenter och gymnasieelever av båda könen använder är att de först söker med bred sökning och sedan med smal sökning. Deras val av sökverktyg är ”Google” och de söker mest med sökord.</p>

This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have about mathematics. On the one hand, we are inclined to believe that the theorems of mathematics are true. Since many of these theorems are existence assertions, it seems that if we accept them as true, we also commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects. On the other hand, mathematical objects are usually thought of as abstract objects that are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This makes it difficult to understand how we can have knowledge of them and how they can have any relevance for our mathematical theories. I begin by characterizing a realist position in the philosophy of mathematics and discussing two of the most influential arguments for that kind of view. Next, after highlighting some of the difficulties that realism faces, I look at a few alternative approaches that attempt to account for our mathematical practice without making the assumption that there exist abstract mathematical entities. More specifically, I examine the fictionalist views developed by Hartry Field, Mark Balaguer, and Stephen Yablo, respectively. A common feature of these views is that they accept that mathematics interpreted at face value is committed to the existence of abstract objects. In order to avoid this commitment, they claim that mathematics, when taken at face value, is false. I argue that the fictionalist idea of mathematics as consisting of falsehoods is counter-intuitive and that we should aim for an account that can accommodate both the intuition that mathematics is true and the intuition that the causal inertness of abstract mathematical objects makes them irrelevant to mathematical practice and mathematical knowledge. The solution that I propose is based on Rudolf Carnap's distinction between an internal and an external perspective on existence. I argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the notions of mathematical truth and existence is that they are internal to mathematics and, hence, that mathematical truth cannot be used to draw the conclusion that mathematical objects exist in an external/ontological sense.