U.S. led Western Democracies have imposed comprehensive sanctions on the PRC government by ceasing high-level exchanges politically and canceling bilateral cooperative agreements economically in response to the PRC¡¦s 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators. At that time, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping brought up a ¡§24 character¡¨ strategy for China¡¦s foreign and security policy: ¡§observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.¡¨ PRC did not gradually disengage from the U.S. led isolation until the U.S. government resumed high-level exchanges in 1993. The end of the Cold War meant that China was the major beneficiary of greatly reduced superpower penetration, and this strengthened the interregional dynamics of the Northeast and Southeast Asia. After PRC disengaged from diplomatic isolation made by U.S. - led Western Democracies and began to have the power to influence regional security affairs, a China-centered East Asian regional security complex was born. From lack of confidence in constructing in East Asian regional security complex in the mid 1990s, China became active and could rule the RSC after late 1990s. The goal of PRC¡¦s security strategy is to form an anti-U.S.-led East Asia military alliance to protect its national security interest. In the existing regional security complexes, the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum was separated into ¡§ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership¡¨ and ¡§non ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership¡¨ camps in 2003. China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and allowed one of the axis of evil states- Iran to participate in the Organization in 2005. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization will develop into an anti-U.S.-led military alliance under China¡¦s manipulation. In 2003, the U.S. government urged China to play a responsible stakeholder role in the Six-Party Talks instead of being a draft- making secretary. The PRC¡¦s participation in constructing East Asia regional security complexes is analogous to a state that clothed neo-realism but harangued regional security interdependence. On the one hand it reprehends the U.S. East Asia military alliance as an out-of-date cold war thinking. On the other hand, PRC¡¦s military expenditure from 1996 to 2006 shows an annual growth of more than 10 percent. The mutual security in East Asian regional security complexes are still being constructed. China participates in The Six-Party Talks and ASEAN Regional Forum while sometimes it will depend on particular circumstances to make certain contributions, but rules the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with its full strength to keep it operate as China¡¦s political will. The aim of this thesis is to examine the changing characteristics of the regional security complexes in East Asia. The thesis focuses on the foreign policies and strategies of PRC¡¦s participation in those security complexes from mid 1990s. Finally, this thesis will to explore what will impact on the East Asian regional security complex when China participates in and try to construct it, and who will construct whom.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 417-443).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of New South Wales, 2004. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 4, 2006). Includes bibliographical references (p. 423-490).

The dissertation is devoted to the notion of preventive diplomacy. In the first part, various theoretical approaches to the term are discussed, especially regarding the position of preventive diplomacy in the cycle of conflict, and its instruments. A brief overview of regional arrangements and their role in preventive diplomacy is provided, too, since the second main part of the work focuses on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its proclaimed intention to introduce preventive diplomacy in the region. Nonetheless, as the study shows, the ARF participants have not yet resorted to the development of preventive diplomacy. The objective of the dissertation is twofold: besides providing a synthesis and systemization of theoretical approaches to preventive diplomacy, it aims to identify the main obstacles hindering the ARF to implement effective measures of preventive diplomacy. In this respect, it is argued that it is both the set of norms also known as ASEAN Way and the Chinese negative stance that constitute the major reason of ARF's inability to proceed to the stage of preventive diplomacy.

This paper is tried to find out by neo-institutional view if there is China Threat theory or China Opportunity theory. And, it‟s researched interaction of ASEAN and China after Cold War by historic structure analysis, and tried to sum up the Political Economy interaction of ASEAN and China. Researching by historic structure analysis, the Political Economy of ASEAN-China Relations is from "close, separation, and then close." With the trend of globalization and regionalization, both sides understand the importance of cooperation. Besides, the process of institutional cooperation to benefit only care about whether transaction costs are saved, but not consider about self-benefit is more than others countries. Hence, from the point of the neo-institutionalism, there is no absolute China Threat theory or China Opportunity theory. Finally, it could help reduce fraud by the establishment of the system to make cooperation more effective, and reduce sense of mutual distrust. This argument is verified t in this paper.

後冷戰時期的亞太區域安全事務趨於複雜，區域性國際組織日漸興起，其中「東協區域論壇」（ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF）主要作為亞太國家協商區域安全合作的重要機制。本篇論文主要介紹「東協區域論壇」之成立背景、過程，以及其運作之具體成就，進而分析其在亞太區域安全中所具備之功能與扮演之角色。 「東協區域論壇」成立於一九九四年，目前共有二十二個成員國。後冷戰時期亞太區域多邊主義形成，加上區域安全架構面臨重組，使得多邊安全對話機制之形成有其必要。「東協區域論壇」成立之基本宗旨是促使亞太國家針對政治及國防安全議題，培養建設性對話之習慣。「東協區域論壇」在推動區域安全合作機制上，分三階段進行：第一階段為推動「信心建立措施」（Confidence Building Measures, CBMs）；第二階段為發展「預防外交」（Preventive Diplomacy）；第三階段則是發展區域衝突的解決機制。至一九九九年第六屆「東協區域論壇」年會為止，已在「信心建立」上達成可觀的成就，並於一九九七年開始朝第二階段「預防外交」推動。 亞太國家在「東協區域論壇」各項目標的推動下，逐漸對區域安全事務之合作建立共識，對於和緩國際緊張情勢，降低衝突昇高機率，具有正面而積極之意義。惟其組織結構鬆散，屬性為協商安全議題之區域性論壇，雖然「信心建立措施」與「預防外交」的推動實施有其顯著成果，要能夠達到具備解決區域衝突的機制，尚有許多仍待努力之處。 中華民國目前並非「東協區域論壇」之成員國，在中共排擠壓力下，無法參加此一多邊安全對話機制。不過，台灣在未來亞太區域安全政策的規劃上，可將「東協區域論壇」成員國所形成之安全共識，作為研究實施之參考。同時，加強「綜合性安全」（comprehensive security）以及「合作性安全」（cooperative security）目標之追求，尋求各種多邊安全合作之途徑，在亞太區域安全中扮演積極之角色。如此可避免我國安全利益受損，並可增加參與國際社會之機會。 第一章、 緒 論 第一節 研究動機與研究宗旨 第二節 研究方法與限制 第三節 研究範圍 第二章、東協區域論壇之成立與運作 第一節 東協區域論壇之成立背景與過程 第二節 東協區域論壇之宗旨與目標 第三節 東協區域論壇之基本架構 第四節 東協區域論壇之運作模式 第三章、東協區域論壇之成就 第一節 歷屆東協區域論壇年會(外長會議)主要議題 第二節 東協區域論壇推動區域安全合作之各項成就 第三節 東協區域論壇對南海問題之態度與處理方式 第四章、東協區域論壇與亞太強權之關係 第一節 東協區域論壇與美國之關係 第二節 東協區域論壇與中共之關係 第三節 東協區域論壇與日本之關係 第五章、結 論

After the Cold War, international relationships changed from the Yalta System (emphasis on military alliance and arms race led by both superpowers the U.S. and the former Soviet Union) to the Malta System (emphasis on economic and security cooperation). Multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in the Asia Pacific were established one after another under the transition of the whole international circumstance. For purposes of maintaining regional stability, the PRC fully participates in the following meetings: ASEAN Regional Forum¡BThe Four Party Talks¡BAsia Europe Meeting¡BASEAN+3 Informal Summit¡BASEAN+1 Informal Summit¡BASEAN-China Dialogue Session¡BWorkshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. It is a worthy issue to continuously observe whether these mechanisms can indeed shape China as a regional responsible member. On the other hand, we must question whether the PRC's participation is merely a tool that can help achieve other underlying purposes. Accordingly, this thesis will discuss two main subjects. Firstly, we will look into China¡¦s standpoints and strategies for participating in these Asia Pacific multilateral security mechanisms. Secondly, we will examine the Asia Pacific security strategies of the U.S., JAPAN, and ASEAN as well as their standpoints and strategies towards the PRC's participation in the Asia Pacific multilateral security mechanisms.

論文摘要 本文主要之研究在於檢驗東協區域論壇是否具有影響亞太區域安全之效能。首先藉由國際關係理論對於「安全」的闡述，筆者運用新現實主義與新自由制度主義的安全觀與對國際建制的看法，來評析東協區域論壇（ASEAN Retional Forum, ARF）對亞太安全的影響力。隨著國際關係理論的檢視過程中得知，新現實主義與新自由制度主義皆認為東協區域論壇在穩定亞太區域和平與穩定的效用不大。 其次，透過Andreas Hasenclever、Peter Mayer與Volker Rittberger在 Theories of International Regimes文章中所提出關於國際建制（International Regimes）評定的指標，其以新自由制度主義的觀點就（1）建制的「效率」（Effectiveness）指標－建制達成目標與貫徹意志的能力、對成員的影響力，以及決議的拘束力等方面；兼以（2）建制的「彈性－堅實」（Resilience / Robustness）指標－東協區域論壇對於現實事件、衝突的解決能力與成效，藉由國際建制的角度來分析東協區域論壇在建制上的完備與否，來評價東協區域論壇是否合乎所謂區域性「安全」機制的標準。 經由國際建制指標的檢視結果得知，不論在「效率」指標或「彈性－堅實」指標，皆驗證出東協區域論壇是個不健全的國際建制，並非所謂的區域性安全機制，對亞太區域安全的影響力也有限。 再者，經由對於亞太地區的主要衝突點－朝鮮半島核武問題、台海危機以及南海主權爭議等事件的討論，檢視東協區域論壇對於事件的處理、事件所做出的決議以及針對事件所發表的聲明，來評析論壇是否具有解決亞太衝突事件之功能。研究發現，東協區域論壇僅能對於衝突事件做出宣示性質的聲明，不具拘束力的決議，無法要求成員國自制，也使得論壇無法做出有效的解決，更失去了處理亞太區域安全事務的能力。 最終，歸結出東協區域論壇的缺失，以及無法有效發揮其安全建制的原因，筆者認為東協區域論壇最主要的缺失在於「制度化程度太低」以及「決議拘束力不足」，因而導致論壇缺乏安全建制的功能、議題無法被普遍討論、對衝突事件缺乏解決能力以及信心建立措施無法順利推展等問題。透過上述之討論，找出提升東協區域論壇解決事件效能之辦法，俾使其發揮安全建制之功能。 關鍵字詞：東協區域論壇、新現實主義、新自由制度主義、國際建制

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.