The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

This investigation is concerned with determining the impact of the United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision upon the state and federal courts. The first chapter discusses the background behind the 1973 decision and outlines the basic issues. The second chapter examines the decision's impact upon opinions in the federal courts and concludes that Rodriguez has become a significant precedent. While school finance reform is dormant in the federal tribunals as a result of the decision, the third chapter concludes that reform is still possible in the state courts. However, there has been a deceleration in the rate of cases overturning school funding statutes since 1973. The final chapter examines some of the state legislatures and concludes that statutory reform is not necessarily linked to action in the courts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato Romeu Renck.pdf: 847067 bytes, checksum: cc4077af3099f7e2dd49656f8ce62b9e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-12-04 / This doctoral dissertation aims at checking if the Brazilian Supreme Court uses recurrent paradigms, determined from a specific and defined nucleolus of intelligibility, when judging parts involved in quantifying the tax base of the income tax for legal person. The Constitution through the concept of income, establishes limits to the taxing power which must be observed in order not to risk constitutional violation. To formulate such limits, it is paramount the formulation of a verifying procedure of what income means, to confront it with the standards determined by law. Through the jurisprudence research, structuring and reasoning of judicial theses, we want to investigate if the Supreme Federal Court establishes such limits. This reasoning must be present in decision making paradigms justified by rational criteria and accepted by the judicial community. We refute the structure of rationality which justifies the theory of the national tributary law by pointing out its flaws. We use the Hermeneutic Phenomenology which is the most adequate theory to the application of the institutional regulations and it also allows for the inference of the universal tributary concepts into single concepts. It defines the limits of each individual taxation. From the results of this research the following is justified: when the Supreme Court rejects as several judged antecedents and permits that the income be determined by the legislator, it is not taking into account the formation of a judging paradigm for the evaluation of income. As it states that the legislator has autonomy to determine what tribute income is for the legal person, the Federal Supreme Court renounces the constitutional duty to establish an applicable paradigm to the income evaluation procedure which institutes the limits to the power of tribute. Such renunciation empowers the legislator to institute whatever pleases him or her, removing from the context of the income tax any remains of the existence of the Rule of Law / A presente tese tem como objetivo verificar se a Suprema Corte brasileira adota paradigmas recorrentes determinados, firmados a partir de um núcleo de inteligibilidade específico e definido, quando julga processos de apuração e quantificação da base impositiva do imposto de renda pessoa jurídica. Para formular, em teses paradigmáticas, limites ao poder de tributar, impõe-se a pré-formulação de um procedimento verificatório do que é renda pelo STF, para confrontá-lo com os standards determinados pela lei. Busca-se verificar, pela pesquisa de jurisprudência e pela estruturação e fundamentação das teses jurídicas, se o STF estabelece tais limites e se repousam em paradigmas de decisões, justificados a partir de critérios racionais e aceitos pela comunidade jurídica. Refuta-se a estrutura de racionalidade, que justifica a teoria do direito tributário nacional, apontando suas deficiências e se adota a fenomenologia hermenêutica, que permite a inferência dos conceitos universais tributários em conceitos singulares; possibilitando concretizar os limites constitucionais em cada tributação individual. Pelo resultado da pesquisa justifica-se: o STF ao permitir que a renda seja livremente fixada pelo legislador, não apresenta um paradigma de julgamento em relação a um procedimento de verificação da renda. Portanto, ao afirmar que o legislador tem autonomia para estabelecer o que é renda tributável da pessoa jurídica, a Suprema Corte renunciou tacitamente ao seu dever constitucional, não estabelecendo um paradigma aplicável ao procedimento de apuração da base de cálculo do Imposto de Renda, que institua limites ao poder de tributar. Tal renúncia outorga ao legislador estabelecer o que quiser, removendo do contexto do imposto sobre a renda a existência do Estado de Direito

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

The work deals with the constitutional protection of freedom of conscience , religion and autonomy of churches and religious societies (hereinafter Freedoms). The work defines the concept and sources of cofession law . The work defines a framework of constitutional freedoms set out in Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter . The fact that the confession law is not purely theoretical discipline , even in its constitutionally level, is best evident in the next chapter of this work, which deals with the case law of the Constitutional Court concerning Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter . The Essentials focus of this work was to collect and capture the basic content of the decision of the Constitutional Court , in which the above-mentioned articles of the Charter were applied. Decision are arranged according to their content and through their interpretations suggestions for improvements to the existing legislation.are made.

Qu’évoque la motivation ? Comment le droit répressif appréhende-t-il la motivation des décisions de justice ? Le concept de motivation renvoie à plusieurs aspects qui changent son sens suivant le rôle assigné à la fonction juridictionnelle. S’il est compréhensible qu'une seule et unique approche ne s'impose pas, la motivation doit être reconsidérée.Elle est en effet généralement perçue comme un instrument contentieux, l’objectif étant de limiter l’arbitraire du juge. A cette fin, elle appelle un ensemble de règles devant s’imposer au juge. L'examen de ces règles dans le domaine du droit répressif aboutit à un résultat peu satisfaisant. Si la motivation est imposée au juge dans certains cas, elle est en revanche écartée dans d’autres, sans qu’on puisse imposer un critère unique légitimant une telle distinction. La nature objective de son contenu est marquée par des lacunes qui alimentent l’approche subjective de la motivation. C'est lorsqu'il est question de méthode que les contournements sont les plus visibles : la motivation à phrase unique, le copier-coller ou encore la pratique de la motivation pré-rédigée. Au demeurant, le contrôle de la motivation, fut-il exercé par le juge européen, laisse au juge répressif une marge d'appréciation, voire parfois une totale liberté. Du droit de la motivation des décisions pénales, le résultat est finalement contrasté.Ne faut-il pas alors aller plus loin et dépasser cette approche contentieuse de la motivation des décisions pénales ? La réponse est évidemment positive. Pour mieux préserver les intérêts du justiciable, la motivation doit se transformer. Cette transformation se marque par un rapprochement de plus en plus fort entre la motivation et les droits fondamentaux du justiciable. La motivation se révèle en effet être la condition de l'exercice des droits de la défense, en même temps qu’elle s’intègre dans le concept plus large du droit au procès équitable. Dans la dynamique de cette évolution, la motivation -en vue de la compréhension et de l’acceptation de la décision par le justiciable- doit occuper une place centrale. Cela implique d'entrevoir, au-delà des règles imposées au juge de motiver la décision, certaines améliorations afin de parvenir à la reconnaissance d’un véritable droit du justiciable à la motivation de la décision, de sa décision. / What evokes motivation? How criminal law grasps motivation of judicial decisions ?The concept of motivation refers to several aspects that change its meaning depending on the role assigned to the judicial function. While it is understandable that a single approach does not compel, motivation should be reconsidered.Motivation is in fact generally perceived as a litigation instrument for the judge, the main aim being to limit its arbitrary power. To this end, a set of rules are binding on the judge. The review of these rules in the field of criminal law leads to an unsatisfactory result. If motivation is imposed on the judge in certain judicial decisions, it is however rejected in others, and a single criterion justifying such a distinction may not appear relevant. The objective nature of its contents is marked by gaps which feed the subjective approach to the motivation. It is when it is about method that the bypassing is the most visible : the motivation with unique sentence, the copy and paste or the practice of the pre-drafted motivation. Moreover, even exercised by the European Court, control of motivation leaves the criminal judge many appreciation margins, even sometimes a total freedom. Concerning the analysis of the criminal decisions, the right of the motivation ends in a contrasted result.Should we then go further and beyond this litigating approach of motivation? The answer is obviously positive. To better safeguard the interests of citizens, motivation must be transformed. This transformation is marked by an increasing connection between motivation and fundamental human rights. The motivation turns out to be the condition for the exercise of the rights of defense, while it fits into the category of the right to fair trial. In the dynamics of this evolution, the motivation - with the aim of the understanding and of the acceptance of the decision by the citizen - has to occupy a central place. It involves to glimpse, beyond rules compulsory for the judge to motivate the decision, certain improvements in order to achieve the recognition of a genuine right of the defendant for the motivation of the decision, its decision.

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Cardoso Vaitekunas Zapater.pdf: 2994134 bytes, checksum: 9624f0c97cd74f248654c8e7c952dc90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-11 / This study proposes to critically analyze the mechanisms implemented as a result of reforms in the Brazilian civil procedure in the last two decades, that aims to standardize court decisions and expedite procedure. The study sustains that , given the conditions under which the Law operates in contemporary society, these mechanisms are unusable to provide court decisions with predictability nor certainty, because these mechanisms tends to become, themselves, a source of uncertainty and unpredictability. Mechanisms of court decisions standardization, such as the Brazilian binding precedent ( súmula vinculante ), depends upon proceedings and legal requirements that undermine the autonomy of the Legal System s operational code, which exposes the system to attacks from the code of other systems, such as Economy and Politic. Mechanisms to expedite proceedings, such as the Court s monocratic ruling by the reporting Justice, by their turn, engender losses in the system s capacity to legitimate judicial decisions by means of the legal proceeding, which also generates uncertainty regarding the social adequacy of the judicial decision. The present work uses Niklas Luhmann s system theory to describe the conditions under which the Law operates in the society, as well as the interrelated Guilherme Leite Gonçalves s thesis, also based upon system theory, to whom problems related to certainty of Law arises out of modern society s semantic inadequacy to describe a society that no longer can count on the old metaphysic certainty centers of the pre-modern societies. The application of the system theory to the Brazilian s Judiciary is based upon Celso Fernandes Campilongo and Orlando Villas Bôas Filho s theoretical approaches, according to which Brazilian Law is a case of an autopoietic system, to which the system theory may be applied, and that suffers with the overload of burdens arising from its environment and hardship to protect the system s center (the Courts) from such burden, which jeopardize the system s autonomy. With this instrumental, the study analyzes the history of the control mechanisms of Court s interpretation of the Law, upon which standardization of Court decisions is based, as well as its main theoretical references, such as common Law s stare decisis et non quite movere and the recent jurisprudence on equality on the application of Law and the right to a expedite trial / Este trabalho propõe uma análise crítica dos mecanismos de uniformização de jurisprudência e de aceleração do procedimento processual implementados pelas reformas no processo civil brasileiro nas últimas duas décadas. Defende-se que, nas condições em que o direito da sociedade contemporânea opera, esses mecanismos não são capazes de propiciar previsibilidade para as decisões judiciais nem certeza do direito, uma vez que eles próprios tendem a se transformar em fontes de incerteza e imprevisibilidade. Mecanismos de uniformização de jurisprudência, como a súmula vinculante, dependem de procedimentos e requisitos que minam a autonomia do código operacional do sistema jurídico, expondo o sistema a investidas de outros sistemas, como a política e a economia. Por sua vez, mecanismos de aceleração do procedimento, como os julgamentos monocráticos pelo relator, importam em perdas na capacidade de legitimar as decisões pelo procedimento, gerando também mais incerteza com relação à adequação social da decisão judicial. O trabalho faz uso do instrumental da teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann para descrever as condições em que o direito opera na sociedade, bem como da correlata proposta de Guilherme Leite Gonçalves, igualmente baseada na teoria dos sistemas, para quem os problemas de certeza do direito decorrem da inaptidão da semântica da sociedade moderna para descrever uma sociedade que já não conta com os antigos centros de certeza metafísicos das sociedades pré-modernas. Para aplicar o instrumental sistêmico ao Poder Judiciário brasileiro, faço uso das propostas de Celso Fernandes Campilongo e Orlando Villas Bôas Filho, que consideram o direito brasileiro um caso de sistema autopoiético, ao qual a teoria dos sistemas pode ser aplicada e que sofre com a sobrecarga de demandas do ambiente e dificuldade de proteger o centro do sistema (os tribunais) do ônus de lidar com essas demandas, pondo em risco a autonomia do sistema. Com esse instrumental, é feita uma análise histórica dos mecanismos de controle da interpretação judicial do direito, em que a uniformização de jurisprudência se funda, no processo civil brasileiro, bem como de suas principais referências teóricas, isto é, o princípio do stare decisis et non quieta movere da common Law e as recentes construções sobre os princípios da igualdade na aplicação da lei e da celeridade processual

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)