<p>There are no set guidelines on how to interpret the criteria’s in the adjustment rule within the meaning of the companies act. The criteria’s are not discussed in literature and the Swedish case law in this area is very limited. A reason for the limited use of the adjustment rule is the slow and very costly process, which does not grantee the outcome of the case. Because of the lack of case law regarding damages and the adjustment rule it has not been up for discussion. The responsibility of a CEO or member of the board is a very central part in a working company. The rules for damages must therefore work as an incitement for a member of the board or CEO to show care and make decisions the very best of interest of the company. All types of companies involve some form of risk taking. The rules within the companies act shall not discourage the board or CEO to make well calculated decisions that in the end can become a loss-making deal.</p><p>The adjustment rule in the companies act is written in very general terms. This is because of the large type of situations that can occur in a company. Sweden’s and the rest of Scandinavia’s legal systems are very much alike. To try and understand how the adjustment rule is supposed to be processed; a comparison is going to be made with another Nordic country’s equivalent rule, in this case Denmark. This can shed more light on how to interpret the adjustment rule within the meaning of the companies act, and if there are any differences between the two countries in the usage of this rule. If there are any differences, is the difference more beneficial seen to the person who has caused the damage?</p><p>There are only minor differences between the two countries and the usage of the rule. However these differences can be seen at more beneficial to the person who has inflicted the damage, when using Denmark’s adjustment rule.</p>

<p>If an enterprise lacks capital it might be in desperate need of capital contribution to avoid liquidation. One solution to restore the economic balance, is to construct a contract in which the enterprise ensures that capital contribution will be made on given conditions. The purpose with this thesis is to analyze different ways to establish such agreements.</p><p>A capital contribution can be triggered by a call-off from the board of directors to the contributor, or automatically, when the shareholders’ equity falls below 50 percent of the registered capital stock. In the literature, the latter is represented as the most adaptable. A consequence of capital contribution, that automatically triggers when shareholders’ equity falls below the critical point, is that it enables for enterprises to stay at a low economic level. This is because the automatically triggered contribution keeps the economic level just as high as necessary. Thus, the enterprise does not have to perform measures that otherwise would be required, according to the Swedish Companies Act. From that follows, that such agreements enables a possibility for the board of directors to avoid legal responsibility to set up a control balance sheet, controlled by an independent auditor. This indisputably reduces the protection for creditors, which are intended to be protected by the rules in the Swedish Companies Act. Therefore, in my opinion, such contractual terms for capital contributions should not be acceptable. When a board of directors has to trigger the contribution by a call-off, they are instead obliged to define the amount before the contribution can be made. Consequently, preventing inactivity within the board of directors, which must be frequently updated with the financial situation. Accordingly these terms of contract in an agreement of capital contribution, would be more in line with the regulations in the Swedish Companies Act.</p>

<p>Capital accession to a company, without subscription of shares, is exercised when a company is facing a forced liquidation, or when the company wants to obtain capital by a less regulated process than conventional methods of raising capital. The main reason for raising capital in this way is that the accession does not add to a company’s liability in the balance sheet, therefore creating a surplus in the balance sheet. Thus, avoiding a forced liquidation caused by a share capital deficit below the required amount for going concern. However, the contributor of a capital accession of this kind, almost certainly wants reimbursement for his deed when not receiving shares. This can be achieved by a range of agreements between the contributor and the shareholders.</p><p>The question is what arrangements can be done to constitute a sufficient security for the contributor. And further, in which way can these be combined?</p><p>The answer depends on many factors, amongst others, whether there is a possibility to alter the Articles of Association, the shareholders’ financial solidity, and if the risk with pledging of shares is accepted. Ultimately, the decision is an agreement between the contributor and the shareholders, upon the conditions in the given situation. Therefore, there cannot be a single solution to every situation.</p>

<p>According to Swedish tax legislation, investment funds are taxed differently depending on if the are Swedish or foreign. The difference between the investment funds lies within the taxation of received dividends and the opportunity to shift the liability of tax of received dividends on to the funds shareholders. This measure is only available to Swedish funds. The question in this thesis is whether this difference is discriminatory against foreign investors and therefore constitutes a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital stated in article 63 EUF Treaty.</p><p>The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given several preliminary rulings on this type of legislation and its compatibility with the principle of free movement of capital. It is not compatible with the free movement according to the court. The reason is that the consequence of the legislation is less attractive for foreign investment funds because the taxation on received dividends, which leads to less dividends to shareholders. This national measure is therefore a forbidden restriction against the free movement of capital. The Swedish legislation has not been under such ruling from the ECJ, but it can be tested based on ECJ other rulings on the matter. The Swedish legislation has been tested in the domestic county administrative court, (Länsrätten i Dalarnas Län), who concluded that the legislation was discriminatory. They based their reasoning on ECJ case law.</p><p>However it has been stated within the treaty and from ECJ case law, that measures which has the result of a restriction can be justified as long the national rule is not discriminatory. The national rule on received dividends is discriminatory as it hinders investment funds to invest capital were they like and prevents Swedish companies from obtaining foreign capital.</p><p>Based on ECJ reasoning on the matter of tax upon received dividends for foreign investment funds and the aim of free movement of capital the Swedish legislation constitute a restriction against the free movement of capital. This restriction is discriminatory. On those grounds the legislation is no longer compatible with EU-law and a change in the legislation of taxation on received dividends is necessary in order to obtain the requirements EU has on the member states.</p>

<p>Företag vars produkt utgörs av kunskap är en bransch med stark tillväxt, som spelar en allt större roll i dagens internationella handel. Eftersom marknaden inom Europeiska Unionen, (EU), skall fungera som en inre marknad med fri rörlighet, är mervärdesskattelagstiftningen inom EU till stor del harmoniserad, genom ett flertal direktiv, varav det centrala är rådets sjätte direktiv.</p><p>Platsen för tillhandahållandet är det främsta instrumentet inom mervärdes-skatterätten för att undvika att en gränsöverskridande tjänst dubbel- eller icke-beskattas, eftersom det avgör vilken stat som har rätt att mervärdesbeskatta tjänsten. Huvudsyftet i denna uppsats är att utreda och analysera vad som utgör platsen för tillhandahållandet av kunskapstjänster, enligt artikel 9 i sjätte direktivet, och ett delsyfte är att undersöka i vilka situationer tillämpningen av artikeln kan resultera i att en transaktion dubbelbeskattas, icke-beskattas eller på annat sätt snedvrider konkurrensen. Med kunskapstjänster avses framför-allt tjänster utförda av konsulter, konsultbyråer, ingenjörer, jurister och revisorer.</p><p>Platsen för tillhandahållandet kan avgöras antingen genom att tjänsten beskattas där leverantören är etablerad, enligt ursprungslandsprincipen eller genom att tjänsten beskattas där den konsumeras, enligt destinationslandsprincipen. I sjätte direktivet används en kombination av principerna. Huvudprincipen i artikel 9.1 i sjätte direktivet är baserad på ursprungs-landsprincipen, men i artikel 9.2 finns ett flertal undantag från huvudregeln, där tjänsten istället anses tillhandahållen där den konsumeras. Att destinationslandsprincipen tillämpas kan innebära att tjänsten exempelvis anses tillhandahållen där kunden är etablerad eller där tjänsten fysiskt utförs. Avgörande för vilken regel kunskapstjänsten omfattas av är hur den klassificeras. I uppsatsen framkommer att det föreligger tolknings- och gränsdragningsproblem, emellan de olika reglerna i artikel 9 i sjätte direktivet, samt att medlemsstaterna inte tolkar direktivet enhetligt. En oenhetlig tolkning kan leda till att en kunskapstjänst, vid handel mellan två medlemsstater, blir dubbelbeskattad eller icke-beskattad. En oenhetlig tolkning av begreppen fast driftställe och skattskyldig i artikel 9 kan också få samma konsekvenser, eftersom tolkningen av begreppen kan vara avgörande för platsen för tillhandahål-landet.</p><p>När det gäller handel mellan ett EU-land och tredje land kan också icke-beskattning och dubbelbeskattning uppkomma. I ett sådant fall är orsaken dock inte en oenhetlig tolkning av sjätte direktivet. Om dubbel- eller icke-beskattning uppkommer är istället beroende av om det tredje landet mervärdesbeskattar tjänsten eller inte. Om ursprungslandsprincipen eller destinationslandsprincipen används för att avgöra platsen för tillhandahållandet i artikel 9 påverkar dock om en situation av dubbel- eller icke-beskattning kan uppkomma.</p><p>Om en tjänst dubbelbeskattas eller icke-beskattas resulterar detta i snedvridning av konkurrensen, eftersom liknande tjänster beskattas olika. En snedvridning av konkurrensen kan också uppkomma genom att tjänsten beskattas med olika skattesatser. Om ursprungsprin-cipen tillämpas beläggs tjänsten med den skattesats, som finns där leverantören är etablerad. Skattesatserna inom EU inte är harmoniserade, vilket kan resultera i att samma typ av tjänst beläggs med olika skattesatser, beroende av var leverantören är etablerad. Om istället destinationslandsprincipen tillämpas, beläggs tjänsten med den skattesats som finns där kunden är etablerad. Det innebär att tjänsten påförs samma skattesats, oavsett i vilket land leverantören är etablerad. Vid valet av princip måste dock även hänsyn tas till andra kriterier, såsom vilken administration principen kräver och hur enkel den är att tillämpa.</p><p>Kommissionen har lagt fram två lagförslagsändringar rörande platsen för tillhandahållandet av tjänster, som syftar till att bättre anpassa reglerna till dagens handel. Det utgör därför ett andra delsyfte att analysera vilken påverkan dessa har, i jämförelse med de nuvarande reglerna, på platsen för tillhandahållandet av kunskapstjänster. Om reglerna införs kommer de i princip inte att förändra platsen för tillhandahållandet av kunskapstjänster till icke-skattskyldiga. Vid tillhandahållanden till skattskyldiga kommer dock de nya reglerna ha en påverkan på platsen för tillhandahållandet av kunskapstjänster.</p>

<p>It was assumed in the mid 1990s that 60% of all global trade took place within a group of enterprises. With increased globalisation leading to an increase in mergers and acquisitions this figure is most likely higher. Thus intra-company and intra-group transactions form a major part of business. These transactions, due to the association between the enterprises, may not always reflect the conditions that a market with independent actors would dictate. There are various reasons for this, which include not only tax considerations but also difficulties in establishing conditions that reflect those that inde-pendent companies would apply, in other words conditions in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In cases where these conditions are not in accordance with what the state considers as an arm’s length price, the profits of the enterprise located in that state may be adjusted for taxation purposes under transfer pricing provisions.</p><p>The complexity of transfer pricing rules and the various methods for establishing an arm’s length price result in different interpretations and increased uncertainty for multinational enterprises that often face different rules for determining a correct transfer price. Therefore, enterprises may often face transfer pricing adjustments of their profits due to the complexity and differences in transfer pricing legislation. Transfer pricing adjustments potentially lead to unresolved double taxation, in fact business reports have indicated that 42% of the transfer pricing adjustments lead to double taxation. Therefore it is imperative to have legal mechanisms that resolve potential double taxation.</p><p>The Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (Arbitration Convention) was adopted to give the multinational enterprises, facing double taxation due to adjustments of their profits, a remedy that obliged the states to resolve the double taxation. This was the first, and is still the only, EC-wide mechanism that technically guarantees that transfer pricing double taxation is resolved and thus holds a great improvement over other existing mechanisms to resolve double taxation. The Arbitration Convention was originally a proposed EC Directive but was transformed into a intergovernmental convention. This has resulted in that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has no jurisdiction to interpret the Arbitration Convention or its application. Furthermore there is no supranational or international organ that could take action against states that interpret or apply the Conven-tion in an unintended manner. The chosen legal form has also resulted in different interpretations as to what status the Arbitration Convention has compared to bilateral tax conventions, and thus whether it precedes them. This could prove troublesome when future bilateral treaties are concluded or where there already exist tax treaties that have different solutions to transfer pricing related double taxation.</p><p>The risk of the Convention being interpreted differently is greatly increased by the various undefined terms and lack of precise provisions in the Convention. Therefore, the Convention has been subject to an inconsistent application and interpretation from the date it came into effect in 1995. The Convention was only given a five year life span, after which it was destined to be renewed if the contracting states so expressed, involving the same ratification process as at the initial acceptation of the Convention. However, as this was inefficient, a Prolongation Protocol was signed to amend the Convention with an automatic extension of its life. As it took till 2004 for this Protocol to be ratified and finally enter into force on 1 November 2004 it created one of the main interpretation and application differences in the life of the Convention.</p><p>The function of the Convention’s procedures and thus its efficiency in resolving double taxation is impeded by the numerous interpretation differences and lack of precise pro-visions in the Convention. The fact that there is no way to guarantee that the provisions of the Convention are precisely followed, partly since there are uncertainties regarding the precise interpretation but also partly since there is no organ that could enforce a uniform application of the Convention, further impedes the efficiency of the Convention, which is clearly seen in practice.</p><p>Another question of interpretation and application raised is that, although the Convention was originally intended as a means for resolving transfer pricing related double taxation, there have been arguments that the Convention could apply to double taxation due to provisions concerning thin capitalisation as well. These provisions bring about similar conditions as those the Convention requires for its applicability and, although a different area of law, the connections in the conditions are many and undeniable.</p>

<p>This master’s thesis deals with the transfer pricing of intangibles and focuses on the U.S. standard commensurate with income. This standard has been accused of being incompatible with the overriding principle of transfer pricing, the arm’s length standard, and is not endorsed by the OECD. Recent developments on the topic include the introduction of a similar provision in Germany. The purpose is to evaluate the standard’s compatibility with the arm’s length standard and to establish the current position of the concept of commensurate with income.</p><p>To meet this purpose the thesis first describes the inherent problems surrounding transfer pricing of intangibles as well as provides a background to transfer pricing in the U.S. The focus then shifts towards the history, application and criticism of the commensurate with income standard. The thesis also gives an account of the OECD’s and Germany’s positions on the matter. In the final analysis the compatibility with the arm’s length standard is examined from two angles; the commensurate with income standard’s valuation approach on one hand and its use of hindsight on the other.</p><p>The commensurate with income standard uses an income approach to valuation of transfers of intangibles instead of the market approach recommended by the OECD. This may lead to overvaluation of intangibles and is not strictly in line with the arm’s length standard. The German commensurate with income provision is more in line with the market approach and is therefore more compatible with the arm’s length standard in this aspect.</p><p>The commensurate with income standard allows adjustments to transfer prices with the benefit of hindsight. The actual income from a transferred intangible is thus used as evidence as to whether or not the original transfer price was set reasonably. The OECD is of the opinion that only information known at the time of the transfer should be used, but makes an exception for the particular situation when a tax authority can prove that unrelated parties would have adjusted transfer prices retroactively. The point made here is that the commensurate with income standard places the burden of proof on the taxpayer, while the OECD places it on the tax authority. This allows the OECD to stay true to the arm’s length standard, while the U.S. and Germany deviates somewhat from it.</p><p>However, there is no exact manner in which to define the arm’s length standard, and even the OECD deviates from it more or less. The commensurate with income standard may be one step further away from the purest definition of it but not a complete deviation. The German version of commensurate with income manages to target the same problem while staying closer to the arm’s length standard. Germany has thereby found a middle way and might hold the solution to finding a consensus between the OECD and the U.S.</p>

<p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida de nya reglerna angående ränteavdragsbegränsningar är förenliga med EG-fördragets fria etableringsrätt och om reglerna inte anses vara det - huruvida en sådan inskränkning kan rättfärdigas.</p><p>De nya reglerna avser en begränsning av avdragsrätten för ränteutgifter och gäller vid räntebetalningar mellan företag i intressegemenskap. Avdrag för ränteutgifter får göras under förutsättning att den inkomst som motsvarar ränteutgiften skulle ha beskattats med en skattesats som uppgår till minst tio procent (tio-procentsregeln) enligt lagstiftningen i den stat där det företag i intressegemenskapen som faktiskt har rätt till ränteinkomsterna hör hemma, om företaget bara skulle ha haft den inkomsten. Avdrag får även göras för ränteutgifter i de fall såväl förvärvet som den skuld som ligger till grund för ränteutgifterna är huvudsakligen affärsmässigt motiverade. Regeln är ett alternativ till tio-procentregeln och gäller därmed även i de fall ränteinkomsten inte beskattas med minst tio procent. Med ordet huvudsakligen avses 75 procent eller mer.</p><p>De svenska reglerna om ränteavdrag är tillämpliga på dotterbolag med både inhemska och utländska moderbolag. Reglerna får till följd att behandlingen av dotterbolag med inhemskt moderbolag skiljer sig från den av dotterbolag med utländskt bolag eftersom reglerna får den <em>effekten</em> att avdragsförbudet endast drabbar dotterbolag med utländskt moderbolag (under förutsättning att beskattningen är lägre än tio procent samt att transaktionen har affärsmässiga motiv som understiger 75 procent). Reglerna medför att det blir mindre attraktivt för bolag med moderbolag i andra medlemsstater att utöva etableringsfriheten och moderbolagen kan på grund av detta komma att avstå från att bilda eller bibehålla etableringar i Sverige där en sådan bestämmelse finns. EG-domstolen menar att detta resonemang även är tillämpligt då det lånegivande bolaget istället är det utländska moderbolagets dotterbolag som i likhet med moderbolaget är hemmahörande i en annan medlemsstat. Enligt vår mening utgör därför de nya reglerna en inskränkning av den fria etableringsrätten i enlighet med artikel 43 och 48 EG.</p><p>En av de rättfärdigandegrunder som kan motivera en inskränkning av den fria etableringsrätten är skatteflykt. EG-domstolen är beredd att pröva skatteflykt som rättfärdigandegrund under förutsättning att reglerna har som syfte att hindra rent konstlade upplägg. Det är därmed tillåtet att försöka minimera sin skattebörda genom att etablera sig i andra medlemsstater så länge som de åtgärder som bolagen vidtar inte medför att vinstmedlen överförs genom konstlade upplägg.</p><p>Ett konstlat upplägg definieras av EG-domstolen som en etablering där ingen faktiskt ekonomisk verksamhet bedrivs. Ett riktmärke kan till exempel vara att lokaler, personal eller utrustning saknas. Förekommer det således affärsmässiga skäl anser vi att det inte kan röra sig om ett konstlat upplägg eftersom ett rent konstlat upplägg enligt definitionen ska sakna faktisk ekonomisk verksamhet. En affärsmässighet om 75 procent och ett konstlat upplägg om 25 procent är därmed omöjligt då ett konstlat upplägg i stort sett förutsätter noll procents motiverad affärsmässighet.</p><p>Enligt ”rule of reason”–doktrinen kan en nationell regel endast godtas om den är utformad på så sätt att den faktiskt säkerställer det syfte som eftersträvas och den får inte utgöra ett mer ingripande hinder i den fria rörligheten än vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå syftet med regeln.Eftersom reglerna, med den lydelse de har idag, träffar fler transaktioner än de rent konstlade är de oproportionerliga i förhållande till sitt syfte. De kan därmed inte rättfärdigas och utgör således ett hinder för den fria etableringsrätten.</p>

<p>Abstract</p><p>The freedom of establishment in Articles 43 and 48 EC is a fundamental freedom within the EU meaning that companies are free to set up secondary establishments in any other Member State. The freedom of establishment is an important means to achieve the com-pletion of the internal market and therefore it is important that this freedom is protected. Member States are obliged to legislate in accordance with the objectives of the fundamental freedoms, still Member States are restricting Articles 43 and 48 EC by applying discrimina-tory national legislation regarding direct taxation. In the Cadbury Schweppes judgment from September 2006 the ECJ found the British CFC legislation to be contrary to Community law. The purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent tax avoidance by conferring additional tax upon companies having subsidiaries in low tax states. According to the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, if the CFC rules are too general in its application they are violating the freedom of establishment. Hence, the CFC legislation must be aimed specifically at “wholly artificial arrangements” aimed at circumventing national tax normally payable. Therefore it is of importance, in the context of applying CFC rules, to clarify the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment. It is also important to note that the CFC rules ap-ply even when a subsidiary is established outside the EU.</p><p>The concept of abuse of Community law has been developed through case law and prohib-its companies to improperly use the provisions of Community law in order to circumvent national legislation. Even if an establishment in another State is made to avoid tax in the State of origin, it is not necessarily abuse of the freedom of establishment since companies are allowed to choose to establish subsidiaries in the Member States with least restrictive rules. The ECJ stated that establishing subsidiaries with the sole purpose to benefit from the lower tax regime do not constitute an abuse of the freedom of establishment as long as the subsidiaries pursue genuine economic activity. The criteria for what is regarded as eco-nomic activity has been discussed in both value added tax and direct tax cases. The re-quirements so far is that the subsidiary established has to be physically present in the host State on a durable basis and have staff and equipment to a certain degree. The ECJ has as-sessed the criteria similarly in value added tax and direct tax cases and stated that the activ-ity has to be considered per se and without regard to its purpose or result. The activity also has to be based on objective factors and be ascertainable by third parties.</p><p>The Cadbury Schweppes case is the first case in the area of CFC legislation and the Court has provided little guidance regarding what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement”. As a consequence of this judgement some Member States have already changed their CFC legis-lation to comply with Community law. Nevertheless, there are cases pending before the ECJ that are further questioning the application of CFC rules and how to define a “wholly artificial arrangement”. The judgement of these cases may result in more changes in the na-tional legislation of the Member States. The future development of the difference between use and abuse of freedom of establishment is important for the protection of the principle of legal certainty. A clarification of what constitutes a “wholly artificial arrangement” will improve the foreseeability for companies and their cross-border transactions will be more efficient.</p> / <p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Etableringsfriheten i artiklarna 43 och 48 EG är en av de grundläggande friheterna inom EU som innebär att företag är fria att etablera dotterbolag i andra medlemsländer. Etable-ringsfriheten är ett viktigt medel för att uppnå målen med den gemensamma marknaden och därför är det viktigt att denna frihet respekteras. Medlemsländerna är skyldiga att lag-stifta i ljuset av de grundläggande friheterna, trots det finns diskriminerande skattelagstift-ning som strider mot artiklarna 43 och 48 EG. I Cadbury Schweppes domen från september 2006 fann EG-domstolen att de brittiska CFC reglerna strider mot gemenskapsrätten. Syf-tet med CFC regler är att förhindra skatteundandragande genom att löpande beskatta in-komster från dotterbolag etablerade i lågbeskattade länder. CFC regler som tillämpas gene-rellt är enligt Cadbury Schweppes domen i strid med etableringsfriheten. Därmed måste CFC reglerna tillämpas specifikt på ”konstlade upplägg” som har som enda syfte att undvika na-tionell skatt. Det är därför viktigt att klargöra skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av eta-bleringsfriheten. I detta sammanhang är det viktigt att poängtera att CFC reglerna är till-lämpliga även på dotterbolag som är etablerade i ett icke-medlemsland.</p><p>Konceptet om missbrukande av EG-rätten har utvecklats i praxis och förbjuder företag att missbruka bestämmelserna i gemenskapsrätten för att kringgå nationell lagstiftning. Även om ett dotterbolag har etablerats i ett medlemsland enbart för att utnyttja den låga skatteni-vån är det nödvändigtvis inte missbruk av etableringsfriheten eftersom företag har rätt att etablera dotterbolag i det land som är mest fördelaktigt ur skattehänseende. EG-domstolen har fastställt att etablering av dotterbolag enbart för att utnyttja en mer fördelaktig skattere-gim inte utgör missbruk av etableringsfriheten om dotterbolaget bedriver verklig ekono-misk verksamhet. Kriterierna för vad som anses utgöra verklig ekonomisk verksamhet har diskuterats i såväl mervärdesskatterättsliga som företagsskatterättsliga mål. Hittills uppställ-da krav är att det etablerade dotterbolaget måste vara varaktigt fysiskt närvarande i värdsta-ten samt till en viss grad ha personal och utrustning så att tredje part kan förvissa sig om dess ekonomiska verksamhet. Utvärderingen av den ekonomiska verksamheten måste ske självständigt utan hänsyn till dess syfte och resultat.</p><p>Cadbury Schweppes är det första målet angående CFC lagstiftning och EG-domstolen har endast tillhandahållit begränsad vägledning om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg”. Som en konsekvens av denna dom har några medlemsländer redan ändrat sin CFC lagstiftning så att den överensstämmer med EG-rätten. Icke desto mindre finns det en del oavgjorda mål som ytterligare ifrågasätter CFC reglernas tillämpning och definitionen av ”konstlade upplägg”. Avgöranden i dessa mål skulle kunna resultera i att medlemsländerna måste göra ytterligare ändringar i sin lagstiftning. Den framtida utvecklingen av vad som är skillnaden mellan bruk och missbruk av etableringsfriheten är viktig för rättssäkerheten. Ett klargö-rande om vad som utgör ett ”konstlat upplägg” kommer att öka förutsebarheten för före-tag vilket leder till en effektivisering av deras gränsöverskridande transaktioner.</p>

This master thesis examines the issues surrounding the pricing of intra-group loans. The main focus of the thesis is the process of establishing an interest rate and the assessment of the credit risk in an intra-group context.  In order to expose the common problems associated with the pricing of intra-group loans the thesis has examined case law from two different jurisdictions, Canada and Sweden, which have been put in relation to the OECD guidelines and Swedish national legislation. The purpose of the master thesis has been to determine whether the establishing of an interest rate and the assessment of the credit risk of an intra-group loan should be made taking into account the parent-subsidiary affiliation or relationship and whether or not this is a deviation of the arm’s length principle. A general assumption is that, if a transaction is carried out between related parties, the price could be different from a price deriving from negotiations between two unrelated parties on the open market, due to their commercial or financial relations. A common feature in case law, regarding the establishing of an appropriate interest rate on intra-group loan, has been whether or not the parent-subsidiary should be included in the assessment of the credit risk. Much of the support available to taxpayers in resolving transfer pricing issues are relating to goods and services and not financing transactions. The main reason is the unique economic profile of financial transactions. Financial transactions are affected by different factors why it is difficult to develop usable transfer pricing policies. Establishing economically justifiable transfer pricing policies while attempting to properly reflect taxable income and prevent penalties from international tax authorities, has resulted in transfer pricing challenges that are unique to intra-group financing. According to Swedish law, interest is regarded as a deductable cost within corporate tax. However, in recent cases, the Swedish tax authorities have been questioning, the deduction right as well as the level of interest on intra-group loans. As of today, there are few national and international guidelines on this area thus it is of interest to examine and address the issues surrounding intra –group loans.