This essay is questioning if the state as an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, according to the principle of equal treatment, has the same rights as the other unsecured creditors. The principle of equal treatment means that creditors with unsecured claims are supposed to have mutually equal rights to dividends in a bankruptcy. In the Swedish bankruptcy law from 1987 there are recycling rules which means that some legal actions taken by the bankrupt debtor before the bankruptcy can be recycled to the bankruptcy estate. These rules do not apply on taxes. This essay analyzes whether the state should have this advantage or not. Another issue that’s discussed in this essay is whether or not the opinion of the Court of Appeal that a right of recourse on a claim for a paid Governmental wage guarantee exists before a bankruptcy should be established by the Supreme Court. This essay also analyzes if the rule which statutes that a company representative can become personally liable for the company tax debts should be abolished or not, since this rule means that the taxes on a larger scale than other claims are paid before the bankruptcy.

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Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenska aktiemarknaden sker främst med kontantvederlag, ofta förenat med aktievederlag. Som alternativ till sådant vederlag kan budgivaren erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare ”stub equity” med vilket avses det fall budgivaren erbjuder målbolagets aktieägare en begränsad mängd aktier i ett särskilt onoterat holding- eller budbolag, vilket i sin tur efter det offentliga uppköpserbjudandet innehar samtliga aktier i målbolaget. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur ett sådant erbjudande måste utformas för att vara förenligt med Takeover-reglerna, då i synnerhet den aktiemarknadsrättsliga likabehandlingsprincipen. Det föreligger inga direkt aktiemarknadsrättsliga hinder för stub equity vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, förfarandets förenlighet med regleringen är helt beroende av hur erbjudandet utformas och vilka syften erbjudandet avser uppnå. Möjligheterna att särbehandla målbolagets aktieägare är till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen i regel mycket små. Ett erbjudande med stub equity torde kunna utformas så att mindre aktieägare erbjuds ett kontantvederlag alternativt ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget medan de större aktieägarna enbart erhåller ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget, då mot bakgrund av de praktiska skäl som finns till stöd för en sådan utformning. Budgivaren har därutöver vid ett erbjudande med stub equity möjligheten att erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare A-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot A-aktier i målbolaget, B-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot B-aktier i målbolaget samt en premie för aktier med olika ekonomiska rättigheter. Ett stub equity-erbjudande ställer därutöver krav på erbjudandehandlingens utformning, innefattande att ett värderingsutlåtande avseende värderingen av aktievederlaget bör inhämtas och bifogas samt att målbolagets aktieägare bör informeras om upplägget i erbjudandehandlingen på ett tydligt och lättbegripligt sätt. Vidare torde villkor om viss anslutandegrad för stub equity-delen av vederlaget, villkor om att aktievederlaget med stub equity begränsas samt villkor om att vissa aktieägare ska acceptera erbjudandet vara förenligt med likabehandlingsprincipen. Gällande reglering torde slutligen innebära ett erforderligt skydd för okvalificerade investerare vid erbjudanden om stub equity, detta då möjligheterna att särbehandla aktieägare till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen är mycket begränsade och skyldigheterna att informera okvalificerade investerare om innebörden av ett erbjudande med stub equity betydande. / Public takeover bids on the Swedish stock market are mainly made with cash considerations, frequently combined with share considerations. As an alternative to such public offerings, the bidder may offer the company's shareholders “stub equity”, in which case the bidder offers the target company's shareholders a limited number of shares in a special unlisted holding or bidding company, which in turn after the public takeover bid holds all shares in the target company. This thesis seeks to discuss how such an offer needs to be designed in order to be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation, in particular the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. There are no direct restrictions to stub equity in public takeover bids in the Swedish takeover regulation, the procedure's compatibility with the regulation is entirely dependent on how the offer is designed and what purposes the offer is intended to achieve. The opportunity to treat the target company's shareholders differently are generally very limited due to the principle of equal treatment. An offer with stub equity ought to be able to be designed so that smaller shareholders are offered a cash consideration or a share consideration in the holding or bidding company, whilst the larger shareholders only receive a share consideration in the holding or bidding company. This in accordance with the exception for practical reasons the Swedish takeover regulation permits in these cases. In addition to this, in an offer with stub equity, the bidder has the opportunity to offer the target company's shareholders A-shares in in the holding- or bid company in exchange for A-shares in the target company, B-shares in the holding- or bid company in exchange for B-shares in the target company as well as a premium for shares with different financial rights. Furthermore, an offer with stub equity places high demands on the design and content of the offer document, including obtaining a valuation statement regarding the valuation of the share consideration and informing the target company's shareholders about the structure of the offer document in a clear and easy to understand manner. Conditions regarding certain degree of accession to the stub equity part of the offer, conditions that the share consideration with stub equity is limited and conditions that certain shareholders must accept the offer ought to also be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation. Lastly, the existing regulation ought to entail the necessary protection for unqualified investors when offering stub equity, as the opportunity to treat shareholders differently due to the principle of equal treatment is very limited and the obligations to inform unqualified investors about the meaning of an offer with stub equity are significant.

The study is mainly to reflect on how the two members of the European Union, Sweden and Finland has chosen to implement the directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union. To limit the study the focus has been to investigate the width of ‘conflict of interest’ as well as the width of ‘contracting authorities’. The conflict of interest may appear in all phases within the purchasing process with a risk for unjust advantages for the wanted supplier or the opposite, where a supplier is excluded by purpose. The actual procurement process is presented in the study in a wider context where the procurement document, the publication of the document as well as the establishing of the winning tender is defined as the second phase. The total process of purchasing begins with a first phase, the analysis of the actual need, market orientation and an evaluating of the previous contract. The third phase, contract management, is very critical as the risk of becoming caught altering the contracts during the term is low. Therefore, is not only the conflict of interest connected to the prior involvement of candidates or tenderers that need to be addressed. The regulation of the two national procurement laws does not contain the wider sense of conflict of interest. Instead, one Finnish inferior law, regulating administration and conflict of interest there in, appears to be the most comprehensive legislation to include all organizations that the procurement law applies to. The Swedish regulation as oppose to the Finnish spread out on a general administrative law and a law applied to the municipal organizations. However, this is not including all the organizations that must process their procurations according to law. The legislator refers to the constitutional principle, the principle of equality, and a mandate for the procurement authority to support all procurement organizations that are obliged to implement procurement under public procurement laws. Above is a simplified description of how the procurement directive has been implemented in Sweden and Finland. What has been noted is that is does not appear to be any penalties for those who shows a behavior indicating that there is a conflict of interest in any of the steps of the purchasing process. On the other hand, it is the contracting organization that may face penalties such as a waste of resources when a procurement is reviewed and fails, which means further time spent on yet another process of procurement. A contracting organization that does not manage its contracts according to the stated demands in the procurement might make such incorrect purchases or concessions that could lead to considerable sanctions.