This thesis examines the influence of domestic nationalist movements on bilateral relations between China and Japan. I will use Two-level game theory as the primary analytical framework. Two-level theory provides a useful lens for examining policy formation at discrete stages, domestic, international, and domestic again in order to ratify international agreements. I will examine three primary cases through this framework to study the effects of domestic nationalism on bilateral diplomacy between Japan and China. The East China Sea Dispute is the only actual territorial dispute between Japan and China. The Yasukuni Shrine controversy and the textbook controversy are both discrete elements of a larger dispute over war memory and guilt, as well as construction of historical narratives for political purpose. I will seek to show that domestic nationalism has a strong limiting effect on the ways in which China and Japan are able to interact with each other on the global stage, as leaders must retain their legitimacy against a backdrop of unresolved historical issues and domestic contention. / text

This senior thesis is a study of Putnam’s two-level game theory and how it applies to the Israeli-Arab and later the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, I analyze how Putnam’s theory explains the successes and failures of past negotiations and what this means about the future of potential negotiations. I conclude that win-sets between the Israeli and Palestinian governments are too far apart for the parties to reach a successful peace accord and that until their citizens are willing to make more significant concessions there will not be lasting peace.

The Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP) was a large trade deal that was negotiated between EU and the US under the years of 2013 and 2019. The negotiations for TTIP started with big expectations for both actors but ended without any succeeded agreement. The purpose of this study is therefore to investigate how this trade deal ended in failure despite the big commitment from these two negotiators.  To achieve this purpose, the study was designed accordingly to the theory of Two-level games. A theory that claims that international agreements depends on the domestic political situation. Focus was for that reason put on identifying changes in the political situation in EU and the US.  The method process tracing was then introduced to help identify these kinds of changes. Based on this method, the study found three possible changes that could have stopped the talks of TTIP: The opposition in EU, Brexit, and Donald Trump. To conclude how these three transformations affected the negotiations, evidence describing these three events was collected and thence tested in different process tracing tests. The results of the process tracing tests found that both Brexit and Trump had affected the talks negatively. Moreover, was the study also able to conclude that trade policy of Donald Trump was the factor that lastly ended the negations of TTIP.

China is playing an increasingly large role in the global arena and the relevance of understanding what drives their behaviour in international affairs is thus more important than ever. Earlier research points to how China upholds legitimacy thorugh socioeconomic performance and how this largely influences their behaviour and actions. With a basis in the theory of Performance Legitimacy, coupled with the Two-Level Games theory of the interconnectedness at the national and international arena, this study aims to explore this relationship in further detail. The purpose of this study is thus to examine how internal legitimacy and international behaviour has varied during the time period 1979–2018 and what impact internal legitimacy has on international actions. A quantitive analysis was conducted, using several socioeconomic factors as indicators of internal legitimacy and Chinas outward foreign direct investments as a variable measuring international behaviour. The analysis shows that when socioeconomic conditions within China deteriorate, they tend to pursue assertive foreign direct investment patterns. Furthermore, the effect of this is even more clear comparing the time period before and after the protests at Tianaman Square, pointing to a shift in the upholding of legitimacy and strengthening the argument for Performance Legitimacy.

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過去十年來，人們體認到任何單一事件可能改變一個國家、一個區域，或全世界的政治情況。以歐盟而言，2014年歐洲議會的選舉就是一個很好的例子，許多研究者稱之為政治地震，這個事件可能促使對於「疑歐運動」脫離歐洲統合過程的陰影產生威脅，歐洲會議所呈現的疑歐論調可能被視為是歐盟末日的開端，或僅只是信任的暫時危機。 本研究試圖分析自歐盟成立以來造成疑歐論興起的各項因素。再者本論文也包含2014年歐洲議會選舉對歐洲穩定和各國政治情況的影響，最後作者應用雙層賽局理論尋求疑歐論興起的適當方法，以及歐洲分化的可能問題。很多觀察者宣稱疑歐論團體 對歐洲的統合沒有造成任何威脅，作者建議疑歐論在最近期應被視為主要的問題，歐盟應有效地回應。 藉著解答這三個研究問題，作者建議進一步了解大多數疑歐政治團體所擁有的動力，此外基於雙層賽局理論和折衝的角色，結論亦包含於處理疑歐論的可能意涵。 / In the past decade, people have witnessed that one single event may alter the political situation of a single country, region or even the whole world. In case of the EU, the 2014 European parliamentary election was one of them. Referred to by many researchers as a “political earthquake,” this event made it possible for the euroscepetic movement to emerge from the shadows and pose a threat to the European integration process. The presence of euroscepticism in the European Parliament may be seen as the beginning of the end of the EU or perhaps just a temporary crisis of trust. This study seeks to analyze the factors that contributed to the rise of euroscepticism since the beginning of the EU. Moreover, the impact of the 2014 European parliamentary election on European stability and the domestic political situation is also included in this paper. Finally, the author applies two-level games theory to find a proper solution to the rise of euroscepticism and the problem of potential European disintegration. Many observers claim that eurosceptic parties do not pose a threat to European integration. I suggest that euroscepticism should be recognized as one of the main problems to which the EU must respond effectively in the near future. By answering three research questions, the author gives further insight into the power gained by most of the eurosceptic political parties. Furthermore, based on the two-level games theory and the role of negotiations, the possible implications in dealing with euroscepticism are included in this paper.

Desde o início dos anos 2000, o regionalismo sul-americano vive uma tendência multidimensional, incluindo novas temáticas ao foco das discussões sobre integração, entre elas, a energia. Diante deste cenário, o objetivo central deste trabalho é entender como se dá a formação de preferências do Brasil por um acordo de integração energética. Além dele, foram adotados como objetivos secundários: (i) estudar o histórico da integração energética na América do Sul, especialmente no que tange ao Brasil; (ii) entender o processo de negociação que envolve um acordo, formulando um tipo ideal voltado a integração energética e; (iii) reconhecer os benefícios e as dificuldades que envolvem a opção por um acordo energético de tipo bilateral ou multilateral. A fim de responder a essas perguntas, adotou-se a abordagem de Jogos de Dois Níveis, de Robert Putnam, por sua capacidade em relacionar a dinâmica da política interna com a externa, permitindo a análise do cenário complexo das negociações de um acordo de integração energética. A partir desta pesquisa, viu-se que a morosidade que envolve o processo de integração energética na América do Sul não é resultado apenas da falta de vontade política ou da ausência de um ator que arque com seus custos, mas principalmente da dificuldade em coordenar uma ampla gama de atores, interesses, expectativas e ordenamentos jurídicos, em mais de uma esfera de negociação. Por isso, diante de necessidades pontuais e imediatas, vê-se, por parte do Brasil, a adoção majoritária de acordos bilaterais, sem abandonar, no entanto, paralelamente, as discussões dos foros multilaterais. / Since the early 2000s, the South America regionalism lives a multidimensional trend, including new themes to focus the integration discussions, including energy. In this scenario, the aim of this research is to understand the preferences formation in Brazil for an energy integration agreement. Besides, were adopted as secondary objectives: (i) study the history of energy integration in South America, especially in regard to Brazil; (ii) understand the negotiation process that involves an agreement by formulating an ideal energy integration agreement and; (iii) recognize the benefits and difficulties involving the choice of an energy bilateral or multilateral agreement. In order to answer these questions were adopted the approach of Two-Level Games by Robert Putnam, because of its ability to relate the dynamics of internal politics with the foreign policy, allowing the analysis of the complex scenario of an energy integration agreement negotiations. From this research, it is clear that the length involving the energy integration process in South America is not the result only a political lack or a paymaster absence, but mainly the difficulty in coordinating a wide range of actors, interests, expectations and legal systems, in more than one sphere of negotiation. So, by particular needs, Brazil elects bilateral agreements, without abandoning, however, in parallel, discussions in multilateral forums.

Desde o início dos anos 2000, o regionalismo sul-americano vive uma tendência multidimensional, incluindo novas temáticas ao foco das discussões sobre integração, entre elas, a energia. Diante deste cenário, o objetivo central deste trabalho é entender como se dá a formação de preferências do Brasil por um acordo de integração energética. Além dele, foram adotados como objetivos secundários: (i) estudar o histórico da integração energética na América do Sul, especialmente no que tange ao Brasil; (ii) entender o processo de negociação que envolve um acordo, formulando um tipo ideal voltado a integração energética e; (iii) reconhecer os benefícios e as dificuldades que envolvem a opção por um acordo energético de tipo bilateral ou multilateral. A fim de responder a essas perguntas, adotou-se a abordagem de Jogos de Dois Níveis, de Robert Putnam, por sua capacidade em relacionar a dinâmica da política interna com a externa, permitindo a análise do cenário complexo das negociações de um acordo de integração energética. A partir desta pesquisa, viu-se que a morosidade que envolve o processo de integração energética na América do Sul não é resultado apenas da falta de vontade política ou da ausência de um ator que arque com seus custos, mas principalmente da dificuldade em coordenar uma ampla gama de atores, interesses, expectativas e ordenamentos jurídicos, em mais de uma esfera de negociação. Por isso, diante de necessidades pontuais e imediatas, vê-se, por parte do Brasil, a adoção majoritária de acordos bilaterais, sem abandonar, no entanto, paralelamente, as discussões dos foros multilaterais. / Since the early 2000s, the South America regionalism lives a multidimensional trend, including new themes to focus the integration discussions, including energy. In this scenario, the aim of this research is to understand the preferences formation in Brazil for an energy integration agreement. Besides, were adopted as secondary objectives: (i) study the history of energy integration in South America, especially in regard to Brazil; (ii) understand the negotiation process that involves an agreement by formulating an ideal energy integration agreement and; (iii) recognize the benefits and difficulties involving the choice of an energy bilateral or multilateral agreement. In order to answer these questions were adopted the approach of Two-Level Games by Robert Putnam, because of its ability to relate the dynamics of internal politics with the foreign policy, allowing the analysis of the complex scenario of an energy integration agreement negotiations. From this research, it is clear that the length involving the energy integration process in South America is not the result only a political lack or a paymaster absence, but mainly the difficulty in coordinating a wide range of actors, interests, expectations and legal systems, in more than one sphere of negotiation. So, by particular needs, Brazil elects bilateral agreements, without abandoning, however, in parallel, discussions in multilateral forums.

Pasitelkus tris teorines prieigas, darbe analizuojama Japonijos klimato kaitos politika. Siekiant atskleisti tiek šios sudėtingos sferos detalumą, tiek bendras tendencijas, tyrimo objektas suskaidomas į tris tyrimo laukus, kiekvienas iš jų analizuojamas taikant atskirą teoriją. Tai atitinkamai: klimato kaitos fenomenas, kuris analizuojamas rizikos visuomenės teorijos pagalba tiriant Japonijos atvejį; tarptautinės ir valstybinės interesų grupės, tiriamos pasitelkiant dviejų lygių žaidimų teoriją ir analizuojant Japonijos dalyvavimą penkioliktojoje Jungtinių Tautų Kopenhagos konferencijoje; valstybinės institucijos, nagrinėjant Japonijos ministerijų ir aukšto rango pareigūnų požiūrį į klimato kaitos politiką, remiantis švelniosios galios teorija. Darbe tiriamas 1992-2011 metų periodas, plačiausiai naudojamas kokybinės turinio analizės ir lyginamasis metodas. Pirmojo tyrimo lauko analizė parodė, kad Japonija gali būti priskiriama prie vėlyvojo modernizmo valstybių, turinčių rizikos visuomenę ir reflektyviai žvelgiančių į savo išsivystymą. Tai viena iš pagrindinių priežasčių, kodėl tokie reiškiniai kaip klimato kaita sulaukia dėmesio ir yra įtraukiami į šalių politinę dienotvarkę. Išnagrinėjus viešą valstybinę retoriką, Japonijos pozicija atitiko 8 iškeltus kriterijus, pradedant globalinio atšilimo reiškinio pateikimu kaip visuotinės neigiamus padarinius sukelsiančios grėsmės ir baigiant siekiais keisti nusistovėjusį gyvenimo būdą tiek vykdant programas šalies viduje, tiek ir... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / By using three theoretical approaches, this thesis analyzes Japan's climate change policy. With the aim to reveal both the details and main tendencies of this complicated field, the object of the research is divided into three fields and each of them is analyzed by using separate theory. It is correspondingly: climate change phenomena, which is analyzed by using risk society theory focusing on Japan’s case; domestic and international interest groups, that are studied by two-level game theory concentrating on Japans’ participation in COP15 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; state institutions, looking at Japan ministries’ and high-ranking officials’ perception of climate change using soft power theory as theoretical basis. The time frame of the work is from year 1992 to 2011. The main methods used are content and comparative analysis. The analysis of the first field shows that Japan can be considered as one of late modernity states distinguished by risk society and reflectivity on its development. It is one of the main reasons why such phenomena as climate change becomes important and included into country’s political discourse. After analyzing public rhetorics, Japan’s position corresponds to eight criteria used in the work, ranging from global warming presentation as a global risk that will have negative consequences to aspirations to change current lifestyle by implementing domestic programs and participating in creation of international institutions. The... [to full text]

Considering the South China Sea dispute as a flashpoint of regional stability and power balance within the Southeast Asian region, the first failure in ASEAN history to reach a consensus in 2012 and the deadlock in 2016 on this issue brought up uncertainty towards the ability of ASEAN member states to reach a consensus on the South China Sea issue. This thesis seeks to analyze this issue based on neo-classical realism and the two-level games theory to what extent, if any, do the ASEAN member states’ domestic factors and external relations influence their decision towards the South China Sea dispute. The theoretical framework of neoclassical realism provides three indicators for analysis, which are national interests, domestic politics, and the role and perception of political leaders. The two-level games theory addresses on the preferences and coalitions within states, political institutions, and the role of chief negotiators as the three indicators to determine the win-sets of the ASEAN member states. The conclusions show the different win-sets size of ASEAN member states vary accordingly from a larger win-sets size of an authoritarian state to a smaller win-sets size of a more democratic state.