Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Altran.pdf: 1835681 bytes, checksum: 676cdf4ba6912928ccee8a5a2f3d586b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-12 / The dissertation suggests that an epistemology that listen to irrationality is relevant to face perennial obstacles in the philosophy of science, against which many objects collide. This seems to be an especially useful alternative in the sciences of religion, where we see ourselves immobilized by rationality when engaging researches that are related to their typically unspeakable phenomena. The mystical experience, often taken as the basis of religion, is a scenario that often brings amid its ineffability a sense of univocity - which is, precisely, the horizon of academic making. Would this ineffable hold an episteme? Following the publications of Marcelo Dascal, Henri Bergson and others, it is argued that, overcoming asymmetric impositions of epistemic legitimacy that inhibit controversies, we could find in bergsonian intuitionism a way toward these subjects as elusive as dangerous, since they put the rationality as a functional pillar for science and irrationality as a metaphysical pillar to reality itself. The transformations that the mystics brought to the world throughout history could be taken as signs that not only the irrationality was their compass, but also that it can bring extremely desirable outcomes for humanity, althought impelled by unspeakable epiphanies. Our aim is to gradually create lucid foundations for the study of alleged mystical univocities that invariably would become relative under the eyes of reason / A dissertação sugere que uma epistemologia que dê ouvidos à irracionalidade é pertinente para enfrentarmos entraves perenes na filosofia da ciência, frente aos quais muitos objetos colidem. Esta parece uma alternativa especialmente útil nas ciências da religião, onde nos vemos imobilizados pela racionalidade ao nos engajarmos em pesquisas que guardam relação com seus fenômenos tipicamente indizíveis. A experiência mística, tantas vezes tida como base das religiões, é cenário que frequentemente traz em meio à sua inefabilidade uma sensação de univocidade - justamente o horizonte do fazer acadêmico. Moraria neste inefável uma episteme? Por meio de Marcelo Dascal, Henri Bergson e outros, argumenta-se que, superadas imposições assimétricas de legitimidade epistêmica que inibem controvérsias, poderíamos encontrar no intuicionismo bergsoniano um caminho a seguir frente a esses assuntos tão fugidios quanto delicados, uma vez que coloca a racionalidade como pilar funcional para a ciência, e a irracionalidade como pilar metafísico para a realidade em si. As transformações que os místicos trouxeram ao mundo ao longo da história servem como indício de que não só foi a irracionalidade sua diretriz, como que ela pode trazer resultados objetivos e extremamente desejáveis para a humanidade, mesmo impelidas por epifanias indizíveis. Pretende-se, assim, aos poucos, criar fundamentos lúcidos para o estudo de supostas univocidades místicas que invariavelmente se tornariam relativas sob o domínio da razão

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The philosophy of early Deleuze is the main subject of this dissertation. Concretely, it will be treated with regard to distinctive and singular individuation of a man: this essay tries to present his relationship to the ultimate horizon of Being in Deleuze's work. The first chapter constitutes a starting point which can be determined in criticism of the image of thought, closely related with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. The second chapter is devoted to its culmination, to the metaphysical description of the virtual field of Ideas, of transcendental conditions of our experience. The next chapter shows how Ideas condition, that Ideas actualise themselves insofar as something develops itself within its intensive field of individuation. The fourth chapter takes us back to our starting point: it concerns a phenomenon, this time sufficiently explained, and we are again obliged to confront us with the image of thought which covers this explanation. This is the reason why our interpretation has to continue. The description of distinctive and singular individuation of a man wants to explain the way by which the image of thought, based on common sense, is established. Even though our experience is constructed on this image, there are still some "small islands" of difference, places where the virtual...

Dans sa provenance platonicienne, l’idéal de l’incarnation de l’Idée doit à la fois affronter des individualités (pré)déterminées et qualitativement différentes (le pluralisme) – qui sont répétitions et répétées elles-mêmes. Il doit devenir le vouloir-dire de la personne qui s’efforce de mettre en œuvre ce dernier et qui cherche à franchir les limites ontologiques de la représentation. Cependant, l’irréalisabilité de la pure répétition du vouloir-dire – ou de n’importe quel « sujet » – atteste de la présence absente du même dans le processus de sa mise en œuvre ; la répétition est toujours déjà répétition différenciatrice, son acte même toujours susceptible d’être perçu comme mimétique en pratique. Lorsque nous « créons », nous cherchons une différence absolue (singularisation) tout en visant l’universalité du vouloir-dire, l’Univocité. Autrement dit, c’est l’inévitabilité de la répétition différenciatrice (« nouveauté ») qui se répète et tend vers un dernier résultat censé être absolument univoque et intersubjectivement compris et jugé. Cette inévitabilité signifie-t-elle une (ou la dernière) impasse théorique – une « fin » – insurmontable ? Comment les artistes, les historiens d’art et les philosophes s’y prennent-ils ? Entre l’origine et le futur de l’art, quelle puissance de la répétition devrait-on y chercher pour ne plus répéter « une répétition pour toute » ? / From its Platonic source, the ideal of embodiment of Idea must face individualities which are (pre)determined and qualitatively different – and are themselves repetitions repeated. It must become “what-is-wanted-to-be-said” or “meaning” (“vouloir-dire”) of the person who endeavors to realize it and to attempt to exceed the ontological limits of representation. Meanwhile, the unrealizability of pure repetition of the “vouloir-dire” – like any other “subject matter” – testifies to the absent presence of the same in the process of its realization; each and every repetition is always already a differential repetition, and its act itself always susceptible to be taken as mimetic in practice. When we “create”, we search for the absolute difference (singularization) while aiming at a universality of the “vouloir-dire”, Univocity. Put another way, it is the inevitability of the differential repetition (“newness”) that repeats itself and moves towards the last outcome that is meant to be unique in itself and intersubjectively understood and judged. Does this inevitability point towards a (or the last) insurmountable theoretical stalemate – “an end”? How do artists, art-historians, and philosophers deal with this problem? Between the origin and the future of art, what sort of force of repetition do we have to look for in order to finally no longer repeat “one repetition for all”?

Il rapporto del giovane Heidegger con Duns Scoto viene analizzato con particolare riferimento alla tesi del 1916 "La dottrina delle categorie e del significato in Duns Scoto". Il pensatore scolastico viene indicato come fonte di primaria importanza per lo sviluppo dell'ontologia heideggeriana matura attraverso alcuni elementi chiave: l'univocità del concetto di essere, la razionalità di principio dell'individuo, la ricerca di un linguaggio descrittivo adatto alla filosofia. Carl Braig risulta uno degli autori il cui contributo determinò maggiormente in Heidegger l'interesse per i problemi dell'ontologia scotista. / The young Heidegger’s relationship to Duns Scotus is analysed with particular reference to the thesis on “Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning” (1916). The scholastic thinker is shown to be a source of primary importance for Heidegger’s mature ontology by the means of some key features: the univocity of the concept of Being, the basic intelligibility of the individual, the search for a descriptive language suitable for philosophy. Carl Braig turns out to be one of the authors who contributed the most to determine Heidegger’s interest in the problems of scotist ontology.