Forces vitales et organisation : vitalisme et philosophie de la nature en Allemagne (1752-1802). / In the course of the last thirty years, a considerable body of scholarship has examined the life sciences that arose in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. This literature has shown that previous dismissals of this tradition, assumed to be infected with a pathological imagination, were unwarranted. Yet the interpretations of the period have not always been consistent with each other, and they often have been characterized by vagueness. Generally speaking, the scholarly debate has focused on the historical and conceptual relationship between three elements: (1) Kant's philosophy of biology, as it is formulated in the Critique of the Power of Judgment , (2) the biological vitalism developed at the Göttingen medical school by Blumenbach and his students Kielmeyer, Link, Reil and Treviranus, and (3) the Naturphilosophie of Goethe, Schelling, Oken and Carus. In his pioneering studies, Timothy Lenoir (1978, 1980, 1981, 1982) argues that, although the life sciences developed in Germany in the late eighteenth century have been dismissed as an era dominated by empty speculation, they were in fact the result of a coherent research program. This program was developed in Göttingen by a wellconnected group of biologists after receiving its first formulation in Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1790. In the second part of this work, Kant sees teleology as a necessary tool to understand fundamental features of living beings such as functions and development. He also considers it as a mere heuristic principle, not as a constitutive character of organized bodies. According to this account, Blumenbach was the first naturalist to accept the Kantian understanding of teleological principles and organize it as a structured research program. This program was first developed by his most distinguished students Kielmeyer, Treviranus and Reil, and then employed by Meckel, von Baer and Müller (Lenoir 1982, 54-111). The disregard of this “Kantian” tradition in life sciences has, for Lenoir, both theoretical and historical grounds. The main issue is the assumption that only reductionist models are capable of generating a quantitative account of natural phenomena. Nevertheless, the idea that biological organization is not quite reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry is fully compatible with the fidelity to quantitative rigor as a touchstone of scientific explanation. According to Lenoir, the “vitalmaterialism” of the Göttingen School accepted this challenge and developed a “teleomechanical” research program based on the Kantian distinction between constitutive and regulative understanding of teleology. […]

Este trabalho procura apresentar através de uma análise do conjunto das obras de Canguilhem uma crítica da razão médica prática, tal como sugere num de seus escritos. Vale dizer que embora ele tenha afirmado não pretender renovar a medicina, procurando apenas ajudá-la a pensar sobre seus pressupostos e conceitos fundamentais, em nosso entender, ao realizar uma crítica à hegemonia do modelo médico científico-moderno e ao operar o desvelamento de sua ideologia de controle da vida, acabou por delinear os contornos de uma nova racionalidade médica que, por se ancorar numa definição de medicina como arte que se coloca a serviço da capacidade de resistência vital, pode vir a fazer frente à mecanização da vida, à normalização dos indivíduos e à gestão sociopolítica médica da vida cotidiana. Assim, é adotando o ponto de vista canguilhemiano de que a ideia de normalidade como normalização mais se identifica à medicina científica moderna que opera com a ideia de norma como média estatística e tipo ideal, do que a uma medicina que considera que na natureza há apenas normalidade como normatividade, que procuramos ao fim de nosso trabalho vislumbrar outro horizonte para as práticas e a ética do cuidado em saúde na atualidade. / This work seeks to present, through the analysis of Canguilhems complete work, a critique of the practical reasoning in medicine, as suggested by the author himself. Although he has not intended to renovate medicine, his intention was to help thinking about its assumptions and fundamental concepts. It is believed that, by criticizing the hegemony of the modern scientific-medical model and operating the unveiling of its ideology of control over life, he ended up outlining the contours of a new medical rationale. This approach is based on the definition of medicine as a type of art which is at the service of a vital resistance capacity. This way, it can cope with the mechanization of life, the normalization of individuals and sociopolitical medical management of everyday life. Thus, by adopting Canguilhems perspective, the idea of normality as normalization is more related to the modern scientific medicine that works with the idea of statistical average and the ideal type than the medicine which considers that, in nature, there is only normality as normativity. At the end of this work, the aim is to glimpse another horizon for the practices and the ethics of current health care.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A dissertação comenta criticamente as interpretações recentes referentes ao vitalismo no século XVIII, dedicando atenção especial aos Nouveuax Éléments de la Science de lHomme (publicado primeiramente em 1778), de Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734-1806). Até a segunda metade do século XX, como é primeiramente argumentado nesta dissertação, intérpretes do iluminismo entendiam a doutrina mecanicista como a herdeira direta da Revolução Científica, bem como a corrente dominante no mundo das ciências da vida ao longo de todo o século XVIII. Assim, na historiografia do século passado, o vitalismo era ou escassamente mencionado, ou visto como uma retrógrada corrente anti-iluminista. Mais recentemente, vários historiadores e pesquisadores da história das ciências no século XVIII (sobretudo Williams e Reill) entendem o iluminismo de um modo mais amplo e plural, considerando o vitalismo iluminista (um termo proposto por Reill) como parte integrante de um conceito mais dinâmico de iluminismo. A seguir, são apresentados a doutrina mecanicista e seus conceitos centrais, bem como as ideias de alguns dos principais representantes do mecanicismo no século XVII e início do XVIII, no caso, mais especificamente, do mecanicismo newtoniano. Em seguida, são expostos e comentados a doutrina vitalista e seus conceitos, no que é dado destaque ao vitalismo na Universidade de Montpellier. Nesse contexto, são comentados conceitos vitalistas, tal como apresentados nos Nouveuax Éléments de la Science de lHomme, no qual Barthez propõe uma nova fisiologia baseada no princípio vital; nisso são apresentados sua metodologia de pesquisa, o conceito de princípio vital, as forças sensitivas e motrizes do princípio da vida, além dos conceitos de simpatia, sinergia e, por fim, o conceito de temperamento. Esses conceitos ou essa terminologia , tal como é mostrado, não são originalmente concebidos por Barthez, mas foram por ele reapropriados e reformulados em debate com o newtonianismo e demais correntes filosóficas médicas desde a Antiguidade até o século XVIII, assim como com observações e experimentos próprios às investigações médico-científicas da época. Como resultado, é alcançada uma compreensão da doutrina vitalista como um esforço intelectual inovador tanto interagindo quanto integrado com o debate científico contemporâneo, ou seja, os médicos vitalistas se viam e, em geral, eram vistos como atuando segundo os padrões de cientificidade exigidos por seus pares. / On the thesis critical comments are made on the recent interpretations of Vitalism on the XVIII century, paying special attention on the Nouveaux Éléments de la Science de lHomme (first published in 1778), by Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734 1806). Since the second half of the XX century, as it is firstly discussed on this thesis, the Enlightenment interpreters understood the mechanist doctrine as the heiress of Scientific Revolution as well as the dominant strain in the sciences of life throughout the XVIII century. This way, on the historiographical of the last century Vitalism was scarcely mentioned or seen as a backward anti-Enlightenment school of thought. Recently, historians and researchers on history of Science of the XVIII century (above all Williams and Reill) understand Enlightenment in a more plural way, considering Enlightenment Vitalism (a name proposed by Reill) an integral part of a more dynamic Enlightenment concept. Next, the mechanist doctrine and its main concepts are shown, as well as the thoughts of some of the mechanist main followers on the XVII century and the beginning of the XVIII century, more specifically the Newtonian Mechanist. Afterwards, the vitalist doctrine and its concepts are exposed and commented with special attention to the Vitalism at the Montpellier University. Within this context, the vitalist concept are commented as they are presented on the Nouveaux Éléments de la Science de lHomme, where Barthez proposes a new physiology based on vital principles; on this way, his researching methodology is presented as well as the vital principle concept, the sensitive forces and the principle of life motive forces, besides the concepts of sympathy, synergy and at last, the concept of temperament. Those concepts or this terminology , as it is shown, are not originally conceived by Barthez, but they were taken and reformed by him on debating with Newtonianism and others Medical Schools strain of thoughts since Antiquity until the XVIII century as well as with experiments and observations of the medical-scientific researches by his own and of his own time. As a result, understanding of the Vitalist doctrine is reached as an in the 18th Century largely well-accepted intellectual effort, fittingly interacting with the contemporaneous scientific debate, that is, vitalist physicians had seen themselves and were also seen by his peers as following the scientific standards of their own time.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / A presente dissertação é uma análise da justificação sociológica dos valores de E.Durkheim. No primeiro capítulo é realizada uma exposição sistemática da teoria da argumentação de Chaïm Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca, com os objetivos, por um lado, de apresentar alguns elementos indispensáveis para a análise da argumentação da sociologia durkheimiana e, por outro lado, de formar um repertório que possibilite futuras prospecções com o fim de estabelecer uma lógica sistemática da justificação sociológica dos valores fundada numa teoria da linguagem e do simbolismo. No segundo capítulo é realizada a análise da obra de Durkheim. No primeiro tópico, apresento o contexto sócio-histórico da fundação da sociologia, seus interlocutores, o conflito de valores e o compromisso político-moral do autor. A exposição é feita tendo como referência o que chamo de processo do individualismo, sendo um debate que versava sobre o problema da legitimidade das regras morais e intelectuais num mundo crescentemente individualista em que as antigas formas de autoridade perderam seu valor. São extraídos dessa discussão problemas sistemáticos que se fundam na oposição entre razão e vida. No segundo tópico, passo para a análise do argumento ontológico de Durkheim, apresentando-o por meio de seus raciocínios dialéticos e de suas analogias, que farão com que a concepção de vida adquira centralidade factual e valorativa na sua sociologia. No terceiro tópico, apresento a antropologia durkheimiana, que dará inteligibilidade para a concepção ontológica, permitindo entender a passagem das forças sociais às formas simbólicas. No quarto tópico, mostro como ocorre a formação simbólica do social, o que dará sentido à missão da sociologia, que é entendida como devendo descrever e explicar as diversas formas de autoridade moral. No quinto e último tópico, apresento a concepção durkheimiana de ciência, que será vista como uma ciência viva da vida. Por fim, concluo encaminhando-me em direção a uma abertura simbólica, fazendo um balanço sobre a sociologia durkheimiana e a sua teoria do simbolismo, o que permitirá ramificar a pesquisa para as mais diversas explorações no campo da teoria da linguagem e do simbolismo.

Des analyses consacrées au vitalisme de Bichat, en 1963, à l’étude du bios cynique dans les toutes dernières leçons de son dernier cours au Collège de France, les références à la vie sont constantes dans l’œuvre de Michel Foucault. C’est dans le cadre du projet philosophico-politique d’un dépassement de l’humanisme moderne que la question de la vie fera irruption dans son œuvre. Notre thèse est désormais que le défi auquel sera confrontée la pensée foucaldienne, consistera à déplacer le centre de l’analyse de l’homme (en tant que fondement supposé des savoirs et des pouvoirs modernes) vers la vie (i.e., vers les savoirs et les pouvoirs qui l’investissent et la produisent), sans pour autant faire de celle-ci un nouveau fondement (que ce soit à la manière d’une philosophie naturaliste, d’une ontologie vitaliste ou d’une phénoménologie du vécu).C’est dans les travaux biopolitiques que la stratégie foucaldienne (contourner l’homme en passant par la vie) se déploie le plus clairement : l’homme y apparaît, en effet, non point en tant que fondement (comme dans les théories contractualistes, qui partent d’une certaine anthropologie afin d’en déduire une certaine politique), mais comme effet et enjeu d’un pouvoir ayant la vie pour but, objet et modèle.Or un tel déplacement n’implique-t-il pas une promotion de la vie au rang du fondement déserté par l’homme ? C’est, comme nous essayons de le montrer dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, le pas que franchissent, parfois, ces deux lectures en apparence antagoniques de l’œuvre foucaldienne que sont les interprétations d’orientation « naturaliste » d’une part (qui insistent surtout sur la « biologisation » de la politique moderne mise en lumière par Foucault) et, de l’autre, les lectures d’inspiration « vitaliste » (qui, à l’instar du commentaire deleuzien, invoquent plutôt l’idée d’une résistance possible aux biopouvoirs qui prendrait appui sur la puissance propre à cette même vie que le pouvoir cherche à investir).C’est dans les travaux archéologiques de Foucault que ces deux lectures de la biopolitique foucaldienne nous semblent trouver leur réfutation la plus flagrante, d’où le fait que la troisième section de notre travail leur soit entièrement consacrée. Foucault y établit en effet l’historicité foncière de cette vie biologique à laquelle seront ordonnés les dispositifs modernes de pouvoir. Par ailleurs, il prend bien soin de mettre en lumière ce qui compromet la prétendue positivité de ces savoirs sur la vie que sont la biologie et la médecine clinique. Il montre enfin à quel point la notion moderne – aussi bien biologique que métaphysique – de vie constitue le revers de la figure moderne de l’homme, de ses détermination empiriques mais aussi de ses prérogatives transcendantales. D’où, sans doute, le fait que son premier effort pour penser une issue possible au « cercle anthropologique » – centré autour de l’expérience littéraire – repose, non sur une revendication des puissances de la vie, mais sur une conceptualisation ontologique de la mort et de sa paradoxale fécondité.Il n’en reste pas moins qu’entre la fin des années 1970 et le début des années 1980, Foucault articulera bien une pensée de la résistance aux biopouvoirs avec une certaine problématisation de la vie. Or – décalage essentiel – il reconceptualisera aussitôt celle-ci à partir de la notion grecque de bios. L’hypothèse qui structure la quatrième partie de notre travail est alors que l’introduction du concept de bios répond au défi de redonner une certaine initiative à la vie (i.e., d’introduire une certaine distance entre celle-ci et la figure moderne, entièrement objectivée, naturalisée, médicalisée de l’homme normal), sans pour autant restaurer le sujet métaphysique ou phénoménologique, dont Foucault aura mené la critique dès le début des années 1960, ni basculer dans une métaphysique vitaliste – dont il aura montré qu’elle ne constitue que le revers de la figure moderne de l’homme. / From the analysis focused on Bichat’s vitalism, in 1963, to the study of the cynical bios in every last lesson of his last course at the Collège de France, the references to life are a constant in the work of Michel Foucault. The issue of life will appear in his work in the context of his philosophical and political project of going beyond modern humanism. From now on, our thesis will be that the challenge confronting Foucault’s thinking will consist in moving the center of the analysis from man (as the alleged foundation of modern knowledge and power) to life (that is, to the knowledge and power that produces and invests it, so as to what, in life, opposes some resistance to them), without turning life into a new foundation (whether the way of a naturalistic philosophy, a vitalist ontology or phenomenology of the vécu).It’s in the biopolitical works (on which the first part of our thesis is focused) where the Foucauldian strategy (getting around man through life) displays itself most clearly: man appears, indeed, not at all as foundation (as in the contract theories, which start with a certain anthropology in order to deduce a certain politics), but as an effect and a stake of a power that has life as goal, object and model. But wouldn’t such a move promote life to the status of a new foundation? It would, as we try to show in the second part of the thesis, the way that crosses sometimes these two seemingly conflicting readings of his work: “naturalistic” interpretations on one hand (which insist mainly on « biologisation » of modern politics, highlighted by Foucault) and, on the other hand, “vitalist” views (which following Deleuzian comments, invoke instead the idea of a possible resistance to biopowers which would rest on life’s own puissance).We think that these two readings of Foucault’s biopolitics find their highest refutation on Foucault’s archeological works. That’s why the third section of our work is completely devoted to them. Foucault, in fact, establishes here the historicity of biological life to which modern power devices will be closely related. Otherwise, he is careful to highlight what compromises the alleged positivity of knowledge. He also shows how the modern notion of life - both biological and metaphysical - is the reverse of man’s modern figure, of his empirical determinations but also of his transcendental prerogatives (that’s what we call “anthropological downturn” of life, which would find one of his endpoints on the phenomenological figure of the vécu). That is why, no doubt, his first effort to think of a possible outcome for the “anthropological circle” - centered on the literary experience- lays not on a argument in favor of the powers of life, but on an ontological conceptualization of death and his paradoxical fertility.It nevertheless remains true that, between the late ‘70s and the early ‘80s, Foucault will articulate a thought of resistance to biopowers with a certain problematization of life. Or – a critical shift – he will soon re-conceptualize it based on the Greek notion of bios. The hypothesis that structures the fourth part of our work is, then, that the introduction of the concept of bios addresses the challenge of restoring some initiative to life (i.e., to insert a certain distance between it and the common man’s modern figure, completely objectified, naturalized, medicalized), without therefore restoring a metaphysical or phenomenological subject (man as empirical-transcendental doublet, center and foundation of any experience, epistemological and practical), of which Foucault himself has been the led critic since the early ‘60s, or falling into a vitalist metaphysics – which he had revealed as only the reverse of men’s modern figure.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T14:16:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Thereza Cera Galvao do Amaral.pdf: 1182080 bytes, checksum: d54b4ce17552e674254887eb7c363e01 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper presents the dynamics of the physiological system of Paul-Joseph Barthez and where this system was inserted, done through a review of the book Nouveaux Éléments de la Science de l'Homme ". Physician, physiologist, scholar, professor and head of the Medical University of Montpellier, France, was born in Montpellier and exercised their professional activities in Montpellier and Paris in the eighteenth century / Este trabalho apresenta a dinâmica do sistema fisiológico de Paul-Joseph Barthez e onde ese sistema estava inserido, feito através de uma análise crítica do livro Nouveaux Éléments de la Science de l`Homme . Médico, fisiologista, estudioso, professor e dirigente da Universidade de Medicina de Montpellier, França, nasceu em Montpellier e exerceu suas atividades profissionais em Montpellier e em Paris, no século XVIII

Cette thèse étudie les liens qui s'établissent entre destruction, savoir et création dans l'ensemble des écrits de Céline (romans, pamphlets, écrits de jeunesse, correspondance) pour montrer comment la création y est conçue comme l'expression d'une vérité fuyante et brutale destinée à échapper aux supposés savants. On comprend mieux les évolutions du désir de « connaître et savoir » manifesté dès 1912 et les voies qu'empruntent progressivement les recherches littéraires de Céline en comparant ses écrits à un certain nombre de textes parfois méconnus dont ils se nourrissent : la revue Le Correspondant pendant son séjour en Afrique, les articles du metteur en scène Charles Dullin au moment de la rédaction de Voyage au bout de la nuit, les ouvrages de l'historien de l'art Élie Faure dans les années trente, puis, après la seconde guerre mondiale, des textes qui datent de la Belle-Époque, qu'il s'agisse de vieux numéros de la Revue des Deux Mondes ou d'ouvrages du philosophe Théodule Ribot. La comparaison des écrits de Céline avec ces textes très divers permet de voir que l'écrivain y découvre un certain nombre d'idées qu'il fait siennes, transforme ou renverse pour faire du savoir presque absolu qu'il revendique souvent une arme littéraire destinée à le faire triompher de ceux qu'il considère comme des usurpateurs ou de faux savants – au premier rang desquels se trouvent ses contemporains, qu'ils soient simples lecteurs, médecins, critiques littéraires ou écrivains / This dissertation focuses on the links between destruction, knowledge and creation in all of Céline's writings (novels, lampoons, early writings, letters), in which knowledge is often depicted as the expression of an elusive and brutal truth so-called scholars are unable to find. It is easier to understand the evolution of this absolute desire to know, expressed by Céline very early on, and to examine his literary innovations when we compare his books to several texts, sometimes little-known, that he was a great reader of : the review Le Correspondant that he used to read during his stay in Africa, the articles of the director Charles Dullin when he was writing Journey to the End of the Night, the books of the art historian Élie Faure in the 1930s, and, after World War II, texts that are typical of the Belle-Époque, such as old issues of the Revue des Deux Mondes or the works of the philosopher Théodule Ribot. The comparison between Céline's writings and these very diverse sources shows where Céline discovers and how he appropriates, transforms or reverses many of the ideas he uses in his books, in which he often tries to make a literary weapon out of this one-of-a-kind knowledge he claims to possess

<p>Denna uppsats är en studie av eventuella likheter mellan Pär Lagerkvist tidiga prosa och stildrag hos den tyska expressionismen, som hade sin blomstringstid samtidigt som Lagerkvist publicerade sina första samlingar med prosa och poesi. Jämförelser har tidigare gjorts, främst gällande lyriken och har då visat på flera gemensamma drag. Denna uppsats jämför prosatexter ur Lagerkvists tre tidiga samlingar Motiv (1914), Ångest (1916) och Kaos (1919) med centrala drag för den tyska expressionismen. Dessa omfattar nutidskänslan, fokuseringen på det subjektiva, verkligheten som mardröm och kritik mot det borgerliga. Andra motiv som behandlas är de groteska inslagen, vitalismen, sinnessjukdomen, Fader-Son-konflikten och kriget.</p>

Denna uppsats är en studie av eventuella likheter mellan Pär Lagerkvist tidiga prosa och stildrag hos den tyska expressionismen, som hade sin blomstringstid samtidigt som Lagerkvist publicerade sina första samlingar med prosa och poesi. Jämförelser har tidigare gjorts, främst gällande lyriken och har då visat på flera gemensamma drag. Denna uppsats jämför prosatexter ur Lagerkvists tre tidiga samlingar Motiv (1914), Ångest (1916) och Kaos (1919) med centrala drag för den tyska expressionismen. Dessa omfattar nutidskänslan, fokuseringen på det subjektiva, verkligheten som mardröm och kritik mot det borgerliga. Andra motiv som behandlas är de groteska inslagen, vitalismen, sinnessjukdomen, Fader-Son-konflikten och kriget.

This paper seeks to forge a grounds for conversation between the affective turn in contemporary theory and a vital materialist ontology. This conversation focuses on materials and their affects through the experience of weirdness. I use weirdness to describe a register of enchantment which is disruptive and alienating, rather than enticing and delightful. The project is motivated by a desire for ways to think about our relationship to the natural world that afford for fuller experiences of perception. The paper works through four major sections; the first three form a conceptual framework while the fourth is an exercise in mobilizing the concepts through subjective readings of affect. It begins by establishing a concept of vitalism with which to think about interactions with a moving, active world and, in following vitalism across borders of embodied flora and fauna, agitates the notion of what constitutes life. To put vitalism into a dynamic of engagement between entities, I then chart processes of affect through various conditions and situations, such as haunting, hallucination, anticipation and psychotropics. I then address the concept of the event in order to trace the contours of affect as it manifests through situated, temporal passages of force. This conceptual netting culminates in episodic readings of affective experiences, taking a kaleidoscopic form oriented toward anxious fascination. / text