Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T16:40:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Scherer_Fernando_M.pdf: 303198 bytes, checksum: 9c44a0bb353360595a0f592902a8630e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Resumo: Esta dissertação investiga em que sentido Wittgenstein considera que a ética é ¿transcendental¿ no Tractatus, conforme o aforismo 6.421. Para tal, realizamos neste trabalho um estudo da teoria figurativa da proposição no Tractatus, com ênfase na distinção entre o dizível e o indizível, seguido de um exame da noção de ¿sujeito metafísico¿ como aquilo que possibilita que as proposições da linguagem adquiram seu sentido pela projeção dos elementos da linguagem no mundo. Por fim, a partir da noção de ¿limites¿ do mundo e da linguagem, investigamos diversas interpretações da natureza desses limites e procuramos apresentar a unidade entre ética e lógica no Tractatus por meio de uma consideração da influência de Weininger no pensamento de Wittgenstein / Abstract: The subject of this work is the notion of ¿transcendental¿ as applied to ethics in Wittgenstein¿s Tractatus, according to the aphorism 6.421. We try to understand in which sense Wittgenstein can say there that ethics is ¿transcendental¿. To that end, we begin with a study of the ¿picture theory¿ of meaning in the Tractatus, stressing the distinction between what can and what cannot be said. After that, we examine the notion of ¿metaphysical subject¿ as what makes possible that propositions of language get their senses through the projection of the elements of the language in the world. Finally, we turn to the notion of ¿limits¿ of the world and the language, and investigate several interpretations of the nature of those limits, trying to show the unit between ethics and logic in the Tractatus by means of Weininger¿s influence in Wittgenstein¿s thought / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Michael Wrigley / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-24T17:20:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marques_JoseOscardeAlmeida_D.pdf: 49000020 bytes, checksum: 94c245bb4c4d7275649db0a6023bf5ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

No description available.

D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy) / Though for a large portion of the twentieth century the question of life’s meaning wasn’t a favorite question among analytic philosophers, recent developments, especially within the last 30 years, show that the meaning of life is no longer ‘the black sheep of normative family’ (Metz 2002: 811). As Thaddeus Metz and others have already noted, most normative philosophers had been more comfortable discussing notions such as ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’ and ‘value’ and, thus, the notion of ‘meaningfulness’ has not been considered as a distinguished category that could account for a good life (cf. Wolf 2010, Metz 2013). However, there is enough evidence to suggest that the question of life’s meaning ‘has come firmly back onto the philosophical agenda’ (Cottingham 2013: 115). Long has passed since the day a distinguished analytic philosopher announced in his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association that ‘once in a time of weakness and lapse of judgment he wrote a paper on the meaning of life’ (Adams 2002: 71). In fact, the very existence of a growing body of literature on the meaning of life shows that ‘the problem does not go away’ (Cottingham 2003: 2) and one is bound to enquire about the ‘problem’ somewhere in one’s life.

This work challenges the assumption that Wittgenstein’s comments about the word “philosophy” are always either normative or descriptive. In the introduction, I demonstrate that some apparent inconsistencies of Wittgenstein’s programmatic remarks can only be resolved if we reject this distinction. Although the distinction is not central to any major interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, rejecting it will have significant implications regarding his relation to the history of philosophy. My central task is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s view of the history of philosophy does not imply a strict distinction between the historical concept of philosophy and Wittgenstein’s method. The core of my argument revolves around the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. In this text, Wittgenstein compares magic with metaphysics and then proceeds to attack Frazer’s exceedingly critical analysis of primitive religions. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later use of the word “metaphysic” indicates that his criticism of past philosophers is not radical enough to justify a strict distinction between his philosophical program and the history of philosophy. In order to confirm the conclusions I have drawn from Wittgenstein’s use of the word “metaphysics,” I studied two conversations Wittgenstein had about Heidegger. I read Wittgenstein’s comments about Heidegger as a sign of the blurring distinction between his own program and more traditional conceptions of philosophy.

Orientador: Arley Ramos Moreno / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-31T15:39:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Martinez_HoracioLujan_D.pdf: 23445620 bytes, checksum: 20127062f01b8aae105438482fa91f74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: Esta tese pretende, primeiro: reconstruir argumentativamente as considerações éticas de Wittgenstein e, segundo: salientar as relações que estas considerações possuem com as noções de linguagem e subjetividade que o filósofo sustentou ao longo de sua obra. Achamos que existe uma relação muito forte entre subjetividade, ética e linguagem e que esta relação muda entre os dois períodos em que se costuma dividir o seu pensamento. Portanto, um acompanhamento das considerações éticas de Wittgenstein nos obrigará a ver como tais considerações se relacionam com a noção de filosofia que este tinha e, sobretudo, a especificar a noção de "terapia gramatical". A partir destas reflexões tentamos redefinir o caráter ético do conceito de filosofia como "terapia" / Abstract: This thesis intend at fírst: to rebuild in an arguable way the ethics considerations of Wittgenstein, and second: to point out the relations that have those considerations wíth the notions of language and subjectivity to this philosopher supported along his works. We believe that has a strong relation among subjectivity, ethics and language, and this relation changes between the two periods that have been used to separate his thought. Therefore, following up the ethical considerations of Wittgenstein it will make us to see how those considerations are related with the notion of philosophy that he had and above ali, to specify the statement of "grammatical therapy". From those reflective considerations we tried to give a new definition of ethical character by the philosophy's concept as "therapy" / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Hermas Gonçalves Arana / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-24T03:36:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Torrezan_Marlene_M.pdf: 6551325 bytes, checksum: 1e9accb80272b88d9ebb67a8be3e17b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Este trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar, através da filosofia da linguagem, a relação entre linguagem e educação como formação. Para tal análise será utilizado como instrumento o conceito de jogos de linguagem, proposto por Ludwig Wittgenstein, e a partir dele tentar-se-á estabelecer novas possibilidades de entendimento do conceito de educação e a multiplicidade de usos que dele se faz. É possível perceber que, na maioria das vezes, o que gera muitos dos problemas inerentes ao conceito de educação é seu uso equivocado. Portanto, é preciso ter clareza sobre o conceito em uso para que se possa estabelecer as regras condizentes com os objetivos específicos a serem alcançados. O conceito de educação como formação assume um papel especial na discussão, pois ele é apontado como uma variável, ou melhor, como um jogo de linguagem que, entre tantas possibilidades, tenta rever o conceito de educação em seu princípio gerador na cultura ocidental / Abstract: This work has the objective of analyzing, through the Philosophy of Language, the relationship between language and education as fonnation. For such analysis it will be used as instrument the concept of language games, proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and starting ITom rum will try to settle down new possibilities of understanding the education concept and the multiplicity of uses we make of him. It is possible to notice that, most of the time, what generates many ofthe inherent problems to the education concept is its mistaken use. Therefore, it is necessary to have c1arity on the concept in use, so that is possible establishing the correspondent mIes with the specific objectives to be reached. The education concept as fonnation assumes a special role in the discussion, because it is aimed as a variable, or better, as a language game that, among so much possibilities, it tries to review the education concept in its generating beginning in the westem culture / Mestrado / Filosofia e História da Educação / Mestre em Educação

This dissertation scrutinizes expressivist theories of first-person privilege with the aim of arriving at, first, a handful of suggestions about how a `best version' of expressivism about privilege will have to look, and second, a critical understanding of what such an approach's strengths and weaknesses will be. Roughly, expressivist approaches to the problem of privilege are characterized, first, by their emphasis on the likenesses between privileged mental state self-ascriptions and natural behavioral expressions of mentality, and second, by their insistence that an acknowledgment of these likenesses is required in order properly to understand the characteristically singular privilege with which one speaks of one's own mental states. The dissertation proceeds in five chapters whose individual tasks are as follows: The first chapter sets out the definition of the phenomena of "first-person privilege" in use throughout the dissertation and defends the claim that those phenomena are indeed real and so the philosophical problem of accounting for them is indeed serious. However, there is no presupposition made against the possibility of an expressivist account of the phenomena of first-person privilege. The second chapter sets out the basic motivations informing expressivist approaches to the problem of first-person privilege. Four immediate and significant questions for the expressivist approach are set out. The chapter also considers one `simple' way of responding to those questions and set outs the most pressing difficulties for a `simple expressivism'. The third chapter sets out my view of Wittgenstein as a methodically non-theorizing philosopher, criticizes rival views and, finally, sets out my view of the Wittgensteinian responses to the four questions set out in chapter two, given my view of him as a philosophical non-theorizer. Many of the later suggestions about a `best version' of expressivism draw directly on my best understanding of Wittgenstein's own approach to the problem of first-person privilege. The fourth chapter sets out David Finkelstein's, Peter Hacker's and Dorit Bar-On's responses to the quartet of questions for expressivists about first-person privilege, while flagging a number concerns for each author's approach. The final chapter condenses and reviews the concerns already raised for the expressivist approaches already canvassed and makes a number of suggestions about the most viable expressivist options for dealing with them. With that in place, the last chapter proceeds to comment on the overall plausibility of the sketch of a `best-version' of expressivism that emerges. Also, concerns to do with the relationship between expressivism about first-person privilege, epistemological foundationalism, content externalism and the mind-body problem are discussed.

No description available.

In this thesis, I draw attention to patterns at the intersection of (a) interpretations of science in two journals (Philosophy of Science, and Social Studies of Science) and (b) references to Wittgenstein's writings. Interpretations of science can be classed according to the degree to which they support a realist or social constructivist understanding of the entities described by current scientific theories. By tracing the intellectual traditions from which these interpretations emerged, I develop an abstracted classification of these positions. Since this classification does not meaningfully map onto the positions articulated by the writers sampled here (which is telling about intellectual histories generally), I develop a new, more promising scheme of classification. I find that Wittgenstein is appropriated more often in support of social constructivist views of science, but that reasons for this support are generally weak. Using a novel measure of content which I call "appeal-to-authority," I show that there is a significant difference between these journals in their use of Wittgenstein's writings. But there is a subtle methodological argument at work here as well. I show that methods of analysis which rely exclusively on intellectual histories, bibliometrics, and globablizing statements about the products of science suffer serious limitations. In short, this thesis reflexively shows that the methods upon which it is based allow room for considerable bias and manipulation, and thereby implicates many bodies of work built upon these methods. / Master of Science