[pt] Esta dissertação objetiva promover uma possibilidade de reflexão filosófica pós-fundacionista em torno das reconstruções da relação entre legitimidade e legalidade na disciplina de Relações Internacionais (RIs), em interseções pontuais desta com o campo do Direito Internacional (DI). Essa investigação é motivada, em particular, por contexto e discursividade que procuraram reconstituir essa relação em termos da diferença (ex: ilegal, porém legítima) ou semelhança potencial (ex: ilegal, porém legítima, porém quase-legal) entre os dois ente-conceitos, tal como em tentativas de ordenamento epistêmico e político dos eventos relacionados ao uso da força pela Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) na região do Kosovo em 1998-1999. Ao longo deste trabalho, tal perspectiva teórico-filosófica pós-fundacionista assumirá diferentes facetas, transitando transdisciplinarmente nos campos da Filosofia (Ludwig Wittgenstein e Jacques Derrida), das Relações Internacionais (construtivismo, pós-colonialismo e pós-estruturalismo) e, pontualmente, do Direito Internacional (estudos críticos legais) e da Sociologia do Conhecimento (etnometodologia), com vistas a deslocar as expectativas quanto à condição ontológica da legitimidade e da legalidade - isto é, ao entendimento destas como ente-conceitos plenos de sentido em si mesmos e articulados com estratégias de ordenamento epistêmico e de delimitação da imaginação política internacional - e, com isso, reconstruir (e não abandonar) o conhecimento e a política da relação legitimidade/ legalidade nas RIs. Investiga-se particularmente a possibilidade de uma reflexão sociológica politicamente engajada com essa relação, ou seja, uma forma de engajamento epistêmico-político na qual a suspensão do sentido do legal e/ou do legítimo configura momento-chave de abertura política a uma sensibilidade investigativa contínua em relação aos limites desenhados pelas tentativas de encerramento de um devido ser do mundo; este, por sua vez, limitadamente articulado enquanto uma impressão sociológica contingente através da performance contextual e discursiva do julgamento normativo vinculado à relação legitimidade/legalidade. / [en] This Master s thesis seeks to promote a possible post-foundational philosophical investigation on the reconstructions of the relation between legitimacy and legality by International Relations (IR), in specific juxtapositions with the field of International Law (IL). This research is especially motivated by those context and discourse that sought to reconstitute this relation in terms of differentiation (e.g. illegal, yet legitimate) or potential similarity (e.g. illegitimate but legitimate, albeit quasi-legal) between the two concepts/entities, such as the attempts to epistemically and politically order the events concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) s use of force in Kosovo in 1998-1999. Throughout this piece, this postfoundationalist theoretical-philosophical perspective takes on different facets, transdisciplinaryly moving around the fields of Philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein e Jacques Derrida), International Relations (constructivism, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism) and, occasionally, International Law (critical legal studies) and Sociology of Knowledge (ethnomethodology), while seeking to displace the expectations on the ontological character of legitimacy and legality - i.e. the understanding of them as meaningful concepts/entities in themselves which are intertwined with strategies of epistemic ordering and circumscription of political imagination - and thus to reconstruct (and not to reject) the knowledge and politics of the legitimacy/ legality in IR. This work particularly investigates a possible sociological form of reflection that is politically engaged with this relation, that is, a form of epistemic-political engagement in which the suspension of the meaning of the legitimate and/or the legal constitutes a key moment for a political opening towards a continuing investigative sensibility vis-à-vis the limits that have been designed by the attempts to delimit a right-being of the world; which is in turn limitedly mobilized as a contingent sociological impression through the contextual and discursive performance of a normative judgement attached to the legitimacy/legality relation.

La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges. L'une des formules de Borges tient que la "métaphysique" n'est qu'une branche de la littérature fantastique. Caractérisant la logique borgésienne d'une "ludique" herméneutique - celle de lire les textes philosophiques à partir des narrativités qu'ils autorisent- cette remarque semble pourtant soulever une question proprement philosophique : celle du statut de notre concept ordinaire d'objet. D'après la proposition wittgensteinienne, notre concept d'objet physique n'est qu'un concept "logique". La question demeure ainsi de savoir si nos jeux de langage ordinaire épuisent sa grammaire, et dans quelle mesure les fictions et les essais de Borges, qui jouent avec celle-ci, devraient être considérés comme un élargissement, ou bien comme une distorsion de la grammaire ordinaire de l'objet. Il s'agira ainsi d'interroger, d'un côté, si les textes borgésiens tolèrent une lecture analytique ; d'un autre, de démontrer comment la fiction, en recadrant à chaque fois le partage entre dire et montrer, permet d'en détourner, ou bien d'en dépasser la "logique". / Metaphysics as a branch of fantastic literature: a Wittgensteinian reading of Borges. One of Borges' slogans holds that "metaphysics" is only a branch of fantastic literature. Characterizing the Borgesian logic behind a playful hermeneutics -i.e., the possibility to read philosophy througout the narrativities it authorizes- this remark seems to raise a strictly philosophical question, namely that of the status of our ordinary concept of object. According to Wittgenstein, our concept of physical object is just a "logical" concept. The question thus remains whether our ordinary language games exhaust its grammar, and to what extent Borges' fictions and essays, as an attemp to play with it, should be regarded as an extension, or rather as a distortion of the ordinary grammar of the object. It will thus be necessary to inquiry, on the one hand, whether the Borgean texts tolerate an analytic reading; on the other, to show how each fiction, by reframing all over again the split between saying and showing, makes it possible to divert or rather to go beyond its "logic".

The aim of this thesis is to describe some central conceptual ideas expressed in the language of six computer interested boys. The starting-point is the philosophy of language of Ludwig Wittgenstein, where language is seen as something deeply integrated in our practices, traditions and culture. The use of our language shows its meaning. The material consists of 18 months of observations in the computer room of a secondary school and a series of three deep-interviews with each one of the boys over a period of three years. The computer has a central function in their identity work. Within our culture, this object - with its structure and its ways of operating - has become a metaphor for human thinking. It offers freedom and control. The discussions involved in this work and its form of representation problemize some of the fundamental assumptions of linguistics and the humanities. The three portraits (chapters 3-5) are to be understood as meaningful examples, while the persons portrayed are to be seen as symbols, inviting the reader to reflect over our culture and our practices. The fostering into the computer world and the ways of looking at the world are shown through the "personal voice", each followed by an interpretation linked to the theories and results of other researchers. In the boys' ways of using language there are differences and similarities. Learning, growing, creating, signifying 'freedom', can be seen as central notions in the identity work of one of them. With another of the boys there is a strong resemblance in his talking of computers and of his personal God; he "fixes" the world through dividing-lines, strong recommendations, further emphasized through the frequent use of the verb ska (shall, should). In the third portrait it is evident that the boy's abundance of words and narrative-making is a strategy of preventing nearness and to be able both to control the interview situation and to intensify the here and now. "Going deep" into computers make certain assumptions about the world more essential than others. Central concepts explicit in their common language game are logic, power and control (chapter 7). There is a common tendency to hierarchize and dichotomize the world; upper/under world, outer/inner world, logic/feeling, we/they, right/wrong. Stability can be seen as a summarizing notion. The deeper significance of their feeling of safety and control in the computer world is a fostering both into male dominance and into a dominant way of thinking about knowledge as something primarily logical, controllable and possible to account for. This masculinist language game is confirmed in different ways: individually, in the group and at a more subtle and symbolic level. / <p>Diss. Umeå : Univ., 1992</p> / digitalisering@umu

Le présent travail a pour objectif d'exposer le traitement que fait Wittgenstein de l'indexicalité dans les Recherches philosophiques. Essentiellement, la lecture proposée permettra au lecteur d'avoir une vue d'ensemble sur la contribution de Wittgenstein à propos des différents aspects du langage qui nécessitent un contexte pour signifier. Pour pouvoir saisir toute la richesse des remarques de Wittgenstein dans les Recherches philosophiques, la présentation de certains concepts essentiels et de philosophes importants est nécessaire. C'est pourquoi le chapitre I y est consacré. Le chapitre Il traite de l'indexicalité dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Comme Wittgenstein dans les Recherches revient sur sa conception du langage du Tractatus, et cela à propos d'aspects pertinents quant à la question de l'indexicalité, le chapitre Il aidera à saisir les deux derniers chapitres. Le chapitre III présente la critique que fait Wittgenstein de son ancienne conception du langage pour mettre en place sa nouvelle, qui comprend les jeux de langage comme condition nécessaire d'interprétation. Ces derniers permettent à la définition ostensive, comme tout phénomène indexical, de signifier. Le chapitre IV sera l'occasion de voir que les objets privés (les sensations) auxquels nous nous référons parfois de manière ostensive, ne sont pas privés au sens où nous ne pouvons pas nous y référer. Cette idée montre que le philosophe apporte des réponses originales sur des questions qui concernent l'indexicalité de manière plus large. Il sera avancé dans ce texte que la philosophie des Recherches philosophiques aboutit à l'idée que ce n'est pas l'objet lui-même qui est essentiel à la signification, autant en ce qui concerne les définitions ostensives que les objets privés. Wittgenstein, avec les jeux de langage, montre que le contexte est nécessaire pour la signification, et qu'il n'y a rien de primitif dans l'objet de désignation qui puisse nous indiquer quelque chose sur lui. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Wittgenstein, Indexicalité, Jeux de langage, Définition ostensive, Objets privés.

Univ., Diss.--Oldenburg, 2007.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2008 / Bibliografia: f. 88-90 / A filosofia de Wittgenstein é dividida em dois momentos aparentemente distintos, porém eles são complementares. O primeiro momento é referido como a do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Já na Introdução desta obra, o autor apresenta a idéia de que a maioria / The Wittgenstein#s philosophy is divided in two apparently distinct moments, but they are complementary. The first moment is refered as the Tractatus Logicophilosophicus. Since the introduction of this book, the autor presents the idea that most of the ph

PINHEIRO, Lília Palmeira. Reflexões sobre o "Tratactus Logico-Philosophicus". 2006. 96f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2006. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T16:30:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2006-DIS-LPPINHEIRO.pdf: 591353 bytes, checksum: adcf5b2bd12eb81e31f4c6fd4d0bbacd (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T18:21:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2006-DIS-LPPINHEIRO.pdf: 591353 bytes, checksum: adcf5b2bd12eb81e31f4c6fd4d0bbacd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-05T18:21:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2006-DIS-LPPINHEIRO.pdf: 591353 bytes, checksum: adcf5b2bd12eb81e31f4c6fd4d0bbacd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / To solve the problems of the language as representation is the focal point of the Tractatus. In order to accomplish this task, Wittgenstein propose a pictorial theory that seems to create a convincing strategy to assure that the logic rules of the world can determinate as the linguistic symbols, in their syntactic and semantic structures – not only the signs, when properly articulated into propositions, can effectively represent possible facts. Surprisingly, once that Wittgenstein solved this concern, he find out that the rules of language are the rules of the world, they share the same essence, and so, he ended to create not only a linguistic, but also an ontological theory as well. My primary intention is to consider the theory created by Wittgenstein, trying to rise up a few plausible problematic questions that appear in face of the perspective defended in the text. / Resolver os problemas da linguagem como representação é o foco principal do Tractatus. Para realizar tal tarefa, Wittgenstein propõe uma teoria pictórica que parece criar uma estratégia convincente para assegurar que as regras lógicas do mundo possam determinar como os símbolos lingüísticos, em suas estruturas sintáticas e semânticas – não somente os signos, quando apropriadamente articulados em proposições, podem efetivamente representar fatos possíveis. Surpreendentemente, uma vez que Wittgenstein resolve essa questão, ele descobre que as regras da linguagem são também as regras do mundo, eles compartilham a mesma essência, e assim, ele acaba criando não somente uma teoria lingüística, mas também uma teoria ontológica. Meu intuito principal é considerar em que consiste a teoria criada por Wittgenstein, buscando levantar algumas questões problemáticas que se mostram plausíveis diante da perspectiva defendida na obra.

This dissertation analyzes the solipsism subject in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein, exploring its possible interpretations and the result of each of them. While solipsism is held to be true and likely to match the realism, although it is not possible to be approached by the language with meaning, which is carried forward in the mystical and showed fields and where we encounter the metaphysical subject, the one that thinks, represents but does not exist as object alongside other objects. Since then, we will demonstrate that it is not possible for Wittgenstein to use the term solipsism in a usual manner, but in a different format, where it can be conceivable the me (solipsism) and the world (realism) simultaneously and in harmony, and the acceptance of other minds in the world. Thus being able to know the truth of solipsism through the mystical feeling. / A presente dissertação analisa o tema do solipsismo no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein, explorando algumas possíveis interpretações e suas decorrências. O solipsismo é tido como verdadeiro e passível de coincidir com o realismo, mesmo não sendo possível de ser abordado pela linguagem com sentido, o que o faz transitar pelos campos do místico e do mostrável, onde nos deparamos com o sujeito metafísico, aquele que pensa, representa mas não existe como um objeto ao lado dos demais. Tentaremos mostrar não ser possível para o Wittgenstein do Tractatus fazer uso do termo solipsismo de uma forma usual, mas sim de uma forma diferenciada, onde possa ser concebível o eu (solipsismo) e o mundo (realismo) ao mesmo tempo e em harmonia, bem como a aceitação de outras mentes no mundo, podendo-se, assim, conhecer a verdade do solipsismo através do sentimento místico.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-04-03Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:27:38Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 bozatski_mf_me_mar.pdf: 850559 bytes, checksum: e97863cf099ca1ae60ffd92574f52040 (MD5) / Procuramos delimitar o âmbito de interação do humano com a realidade a partir da teoria lingüística expressa no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e nas Investigações Filosóficas. A partir da identificação deste âmbito ontológico-lingüístico da ação humana, representadas pela tríade agir/sentir/pensar, demonstraremos como a linguagem representa a realidade a partir da afiguração. Através de contextualizações e aproximações das teorias wittgensteinianas com noções filosóficas tradicionais busca-se demonstrar a inovação do método wittgensteiniano e suas possibilidades de aplicação ao exercício filosófico contemporâneo. / We have tried to delimit the ambit of the human's interaction with the reality starting from the linguistic theory expresses in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in the Philosophical Investigations. Starting from the identification of this ontological-linguistic ambit of the human action, represented by the triad to act/to feel/to think, we will demonstrate as the language it represents the reality starting from the representation. Through contextualize and approaches of the Wittgenstein’s theories with the traditional philosophical notions, we aim for to demonstrate the innovation of the Wittgenstein’s method and your application possibilities to the contemporary philosophical exercise.

Dans ses Remarques mêlées, Wittgenstein écrivait : « Qui enseigne aujourd’hui la philosophie ne choisit pas pour son élève une nourriture à son goût, mais celle qui est capable de changer son goût. »Et nous avons mauvais goût manifestement : notre palais n’est sensible qu’aux schèmes verticaux. Il n’affectionne que ce qui s’y apparente. Ce « nous » auquel nous nous référons n’englobe pas que les étudiants. Il désigne avant tout les professionnels de la philosophie, et ceux des sciences humaines. La cible de Wittgenstein, c’est finalement l’universitaire. Celui, du moins, qui en a adopté le langage et les codes, et qui, à travers eux conçoit ce qu’est un résultat et les moyens d’y parvenir.Adopter ce langage et ces codes en philosophie résulte d'un malentendu, d'une ambition qui ne peut que manquer ce qu'elle voudrait atteindre, car cette méthode ne lui est pas propre : elle se calque sur celle des sciences. Elle édifie quand elle devrait décrire, elle démontre quand elle devrait étaler.La philosophie ne devrait être qu’horizontalité. C’est là le « message wittgensteinien », nous semble-t-il. C’est en tout cas comme cela que nous nous permettons de le formuler. Il est présent en chaque point de son œuvre, de manière plus ou moins perceptible, il est vrai. La forme de celle-ci se déroule, se dessine peu à peu à partir de ce précepte. C’est la raison pour laquelle il n'est pas évident pour le lecteur de s’y retrouver. Rien ne lui est livré comme de coutume, dans les emballages desquels il est familier. Le message est distillé à chaque instant, par touches succinctes, peu importe le tableau. C’est en cela qu’on peut parler d’ubiquité de la pensée wittgensteinienne. / In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein wrote: ‘Someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupil foods, not because they are to his taste, but in order to change his taste.’We obviously have bad taste: our palate is only sensitive to vertical schema. It only likes what it is similar to it. This ‘us’ we refer to, does not only include students. It mostly designates the professionals of philosophy, and those from Human Sciences. Wittgenstein's aim is, after all, the academic. Or at least, the one who uses its language and its codes, and through them, knows what a result is and the means to reach it.Use this language and these codes in philosophy, is the result of a misunderstanding, of an ambition that is only able to miss what it wants to reach, because this method is not its own: it models itself on the scientific one. It edifies when it should be describing and demonstrates when it should be spreading.Philosophy should only be horizontality appears to be the ‘Wittgensteinian message’, it seems to us. We allow ourselves to express it as so anyway. We can find this message, in a more or less discernible way, that is true, all along his work. The shape of Wittgenstein's work appears bit by bit from this precept. This is the reason why it is not easy for the reader to find his way through. Nothing is given to him as usual, in the packages he is used to receive it. The message is disclosed, in every instant, by succinct touches, no matter the picture. We can therefore talk about the ubiquity of Wittgensteinian thought.