Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. No decorrer do texto, deparamonos com as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. E acredita que há uma solução cética para o paradoxo que flerta com o niilismo. Por outro lado, os comentadores ingleses apresentam o conceito de regra cumprindo um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem. Na medida em que estas se constituem como funções normativas de usos das palavras, são expressas na linguagem e determinadas contingentemente de acordo com os contextos de uso. / This work has as main objective the analysis of the role of the concept of rule in Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations. Throughout the text we have the readings of S. Kripke and G.P. Baker & P M S. Hacker. The first argues that the notion of rule, inspite of presenting a paradox, it is a very important point in the argument against private language. He believes there is a skeptical solution to the paradox which flirts with nihilism. Furthermore, the Englishs commentators have the concept of rule fulfilling a key role in the explanation of Wittgenstein on the functioning of language. The rules are as functions of normative uses of words, they are expressed in the language and determinate according to the contexts of use.

La pregunta que ha guiado esta investigación es qué es lo que significa comprender al otro. En busca de una posible respuesta me he centrado en las sugerentes ideas de la segunda etapa de Wittgenstein. La cuestión de la comprensión emerge de las críticas que hizo a la famosa obra La Rama dorada del antropólogo James Frazer. No obstante, no hay un desarrollo explícito de los elementos que están comprometidos en el fenómeno de la comprensión, por ello lo que intentaré hacer es esbozar una respuesta a la pregunta desde sus elucidaciones gramaticales y desde el espíritu de su obra. Mi respuesta a la pregunta es que comprender una creencia, una acción o un deseo extraño es encontrarle sentido y ello es posible cuando (I) somos capaces de ubicar esa creencia, una acción o un deseo en un contexto, en conexión con otras actividades, lo que se logra solo si compartimos una forma de vida y (II) a su vez logramos establecer un vínculo entre esos otros y nosotros. Para justificar la respuesta, dividí el trabajo en tres capítulos. El objetivo del primer capítulo es introducirnos al fenómeno de la comprensión. El capítulo dos está dedicado a defender la primera parte de la tesis: que para comprender una creencia es necesario compartir una forma de vida, lo que nos llevó al estudio de la naturaleza social y pragmática del lenguaje. El capítulo tres está dedicado a defender la segunda parte de la tesis, a saber, que para comprender al otro es necesario encontrar conexiones entre sus creencias y las mías; para ello nos centramos en la noción de “representaciones perspicuas”. La conclusión de este trabajo es que la comprensión no es un evento psicológico interno sino una experiencia anclada en la práctica que desborda las subjetividades de quienes participan en ella: una experiencia de integración y transformación. / Tesis

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauricio Palma Resende.pdf: 1111626 bytes, checksum: 40dd782dff09615491e9d65b468e176e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-26 / This work aims to explore two directions associated with the development of the philosophy of language that leaded to dissonant conceptions of philosophy of law: in one hand, the Wittgenstein s thought on the language and the world; on the other hand, Luhmann s theory grounded on his thesis of an operational rupture regarding man and communication in autopoietic systems. Right after an explanation over both perspectives and their reflects on law, it is outlined a dialogue based on Wittgenstein with Luhmann s theory, discussion which in the end shows that the theory of functional social systems has an insufficient explanation of the corruption phenomenon in result of the thesis concerning the operational opposition man/communication, and affirms that Wittgenstein s notions such as language-games and form of life are worthy ways to struggle with this question. In conclusion, the work pictures the law as a factor based on human s language, positioning it on the mark of an analysis of its language games, which reveals cultural and historical aspects / trabalho busca explorar dois caminhos relacionados à filosofia da linguagem que conduziram a divergentes correntes da filosofia do direito: de um lado, as considerações de Wittgenstein sobre linguagem e mundo e, de outro, a teoria de Luhmann fundada na tese da separação operacional dos seres humanos da comunicação em sistemas autopoiéticos. Após a exposição do pensamento destes autores e seu reflexo no direito, é delineado um diálogo alicerçado em Wittgenstein com a teoria luhmanniana, sendo que ao final deste entende-se que a teoria da diferenciação funcional dos sistemas sociais apresenta uma explicação insuficiente do fenômeno da corrupção em decorrência da referida apartação do homem da comunicação, e afirma-se que noções wittgensteinianas como as de jogos de linguagem e forma de vida indicam um profícuo caminho para trabalhar esta questão de forma menos porosa. Em conclusão, retrata-se direito como plasmado pela linguagem humana, o que o confina à análise dos jogos de linguagem e revela suas feições culturais e históricas

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O objetivo é analisar as implicações da teorização pós-estruturalista para o pensamento educacional, especialmente no que se refere ao relativismo decorrente desta teorização, assunto que ganhou destaque nas discussões acadêmicas não só apenas de filosofia da educação como também nas relacionadas à filosofia da ciência e do pensamento social. Não se objetivou uma análise extensiva das possibilidades da filosofia pós-moderna para a educação, uma vez que a multiplicidade dos discursos, autores e idéias tornaria esta tarefa irrealizável e inadequada no que se refere ao escopo deste trabalho. Antes, o foco é estabelecido sobre a idéia da deposição das fundamentações realistas, racionalistas e naturalistas do discurso educacional, e sobre as críticas mais representativas que este movimento suscita na comunidade de pensadores da educação.

Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and phases, and that human remembering consists in inner, cognitive processes that are implemented by distinct neural processes. This dissertation draws on recent empirical work, and on philosophical arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, to demonstrate that this latent computationalism in the study of memory is problematic, and that it can and should be eliminated. Cognitive psychologists studying memory have encountered numerous data in recent decades that belie archival models. In cognitive neuroscience, establishing the neural basis of storage and retrieval processes has proven elusive. A number of revised models on offer in memory science, that have taken these issues into account, fail to sufficiently extricate the archival framework. Several impasses in memory science are products of these underlying computationalist assumptions. Wittgenstein and other philosophers offer a number of arguments against the need for, and the efficacy of, the storage and retrieval of traces in human remembering. A study of these arguments clarifies the ways that these computationalist assumptions are presently impeding the science of memory, and provides ways forward in removing them. We can and should characterize and model human memory without invoking the storage and retrieval of traces. A range of work in connectionism, dynamical systems theory, and recent philosophical accounts of memory demonstrate how the science of memory can proceed without these assumptions, toward non-archival models of remembering.

There are historically three main trends in understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The first is the interpretation offered by the Vienna Circle. They read Wittgenstein as arguing that neither metaphysical nor normative propositions have any cognitive meaning, and thus are to be considered nonsense. This interpretation understands Wittgenstein as setting the limits of sense, and prescribing that nothing of substantive philosophical importance lies beyond that line. The second way of reading the Tractatus, which has became popular since the 1950s, is the interpretation which most currently accept as the early Wittgenstein's view; for this reason I refer to it as the 'standard reading.' According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein did not consider metaphysical and ethical discourse as nonsense. Rather, relying upon the distinction between saying [sagen] and showing [zeigen], he meant that these truths cannot be uttered, but instead are only shown. The standard reading can perhaps be best understood in contrast with the third interpretation, dubbed the "resolute reading." The resolute reading takes seriously Wittgenstein's remark at 6.54 that "[m]y propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsense [unsinnig]." According to the resolute interpretation, Wittgenstein is not advancing a series of philosophical theses in the Tractatus. Rejecting the distinction characteristic of standard readings, between propositions without sense [sinnlos] and just plain nonsense [unsinnig], these interpreters read Wittgenstein as treating ethical and metaphysical inquiry, as well as a bulk of the doctrines in the text, as nonsense. To them, Wittgenstein did not intend to put forth any theses in the the text. Instead his methodology is therapeutic, similar to the later philosophy. It In this essay I explain each interpretation, and evaluate them in terms of textual and philosophical viability. I conclude by arguing that the biases which exist in the tradition of analytic philosophy substantively temper the interpretation of historical texts, which ultimately leads to the fundamental distinction between these three interpretations.

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