This thesis concerns the metaphysics of scale. It investigates the implications of a physical determinable being dimensionful. In particular, it considers the case study of mass, as it features within Newtonian Gravity. Nevertheless, most of the terminology, methodology and arguments developed should be relatively straightforwardly applicable to other determinables and theories. Weak Absolutism about mass holds that mass ratios obtain in virtue of absolute masses. Weak Comparativism denies this. In the first five chapters I argue in favour of Weak Absolutism over Weak Comparativism. The sixth chapter argues against reducing mass to other non-mass facts. The overall conclusion is Strong Absolutism about mass within Newtonian Gravity: mass ratios obtain in virtue of absolute masses, which themselves are fundamental (i.e. they do not require anything further in order to obtain). Comparativism promises to recover all the virtues of absolutism, in particular its empirical adequacy, but at a lower 'metaphysical cost'. Special attention is given to Dasgupta's recent comparativist proposal. Dasgupta interprets the requirement of empirical adequacy in terms of the undetectability of the absolute mass scale. I argue that undetectability is an unsuitable way of understanding empirical adequacy and that we would do better to understand it in terms of a theory's ability to correctly generate the set of empirically possible worlds (or at least the actual world). I refute Dasgupta's comparativism both on my terms and on his own terms. I subsequently develop and strongly criticise alternative versions of comparativism. Chapter five sheds doubt on the supposed 'metaphysical parsimony' of comparativism. This debate should be of particular interest to readers who engage with the substantivalism-relationalism debate. These debates are much more entwined than previously acknowledged, which provides a significant source of mutual inspiration, although I do also draw out some important disanalogies.

Submitted by Sandra Pereira (srpereira@ufrrj.br) on 2017-05-18T12:22:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2011 - Bruno Silva de Souza.pdf: 597169 bytes, checksum: 673fbe11f321d737d659d58670ebebdb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-18T12:22:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2011 - Bruno Silva de Souza.pdf: 597169 bytes, checksum: 673fbe11f321d737d659d58670ebebdb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-01 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This study aims to reflect about the Iberians formulations concerning the royal power, stressing the unsuitable nature of the absolutism notion to characterize the question of power in the Iberian anci?n r?gime. Starting from the analysis of the ?good reason of State? doctrine, an alternative formulation against the Machiavellian thought, we intends to point the elements that restrains the sovereignty exercises for the King, especially the role played by the catholic religion in the Iberian political thought in 17 th century. / Esta trabalho pretende refletir sobre as formula??es ib?ricas concernentes ao poder r?gio, enfatizando a inadequa??o da no??o de Absolutismo para caracterizar a quest?o do poder no Antigo Regime ib?rico. Partindo da an?lise da doutrina da buena raz?n de Estado, formula??o alternativa e oposta ao pensamento de Maquiavel, procura-se apontar os elementos de limita??o do exerc?cio da soberania r?gia, especialmente o papel da religi?o cat?lica no pensamento pol?tico ib?rico do s?culo XVII.

The Reformation was a period of change in which there was a distinct break between the medieval tradition and the Early Modern Period. Divine Right to Rule, the doctrine that states monarchs derive their right to rule from and are only answerable to God, became a central point in Early Modern political theories, such as in The Six Bookes of the Commonwealth by Jean Bodin. Sovereignty was described in absolutist terms that stressed obedience to the ruler and denied resistance under any circumstances. The cultural phenomenon of obedience and non-resistance largely emerged through the doctrines of Reformation writers such as Martin Luther and William Tyndale. This thesis attempts to trace the intellectual origins of the Divine Right theory from the medieval antipapal polemics to Bodin¡¦s concrete definition of sovereignty. This thesis uses a cultural studies approach to trace the ideas which eventually led to the emergence of the Divine Right theory. It finds similarities in the historical circumstance, which influenced the production of each, individual work, and finds similarities between the texts of different historical periods. It also explores the influence each text had on its contemporaries and on later generations. To start, Bodin¡¦s The Six Bookes of the Common-Weale will be examined to determine the definition of absolutism defined by divine right as seen by sixteenth century intellectuals. It is important to note that Bodin did not always support royal absolutism, but like many other political thinkers, the chaos of the French Civil Wars led him to the conclusion that only a strong king has the ability to unify a country. Bodin¡¦s Six Bookes set out to clearly define the meaning of sovereignty and the obligations of the sovereign. He determined a sovereign has to have supreme, unshared power that is not limited by any subject. Moreover, a sovereign ruler recognizes no higher authority, save God. Therefore, Bodin justifies royal absolutism through Divine Right. This becomes clear through his stance on resistance¡Xactive resistance, rebellion and tyrannicide are forbidden under all circumstances. The ideas highlighted in Six Bookes will be compared with the philosophy presented by Marsilius of Padua in Defensor Pacis. It may seem strange to compare thought of Marsilius against that of Bodin, for Marsilius actually had a profound dislike of absolutism (Copleston 310), however Marsilius¡¦ doctrine plays a crucial role in the foundations of divine right. Appalled by papal interference into secular affairs, Marsilius created an antipapal polemic, which attempts to destroy the papacy¡¦s claims on temporal power and places the state above the church in earthly affairs. Both the medieval and modern standpoints will then be compared with the ideas of Reformers. Like Marsilius, both Luther and William Tyndale begin their respective works with antipapal rhetoric. Luther¡¦s An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to the Amelioration of the State of Christendom (1520) attacks the ¡§three walls¡¨ he felt protected the pope¡¦s erroneous actions. In Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, Luther agrees with Marsilius¡¦ opinion that the pope had no coercive power or jurisdiction in earthly affairs, and identifies the king as God¡¦s representative on earth. Thus a good Christian has the duty to obey the king and not resist his orders. Tyndale¡¦s The Obedience of a Christian Man further developed Luther¡¦s political theory, in particular with the idea of obedience. Tyndale emphasizes the divine right to rule and that usurping a sovereign ruler is equivalent to usurping the will of God. In his eyes, disobedience breeds disobedience and the result of rebellion is chaos. While still based on theology, the political thinking of both Luther and Tyndale act as a bridge between merely attacks against the pope and the sophisticated political philosophies justified by history and civil law. In conclusion, Reformation writers were immeasurably useful in providing intellectual support for secular claims for supremacy, obedience and non-resistance, particularly in the ecclesiastical split between Henry VIII and Rome. The Reformation doctrine of obedience developed from the antipapal polemics of the medieval period and become a defining point in Early Modern political tracts. Obedience and non-resistance also enabled the claim of Divine Right to Rule by sixteenth and seventeenth century rulers.

Le pragmatisme, en tant que courant philosophique, et l'anarchisme, en tant que courant politique, semblent être reliés par deux approches d'apparence complémentaire : le premier est souvent considéré comme politiquement neutre alors que le second comme philosophiquement indifférent. Notre étude consiste à examiner cette double neutralité et, suivant notre interrogation, à savoir « le pragmatisme, est-il une philosophie anarchiste ? », valoriser et évaluer la possibilité d'une réponse positive, car les conséquences politiques de l'un et les conséquences philosophiques de l'autre, ainsi que les causes de leur prétendue indifférence complémentaire, nous inspirent l'idée d'une architecture commune. Dans un premier temps, nous tentons de situer cette architecture dans la philosophie de James et de Dewey se focalisant sur le rapport du pragmatisme à la démocratie. Nous dégageons ainsi les traits principaux d'une philosophie de l'expérience conforme aux exigences que les philosophes pragmatistes prêtent à la démocratie, car c'est l'expérience qui permet à la démocratie de voir sa dimension éthique, très présente chez les pragmatistes, devenir politique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinons l'articulation de ce que l'on peut appeler doxa anarchiste avec les thèses philosophiques que James et Dewey voient composer la philosophie de l'expérience. Nous nous focalisons notamment sur la pensée de Proudhon et de Bakounine, dont la filiation nous semble porteuse du même esprit anti-absolutiste qui correspond à la dimension critique de la philosophie de l'expérience. / Pragmatism, as a philosophical movement, and anarchism, as a political one, seem to be connected by two seemingly complementary approaches: pragmatism is often considered as politically neutral, while anarchism as philosophically indifferent. The aim of our study is to examine this double neutrality and, following our interrogation, namely « is pragmatism an anarchist philosophy? », to evaluate the possibility of a positive answer, the political consequences of the one and the philosophical consequences of the other, and also the causes of their alleged complementary indifference, inspiring us the idea of a commun architecture. First, we try to locate this architecture in the philosophy of James and Dewey, focusing on the relationship of pragmatism to democracy. Thus, we point out the main features of a philosophy of experience fitting the demands - in a pragmatic perspective - of democracy. For it is only experience that allows democracy to see its ethical dimension - very present among pragmatists - become political. Second, we examine the articulation of what we can call anarchist doxa with the philosophical assertions that form, according to James and Dewey, the philosophy of experience. We focus, in particular, on the thought of Proudhon and Bakunin, whose kinship seems to carry the same anti-absolutist spirit that forms the critical dimension of the philosophy of experience.

O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar a monarcomaquia como um instituto jurídico criado no processo verbal de expulsão dos jesuítas em Portugal e França e diferenciá-la da lesa-majestade. Como metodologia utilizase o casuísmo e a contextualização pela metodologia da história dos conceitos através do método indutivo a partir da análise do processo verbal que ocorreu nestes países pois a monarcomaquia não havia sido utilizada antes como fonte do direito. Como resultado podemos caracteriza-la e diferenciá-la do lesamajestade. Concluímos a presente tese no sentido de que a monarcomaquia é criada como um instituto jurídico do absolutismo francês e do despotismo português por conta dos fatos envolvendo a Companhia de Jesus, no contexto de século XVIII, apresentando como sanção a expulsão e a tomada do patrimônio, diferenciando-se do lesa-majestade. / The objective of the present work is to present monarcomaquia as a legal institute created in the verbal process of expulsion of the Jesuits in Portugal and France and to differentiate it from the lese-majesty. As methodology is used casuism and the contextualization by the methodology of the history of the concepts through the inductive method from the analysis of the verbal process that occurred in these countries because monarcomaquia had not been used as a source of law. As a result, we can characterize it and differentiate it from lese-majesty. We conclude this thesis in the sense that monarcomaquia is created as a legal institute of French absolutism and Portuguese despotism on account of the facts involving the Society of Jesus, in the context of the eighteenth century, presenting as a sanction the expulsion and the taking of the patrimony, differentiating itself from lese-majesty.

O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar a monarcomaquia como um instituto jurídico criado no processo verbal de expulsão dos jesuítas em Portugal e França e diferenciá-la da lesa-majestade. Como metodologia utilizase o casuísmo e a contextualização pela metodologia da história dos conceitos através do método indutivo a partir da análise do processo verbal que ocorreu nestes países pois a monarcomaquia não havia sido utilizada antes como fonte do direito. Como resultado podemos caracteriza-la e diferenciá-la do lesamajestade. Concluímos a presente tese no sentido de que a monarcomaquia é criada como um instituto jurídico do absolutismo francês e do despotismo português por conta dos fatos envolvendo a Companhia de Jesus, no contexto de século XVIII, apresentando como sanção a expulsão e a tomada do patrimônio, diferenciando-se do lesa-majestade. / The objective of the present work is to present monarcomaquia as a legal institute created in the verbal process of expulsion of the Jesuits in Portugal and France and to differentiate it from the lese-majesty. As methodology is used casuism and the contextualization by the methodology of the history of the concepts through the inductive method from the analysis of the verbal process that occurred in these countries because monarcomaquia had not been used as a source of law. As a result, we can characterize it and differentiate it from lese-majesty. We conclude this thesis in the sense that monarcomaquia is created as a legal institute of French absolutism and Portuguese despotism on account of the facts involving the Society of Jesus, in the context of the eighteenth century, presenting as a sanction the expulsion and the taking of the patrimony, differentiating itself from lese-majesty.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adherence to absolute truth and moraluniversalism is compatible with democracy. The starting point is that there is absolute truthand absolute values.My thesis is that democracy in the form of universal suffrage is not necessarily in the wayof truth, but rather party politics and representative democracy. Abolishing the parties may besufficient to overcome both truth relativism and moral relativism, and thus provide analternative to abolishing universal suffrage. I suggest the problem lies in party politics, andthe way in which political talks are conducted, rather than in the right to vote.The investigation shows that democracy only have instrumental value. It shall be judgedbased on how well it promotes absolute truth and absolute values. Furthermore, representativedemocracy does not promote absolute truth and absolute values. One alternative isepistocracy. Another option is to abolish the parties, preserve universal suffrage, and createconditions for a new form of political dialogue. The conclusion is that the latter option is bestfor promoting the absolute truth.

Au siècle des Lumières, la physiocratie constitue un paradigme attractif qui propose un modèle universel et original de réforme de la société d’Ancien Régime. À compter des années 1760, les idées portées par cette doctrine politique, économique et juridique circulent à travers tout le continent européen et sont accueillies avec plus ou moins d’attention par les souverains et les élites éclairées. Les propositions du mouvement emportent l’adhésion de certains grands d’Europe et suscitent l’enthousiasme de nombre d’intellectuels, diplomates et administrateurs étrangers. Ouverts à l’esprit du temps, plusieurs monarques et ministres de haut rang décident de recourir à la physiocratie dans le cadre de leurs réformes du droit commercial, de la fiscalité, de l’organisation du travail, de l’agriculture, de l’administration territoriale ou de l’instruction publique. De même, la théorie du despotisme légal conjuguée au triptyque jusnaturaliste « liberté, propriété, sûreté » offre un modèle propice à la régénération de l’État et à la reconnaissance des droits fondamentaux. Or, dans d’autres contrées européennes, la physiocratie est reçue avec scepticisme ou indifférence par certains princes, ministres ou penseurs souvent proches du pouvoir. Bien qu’en quête de solutions réformatrices, ces gouvernants ne recourent alors qu’avec parcimonie aux préceptes de l’école, quand ils ne les rejettent pas purement et simplement au prétexte de leurs effets pernicieux pour l’ordre social traditionnel. / During the Age of the Enlightenment, physiocracy established an attractive paradigm which proposed an original and universal model of reform of society under the Ancien Régime. From the 1760s onwards, the ideas carried by this political, economic and legal doctrine spread across the entire continent of Europe and attracted the attention to a greater or lesser extent of sovereigns and the enlightened elites of the day. What the movement proposed had the support of a number of crowned heads and aroused the enthusiasm of many of intellectuals, diplomats and foreign administrators. Certain monarchs and ministers were very much open to the spirit of the time and they decided to use physiocracy within the framework of their reforms of commercial law, taxation, the organization of labour, agriculture, territorial administration or education. Indeed, the theory of legal despotism combined with the three natural rights of “liberty, property and security” offered a suitable model for the regeneration of the State and the recognition of fundamental rights. Yet in some European countries, physiocracy was greeted with scepticism or indifference by other princes, ministers and thinkers who were often close to those in power. Although these rulers were looking for reformist solutions, they resorted only sparingly to the precepts of the school, when they didn’t reject them outright, the pretext being the pernicious effects of such precepts on traditional social order.

O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar a monarcomaquia como um instituto jurídico criado no processo verbal de expulsão dos jesuítas em Portugal e França e diferenciá-la da lesa-majestade. Como metodologia utilizase o casuísmo e a contextualização pela metodologia da história dos conceitos através do método indutivo a partir da análise do processo verbal que ocorreu nestes países pois a monarcomaquia não havia sido utilizada antes como fonte do direito. Como resultado podemos caracteriza-la e diferenciá-la do lesamajestade. Concluímos a presente tese no sentido de que a monarcomaquia é criada como um instituto jurídico do absolutismo francês e do despotismo português por conta dos fatos envolvendo a Companhia de Jesus, no contexto de século XVIII, apresentando como sanção a expulsão e a tomada do patrimônio, diferenciando-se do lesa-majestade. / The objective of the present work is to present monarcomaquia as a legal institute created in the verbal process of expulsion of the Jesuits in Portugal and France and to differentiate it from the lese-majesty. As methodology is used casuism and the contextualization by the methodology of the history of the concepts through the inductive method from the analysis of the verbal process that occurred in these countries because monarcomaquia had not been used as a source of law. As a result, we can characterize it and differentiate it from lese-majesty. We conclude this thesis in the sense that monarcomaquia is created as a legal institute of French absolutism and Portuguese despotism on account of the facts involving the Society of Jesus, in the context of the eighteenth century, presenting as a sanction the expulsion and the taking of the patrimony, differentiating itself from lese-majesty.

There are many ways to view mathematics, two of the most prominent ways are absolutism and fallibilism where you view mathematical concepts as something static or ever changing respectively. In school it has been shown that students with a fallibilistic view have an easier time solving problems than those who see mathematics absolutisticly. On pace with the digitization of the Swedish school where digital tools are becoming more common, we wonder what views of mathematics those platforms offer, and what views are expressed by the students in their interaction with them. To answer these questions we have analysed observations and interviews with three students. The observations have been done during a lesson where the students have used digital tools, such as NOKflex which is a learning platform while the interviews were qualitative and had the students answer questions about how they work with digital tools in different subjects. The result of this study shows that NOKflex primarily offers an absolutist view, but the students express both an absolutist and fallibilistic way of thinking during the lesson and the interview. A conclusion drawn from this is that these views are not mutually exclusive to each other and a primary factor to what view is expressed depends on the context of the situation. Due to the absolutist view NOKflex offers students problem solving and reasoning skills suffer.