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Rouen en 1650 : carrefour des conflits / Rouen 1650 : crossroads of conflictEtienne, Baptiste 17 December 2018 (has links)
Dans une société urbaine en ébullition, la capitale normande forme un observatoire privilégié des jeux de pouvoirs et avec l’autorité centrale. Cette thèse interroge fondamentalement le rapport entre l’État et la province, alors que le royaume de France est en proie à la dernière grande révolte d’Ancien Régime. Ainsi, la Fronde bouleverse les équilibres et agit comme un révélateur de la tension quotidienne. Économie, religion, politique et culture citadine se conjuguent pour dévoiler une société du conflit. Rouen catalyse les rivalités qui se rencontrent et éclatent au grand jour au cœur du théâtre urbain. Deuxième ville du royaume de France, la cité normande intègre le monde qui y exporte ses tensions. Rouen est aussi et sûrement une ville en crise au milieu du XVIIe siècle, traversée par une conflictualité qui s’enchevêtre dans le carrefour urbain. / In an exciting society that has become mostly urban, taking a look at Rouen makes it possible to witness power relationships involving the central authority. This thesis looks at the relationship between the State and the regional areas at a time when the Kingdom of France is going through its last major revolt of the Ancien Régime. The Fronde shakes balances and reveals the daily tensions. Economy, religion, politics and urban culture come together and revel and conflictual society. Rouen exacerbates the rivalries at stake. Rouen at the time is the second biggest city of the Kingdom of France, it is a world city and exports its tensions. In the middle of the 17th Century Rouen is also without a doubt a city going through a crisis that is entangled in this urban hub.
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Negotiating for Efficiency: Local Adaptation, Consensus, and Military Conscription in Karl XI's SwedenJett, Zachariah L. January 2020 (has links)
No description available.
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[pt] AS METODOLOGIAS DECISÓRIAS DA LIBERDADE DE DISCURSO: UM ESTUDO SOBRE A RELAÇÃO ENTRE FORMA E SUBSTÂNCIA NA JURISDIÇÃO CONSTITUCIONAL DA PRIMEIRA EMENDA / [en] THE DECISION-MAKING METHODOLOGIES OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A STUDY ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT S DOCTRINESJOHANN MEERBAUM 08 September 2023 (has links)
[pt] Este é um trabalho sobre a natureza das razões as quais a Suprema Corte dos
Estados Unidos recorre para resolver casos envolvendo a liberdade de discurso.
Considero que sejam dois os tipos de razões que orientam o processo decisório da
Primeira Emenda: as formais e as substantivas. As razões substantivas são aquelas que o
direito compartilha com outros domínios da ação social humana, como a moral, a
economia e a política. As formais, por sua vez, são razões jurídicas autoritativas - no
sentido de derivarem de uma norma jurídica válida (Constituição, leis, regulamentos,
precedentes, contratos, e outros documentos normativos afins) – e compulsórias (ou
excludentes), pois geralmente excluem do horizonte do raciocínio decisório razões
substantivas concorrentes. O meu objetivo nesta dissertação é descrever a maneira pela
qual o raciocínio jurídico formal e o raciocínio jurídico substantivo foram em certa
medida conciliados no âmago da prática decisória da Suprema Corte norte-americana.
Para tanto, esforço-me em apresentar, comentar e comparar entre si alguns dos mais
emblemáticos julgamentos levados a cabo pela Corte ao longo de mais de um século de
jurisdição constitucional da Primeira Emenda. Procuro mostrar também que os métodos
adjudicatórios por ela desenvolvidos podem ser classificados de acordo com a
importância que cada um deles atribui às razões formais (ou, por outro lado, às razões
substanciais) da liberdade de discurso. Por exemplo: o conflito entre “balanceamento” e
as metodologias pertencentes a “tradição definicional” (e.g., absolutismo, categorização)
nada mais representa senão uma instância particular do conflito mais geral entre forma e
substância no pensamento jurídico norte-americano. Mas se até meados da década de
1960 a discussão sobre métodos decisórios da liberdade de discurso era completamente
dominada pela oposição entre balanceamento e absolutismo, aos poucos a Suprema Corte
dos Estados Unidos, em companhia com grandes nomes do pensamento jurídico daquele
país, foi abrindo seus olhos para a existência de pontos médios entre aqueles dois
extremos. O resultado disto foi a criação de novas teorias normativas da decisão (e.g., o
balanceamento definicional), bem como de uma série de testes, fórmulas, parâmetros e
presunções, tornando assim possível que elementos formais e substantivos do raciocínio
jurídico da Primeira Emenda passassem a conviver no domínio das mesmas metodologias
decisórias. Para além do meu esforço em reconstruir racionalmente as transformações
pelas quais passaram as abordagens metodológicas da Suprema Corte ao longo das
últimas décadas, me proponho também a dotá-las de algum sentido. Interpreto que a
preocupação que a Corte historicamente tem demonstrado com a estabilização de seus
procedimentos decisórios, bem como com a previsibilidade de seus julgamentos, guarda
íntima relação com a crença de que as justificativas subjacentes à Primeira Emenda (e.g.,
maior controle do governo pelo povo; busca pela verdade e autoexpressão artística e
intelectual) são mais eficazmente promovidas mediante a adoção de uma abordagem
decisória que priorize o alcance de melhores resultados em um nível global em detrimento
daquilo que muitas vezes parece ser o melhor resultado para o caso mais imediato. / [en] This is a paper about the nature of the reasons that the United States Supreme
Court uses to resolve cases involving freedom of speech. I believe that there are two types
of reasons that guide the First Amendment decision-making process: formal and
substantive. Substantive reasons are those that law shares with other domains of human
social action, such as morality, economics and politics. Formal reasons, in turn, are
authoritative legal reasons - in the sense that they derive from a valid legal norm
(Constitution, laws, regulations, precedents, contracts, and other related normative
documents) - and compulsory (or exclusionary), because they generally exclude
competing substantive reasons from the horizon of decisional reasoning. My aim in this
dissertation is to describe the way in which formal legal reasoning and substantive legal
reasoning have to some extent been reconciled at the heart of the decision-making practice of the US Supreme Court. To this end, I endeavor to present, comment on and compare with each other some of the most emblematic judgments carried out by the Court over more than a century of First Amendment constitutional jurisdiction. I also try to show that the adjudicatory methods she has developed can be classified according to the importance each of them attaches to the formal reasons (or, on the other hand, the substantial reasons) for freedom of discourse. For example: the conflict between balancing and the
methodologies belonging to the definitional tradition (e.g., absolutism, categorization)
represents nothing more than a particular instance of the more general conflict between
form and substance in American legal thought. But while until the mid-1960s the
discussion about methods of deciding freedom of speech was completely dominated by
the opposition between balancing and absolutism, little by little the United States
Supreme Court, in company with the great names of legal thought in that country, opened
its eyes to the existence of middle points between those two extremes. The result was the
creation of new normative theories of decision (e.g., definitional balancing), as well as a
series of tests, formulas, parameters and presumptions, thus making it possible for formal
and substantive elements of First Amendment legal reasoning to coexist in the realm of
the same decision-making methodologies. Beyond my effort to rationally reconstruct the
transformations that the Supreme Court s methodological approaches have undergone
over the last few decades, I also propose to give them some meaning. I argue that the
Court s historical concern with the stabilization of its decision-making procedures, as well
as with the predictability of its judgments, is closely related to the belief that the
justifications underlying the First Amendment (e.g., greater control of government by the
people; the search for truth; and artistic and intellectual self-expression) are most
effectively promoted by adopting a decision-making approach that prioritizes the
achievement of better outcomes on a global level over what often appears to be the best
outcome for the most immediate case.
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The Marillac: Family Strategy, Religion, and Diplomacy in the Making of the French State during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth CenturiesEdward J Gray (8649114) 16 April 2020 (has links)
The Marillac were one of the most important noble families in early modern France. My analysis of this pivotal and deeply political family during the turbulent era of the French Wars of Religion (1562-1629) examines and explains the importance of the interaction of familial alliances, religion and diplomacy in the making of the state. This period represents a critical moment in the process of state development. In contrast to prevailing studies of early modern state formation that concentrate on a centrally-directed program, this dissertation argues that it was the expansion of family strategy, and its interplay with religion and diplomacy, that drove the ongoing construction of the early modern state. There was no blueprint for the creation of this state. Rather, it was born out of an accretion of policies formed by politically important clans working to advance their familial interests. By closely tracing the fortunes of the Marillac clan through archives and research libraries in France, this study discloses the nature of power in early modern Europe in its daily, practical manifestations. My project reaffirms the agency of the family and the individual in the making of the state. It showcases the importance of religious devotion to the formation of family strategy, and especially how Marillac women were drivers of this devotion. My research demonstrates how one family successfully negotiated the Wars of Religion. Additionally, I discuss the impactful role of the individual diplomat in the practice of foreign affairs. Finally, by tracing the fortunes of the Marillac family, I show how a family not only rises to power, but falls, as well as the consequences and limits of disgrace. My research will therefore contribute to the fields of early modern state-building, diplomacy, religious politics, and women and gender through the prism of Marillac family strategy and its interaction with religion and diplomacy.
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